Anderson v. Macy's, Inc.

Citations: 943 F. Supp. 2d 531; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62790; 2013 WL 1857535Docket: Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-556

Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; May 2, 2013; Federal District Court

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Christina Anderson has filed a lawsuit against Macy's under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming she is disabled as defined by the ADA and alleging that Macy's retail stores fail to comply with ADA standards due to discriminatory product placement and pricing of plus-sized women's clothing. The defendants, Macy's Incorporated, Macy's East, and Macy's Central, filed a motion to dismiss the claims based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of standing, allowing Anderson 30 days to file an Amended Complaint to establish her standing. The Court found that her Amended Complaint did not sufficiently state a claim under the ADA, except for her request for injunctive or declaratory relief regarding certain barriers Macy's allegedly has not removed.

Anderson asserts she is disabled due to various health issues, including hypothyroidism, arthritis, and obesity, which she claims limits major life activities. In her experience at a Macy's store, she encountered a pricing discrepancy where plus-sized items were sold at a higher price compared to identical items in smaller sizes. Despite receiving a discount after raising her concerns, the incident caused her embarrassment and led to her avoiding that Macy's location. She further observed similar pricing disparities at another Macy's store.

Plaintiff Anderson inquired about the pricing of plus-sized clothing at Macy’s, noting a sales clerk attributed the higher prices to increased fabric costs. When questioning why petite sizes weren't cheaper, the clerk did not respond and departed. Between August 18, 2011, and April 12, 2012, Anderson visited numerous Macy’s locations in Pennsylvania and Ohio. She alleges that the plus-sized clothing section is "segregated" from smaller sizes and often placed far from main entrances, making it inconvenient for shoppers. Moreover, accessory items appealing to women are located closer to smaller sizes, further isolating the plus-sized section, which is also described as being smaller and more difficult to navigate due to narrower aisles. Anderson claims these arrangements are discriminatory under Title III of the ADA, imposing illegal surcharges based on size and offering unequal benefits to disabled individuals. She seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and civil penalties. The court granted her Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis on August 2, 2012, and she submitted an Amended Complaint on September 5, 2012, to which the defendants responded with a Motion to Dismiss on October 3, 2012. The court recognizes that pro se litigants, like Anderson, are afforded a more lenient standard in their pleadings.

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must present sufficient factual allegations to support a plausible claim for relief, as established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. The court accepts well-pleaded facts as true but disregards legal conclusions and mere conclusory statements. A motion to dismiss is warranted if the plaintiff fails to allege facts that could entitle them to relief.

For in forma pauperis (IFP) litigants, federal courts apply 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which allows for dismissal if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This standard mirrors that of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

The plaintiff alleges discrimination by Macy’s as a disabled individual with obesity-related physiological disorders. The court must first ascertain the plaintiff's standing to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Standing requires the plaintiff to demonstrate an "injury in fact" that is concrete and particularized, fairly traceable to the defendants' actions, and likely redressable by a favorable outcome.

In Title III ADA cases, courts assess four factors to evaluate the likelihood of a plaintiff returning to the site of alleged discrimination: (1) proximity to the public accommodation, (2) past patronage, (3) definitiveness of plans to return, and (4) frequency of nearby travel. The defendants argue that the plaintiff's proximity to the stores in question is inadequate to establish standing, asserting that her stated distances to certain Macy’s locations diminish the likelihood of future harm. The court notes that a distance over 100 miles generally fails the proximity requirement and finds it unlikely that the plaintiff will return to a Macy’s store located 21.7 miles away or 100 miles away, given the availability of closer locations.

A plaintiff’s past patronage of a defendant’s public accommodation is critical in establishing standing due to the likelihood of return and potential future harm. In the case at hand, the plaintiff, Anderson, has only visited the listed stores infrequently and primarily for the purpose of surveying them, with a documented purchase at only one location (Macy’s). The law suggests that a single visit undermines claims of future injury at that location unless a more substantial connection is demonstrated. Anderson has not shown a concrete intent to return to any of the stores beyond vague aspirations, failing to meet the requirement for demonstrating actual or imminent injury. Additionally, she has not provided evidence of frequent travel to the areas around the stores, which further weakens her standing. The court concludes that Anderson's amended complaint does not sufficiently allege an injury-in-fact to establish standing for her claims. However, the court allows her thirty days to file an amended complaint to address these standing deficiencies, particularly in light of one claim that may meet the minimal threshold for a motion to dismiss. Under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish discrimination based on disability in the enjoyment of services at a public accommodation, which requires showing that the discrimination was perpetrated by the establishment’s owner or operator.

