Axelsen v. Hillsboro Union High School District No. 3

Citations: 898 F. Supp. 719; 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12672; 1995 WL 518836Docket: Civ. No. 94-542-JO

Court: District Court, D. Oregon; July 17, 1995; Federal District Court

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Judee Axelsen, a former principal of Brown Junior High School, has filed a lawsuit against Hillsboro Union High School District No. 3 and several individuals, alleging violations of her due process and liberty rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments related to her termination in June 1992. The court is considering the defendants' motion for summary judgment, which is partially granted and partially denied. 

Axelsen was employed as a building principal from July 1989 until June 1992, initially as a probationary employee. Performance evaluations in early 1992 identified deficiencies in her management style, leading to a plan of assistance with specified improvement targets and evaluation dates. By late March 1992, Axelsen was aware of the potential for her termination and was negotiating a resignation agreement. However, the District failed to provide her with the required written notice regarding her contract status. On April 6, 1992, she learned she would be removed from her position. 

Subsequently, she attended a pre-termination hearing after declining to resign, where she presented her case against dismissal. On May 21, 1992, the District Board voted to dismiss her based on failure to meet performance targets, notifying her the following day. Axelsen states she has been unable to find further employment in school administration since her termination. Her complaint includes claims for deprivation of property interest without due process and violation of her liberty rights, with the defendants moving for summary judgment on both claims.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine disputes over material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of genuine issues, prompting the non-moving party to present facts that indicate a trial issue. Evidence must be substantial; mere scintilla or colorable evidence does not suffice. The materiality of facts is dictated by substantive law, and any reasonable doubts about factual issues are resolved in favor of the non-moving party. 

In addressing the plaintiff's due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is highlighted that a protected property interest in employment exists only if the employee has a reasonable expectation or legitimate claim of entitlement, not a mere unilateral expectation. The existence of such an interest is determined by state law. In Oregon, a probationary teacher lacks a property interest in their position unless a contract stipulates otherwise. The defendants argue the plaintiff's due process claim fails because she had no protected property interest post her probation period ending June 30, 1992. They contend she received all necessary procedural protections. Conversely, the plaintiff asserts that the Oregon Fair Dismissal Law provides her with a property interest due to the District's failure to notify her of contract nonrenewal by April 1, 1992, which she claims granted her automatic permanent teacher status. She also argues that the defendants’ actions led her to reasonably expect continued employment. The discussion notes the lack of identified District rules and clarifies the definitions of permanent and probationary teachers under Oregon law.

A district board has the authority to dismiss a probationary teacher at any time during the probationary period for any reason deemed sufficient in good faith. Upon request, the board must provide written reasons for the dismissal and hold a hearing. Similarly, the board can refuse to renew a probationary teacher's contract for any good faith reason, with notice required by April 1. If the board fails to provide this written notice, the contract is automatically renewed for the next school year at the current salary. The Oregon Court of Appeals mandates that the teacher must actually receive written notice of nonrenewal by the designated date. While no specific format for the notice is required, actual notice does not waive the written notice requirement. Permanent teachers have more protections, being dismissible only under specific grounds and with mandatory notice and hearing requirements, as well as the right to appeal to the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (FDAB). In the current case, the District did not notify the plaintiff in writing by April 1, 1992, resulting in her automatic renewal for the next school year. The key issue remains whether she became a permanent teacher after April 1 or remained probationary until her dismissal on June 30, 1992. If she attained permanent status, the adequacy of the procedural requirements for her dismissal would require resolution at trial. A similar case, Wesockes v. Powers Sch. Dist. No. 31, illustrated that a probationary teacher who received renewal notice but was dismissed before completing the school year did not achieve permanent status.

The court clarified that the school district's renewal of the petitioner’s contract for the following year did not ensure protection against dismissal during the current school year. Under ORS 342.835(1), a teacher can be discharged at any time during their probationary period, which lasts until they have been employed for three consecutive school years, as defined in ORS 342.815. Consequently, the petitioner remained in a probationary status after renewal until completing the third year, making him subject to termination despite the potential for permanent status at the end of the year. 

