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Morales v. Chadbourne
Citations: 996 F. Supp. 2d 19; 2014 WL 554478; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19084Docket: C.A. No. 12-301-M
Court: District Court, D. Rhode Island; February 11, 2014; Federal District Court
Several motions to dismiss have been filed by individual defendants in a case concerning Ms. Ada Morales, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Guatemala. The lawsuit addresses three main issues: whether the federal government unlawfully detained Ms. Morales, violating her rights against illegal seizure, due process, and equal protection; whether ICE deprived her of liberty without notice or an opportunity to be heard, thus breaching her procedural due process rights; and whether state immigration detainer policies unlawfully detain individuals without probable cause, infringing upon Ms. Morales’ constitutional and common law rights. Ms. Morales has been a lawful permanent resident since the 1980s and became a U.S. citizen on September 11, 1995. The incident in question began on May 1, 2009, when she was arrested by Rhode Island State Police on state criminal charges related to alleged misrepresentations on a public benefits application. During her detention, a state official reported her information to ICE based on her race and ethnicity. ICE conducted a background check but found no record under her legal name, instead identifying an alias associated with her. On May 4, 2009, ICE Agent Edward Donaghy issued an immigration detainer for Ms. Morales without interviewing her about her citizenship status. The detainer was faxed to the Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institution, directing them to hold Ms. Morales for up to 48 hours. Ms. Morales was not informed about the detainer prior to her appearance in state court that same day, where the warrant for her state charges was withdrawn and she was released. The court, however, informed her of an immigration hold that required her to report to the Attorney General’s office for further processing. State officials returned Ms. Morales to the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) based on a federal ICE detainer issued the same morning. At 4:20 p.m., an ACI employee notified ICE agent Greg Mercurio that Ms. Morales had no state charges pending and was only being held due to the immigration detainer, requesting any relevant information. No ICE officials acted on this notice to investigate or cancel the detainer, nor did they provide Ms. Morales an opportunity to contest her detention. Ms. Morales asserted her U.S. citizenship and attempted to inform ACI officials, but during her additional 24 hours in custody, she was denied medication and subjected to harassment regarding her immigration status. On May 5, 2009, ICE took her into custody, where her citizenship was verified after several hours, leading to her release. Ms. Morales had previously been inappropriately detained by ICE in 2004 based on unfounded allegations of deportability. In response, she filed an Amended Complaint against various federal and state officials, asserting eleven counts. Counts I-III are Bivens claims alleging violations of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by Federal Defendants. Counts IV-VI are § 1983 claims against state defendant A.T. Wall, citing similar constitutional violations including the Fourteenth Amendment. Counts VII and VIII are state tort claims for false arrest and imprisonment, while IX and X assert similar claims against Federal Defendants under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Count XI seeks injunctive relief to prevent future unlawful detentions by ICE. The defendants filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the FTCA claim and failure to state a claim on most other counts. ICE Agent Edward Donaghy also sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The Court conducted a hearing on these motions, reviewing the parties' detailed memoranda and relevant law and facts. The standard for dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) involves disregarding conclusory allegations and viewing the facts favorably to the non-moving party, ensuring the complaint meets the requirement of a "short and plain statement" to provide fair notice of the claims. On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of genuine material fact disputes and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. If successful, the nonmoving party can only counter by presenting specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial. The court’s role is to assess whether such an issue exists without weighing evidence or determining truth. Ms. Morales claims that federal ICE and state prison officials violated her constitutional rights, asserting illegal warrantless seizure, due process violations from detention without notice, and equal protection breaches due to discriminatory treatment based on national origin. Additionally, she raises a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim regarding ICE's negligent conduct and seeks an injunction against future illegal detentions. At the state level, Ms. Morales argues that state policies unlawfully extend detention beyond applicable limits based on unsupported immigration detainers, violating her due process rights by failing to provide notice and a hearing, and asserts negligence. The court’s review is limited to whether Ms. Morales has sufficiently alleged plausible constitutional claims, assuming the truth of her complaint's facts in her favor. Should her claims be found valid, the court must then assess if defendants are shielded by qualified immunity. The Federal Defendants seek dismissal of her constitutional claims under Rule 12(b)(6), referencing the Bivens precedent that allows suits against federal officials for constitutional violations akin to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against state officials. Specifically, Ms. Morales alleges a Fourth Amendment violation, claiming her unlawful detention exceeded 24 hours despite her posting bail. The Fourth Amendment protects against all forms of personal seizure, including brief detentions. Ms. Morales argues that her seizure under the Fourth Amendment was unconstitutional because it was based solely on an ICE