Williams v. Krug Lincoln-Mercury

Citations: 848 F. Supp. 763; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4385; 1994 WL 122349Docket: No. 92-76330

Court: District Court, E.D. Michigan; April 7, 1994; Federal District Court

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The Court, under Judge Anna Diggs Taylor, issued a Memorandum Opinion following a bench trial regarding Christopher Williams, an African American man who alleged disparate treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Initially representing himself, Williams gained court-appointed counsel who amended his complaint to include an Elliott-Larsen claim; however, due to deteriorating relations, the attorney withdrew, leaving Williams to represent himself again during the jury trial. On the trial's first day, the Court dismissed the Elliott-Larsen claim, stating it would not have permitted the amendment had it known Williams would have to self-represent during a jury trial.

Additionally, the Court addressed a motion from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to quash a subpoena for investigator Linda Sankovich, which was granted. Defense counsel had previously deposed Sankovich, allowing the use of her deposition at trial due to her unavailability.

Williams was employed by Krug-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. as a body shop helper starting July 29, 1991, a role that involved minor vehicle assembly tasks, unlike a certified body shop technician who performs more complex repairs and is compensated by commission. Williams was hired to replace a white employee, Robert Marlatt, who earned $5.00 per hour, while Williams started at $6.00 per hour. The body shop manager, Christopher Diroff, confirmed that Williams was hired based on recommendations and his previous experience. Krug, located in Dearborn, Michigan, is a certified motor vehicle repair facility and follows state regulations requiring certification for technicians; only state-certified personnel can perform collision repairs, while body shop helpers and assemblers receive hourly wages.

Plaintiff, an unlicensed body shop helper, alleges race discrimination by Defendants for failing to pay him a 47% commission in addition to his hourly wage. However, licensed certification is required for employees performing collision-related work, and the Defendants demonstrated compliance with this requirement. The Court does not accept Plaintiff's claim that he accepted the hourly position "only for a few days" to showcase his abilities or that a commission agreement was made upon his arrival, especially since he came from a painter’s helper position.

Plaintiff presented evidence that two of Defendants' technicians lacked active state certifications during his employment, including Leroy Ali, who was certified but not active during a significant period, and Robert R. Higgs, who became certified later. Notably, Ali, whom Plaintiff perceived as favored, is also black. Testimony indicated that Plaintiff's replacement, Larry Smouthers, was paid an hourly wage of $9.00 due to his state certification, though Plaintiff contested this by presenting records suggesting Smouthers was not certified. However, Diroff, the Body Shop Manager, affirmed seeing Smouthers' certificate from prior employment.

The Court finds that Defendants believed all body shop technicians were licensed, dismissing the notion that they would jeopardize their dealership's license by employing unlicensed workers. Additionally, Smouthers was not hired on the commission basis that Plaintiff claims. Plaintiff's earnings from July 29, 1991, to October 2, 1991, totaled approximately $2,357.00, primarily from non-collision work. He asserts entitlement to commissions for "independent" work totaling $4,558.30 based on time slips, amounting to a claim of $2,142.40 in commissions alongside his hourly wages.

The Court concludes that it cannot support Plaintiff's claim for dual compensation for the same work, which would set him apart from all other employees. Furthermore, testimony from Defendant’s Production Manager indicates that Plaintiff did not fully grasp the compensation structure, undermining his assertions.

Confusion arose for the Plaintiff regarding an incentive plan intended for his benefit, which allowed him to earn a 47% commission on independent work exceeding $600 billable to customers, starting September 1, 1991. Body Shop Manager Diroff testified that this figure was calculated to cover the Plaintiff’s existing $6.00 hourly wage. Diroff tracked Plaintiff's work with time slips to determine eligibility for incentive pay, asserting that the slips were necessary for accounting purposes. The Plaintiff claims he is owed $2,142.40 in additional commissions and argues that he was wrongfully denied both hourly wages and commission due to racial animus. The Court found that awarding both would constitute double compensation and noted that no employee had previously received both wages and commissions, regardless of race. The claim of racial animus was dismissed due to a lack of supporting evidence.

Additionally, the Plaintiff alleged that his discharge for insubordination was racially discriminatory. During an incident involving a confrontation with Diroff over time slips, Plaintiff claimed Diroff used a racial epithet. Diroff recounted that he discharged Plaintiff for insubordination after an altercation where Plaintiff pushed him. Diroff denied making any racially charged statements, a claim corroborated by Production Manager Elliott, who witnessed the incident and confirmed that Diroff did not use the alleged epithet. The Court found no evidence of racial discrimination in either the incentive plan or the discharge, leading to the dismissal of the Plaintiff's complaints.

