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Johnson v. Gestamp Alabama, LLC
Citations: 946 F. Supp. 2d 1180; 91 Fed. R. Serv. 588; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70922; 2013 WL 2248150Docket: No. 2:12-cv-275-LSC
Court: District Court, N.D. Alabama; May 20, 2013; Federal District Court
Curtis Johnson, an African-American male born on May 18, 1966, alleges that his former employer, Gestamp Alabama, LLC, discriminated against him based on race and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and Alabama law. He claims Gestamp terminated his employment, denied him training opportunities, created a racially hostile work environment, and retaliated against him for filing complaints. Johnson worked as a Team Leader for the Ultrasound Technology Group at Gestamp from May 2004 until his discharge. During his tenure, he was primarily assigned to the second shift and was responsible for supervising associates, ensuring quality control, and programming computers. Initially, he was permitted to stack breaks by his supervisors, but this permission was revoked after their departures. Throughout his employment, Johnson raised concerns about insufficient manpower and the performance of first shift Team Leader Kevin Childers, who is a Caucasian male and whom Johnson identifies as a relevant comparator for his discrimination claims. Johnson also sought additional training in skills associated with the first shift but faced obstacles due to workload and the unavailability of the necessary trainer. Following discovery, Gestamp filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, leading to the submission of various motions by both parties for the court’s consideration. In January 2011, Gestamp's HR Manager Marva Morgan, an African-American female, initiated an investigation into Plaintiff's absences after an African-American Associate reported difficulty in locating him. Morgan enlisted the help of Quality Engineer Kenny Green, who documented Plaintiff's absence for about one hour on January 27 and an hour and fifteen minutes on February 1. Senior Group Leader Darrick Stallworth, also African American, was brought in to observe Plaintiff and reported that he was absent from the facility for over an hour on February 7. Stallworth's findings were corroborated by Caucasian Group Leader Armen Weinrick, who independently communicated similar observations to Morgan. Morgan learned from Stallworth, Nelson, and Plant Manager Jamie Mitchell that none had authorized Plaintiff's absence on February 7. On February 10, after concluding that Plaintiff violated a 'Zero Tolerance' policy, Morgan decided to postpone any disciplinary action due to staffing concerns and began searching for a temporary replacement. She initially approached Greg Lucas, a Caucasian male, who declined the position upon realizing he would be replacing Plaintiff. Eventually, Morgan settled on Kristopher Thompson, a young Caucasian male with relevant experience, to take over Plaintiff's duties after termination. On February 16, a confrontation occurred between Plaintiff and Weinrick regarding delivery issues, during which Weinrick displayed aggressive behavior towards Plaintiff. Following the incident, Plaintiff reported the altercation to Morgan via email, intending to discuss it further. However, when he attempted to raise the issue the next day, Morgan instructed him to first speak with his supervisor, per company policy. Later, during a conversation with Crawford and Nelson, Plaintiff expressed concerns about Weinrick's behavior and alleged racial harassment. They reportedly advised him to "let this go" and suggested that not doing so could jeopardize jobs. Plaintiff experienced issues with clocking in and out prior to his termination and reported these problems to Morgan, Childers, and his supervisor via email. He received pay adjustments due to errors in his recorded hours. On March 28, 2011, he was suspended as per Gestamp’s termination procedures, which require suspension before termination. Following an investigation, Morgan terminated his employment for violating Gestamp’s 'Zero Tolerance' policy. After his termination, Thompson took over Plaintiff's responsibilities and trained new employee David Ward, whom Plaintiff claims is a comparator for his age discrimination allegations. Plaintiff initiated legal action on January 26, 2012, asserting claims of race discrimination (Title VII and 1981), age discrimination (ADEA), hostile work environment (Title VII and 1981), retaliation (Title VII and 1981), FLSA retaliation and discrimination, breach of contract, and breach of an implied-in-fact contract under Alabama law. Gestamp subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, to which Plaintiff responded, leading Gestamp to file a Motion to Strike parts of Plaintiff's response. Before responding to this motion, Plaintiff requested a Protective Order to exclude Gestamp's Motion to Strike. Gestamp later sought permission to submit a Reply, prompting Plaintiff to file a Second Motion for Protective Order against this Reply. The excerpt discusses the legal ambiguity regarding the appropriateness of motions to strike evidence versus pleadings, referencing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) and various case law that illustrates differing interpretations on the matter. Other courts have established that objections to factual assertions by an opposing party should be based on the grounds of inadmissibility in evidence, as outlined in Norris v. GKN Westland Aerospace, Inc. Courts will interpret motions to strike material outside the pleadings as notices of objection, focusing on the substance rather than the form of the motion. In considering Gestamp’s motion for summary judgment, the court is allowed to evaluate the substance of Gestamp’s motion to strike without formally striking the evidence presented by Plaintiff. Only evidence that is admissible or can be made admissible