The court referenced ORS 342.840, enacted in 1981, which states that a probationary teacher employed for 135 consecutive days in any school year is credited with a full year of employment. However, this statute was not addressed in the context of the Wesockes case due to its timing, and no Oregon appellate court has since cited it. The court noted that interpreting an Oregon statute involves determining its clear meaning as per O.R.S. 174.010. 

The plain language of ORS 342.840 indicates that achieving 135 consecutive days of employment grants a teacher the status of having completed the school year, without additional limitations. Apart from completing three school years, the only requirement for a probationary teacher to attain permanent status is re-election by the district for the following year, per ORS 342.815(5). 

In support of the argument against third-year probationary teachers achieving permanent status mid-year, the District referenced a case, York v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, where a third-year teacher who had completed over 135 days was dismissed without prior non-renewal notice. The majority opinion in that case found that ORS 342.840 does not confer permanent status on a probationary teacher still in their third year simply based on the 135-day criterion. The dissenting opinion contended that the legislature intended ORS 342.840 to allow for the possibility of dismissing a probationary teacher before the end of their third year.

ORS 342.840 establishes that 135 days of service counts as a full year for probationary employees. The appellant had served two full years and 185 days in his third year, making his dismissal unjust because it contravenes the right to have 135 days recognized as a full year of service. By April 1, 1983, the appellant completed the required service, leading to an automatic renewal of his contract by law at that date, thus granting him permanent teacher status as defined by ORS 342.815(5). The legislative intent behind ORS 342.840 was to prevent school districts from perpetually keeping teachers in probationary status by dismissing and rehiring them annually. 

In this case, the plaintiff had worked for 135 consecutive days in 1992, completing this requirement by January 1992, prior to her reelection on April 1, 1992. Consequently, she also attained permanent teacher status and had a protected property interest in her employment. Awareness of potential dismissal does not negate this property right or exempt the district from following necessary dismissal procedures for permanent teachers. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is denied. While the plaintiff also argued that the defendants' actions created a reasonable expectation of continued employment, this point is moot since her permanent status already guarantees her due process rights. If her claim had solely relied on defendants' conduct, it would have been legally insufficient.

Public employee tenure rights in Oregon are derived exclusively from statutes or regulations, as established in Papadopoulos v. Oregon State Board of Higher Ed. Employment contracts may provide additional rights, but do not independently create property interests that necessitate due process protections. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this interpretation, emphasizing that any implied or express employment agreements must be linked to statutory authority to confer property rights. The plaintiff's liberty interest claim alleges that her dismissal harmed her reputation and job prospects. Although dismissals can implicate protected liberty interests, defendants argue that the plaintiff's dismissal did not involve stigmatizing reasons and followed proper protocol. The plaintiff contends that her dismissal, rather than a non-renewal, and a letter from a defendant implied a stigma affecting her employability. However, the court finds that the act of dismissal itself does not create actionable stigma and that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence showing that Squire’s statement was perceived as stigmatizing by potential employers. Consequently, the defendants' motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's liberty claim is granted.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is partially granted and partially denied. Their motion to strike is denied as moot, as it does not affect the rationale for the decision. Defendants may raise objections to the plaintiff's exhibits through pretrial motions or at trial. Although the complaint presents three causes of action, only two are properly alleged. The automatic renewal provision requires written notification from the teacher or administrator to the board by April 15 to be effective for the following school year, per O.R.S. 342.513(2). On April 13, 1992, the plaintiff's attorney requested a written contract for the next school year. Evidence indicates that while the District met dismissal requirements for probationary teachers, it did not comply with statutory requirements for dismissing permanent teachers. The District's interpretation suggests that any teacher working 135 days in their third year automatically achieves permanent status, which is not the legislative intention. Permanent status requires reelection to a fourth year after three years of service, as per O.R.S. 342.815(5). Reelection may occur by operation of law if the District fails to act on not reelecting a teacher. Defendants’ argument for dismissing individual defendants if summary judgment is denied was not raised in their initial memorandum or addressed by the plaintiff, leaving the court unable to decide on this issue with the current record.