Court: District Court, N.D. Alabama; March 11, 2013; Federal District Court
Plaintiff Jeff Benton Homes, Inc. filed a copyright infringement suit against Alabama Heritage Homes, Inc. and Stoneridge Homes, Inc. on April 22, 2011, claiming that the defendants copied two copyrighted house plan designs. Currently, the court is addressing the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's motion to exclude testimony from the defendants' expert witnesses, Jeremy C. Erdreich and Denise T. Dauphin. The court partially grants and partially denies the motion to exclude, focusing only on relevant portions of expert testimony related to design functionality, lack of variation, and substantial similarity.
The court references Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, emphasizing that expert opinions must be based on reliable principles and methods, relevant to the case, and assist the trier of fact. The court notes its "gatekeeping" role in ensuring that the expert testimony adheres to these standards, with specific factors to consider, such as testability, peer review, error rates, and general acceptance in the relevant field. Ultimately, the court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Jeremy C. Erdreich, a registered architect based in Birmingham, Alabama, holds a Bachelor of Arts in Architecture from Yale (1990) and a Master of Arts in Architecture from Harvard (1994). He has operated Erdreich Architecture since 1998, offering a range of architectural services, including historical renovations and residential and commercial designs.
In his expert report dated April 6, 2012, Erdreich compared the plaintiffs' "2715" house plan to the defendants' "Dorothy" design, reaching four main conclusions:
1. The design elements of both plans are primarily functional.
2. There are fewer design variations in this market segment.
3. The plans are not substantially similar.
4. The value apportioned to the designs is significantly diminished due to various factors.
Erdreich elaborated on design functionality and creativity, stating that functionality encompasses elements shaped by industry standards and market forces, while creativity is subjective and may not always result in original designs. He categorized both house plans as "production houses," uniform in size (approximately 3,000 square feet) and price (around $300,000 in the Huntsville area), sharing numerous functional design features, such as small formal living areas, a larger family and kitchen area, main-level living spaces, and specific room configurations. Additionally, he noted common functional elements driven by industry standards, including the absence of basements, economical room dimensions, and standardized window sizes.
Mr. Erdreich identified shared non-functional or "creative" elements between the "2715" and "Dorothy" houses, including bathroom layouts, closet configurations, kitchen arrangements, laundry room setups, front door designs, window configurations, window shutters, and minor decorative details. He concluded that most functional elements are similar across both houses and that the remaining non-functional elements, while having substantial differences, are not unique. Erdreich noted a general lack of design variations among "production houses" targeting the same market, stating that limited design options exist once functional requirements are met, making any differences in floor plans significant.
Erdreich further concluded that the "2715" and "Dorothy" house plans are not substantially similar when functional elements are excluded, as the remaining non-functional elements display many differences. He emphasized that choices such as paint colors and hardware styles are primarily buyer-driven rather than designer decisions. In his deposition, Erdreich revealed that 90 to 95 percent of his work is residential architecture, although he has never worked in Madison County, Alabama. He reviewed house plans from online sources based on specific criteria but lacked knowledge of their designers or construction history in Madison County. Erdreich did not survey the local housing market to assess buyer preferences for functional versus non-functional elements. His methodology for excluding functional aspects from the comparison was based on personal experience, without reference to industry standards in copyright infringement cases.
Mr. Erdreich is not challenged on his qualification as an expert witness, but the plaintiff seeks to strike his testimony on several grounds. The plaintiff argues that Erdreich's conclusions lack sufficient supporting facts or data, as he relied solely on personal opinions and experience without outside sources. Additionally, the plaintiff claims Erdreich's unfamiliarity with the Huntsville-Madison County real estate market and his limited comparison of only nine house plans undermine the reliability of his testimony. The plaintiff also criticizes Erdreich's methodology, asserting that his distinction between functional and non-functional elements is self-created and not based on external references, and that he applies an incorrect standard for evaluating copyright infringement. Lastly, the plaintiff contends that Erdreich's testimony does not assist the trier of fact, being merely "lay opinions."