in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) will be considered for summary judgment. Consequently, Gestamp’s Motion to Strike will be denied, but its substance will be taken into account in the summary judgment decision. In Plaintiff's First Motion for Protective Order, he claims a protective order is warranted against Gestamp’s Motion to Strike for two reasons. The court has already ruled on the first reason, noting that a motion to strike applies only to pleadings. The second reason posits that Gestamp's motion attempts to bypass the ten-page reply brief limitation set by the court’s Uniform Initial Order. The court indicates that Gestamp could have sought an extension for the page limit and that the Plaintiff's nine-page response could not be adequately countered within the ten-page constraint. Since the Plaintiff had the opportunity to respond to Gestamp’s Motion to Strike, any unfairness from Gestamp’s additional brief was mitigated. Therefore, Plaintiff's First Motion for Protective Order is denied. In his Second Motion for Protective Order, Plaintiff requests that the court not consider Gestamp's Reply to his Response to the Motion to Strike. He argues that the briefing schedule did not permit Gestamp to file a reply. However, the court finds that Gestamp did not file the reply without seeking permission, and since Gestamp was not granted leave to file a reply, the court will deny this request and not consider the submission. Thus, Plaintiff's Second Motion for Protective Order is deemed moot. For summary judgment, it is deemed appropriate when evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as stated in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party bears the responsibility for informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying evidence that demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, the Supreme Court established that a movant can satisfy their burden by demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact or by showing the nonmoving party's failure to present evidence supporting an essential element of their case. The court must evaluate the evidence favorably for the nonmoving party. After the movant meets its burden, the nonmoving party must provide specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, beyond mere pleadings. The discussion then shifts to the plaintiff's discrimination claims, which include race discrimination under Title VII and 1981, and age discrimination under the ADEA, both based on disparate treatment. The crux of liability in these cases hinges on whether discriminatory intent motivated the employer's decisions. A plaintiff can present direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence of such intent. In this instance, the plaintiff relies solely on circumstantial evidence, necessitating an analysis under the McDonnell Douglas framework. This framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, prompting the employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Should the employer succeed, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's reasons were pretextual. While the McDonnell Douglas method is a recognized approach, it isn't the exclusive means of proving discriminatory intent under Title VII, 1981, or ADEA claims. The Eleventh Circuit asserts that a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment if they present circumstantial evidence that raises a triable issue regarding the employer’s discriminatory intent. The plaintiff claims racial discrimination based on two adverse employment actions: his discharge for violating a "zero tolerance" policy and the denial of training opportunities that were available to others. Gestamp argues that the Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case for racial discrimination, which requires demonstrating that: 1) the Plaintiff is part of a protected class, 2) he faced an adverse employment action, 3) similarly situated employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably, and 4) he was qualified for his position. Gestamp specifically contends that the Plaintiff fails to identify an appropriate comparator—an employee of a different race who was treated more favorably. To qualify as similarly situated, employees must have engaged in comparable conduct and received different disciplinary actions. The Plaintiff identifies Kevin Childers as a potential comparator, supporting his claim with an outline from the EEOC investigation, responses to interrogatories, and Childers' disciplinary file. Gestamp challenges the admissibility of this evidence, particularly the outline, arguing it constitutes hearsay and does not meet the 'recorded recollection' exception to the hearsay rule. The exception applies only if the record was created by the witness when the matter was fresh in their memory and accurately reflects their knowledge, which Gestamp contends the outline does not. The Plaintiff's deposition reveals a lack of firsthand knowledge regarding the claims in the outline, further undermining its admissibility. The Outline cannot be considered as evidence for Gestamp’s Motion for Summary Judgment, as it fails to meet the criteria for recorded recollection and lacks the potential to be transformed into admissible evidence. The content is indistinguishable between personal knowledge and rumor or speculation, undermining its validity. Regarding Responses, while parties can cite interrogatory answers to dispute facts under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), the permissibility of using self-serving answers is debated among circuits. Some prohibit their use, while others allow for personal knowledge testimony at trial. Consequently, the Court cannot categorically dismiss the Responses as inadmissible unless they lack personal knowledge or contradict deposition testimony. Gestamp challenges specific statements made by the Plaintiff, asserting that one statement regarding Childers’ alleged