Obesity's classification as a disability under the ADA remains undecided by the Third Circuit; however, lower courts suggest that obesity linked to a physiological disorder may qualify as a disability. The Court has not established a clear stance on whether obesity limits a major life activity. Generally, excess weight is not considered a "physical impairment" unless associated with a physiological disorder. The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) aimed to broaden ADA coverage, countering the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretations of "substantially limits." Therefore, for the current case, obesity caused by an underlying condition should not be excluded from ADA disability definitions.

In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Anderson claims that Macy’s discriminated by imposing a "surcharge" on women's plus-sized clothing, violating 28 C.F.R. 36.301(c). This regulation prohibits public accommodations from imposing additional costs on individuals with disabilities to cover necessary ADA compliance measures. The Court evaluates whether the cost is for ADA-mandated measures and if it constitutes an actual surcharge. Anderson's claim fails both assessments: Macy’s is not obligated to provide plus-sized clothing, as the ADA allows for reasonable modifications but does not require fundamentally altering services. Additionally, the alleged higher prices for plus-sized items do not qualify as a surcharge since there are no claims that disabled individuals incur higher prices compared to non-disabled individuals. Thus, the allegations do not establish an ADA violation, leading to the dismissal of this claim with prejudice.

Counts II and III of the complaint allege that Macy’s violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by providing a 'separate benefit' and an 'unequal benefit' to disabled individuals. Anderson contends that the plus-sized clothing is placed in a separate, isolated area, distant from other women’s clothing and areas likely to interest female shoppers. She claims the selection of items in the plus-sized section is significantly smaller compared to other sections. Title III of the ADA mandates that public accommodations must not discriminate against individuals based on disabilities and must provide services in the most integrated setting appropriate. Specifically, it prohibits offering services or facilities that are unequal or separate from those available to non-disabled individuals.

Anderson’s main argument focuses on the inconvenient location of the plus-sized section, which she claims is harder to reach due to its distance from main entrances and key departments. However, she does not assert that she was unable to access the plus-sized section or that she was forced to shop only there because of her disability. The complaint lacks allegations that she was denied access to any goods or services provided to non-disabled customers. Previous case law supports the notion that there must be a denial of access to claim a violation under Title III, which Anderson fails to demonstrate in her complaint.

Defendants’ placement of the plus-sized clothing department at Macy’s may have limited Anderson’s ability to shop in preferred locations, but it did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as it did not impede her general access to all merchandise. Anderson claims that the aisles in the plus-sized department are narrower—often two feet wide compared to four to five feet in average departments—making it difficult for individuals with disabilities related to obesity to navigate. Under 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), discrimination includes not removing architectural barriers when readily achievable. The court acknowledges that the narrower aisles could plausibly affect access for those with obesity-related disabilities. Thus, Anderson sufficiently alleges discrimination under ADA Title III concerning aisle width to survive a Motion to Dismiss.

Additionally, Anderson contends that Macy’s offers “different or separate” benefits for plus-sized clothing, violating 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii), and that services are not provided in the “most integrated setting appropriate” under 42 U.S.C. 12182(b)(1)(B). The Supreme Court defines the “most integrated setting” as one allowing maximal interaction between disabled and non-disabled individuals. However, Anderson fails to demonstrate that she could not interact with non-disabled shoppers in the plus-sized section or that only similarly disabled individuals shop there. Both disabled and non-disabled persons can access plus-sized clothing, and Anderson does not claim limited access to other store areas. Finally, her argument about a smaller selection of plus-sized clothing compared to other departments does not constitute a valid legal claim under Title III of the ADA.

Title III of the ADA does not mandate alterations to the product offerings of public accommodations, leading to the dismissal with prejudice of allegations regarding Macy's limited selection of plus-sized clothing. The court granted Macy's Motion to Dismiss for lack of standing, allowing the plaintiff, Anderson, 30 days to file an Amended Complaint detailing her standing related to her remaining claim regarding the narrowness of aisles in the plus-sized section. All other ADA claims, except the aisle width claim, were dismissed with prejudice, including claims for monetary relief. Anderson has also filed a similar lawsuit against another retailer. The court noted that Anderson's pleadings are well-articulated and suggested that if assisted by a lawyer, that individual must enter their appearance, as ghostwriting is prohibited. The court emphasized its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to dismiss cases if poverty claims are untrue or if actions are frivolous. Additionally, the court assessed the distance from Anderson's residence to various Macy's locations, noting that closer stores exist, but she did not assert having shopped at them.