The court, however, finds the plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive. It clarifies that reliance on personal experience alone does not disqualify an expert under Federal Rules of Evidence, as experience can provide a sufficient foundation for testimony in certain fields. The court acknowledges that while Erdreich's experience must be supported by reliable methodology, his lack of direct experience in the Huntsville-Madison County market does not inherently disqualify his testimony. Erdreich asserts a general knowledge of construction and architecture standards applicable across Alabama, indicating that the functional and non-functional elements he identified are common to all production home markets. The court is not convinced that Erdreich's comparisons of the house plans are improper, noting that his established methods for comparison have been deemed sufficiently reliable.
Mr. Erdreich is not to be criticized for his lack of knowledge regarding the designers, creation dates, copyright status, or building status of the plans he reviewed. The court finds that his testimony should not be excluded based on the "standard" he applied. The plaintiff contends that Erdreich's focus on creative elements alone conflicts with applicable law, which requires consideration of the selection, coordination, or arrangement of individual standard features to determine substantial similarity. The court acknowledges that while individual design features may not be copyrightable, the compilation of these features within an architectural work can be protected. According to the Copyright Act, individual standard features—such as common windows and doors—are not protectible, but the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in a design are. This reflects Congress's understanding that creativity in architecture often arises from the original arrangement of unprotectable elements.
The court cites various cases affirming that while individual standard features are not copyrightable, their unique combination can be. Both the individual design elements and their unique compilation are relevant in copyright infringement evaluations, making Erdreich's testimony about individual elements appropriate. The plaintiff was able to argue the similarity of its design compilations to those of the defendants in summary judgment briefs, and would have further explored this through cross-examination if the case had proceeded to trial. Lastly, the court rejects the notion that Erdreich's testimony is merely lay opinion, indicating that expert testimony is admissible when it addresses matters beyond a layperson's understanding, as established in relevant case law. The plaintiff’s argument that Erdreich's process of customer revisions diminishes the value of his testimony does not negate its relevance.
The court finds the argument presented by the defendants unconvincing, noting that while a homeowner may review and suggest changes to an architect’s plans, they lack the professional capability to compare architectural designs as effectively as a licensed architect like Erdreich. Erdreich's expertise would aid in identifying common elements and differences between the plaintiffs’ "2715" plan and the defendants’ "Dorothy" plan. The court references two district court cases that, although unpublished, are persuasive in establishing that an architect can serve as an expert witness in copyright infringement cases involving architectural plans.
In *The Harvester, Inc. v. Rule Joy Trammell, Rubio, LLC*, the architect James Finch testified that he believed the defendant copied elements from the plaintiff's drawings. Despite the defendant's challenge to Finch’s reliability under Daubert standards—citing his lack of a specific methodology or peer-reviewed methods—the court upheld his testimony, drawing parallels to experts in other fields who rely on experience. The court concluded that a licensed architect with significant experience is qualified to provide expert testimony on the similarities between architectural drawings.
In *Home Design Services, Inc. v. Trumble*, both parties presented expert testimony from architects regarding allegations of copying residential designs, reinforcing the notion that architects can competently evaluate and compare architectural works in copyright cases.
The opinion primarily addresses the admissibility of rebuttal expert testimony from Kevin Alter concerning the architectural similarities and differences between two house plans. The plaintiff sought to exclude an exhibit from Alter's report, claiming it would not help the jury, which could make the comparison independently. The district court disagreed, stating that while the jury will determine substantial similarity, Alter's expert testimony is beneficial for understanding the complex architectural details involved in the case. Expert testimony is deemed necessary in cases with intricate subject matter where a lay observer might struggle to evaluate the similarities without assistance.
Alter's qualifications as a licensed architect and his extensive professional experience lend reliability to his testimony. However, the court cautioned that he must refrain from providing legal opinions on ultimate issues, specifically that he cannot conclude the two works are substantially similar. Instead, he may assist the jury in analyzing the individual design elements.