comparable offense is inadmissible due to lack of personal knowledge, as the Plaintiff himself admits uncertainty about the situation. Similarly, another statement about the second shift's workload is also deemed inadmissible due to the Plaintiff's admission of lacking personal knowledge. Both statements are thus excluded from consideration as they do not meet the standards for admissible evidence. Plaintiff claims that Childers violated company policies without facing discipline, but fails to provide evidence beyond his own assertions to substantiate this claim. Although Plaintiff cites testimonies in support, the court emphasizes that it will only consider admissible evidence, which excludes Plaintiff's unsupported assertions. The court identifies two documented violations in Childers' file: texting on the job and admitting to marijuana use, neither of which are comparable to Plaintiff's infraction of leaving work without permission. Thus, Childers is not a valid comparator for Plaintiff's termination. Regarding Kristopher Thompson, Plaintiff argues he is a suitable comparator due to alleged prior violations. However, Plaintiff acknowledges he lacks firsthand knowledge of these violations, including instances of fraternization and poor job performance, rendering the evidence inadmissible. The only evidence Plaintiff provides is Thompson's disciplinary file, which contains violations related to job performance, including mislabeling issues. Consequently, the court will not consider these claims in the context of Gestamp's motion for summary judgment. None of the violations attributed to Thompson are classified as 'zero tolerance' violations, nor do they parallel the Plaintiff’s violation of leaving Gestamp’s facility without permission during work hours. Thompson's attendance violations were less frequent, occurring three times over two years compared to the Plaintiff's three violations within two weeks. Additionally, Thompson has not committed any 'zero tolerance' violations, such as excessive unauthorized absence from his workstation, making him an inappropriate comparator to the Plaintiff. Regarding Greg Lucas, who was laid off but later offered a job, there is no evidence that he engaged in conduct similar to the Plaintiff or faced differing disciplinary actions. Consequently, Lucas is also not a suitable comparator. The Plaintiff has not established any appropriate comparators, failing to demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate treatment in his race discrimination claim related to his termination. Assuming the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the burden would shift to Gestamp to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination. Gestamp claims that Morgan decided to discharge the Plaintiff due to his violation of the Zero Tolerance Policy by leaving the facility without permission and being excessively away from his work area. The Plaintiff must then show that this reason is pretextual, meaning it was not the true motivation for his termination. To demonstrate pretext, the Plaintiff must prove either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer's explanation lacks credibility. The focus is on Morgan's motive in the termination decision. The Plaintiff has provided no evidence to suggest that discrimination influenced Morgan's decision, as the investigation into the Plaintiff’s conduct was initiated by Morgan when another employee could not locate him, and there is no indication of differential treatment compared to other employees. Plaintiff argues that his termination was pretextual, citing that Thompson and Childers were not investigated despite having disciplinary violations. However, the infractions attributed to Childers and Thompson were infrequent and unrelated to absences. There is no evidence that Morgan, the decision-maker, acted with discriminatory intent. Citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Staub v. Proctor Hosp., Plaintiff contends that he only needs to show that a discriminatory act was a proximate cause of his termination. In Staub, evidence of supervisors' hostility toward military obligations was present, but in this case, there is no indication that the investigators harbored racial animus. Plaintiff claims that Weinrick's email to Morgan reflected racial bias; however, Weinrick's report was unsolicited and similar to others, indicating it was not a proximate cause of the termination. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to prove Weinrick's alleged discriminatory motives, as half of his evidence lacks personal knowledge. He bases his assertions on hearsay, such as claims that Weinrick favored white workers and harassed a white employee, which he cannot substantiate through direct experience. The evidence presented is deemed inadmissible and should not influence the Court's summary judgment decision. The plaintiffs' claims regarding Weinrick's motives are speculative and differ from the case of Staub, where the supervisor’s biased intent was clear. Without considering the inadmissible evidence, the plaintiff fails to show that Weinrick acted with racial bias, thus cannot directly demonstrate pretext. Indirectly attempting to prove pretext, the plaintiff argues that he had permission to stack breaks, but neither of the supervisors who granted that permission had the authority during the investigation. The necessary approvals from managers Crawford or Nelson were absent. Additionally, the plaintiff contends that Gestamp's prolonged investigation indicates a lack of credibility in their reasons for termination; however, the duration of the investigation does not infer discriminatory intent, as the court focuses solely on whether such intent motivated the decision. While the plaintiff asserts that he can still show discriminatory intent under the Lockheed-Martin precedent, which allows for circumstantial evidence to create a triable issue, he has not established a convincing case. The