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Quinn v. Walgreen Co.
Citations: 958 F. Supp. 2d 533; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112670; 2013 WL 4007568Docket: No. 12 CV 8187(VB)
Court: District Court, S.D. New York; August 7, 2013; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs Rosemary Quinn and Alan Ducorsky filed a putative class action against Walgreen Co. alleging that certain dietary supplements marketed to "help rebuild cartilage" are ineffective, as it is biologically impossible to rebuild cartilage. They claim violations of New York and Connecticut consumer protection laws, breach of express warranty, and unjust enrichment. Walgreens sought to stay proceedings under the "first-filed" rule and to dismiss the complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The court denied the motion to stay and granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, confirming jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. The Glucosamine Supplements in question, which contain glucosamine hydrochloride and chondroitin sulfate, have labels making claims about rebuilding cartilage, accompanied by FDA disclaimers. Plaintiffs argue these claims are false, referencing scientific studies that indicate glucosamine and chondroitin cannot effectively rebuild cartilage or treat osteoarthritis. Additionally, they acknowledge some older studies suggesting potential cartilage effects but question their credibility due to their age and sponsorship. Plaintiff Quinn purchased the supplements in 2011 after reviewing the label claims. Quinn and Ducorsky, plaintiffs in this case, allege that the Glucosamine Supplements they purchased were falsely advertised as capable of rebuilding cartilage. Both plaintiffs reviewed the product claims before their purchases and assert that they would not have bought the supplements had they known the claims were untrue. The lawsuit was filed on November 9, 2012. Walgreens seeks a stay of this case, citing a related earlier lawsuit, Guilin v. Walgreen Co., which was filed on November 1, 2011. The Guilin case involves similar allegations regarding the misleading marketing of Glucosamine Chondroitin Complex supplements and includes claims based on California consumer protection statutes, with a request for multi-state class certification. The court notes that it has the discretion to stay or dismiss duplicative lawsuits. The established "first-filed rule" prioritizes the initial lawsuit to promote judicial efficiency and avoid duplicative litigation. The Guilin case is currently undergoing a motion to dismiss, which was fully briefed, with a conference scheduled for August 29, 2013. When determining the applicability of the first-filed rule in cases with potentially duplicative lawsuits, courts must ensure that the suits are genuinely duplicative, not merely similar. The presumption favoring the first-filed suit is flexible, requiring the court to assess the equities involved rather than apply a strict standard due to the complexities of multiple federal actions. Although the rule is generally used in non-class action contexts, it can also apply to class actions, provided the parties and claims are essentially the same in both cases. In the current case, the court finds that the first-filed rule does not apply because the parties and claims differ from those in the Guilin action. The plaintiffs in this case are asserting claims under New York and Connecticut law, while the Guilin plaintiff's claims are based on California law. Additionally, although Guilin involves a multi-state class, no nationwide class has been certified. Walgreens, the defendant, is not seeking dismissal or transfer of this case but is requesting a stay pending the resolution of a motion to dismiss in Guilin. The court concludes that the outcome of that motion will not affect this case, as it involves different plaintiffs and legal standards. Therefore, the motion for a stay is denied. Regarding the motion to dismiss, the court reiterates that federal courts operate under limited jurisdiction, and a case can be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) if the court lacks the constitutional or statutory authority to hear it. Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence once jurisdiction is questioned. The court must accept all complaint allegations as true and make reasonable inferences favoring the plaintiff, but must also require affirmative proof of jurisdiction, which can include evidence outside the pleadings. A motion to dismiss assesses the legal feasibility of the complaint rather than the evidentiary weight. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court applies a “two-pronged approach” to evaluate the complaint's sufficiency based on the Supreme Court's guidance in Ashcroft v. Iqbal. First, legal conclusions and vague recitations of claims do not receive the assumption of truth and are insufficient to avoid dismissal. Second, well-pleaded factual allegations are assumed to be true and must plausibly suggest entitlement to relief, meeting a standard of “plausibility” rather than mere possibility. Regarding standing, Walgreens argues that plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims for products not purchased, citing Rule 12(b)(1). While plaintiffs purchased only one specific Glucosamine Supplement, the court disagrees with Walgreens. Constitutional standing necessitates that plaintiffs show (1) an “injury in fact,” (2) a causal link between the injury and the defendant’s actions, and (3) that a court ruling can remedy the injury. There is a legal divide on whether plaintiffs can challenge products they didn’t buy but are substantially similar to those they did. Certain federal courts have determined that plaintiffs generally lack standing to bring claims regarding products they did not purchase. Specifically, cases like *Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp. Inc.