Anderson asserts in her Sur-Reply that she has been shopping at various Macy's stores since 2006. However, she cannot amend her Complaint through facts presented in her opposition papers, as established in Pension Ben, Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc. Courts typically consider only the allegations in the complaint, attached exhibits, and public records when evaluating a motion to dismiss. The Court observes that Anderson received the same sales discount for a specific item as for smaller sizes, indicating she suffered no injury in that instance. Furthermore, Anderson fails to show an intent to return to any Macy's store, which undermines her claim of standing despite alleging that Macy's has an ADA-violative corporate policy. In her response to Macy's motion, Anderson argues that she will shop for clothing at a similar rate as others, suggesting a reasonable expectation of repeated injury. However, since necessities can be obtained from various retailers, her assumption lacks real-world support, and she does not specify an intention to return to any particular Macy's store. Additionally, these necessity claims are not included in her Complaint, reinforcing that she cannot amend it through her opposition. The Third Circuit has not definitively ruled on whether a tester—someone who evaluates compliance with the ADA—can fulfill the intent to return requirement. While some courts recognize that testers may have standing under the ADA, merely claiming a desire to return solely to check compliance does not suffice to demonstrate standing. Acknowledgments from various cases suggest that the assertion of intent to revisit an establishment for testing without more substantial evidence is inadequate for establishing standing.

An ADA plaintiff cannot establish standing in federal court merely by stating an intention to return to a facility. The Court finds it imprudent to address the significant issue of "tester" standing under Title III of the ADA at this stage, especially since the claim's scope is limited to aisle width in Macy’s stores. Although the plaintiff, Anderson, claims to have a history as a Macy's customer, she must adequately support this assertion in her next Amended Complaint to demonstrate standing, which may render the consideration of "tester" standing unnecessary. The Court emphasizes its obligation to review in forma pauperis (IFP) cases to ensure they state a valid claim, noting that Anderson's current standing does not meet the required legal standards. Macy’s does not dispute that its stores qualify as places of public accommodation under the ADA. The excerpt also discusses the definition of disability under the ADA, referencing various court decisions that differentiate between morbid obesity caused by a physiological condition and non-physiological obesity, the latter not being classified as an impairment. The ADAAA has expanded the definition of major life activities to include limitations on major bodily functions, with a non-exhaustive list of activities such as caring for oneself, walking, and communicating.

A major life activity under the ADA includes the operation of significant bodily functions, such as those of the immune, digestive, neurological, and reproductive systems. Congress aimed to expand the definition of disability through the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), and courts that previously recognized obesity linked to a physiological condition as a disability are unlikely to change their stance post-Amendment. The Court notes that the plaintiff alleges a physiological condition causing her obesity, thus sidestepping the need to determine if obesity alone constitutes a disability under the ADAAA. The plaintiff's claims arise under Title III of the ADA, which addresses discrimination in public accommodations, contrasting with Title II, which pertains to public entities. Title II prohibits public entities from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in services and activities, while Title III ensures equal enjoyment of services and goods offered by private entities. The regulations under both titles are similar, specifically prohibiting surcharges on individuals with disabilities for compliance measures. Case law indicates that while public accommodations cannot refuse service based on disability, they aren't required to provide specialized products. The Court emphasizes that claims asserting insufficient availability of goods fail if they suggest that a business must offer more than it currently does without a legal obligation to do so.

The ADA mandates that services be provided in the most integrated setting possible. The Court questions the relevance of a shopper's height to aisle width and notes that the Plaintiff fails to demonstrate this connection. Under Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), Congress specifies that physical barriers must be removed, including those imposed by the arrangement of movable structures like furniture and display racks. Examples of necessary adjustments include rearranging tables in restaurants or display racks in stores. The ADA defines "readily achievable" as actions that can be accomplished with minimal difficulty or expense, considering factors such as the cost of actions, financial resources of the site, and the operational impact of changes. Specific examples of barrier removal include rearranging furniture, but such actions should not result in a significant loss of selling space. The ADA emphasizes the importance of providing goods and services in an integrated manner, as segregated accommodations marginalize persons with disabilities. Regulations implementing Title II of the ADA are outlined in 28 C.F.R. 35.101 et seq. The Plaintiff's complaint does not adequately allege refusals by Defendants to order special goods for individuals with disabilities. Consequently, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and denies the Motion to Stay Discovery as moot.