Similarly, expert Jeremy C. Erdreich, also qualified by years of architectural experience, is permitted to testify about the similarities and differences between the plaintiffs' plans and the defendants' "Dorothy" plan, aiding the jury in their decision regarding copyright infringement. However, like Alter, Erdreich is restricted from making statements about "substantial similarity" and any related references in his report will be stricken. The court will independently assess substantial similarity based on Erdreich's other opinions and the existing evidence.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states that a court must grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is appropriate when, after sufficient discovery, a party fails to present enough evidence to establish an essential element of their case, which they must prove at trial. The court must consider all evidence and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the opposing party; however, these inferences cannot be mere guesses or conjectures. A genuine issue of material fact exists only when there is enough evidence that a reasonable jury could favor the nonmoving party. The relevance of disputed facts is determined by substantive law, and mere factual disputes do not impede summary judgment unless they materially affect the case outcome.
The document also outlines the parties involved in the case: Plaintiff Jeff Benton Homes, Inc., led by Jeff Benton, has operated in residential construction in Huntsville-Madison County, Alabama, since 1987. The Defendants are Alabama Heritage Homes, Inc., and Stoneridge Homes, Inc., which are also homebuilders in the same area. Alabama Heritage was established in 2002 and Stoneridge in 2008, sharing office space and management. In 2007, Alabama Heritage shifted its business model to produce simpler, more efficient home designs, including the "Dorothy" plan central to this lawsuit, resulting in increased competition with Jeff Benton Homes. Currently, Jeff Benton views Alabama Heritage and Stoneridge as his primary local competitors, as they all operate in similar market segments, often developing near or within the same communities. Alabama Heritage actively researches its competitors' strategies and products through its sales staff, although the reporting process is inconsistent.
Alabama Heritage obtains competitive information by monitoring rival neighborhoods and is aware of Jeff Benton’s marketing strategies and sales performance, including his participation in the Parade of Homes. The plaintiffs' top-selling house plans are the "2715" and "2820," which are nearly identical except for a half-bath in the "2820" plan. Both plans were originally created by independent contractor Julie Brakefield, who had no formal employment relationship with Jeff Benton and sold the "2715" plan to him for $200 in 1997 with an informal agreement allowing unlimited use without further compensation. Subsequent modifications by Brakefield led to the creation of the "2820" plan around 2001. An Assignment Agreement executed on May 18, 2006, between Jeff Benton Homes and Brakefield stipulates that she assigns all rights to her architectural works, acknowledging that her contributions were made independently and that no other party claims ownership. The agreement lists specific house plans, including the "2715" and several variations of the "2820."
Jeff Benton converted Brakefield’s hand drawings for the "2715" and "2820" plans into electronic format using CADD software, which facilitates easier modifications. Benton does not know which draftsman created the CADD versions, but all employed during the conversion were independent contractors who did not sign work-for-hire agreements or Assignment Agreements, unlike Brakefield. The original hand drawings for these plans have been lost. Benton obtained Certificates of Registration for the "2715" and "2820" plans from the U.S. Copyright Office on May 31, 2006, using the CADD drawings derived from Brakefield's designs, after discovering a competitor was using the plans. Despite having copyright registration, Benton published copies of the plans without copyright notices.
In 2007, Alabama Heritage purchased the “Dorothy” plan from draftsman Lavor Haynie, who worked independently and was paid to convert hand-drawn floor plans to CADD. Haynie stated he had not seen the "2715" and "2820" plans when creating the Dorothy plan, though he attended trade shows and received local publications. Alabama Heritage registered copyright for the Dorothy plan in September 2010.
Comparative analysis of the "2715," "2820," and Dorothy plans shows similarities in design elements, including small formal living spaces, a larger informal family area, main-level living space, separation of the master suite, a minimum two-car garage, four bedrooms, three bathrooms, and a conveniently located laundry or mudroom.
