Associated Bodywork & Massage Professionals v. American Massage Therapy Ass'n
Docket: No. 95 C 367
Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois; September 1, 1995; Federal District Court
The court, presided over by Judge Norgle, addressed the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant American Massage Therapy Association (AMTA) against Plaintiff Associated Bodywork and Massage Professionals under Rule 12(b)(6). The motion was granted for Counts II (Sherman Antitrust Act violation) and IV (RICO violation), leading to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's federal claims. Consequently, the court chose not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims in Counts I (state law libel) and III (Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
The Plaintiff is a for-profit corporation aimed at supporting massage therapy professionals, while the Defendant is a not-for-profit organization involved in advocating for regulatory frameworks for massage therapy at the state level. AMTA's Government Relations Committee promotes massage therapy regulations requiring accreditation from recognized bodies, which effectively excludes entities like the Plaintiff from professional membership.
The court noted that on a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true, and any reasonable inferences drawn from those facts must favor the Plaintiff. However, the court is not bound by the Plaintiff's legal characterizations or required to strictly adhere to the specific legal theory presented, as long as the complaint outlines the necessary elements for recovery.
Count II of the complaint alleges that Defendant's attempts to influence legislation, along with actions by NCBTMB and COMTTA, violate the Sherman Antitrust Act by restraining trade. Plaintiff claims that these entities conspired to monopolize the massage therapy industry, instituting certification requirements that favor AMTA members and exclude non-members, resulting in harm to Plaintiff's business reputation and income. In response, Defendant moves to dismiss, asserting First Amendment protections for its lobbying activities, referencing established case law that grants immunity for anticompetitive effects arising from efforts to influence legislation. This includes the principles from cases such as Lawline v. American Bar Ass’n and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, which emphasize that political actions aimed at legislation are shielded from antitrust liability, regardless of intent. Defendant argues that any injury claimed by Plaintiff stems from legislative decisions, not from the Defendant's lobbying. In contrast, Plaintiff counters by suggesting a "sham" exception to this protection, claiming Defendant's actions were aimed at denying Plaintiff access to the regulatory process.
Plaintiff's complaint focuses on Defendant's efforts to promote legislation, asserting that even if Defendant sought to restrict Plaintiff's access to legislative processes, the 'sham' exception to antitrust immunity applies only if Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of success. Since several states adopted legislation influenced by Defendant, it cannot be said that Defendant lacked such an expectation. Plaintiff also claims the 'sham' exception should apply due to Defendant's alleged use of libel to restrain competition. However, general restraints not covered by the Sherman Act cannot be rendered actionable merely by alleging improper means. The 'sham' exception is limited because antitrust laws are not suited for political contexts, thus Defendant’s legislative activities are protected under the First Amendment.
Additionally, for an antitrust conspiracy to be actionable, it must involve separate entities, not affiliated ones. While Plaintiff argues that the relationship between NCBTMB and Defendant is a factual issue requiring denial of Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff's own statements describe NCBTMB as an administrative affiliate of Defendant, indicating no separate entity status. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to establish an actionable antitrust conspiracy, leading to the dismissal of Count II.
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, along with NCBTMB and COMTTA, conspired to engage in racketeering under RICO by sending fraudulent information via mail to state legislatures. However, Defendant's communications, even if containing libelous content, are protected by First Amendment rights, as free exchange of information is essential to democracy. RICO should not be invoked to inhibit this marketplace of ideas, and allegations of state law violations do not transform protected speech into RICO violations.
Business rivals cannot utilize the RICO statute for claims of injuries resulting from mail fraud directed at third parties. The case of Israel Travel Advisory Serv. v. Isr. Identity Tours, Inc. illustrates that claims must involve direct victims of fraud. In this instance, the Plaintiff alleges injury due to fraud against state legislatures but is not a direct victim; the injury arises from political decisions rather than the Defendant's actions. The original intent of Congress in enacting RICO was not to allow competitors to scrutinize each other's communications with legislative bodies or to protect themselves from unsolicited communications. A functioning representative republic relies on free communication of ideas. Consequently, while the Plaintiff may have other legal remedies, the indirect nature of the alleged injury does not support a RICO claim. The court dismissed the RICO claim due to a lack of established mail fraud and First Amendment issues. The Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice regarding Counts II and IV, and the court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I and III.