court requires a "convincing mosaic" of evidence indicative of intentional discrimination, similar to cases with documented discriminatory practices, which the plaintiff has not provided. Thus, the plaintiff has not met the McDonnell Douglas framework for proving discrimination. Plaintiff presents circumstantial evidence to support claims of intentional discrimination by Gestamp, although the Court has deemed some of this evidence inadmissible. Key pieces of evidence include an investigation by Morgan regarding the absence of a second shift, discrepancies in scrutiny between Plaintiff and Childers, and Plaintiff's assertion that first and second shifts were racially homogeneous. However, the Court finds that this evidence fails to establish a "convincing mosaic" of intentional discrimination. Specifically, there is no evidence suggesting racial animus from Morgan, Plaintiff's claims about racial composition lack personal knowledge, and there is no documented history of disparate treatment or awareness of Childers' absences by Morgan. Additionally, Gestamp argues that Plaintiff's claim of discriminatory treatment due to denied training opportunities does not meet the legal standard for adverse employment action, as Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he experienced a materially adverse change in employment conditions. The subjective significance Plaintiff places on the denied training does not suffice, as he fails to provide evidence that the training was material or identify specific opportunities he missed. Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the denial of training constitutes an adverse employment action, which is essential for establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Gestamp argues that Plaintiff cannot show he was treated less favorably than similarly situated non-minority employees. To prove this, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he and the comparators are alike in all relevant respects. Although Plaintiff identifies Childers as a comparator who received advanced training, Childers works a different shift with distinct job duties, and the training in question pertains only to responsibilities on Childers’ shift. Plaintiff claims that the differences arise from Childers receiving special training, but he does not provide admissible evidence to back this assertion. Consequently, Childers is not an appropriate comparator, and Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case for disparate treatment regarding the denial of training. Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), it is unlawful to discriminate against individuals aged 40 and older based on age. The Supreme Court in Gross v. FBL Financial Services clarified that for a claim under the ADEA to succeed, the plaintiff must prove that age was the "but-for" cause of the adverse employment action. To establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that they are over 40, experienced an adverse employment action, were qualified for the position, and were replaced by a younger individual. Plaintiff provides evidence of being over 40, having been terminated, being qualified for the position in question, and being replaced by a younger individual, which satisfies the requirements for a prima facie case under the ADEA. The plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination. Gestamp has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination, asserting that he violated the Zero Tolerance Policy by leaving the facility without permission during work hours. The plaintiff now bears the burden of demonstrating that this reason is pretextual. Gestamp contends that the plaintiff has failed to show that the termination reason is not the true motivation, referring back to the racial discrimination claim. The plaintiff argues that the treatment of his younger replacement, Thompson, who faced no similar investigation despite having disciplinary violations, indicates pretext. However, Gestamp counters that Thompson's violations were infrequent compared to the plaintiff's. The plaintiff cites comments made by Morgan regarding his age, but these were complimentary and insufficient to suggest discriminatory intent. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that Thompson and another younger individual, Ward, were unqualified for the Team Leader position, but admits he lacks personal knowledge to substantiate this claim, rendering his evidence inadmissible. Consequently, there is no credible evidence of discriminatory motivation by Morgan in the plaintiff's termination. The plaintiff has not successfully challenged Gestamp's reasons for his termination, failing to meet the McDonnell Douglas framework. Regarding the hostile work environment claim under Title VII and Section 1981, a violation occurs when the workplace is filled with severe or pervasive discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, or insult that alters the conditions of employment. To establish employer liability for a racially hostile work environment under Title VII and Section 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate five elements: membership in a protected group, unwelcome harassment, that the harassment was race-based, that it was severe or pervasive enough to alter the employment terms, and that the employer is liable through vicarious or direct responsibility. In the case of Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, Gestamp argues the plaintiff fails to show race-based harassment, citing several incidents: an investigation initiated by Morgan, disparaging remarks from Jake Johnson, a verbal altercation with Weinrick, and management's inaction on harassment complaints. However, the plaintiff has not provided evidence that these events were racially motivated. The investigation was triggered by a logistical issue unrelated to race, and the confrontation with Weinrick stemmed from a work-related dispute without racist