The document outlines specific features and design elements of pre-fabricated fireplaces and master bathrooms in home plans, particularly the 2715 and 2820 plans in relation to the Dorothy plan. Key functional elements include the absence of basements or crawl spaces, no finished attic space, a square design to minimize costs, a limited number of French doors, standard room dimensions for economical lumber use, simple roof geometry, and uniform window sizes. These functional elements are influenced by industry standards rather than individual designer preferences.
Erdreich, an expert, differentiates between "functional" elements—standardized features shaped by external market forces—and "creative" elements, which reflect the subjective choices of designers. While the 2715 and 2820 plans share many functional features with the Dorothy plan, their "individual arrangement and spatial character" differ due to unique design choices.
Creative differences highlighted by Erdreich include variations in bathroom layouts, closet configurations, kitchen arrangements, laundry room designs, front door styles, window placements, and minor decorative details. Specific examples of these creative choices include distinct designs for entry doors, ceiling styles, window placements, and the arrangement of master suite elements such as walk-in closets and bathrooms, emphasizing the unique design characteristics of each plan despite their shared functional elements.
The document outlines differences and similarities between two sets of house plans: the "Dorothy" plan and the "2715/2820" plans. Key differences include:
1. **Bedroom Entries**: The Dorothy plan features 45-degree entries in two bedrooms, while the 2715/2820 does not.
2. **Den and Breakfast Area**: There is a partial wall in the 2715/2820 that separates the den and breakfast area, which is not present in the Dorothy.
3. **Master Suite Access**: The master suite in the 2715/2820 has direct access from the den, whereas in the Dorothy, access is through a hallway.
4. **Garage Design**: The Dorothy plan includes a 3-car garage, while the 2715 and 2820 have 2-car garages.
5. **Kitchen Features**: The kitchen in the 2715/2820 has a wall of cabinetry at a 45-degree angle, which is absent in the Dorothy, and the pantry locations differ.
6. **Bathroom Access**: The guest bathroom in the Dorothy is accessible directly from the second bedroom, while in the 2715/2820, it is only accessible from the hallway.
7. **Fourth Bedroom Window**: The 2715/2820 features a window from the fourth bedroom to the covered terrace, which is not included in the Dorothy.
Julie Brakefield, a witness, noted the significance of a specific seven-foot wide foyer in the 2715/2820 that transitions to a five-foot width, asserting it is a unique design element that would not be independently created by another designer.
Erdreich emphasized that smaller homes, like the 2715 and 2820, offer limited design variations compared to larger custom homes, leading to more pronounced creative differences when they do exist.
In the discussion section, defendants argue for summary judgment based on three points: (1) the protectable elements of their Dorothy plan are not substantially similar to the plaintiffs' plans, (2) the plaintiffs’ copyrights are invalid or unenforceable due to lack of ownership rights, and (3) the plaintiffs waived copyright interest by publishing the plans without notice of copyright. The court finds merit in the first argument, deeming it unnecessary to address the other two. To establish copyright infringement, it is required to prove ownership of a valid copyright and the copying of original elements of the work.
In cases where the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of copyright infringement, they can establish copying by demonstrating the defendants had access to the copyrighted work and that the works in question are substantially similar. In the current situation, the plaintiff has not provided direct proof of copying, but it is acknowledged that the defendants accessed the plaintiff's 2715 and 2820 house plans through their own research and the plaintiff's advertising. The primary issue remaining is whether the Dorothy house plan is substantially similar to the plaintiff's house plans.
The Eleventh Circuit has confirmed that substantial similarity can be addressed at the summary judgment stage, particularly when it is the "crucial issue" in copyright infringement cases. This is due to the legal nature of distinguishing between protectable and non-protectable elements of a work. The summary judgment inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable jury could determine that the designs are substantially similar in terms of protected expression.
According to the statutory definition, an "architectural work" encompasses the design of a building as expressed in tangible forms, including plans or drawings, and includes the overall form and arrangement of spaces but excludes individual standard features. While individual features are not protectable, their arrangement and coordination may be, as Congress recognized that originality in architecture often arises from the selection and arrangement of otherwise unprotectable elements.