detainer, which lacks the warrant requirement and requisite probable cause. She contends that the detainer's justification—an investigation of her immigration status—does not meet the probable cause standard necessary for lawful detention, as mere investigations do not warrant seizures. The Court agrees that Ms. Morales has sufficiently claimed a lack of probable cause for her detention. Regarding Defendant Gregory Mercurio, the Federal Defendants assert he did not issue the ICE detainer and thus cannot be liable for a Fourth Amendment violation. They argue that receiving a facsimile notification of the detainer does not impose an obligation to act, and Ms. Morales fails to demonstrate that he had any duty or authority to investigate or release her. The Court finds that the allegations portray Mr. Mercurio as a passive recipient of information without any actionable responsibility, leading to the dismissal of claims against him. As for Defendants Bruce Chadbourne and David Riccio, both hold supervisory positions within ICE and argue they cannot be held liable for the constitutional violations of their subordinates without a direct link to their own actions or inactions. Ms. Morales claims that Messrs. Chadbourne and Riccio were aware that their subordinates issued immigration detainers without probable cause. However, they argue that she fails to provide specific factual support for this assertion. Ms. Morales contends that the supervisors were responsible for agents who issued detainers without proper investigation. The court notes that under the Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each official's individual actions violated the Constitution. Furthermore, First Circuit precedent indicates that merely alleging a defendant's participation or knowledge of violations is insufficient for establishing supervisory liability. A plaintiff must present facts showing that the supervisor was directly involved in the unconstitutional actions. The court acknowledges that a supervisor can be held liable if there is an affirmative link between a subordinate's actions and the supervisor's conduct that led to a constitutional violation. Liability may also arise if a supervisor shows deliberate indifference while overseeing, training, or hiring a subordinate, which Ms. Morales claims against Messrs. Chadbourne and Riccio. The court will evaluate her allegations according to the law on supervisory liability. It employs a two-pronged test: first, it discards conclusory allegations, and then it assesses whether the remaining facts allow for reasonable inferences of liability. Ms. Morales' allegations are deemed specific rather than conclusory and indicate that Messrs. Chadbourne and Riccio had a role in the rules and regulations leading to her constitutional rights being violated, thereby supporting her claims of deliberate indifference and Fourth Amendment violations. Ms. Morales claims that Defendants Chadbourne and Riccio enacted or perpetuated policies concerning immigration detainers that led to a violation of her constitutional rights. She argues that they were aware or indifferent to their subordinates regularly issuing detainers without adequate investigation or probable cause. The Complaint asserts that they either created, supported, or ignored these policies with deliberate indifference to the likelihood of infringing upon her Fourth Amendment rights. Unlike conclusory claims outlined in *Iqbal*, her allegations connect specifically to the Defendants' conduct causing her injuries, providing sufficient detail for them to understand the claims against them. The Court has found that Morales has adequately stated a Fourth Amendment claim, leading to a review of the Defendants' motions for dismissal based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability unless their conduct violates established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The Court must assess whether Morales's allegations demonstrate a constitutional violation and if that right was clearly established at the time. The Court has accepted that Morales’s claims indicate a plausible Fourth Amendment violation by Chadbourne and Riccio, and Donaghy has acknowledged similar claims against him. The pivotal question is whether the alleged constitutional rights were "clearly established," which involves examining the law's clarity when the violation occurred and whether a reasonable official would have recognized their actions as violating those rights. The Supreme Court has indicated that plaintiffs must reference controlling or persuasive authority to establish that the right was clearly recognized at the time, rather than merely asserting a violation of a long-standing right without context, which would undermine the balance between protecting citizens’ rights and allowing officials to perform their duties effectively. Bruce Chadbourne and David Riccio contend they are not liable for the immigration detainer against Ms. Morales, arguing it did not breach 'clearly established' constitutional rights regarding illegal seizure. Edward Donaghy supports this position. The document establishes that an ICE officer cannot detain or deport U.S. citizens and that an officer aware, or reasonably expected to be aware, of a person's citizenship would violate that individual’s liberty rights under the due process clause. Furthermore, detaining an individual without probable cause of illegal immigration status violates the Fourth Amendment. Given the Court's ruling that Ms. Morales’ Fourth Amendment rights were indeed violated, the critical issue is whether the defendants had 'fair warning' that their actions were unconstitutional at the time of her detention. It is established that detaining individuals solely to check immigration status raises constitutional issues. The Court notes that detaining Ms. Morales for immigration verification without probable cause was unreasonable. Consequently, it finds that Ms. Morales has articulated a valid Fourth Amendment claim against Chadbourne, Riccio, and Donaghy, denying their motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. In Count II, Ms. Morales claims her procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated when she was detained without prior notice or a hearing regarding the ICE detainer. The defendants argue that she was