* establish that claims about unpurchased products must be dismissed for lack of standing. However, some courts prefer to address standing during class certification motions rather than at the initial dismissal stage, as seen in *Forcellati v. Hyland’s, Inc.*, where the argument was evaluated in terms of typicality and adequacy of representation. The prevailing view among courts is that a plaintiff may have standing to assert claims for unnamed class members concerning products they did not buy if the products and alleged misrepresentations are substantially similar. Courts have found even minor differences in product ingredients or flavors do not negate standing, as demonstrated in cases like *Astiana v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc.* and *Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co.*. In the context of glucosamine supplements, there is a split among district courts. In *Pearson v. Target Corp.*, the court ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing for products he did not purchase. Conversely, in *Cardenas v. NBTY, Inc.*, the court held that a plaintiff could assert claims for products within the same line despite only purchasing one, deferring broader standing analysis to class certification under Rule 23. This reflects a more favorable approach for plaintiffs seeking to represent a class based on product similarities. The Court finds the reasoning in *Cardenas v. NBTY, Inc.* compelling, affirming that the plaintiffs possess standing to assert claims concerning the product they purchased. There are significant similarities among the defendants’ Glucosamine Supplements, with nearly identical alleged misrepresentations on their labels. The Court determines that the appropriate time to evaluate the plaintiffs' ability to file claims on behalf of all purchasers of the Glucosamine Supplements is during the class certification stage, rather than at the motion to dismiss phase. This aligns with precedents from *Brown v. Hain Celestial Grp. Inc.*, and *Koh v. S.C. Johnson, Son, Inc.*, which support deferring decisions on claims related to products not purchased by plaintiffs until class certification. Consequently, the motion to dismiss these claims is denied. Regarding the failure to state a claim, under New York General Business Law § 349, plaintiffs must show that deceptive acts were directed at consumers, misleading in a material way, and caused injury. “Deceptive acts” are defined as those likely to mislead a reasonable consumer. Notably, Section 349 does not require heightened pleading standards, reliance on misrepresentations, or proof that the defendants knew the statements were false. The Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) prohibits unfair competition and deceptive practices, being broadly construed to further its public policy goals. CUTPA does not require proof of reliance or intent to deceive, and claims under it do not need to meet heightened pleading standards. Whether an act is deceptive is generally a factual question. In this case, plaintiffs allege that the defendant's claim about Glucosamine Supplements "helping rebuild cartilage" is false, supported by scientific studies indicating it's biologically impossible to restore damaged cartilage solely through these supplements. The court finds plaintiffs have sufficiently identified the specific misleading statements and provided rationale for their claims, allowing them to proceed despite the defendant's arguments regarding the studies' applicability. The court emphasizes that the determination of whether a practice is deceptive typically requires evidence weighing from both sides and cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ claims are not merely about a lack of scientific substantiation, but rather assert that the statement is factually false. Consequently, the court denies the motion to dismiss these claims under Section 349 and CUTPA. Additionally, to assert a breach of warranty claim in New York and Connecticut, timely notice of the alleged breach must be given by the buyer. If a buyer accepts a tender, they must notify the seller of any breach within a reasonable time after discovering it, or they forfeit their right to remedies as per Conn. Gen. Stat. 42a-2-607(3)(a). The plaintiffs did not allege that they notified the seller of the defect, leading to the dismissal of their breach of warranty claims. Previous case law supports that failure to comply with the notice requirement bars recovery in breach of warranty actions. For unjust enrichment claims in New York, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant was enriched at their expense and that equity demands restitution. Connecticut law requires similar proof. The plaintiffs alleged that Walgreens benefited from their purchases of Glucosamine Supplements, and it would be unjust for Walgreens to retain that benefit if the products did not perform as advertised. Thus, the plaintiffs successfully stated claims for unjust enrichment under both states' laws. The court denied the defendant's motion for a stay but granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss the complaint. The court also did not decide on the potential for treble or punitive damages at this stage. The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motions.