comments. Furthermore, no specific racist remarks were identified, nor was there evidence that management's response to complaints was racially influenced. Gestamp also contends that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that any alleged harassment was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. The evaluation of severity and pervasiveness involves both subjective and objective assessments. While the court must accept the plaintiff's subjective perception of the hostility, it also requires a reasonable person standard. Factors considered include the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether it was threatening or humiliating, and its impact on work performance. Thus, Gestamp maintains that the plaintiff's claims do not meet the necessary criteria for a hostile work environment. Plaintiff experienced minimal and infrequent discriminatory conduct from Weinrick, including one yelling incident, occasional disparaging remarks, and constant surveillance, which alone was insufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim. The surveillance did not significantly impede Plaintiff's work performance. To prove retaliation under Title VII and Section 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate engagement in statutorily protected activity, suffering of a materially adverse action, and a causal link between the two. Gestamp contends that Plaintiff fails to prove he engaged in such protected conduct, which requires a good faith, reasonable belief of unlawful practices by the employer. This belief must satisfy both subjective and objective standards; it must be both sincerely held and objectively reasonable based on the circumstances. Plaintiff's complaints included an argument with Weinrick, an investigation he underwent, insufficient manpower on second shift, and perceived deficiencies in leadership. While Plaintiff subjectively believed Weinrick was racist, this belief was deemed not objectively reasonable. Weinrick's raised voice was in response to perceived harassment rather than racial animus, and there was no evidence to suggest that any of the actions taken against Plaintiff were motivated by racial bias or violated Title VII or Section 1981. Plaintiff asserts that management's inaction regarding manpower issues and Childers' leadership constitutes violations of Title VII and Section 1981; however, he lacks admissible evidence to support this claim. Notably, the only evidence presented is Crawford's reluctance to discuss Childers with first-shift associates, which does not indicate racial animus. Consequently, a reasonable person would not determine that management's inaction violates these statutes. Additionally, Plaintiff fails to establish a causal connection between his complaints and his termination. There is no admissible evidence that Morgan, the manager responsible for the termination decision, was aware of Plaintiff's complaints prior to making her decision. Nelson's comment about potential job loss came after Morgan had already begun training Plaintiff's replacement, further negating any causal link. Regarding claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Plaintiff alleges retaliation based on complaints about malfunctioning time clocks. To prove FLSA retaliation, he must demonstrate protected activity, adverse action, and a causal connection. Gestamp counters that no causal connection exists, as Plaintiff has not shown he was terminated due to his clock-related complaints. He received pay adjustments for discrepancies he identified, and his termination was based on unauthorized absences rather than his complaints. Claims of other employees not facing discipline are irrelevant because there is no evidence that Morgan was aware of those incidents during her decision-making process. Finally, Plaintiff's breach of contract claims under Alabama law are invalid as he cannot demonstrate the existence of any express or implied contract regarding break stacking. Proof of a contract is essential for both types of claims. Plaintiff did not provide a sufficient response to Gestamp’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding the breach of contract claim, as required under Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012 (11th Cir. 2000). The court emphasized that parties opposing summary judgment must present their evidence prior to the ruling, as outlined in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3). Failure to adequately address Gestamp's assertions could lead to the granting of summary judgment if the supporting materials demonstrate that Gestamp is entitled to it. Consequently, the court concluded that Gestamp is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the breach of contract and implied-in-fact contract claims. The court denied Gestamp’s Motion to Strike, Plaintiff’s First Motion for Protective Order, and Gestamp’s Permission Request, while deeming Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Protective Order moot. The court granted Gestamp’s Motion for Summary Judgment, with a separate order to follow. The facts considered were derived from the parties' submissions and the court's review of the evidentiary record, resolving any reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, consistent with Info. Sys. Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2002). Certain factual statements from Plaintiff were deemed inadmissible due to lack of personal knowledge or as hearsay, which the court cannot accept. The court highlighted that factual assertions in motion papers do not suffice to establish genuine disputes at summary judgment, citing Rule 56(c)(1)(A). It also noted that Gestamp’s Associate Handbook specifies "Zero Tolerance" policy violations, which incur immediate discharge without prior warnings for severe violations, including unauthorized absences. The court found that the relevance of certain certifications mentioned by Plaintiff was not adequately explained.