not entitled to such due process for a one-day detention and claim qualified immunity since the right to notice and a hearing prior to the issuance of an ICE detainer was not clearly established at that time. The Court recognizes that qualified immunity assertions can complicate the identification of the factual basis for claims and has the discretion to evaluate these claims in a manner that facilitates fair case resolution, starting with whether Ms. Morales’ due process claim violates clearly established law. The Court determined that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of an ICE detainer was not a clearly established right, as federal regulations allow individuals to be held for up to 48 hours without such provisions. No court decision was cited by Ms. Morales to support a claim of a pre-detention right to notice or hearing, leading the Court to grant qualified immunity to the Federal Defendants regarding the procedural due process claim, resulting in the dismissal of Count II against Bruce Chadbourne and David Riccio. In her equal protection claim under the Fifth Amendment (Count III), Ms. Morales alleged that ICE officials issued a detainer based solely on her place of birth and Spanish surname. She contended that Mr. Donaghy assumed she was not a U.S. citizen based on her race or ethnicity, resulting in discriminatory treatment compared to similarly situated U.S. citizens. The Federal Defendants countered that Ms. Morales failed to provide sufficient facts to support her claim and argued that considering her nationality was permissible in determining her immigration status. However, the Court noted that using her country of birth as the sole basis for detention violated constitutional standards, especially given the significant number of U.S. citizens born abroad. The Court found that Ms. Morales' allegations supported an inference of a constitutional violation based on national origin discrimination, indicating that Mr. Donaghy acted with discriminatory intent and had the means to verify her citizenship status before issuing the detainer. Thus, the Court recognized that the Federal Defendants had fair warning of the unconstitutionality of their actions. Constitutional principles are firmly established, indicating that the Federal Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, Mr. Donaghy’s motion for summary judgment regarding Ms. Morales’ equal protection claim is denied due to genuine disputes over material facts and evidence suggesting Mr. Donaghy acted with discriminatory intent. The Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment are both denied. Regarding Ms. Morales' FTCA claim for negligent investigation, training, and supervision, the United States argues for dismissal based on the discretionary function exception, asserting that such negligence claims are outside the court's jurisdiction. They contend that ICE's decisions in these areas are discretionary and should therefore be dismissed. Ms. Morales counters that the FTCA allows for negligence claims against the United States and that the discretionary function exception does not apply here, as the actions of federal employees were not discretionary and involved constitutional violations. The Court finds that many of Ms. Morales’ allegations do not pertain to discretionary conduct and thus are not subject to this exception, particularly as they relate to unlawful detention without probable cause or due process. Ms. Morales alleges negligence by federal agents, specifically naming Chadbourne, Riccio, Donaghy, and unnamed ICE officials, which resulted in her unlawful detention. She claims that Donaghy issued a detainer without probable cause and failed to investigate her immigration status. Furthermore, she asserts that Chadbourne and Riccio were aware that their team routinely issued detainers without proper investigation. Conduct that violates the Constitution is not protected under the discretionary function exception, as established in Limone, 579 F.3d at 101. Consequently, Ms. Morales's claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) were deemed sufficient, leading to the denial of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss regarding this claim. Regarding her request for injunctive relief, the Federal Defendants argued that she lacked standing due to insufficient evidence of a future threat of harm. Ms. Morales countered this by citing her past unlawful detentions and an ICE agent's warning of potential future detentions, which she argued met the threshold for standing. She seeks an injunction to prevent future detainers from both Federal and State Defendants. The court noted that to withstand a motion to dismiss related to standing, a party must plausibly allege that they are realistically threatened by a repetition of their experiences. Ms. Morales's allegations of past detentions and the state’s policy of reporting foreign-born arrestees to ICE were deemed sufficient to establish a realistic fear of future detention. Therefore, the Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss her request for prospective relief was denied. Additionally, Ashbel T. Wall, as the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, submitted a Motion to Dismiss concerning Counts IV-VIII of the complaint. Director Wall moves to dismiss claims against him, asserting that the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) acted lawfully in detaining Ms. Morales, as required by federal regulation (8 C.F.R. 287.7(d)), which mandates detention for up to 48 hours following her scheduled release. He contends that the detention was based on a valid ICE request, absolving him of liability, and claims that the state cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. 