The Court carefully examined allegations regarding a purported racist statement made by a supervisory agent of the Defendant. This allegation surfaced during the Defendant's summary judgment motion, which the Court denied. After evaluating trial testimony, the Court concluded that the statement was not made. The Plaintiff claimed to have informed his EEOC investigator, Linda Sankovich, of the statement, but she reportedly did not include it in the records due to its hearsay nature. During trial, the Defendant presented Sankovich's deposition, in which she denied ever hearing about the alleged statement from the Plaintiff and indicated she would have documented such a significant claim. Furthermore, the pleadings filed by the Plaintiff, aside from his trial brief, do not mention the statement, which is the sole evidence of the Defendant's racial animus.

The Court found the Plaintiff's trial testimony regarding the statement to be not credible. Additionally, the Plaintiff argued that the circumstances surrounding his request for his final paycheck were indicative of racial discrimination. On returning to the body shop for his paycheck two weeks post-termination, an employee called the Dearborn police, claiming an African American male was present with a gun, despite no weapon being found on the Plaintiff or his cousin. The police, acting as intermediaries, barred the Plaintiff from returning to the body shop and directed him to the main office for his paycheck, which was ultimately handed over by the police.

While the Court acknowledged that race may have influenced the decision to call the police, it determined that the events did not constitute evidence of race discrimination regarding the Plaintiff's employment or discharge. There was insufficient evidence regarding the identity of the person who called the police or that the call lacked legitimate justification, given the prior physical altercation. The Defendant's assertion that the Plaintiff's final paycheck was withheld due to tools he allegedly had was also dismissed, as the Plaintiff denied receiving any tools from the Defendant, and no documentation supported the Defendant's claim. Consequently, the Defendant's claim for $750 for the tools was denied. The Court confirmed federal question jurisdiction over the lawsuit after dismissing the Plaintiff's state-based Elliott-Larsen claim.

Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits employers from discharging or discriminating against individuals based on race concerning employment compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges. To establish a prima facie case of racially discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) membership in a protected class, 2) discharge from employment, 3) differential treatment compared to a similarly situated white employee, and 4) that the employer sought applicants for the position from which the plaintiff was terminated. If the plaintiff meets these criteria, a presumption of unlawful discrimination arises, shifting the burden of production to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. The plaintiff then must prove that this reason is a pretext for discrimination and that the real motive was discriminatory. In determining whether intentional discrimination occurred, the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation over the employer's. Ultimately, the burden of persuasion regarding intentional discrimination remains with the plaintiff. In this case, the court found that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case, as he failed to demonstrate that he was treated differently than similarly situated white employees. Evidence showed that he was compensated at a higher hourly wage than the white employee he replaced and that he was not a state-certified technician.

The modified pay plan, which the Plaintiff alleges was discriminatory, was implemented in good faith by the Defendant to address the Plaintiff's requests for increased income. As the only body shop helper at the time, the Plaintiff had the opportunity to earn additional income through the incentive program, which was not discriminatory or disadvantageous to him. The Plaintiff's argument that his time slips were handled by Diroff rather than the payroll department does not indicate disparate treatment; Diroff monitored the time slips to assess the incentive program's profitability and the Plaintiff's performance.

The Court supports Diroff's testimony regarding the program's implementation and finds that his oversight of the Plaintiff's time slips was a legitimate business practice. The Plaintiff failed to provide credible evidence of intentional discrimination related to his discharge, which Diroff attributed to insubordination—an acceptable non-discriminatory reason. Although the Plaintiff alleged a racist comment was made during the incident leading to his termination, the Court found no evidence to support this claim, as Diroff and a corroborating witness denied the statement, and the Plaintiff did not report it during his EEOC interview.

Even if a prima facie case had been established, the Plaintiff would not succeed on his Title VII disparate treatment claim. Diroff's incentive program was intended to benefit the Plaintiff, and the monitoring of his time slips does not demonstrate disparate treatment, particularly as the Plaintiff, being an unlicensed body shop helper, was not in the same situation as licensed technicians. The Plaintiff did not show that he was treated differently from similarly situated white employees or provide evidence of intentional discrimination. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims of disparate treatment and wrongful discriminatory discharge under Title VII, as well as the Defendant's counterclaim for $750 for unreturned tools, due to a lack of evidence that the Plaintiff ever received any tools. The case is ordered to be dismissed.