1988. Ms. Morales alleges that her detention was based solely on her national origin and Hispanic last name, despite her claim of U.S. citizenship. She argues that RIDOC misinterpreted the ICE detainer as mandatory, resulting in unlawful detention due to the RIDOC's policy of detaining individuals under ICE detainers without probable cause. She seeks damages against Director Wall personally and injunctive relief in his official capacity, asserting four counts against him, including violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and claims of false imprisonment and negligence under state law. The court finds that Ms. Morales has presented plausible claims, allowing her to proceed with the case. Specifically, regarding the illegal seizure claim, she argues that the RIDOC's detention based solely on the ICE detainer violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Director Wall claims the detainer required her detention and was valid. However, the court notes that Fourth Amendment seizures must be based on probable cause, which was not met in this case, as the only basis for detention was Ms. Morales's country of birth—insufficient to establish that she was illegally present in the U.S. The RIDOC should have recognized that the ICE detainer lacked facial validity and probable cause. The detainer for Ms. Morales was deemed unconstitutional because it was based solely on her national origin, which violates the United States Constitution as established in Arizona v. United States. The Court rejected Director Wall's argument that the RIDOC was mandated to detain Ms. Morales, noting that the detainer order was facially invalid and distinguishing detainers from valid warrants, citing Baker v. McCollan. The RIDOC received an invalid request for detention related to immigration status based solely on Ms. Morales' country of birth, leading to the conclusion that her Fourth Amendment claim could proceed against the State's motion to dismiss. Regarding procedural due process, Ms. Morales claimed that her rights were violated by the RIDOC's detention without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The Court acknowledged that Director Wall did not challenge these due process claims in his motion to dismiss, thus waiving his argument. The Court outlined that procedural due process requires a hearing before depriving an individual of significant liberty interests, referencing cases like Roberts v. Maine and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill. Ms. Morales asserted she informed the State of her U.S. citizenship but was not allowed to present evidence of her status or contest the detainer before her detention. Ms. Morales was denied a hearing because the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC) treated ICE detainers as mandatory, despite federal regulations categorizing them as requests. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. 287.7 indicates that detainers are not obligatory and are instead requests for notification before an individual's release, which courts have affirmed. The Court contends that RIDOC should not have interpreted ICE detainers as mandatory and, once Director Wall adopted this incorrect policy, he was obligated to ensure due process to prevent wrongful detentions. Ms. Morales was detained without the opportunity to contest the ICE detainer or present her citizenship documentation, even after asserting her status as a U.S. citizen. In her claims under Rhode Island law, Ms. Morales argues that Director Wall did not adequately address her allegations of false arrest and negligence, which are recognized tort claims in the state. Director Wall's motion to dismiss these claims is based on his assertion that Ms. Morales was lawfully detained; however, the Court has determined that her claims regarding the legality of her detention are valid, leading to a denial of Director Wall's motion. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of naturalized citizens in the U.S., noting the collective oath they take and their contributions to the nation, reaffirming the significance of immigration policy in shaping the country's future. Ms. Morales alleges unconstitutional detention based on her national origin and Hispanic last name, asserting her rights as a citizen were violated. The Court has dismissed claims against Defendant Gregory Mercurio, procedural due process violations against Federal Defendants in Count II, equal protection claims in Count VI against Defendant A.T. Wall (withdrawn by Ms. Morales), and all claims for retroactive injunctive relief (also withdrawn). Ms. Morales is permitted to proceed with the following: Count I (Fourth Amendment violation against Federal Defendants Edward Donaghy, Bruce Chadbourne, and David Riccio); Count III (Fifth Amendment equal protection claims against Edward Donaghy); Counts IV, V, VII, and VIII (1983 claims for illegal seizure and procedural due process against A.T. Wall); Counts IX and X (FTCA claims against the United States); and Count XI (prospective injunctive relief against remaining parties). The Court has also addressed various motions to dismiss filed by multiple defendants, including the United States of America and individual defendants. Ms. Morales was wrongfully detained by ICE, despite being a U.S. citizen, following her arrest by the Cranston Police Department in July 2004 for charges that were later dismissed. Counts VI and requests for retrospective declaratory relief have been withdrawn by Ms. Morales. Federal Defendants acknowledge Ms. Morales' plausible claim that Defendant Edward Donaghy violated her Fourth Amendment rights, opting not to dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6), although Donaghy seeks summary judgment on that claim. Ms. Morales agrees that her claim is best analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than a Fifth Amendment substantive due process violation. Legal precedent indicates that overdetention, even briefly, can constitute a constitutional violation. The court previously granted Mr. Mercurio’s motion to dismiss, and it will not determine the existence of the underlying right due to the qualified immunity defense shielding these Defendants from liability. Ms. Morales has withdrawn her equal protection claims against Chadbourne and Riccio and argues for less stringent pleading standards regarding defendants' motivations or knowledge. The Federal Defendants do not invoke the discretionary function exception for Ms. Morales' FTCA claims, except for her negligence claim. They incorrectly assert that she must demonstrate immediate harm; instead, she only needs to present plausible allegations of a realistic threat of future harm. The Fourth Amendment applies to states via the Fourteenth Amendment. Director Wall's claim for dismissal based on Rule 8 is rejected, as the court finds her Complaint meets the necessary pleading standards.