The Eleventh Circuit also noted that copyright protection for architectural works is "thin," meaning substantial similarity is only found when an average observer would perceive the alleged copy as derived from the protectable aspects of the copyrighted work.
Modest dissimilarities in architectural designs can be more impactful in determining substantial similarity than in other art forms. In the context of residential floor plans, particularly highlighted in Miller’s Ale House and further analyzed in Intervest Construction, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that similarities in general layout can occur innocently due to the limited ways to design a rectangular building. Thus, differences between two floor plans weigh heavily against claims of substantial similarity.
In Intervest Construction, two competing builders' plans, "Kensington" and "Westminster," were examined. Despite both being four-bedroom houses with common features such as a two-car garage, living room, and kitchen, significant dissimilarities existed in the arrangement and selection of these components. For instance, room sizes, garage entrances, attic access, and utility placements differed. The three secondary bedrooms exhibited variations in closet shapes and configurations, and the bathrooms had distinct sizes and layouts. The kitchens also presented differences in wall placements, pantry locations, and specific features such as islands. Overall, while both designs shared a general resemblance, the unique characteristics and arrangements played a critical role in the analysis of substantial similarity.
The district court determined that the differences in the coordination and arrangement of common architectural elements between the plaintiffs' floor plans and the defendants' plan were significant enough that no reasonable observer could find substantial similarity. The Eleventh Circuit upheld this ruling. The plaintiffs' 2715 and 2820 plans and the defendants’ Dorothy plan share a basic layout, including features like an entrance foyer, living and dining rooms, a family room, kitchen, four bedrooms, and three bathrooms, along with standard amenities such as a 2-car garage and a specific master bath design. However, these elements are considered standard features that lack copyright protection, as established in prior case law. The plaintiffs do not claim copyright over these individual elements but rather on their unique selection and arrangement. The court rejected the notion that the overall form of the Dorothy plan was substantially similar to the plaintiffs' plans, emphasizing that the arrangement of these common elements is not unique and that many configurations exist for a home of approximately 3,000 square feet. Granting copyright protection in this context would hinder the free flow of ideas and information. The court concluded that the differences between the plans were significant enough to negate a finding of substantial similarity, consistent with the limited protection afforded to architectural works under copyright law.
Significant differences between the plaintiffs' plans (2715 and 2820) and the defendants' Dorothy plan include variations in the master suite layout, interior door and ceiling designs, window placements, the presence of a walk-in pantry exclusive to the Dorothy, and differences in wall structures and entry points to the guest bathroom. These discrepancies are comparable in scale to those noted between the Kensington and Westminster plans in the Eleventh Circuit’s Intervest decision. Consequently, the court concludes that the differences are so substantial that no reasonable jury could determine that the plans are substantially similar, leading to the dismissal of the plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim as a matter of law.
The court partially granted and denied the plaintiff's motion to exclude testimony from the defendants’ expert witnesses. It specifically excluded expert Jeremy Erdreich's opinions on substantial similarity but permitted his testimony regarding the functionality of design elements and lack of design variation. As the defendants did not rely on certain expert testimonies for their summary judgment motion, the motion to exclude those was deemed moot. Ultimately, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing all of the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice and imposing costs on the plaintiff. The Clerk was instructed to close the case file. Additionally, a note on Rule 702 was provided, indicating recent amendments aimed at enhancing clarity without changing evidentiary outcomes.
To qualify as expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, three criteria must be met: (1) the witness is qualified as an expert, (2) the testimony is derived from reliable principles and methods, and (3) those principles and methods have been reliably applied to the case facts. Additional factors for a district court's consideration include whether the expert's opinion stems from independent research or was developed for litigation, whether the expert has improperly extended accepted conclusions, whether the expert has exercised appropriate caution as in his professional practice, and whether the claimed expertise reliably yields results for the opinion provided. The expert report by Jeremy C. Erdreich does not specifically mention the "2820" plan, which the plaintiff claims was copied, but it is acknowledged that the 2820 plan is a reverse-image of the 2715 plan with some modifications. The modifications include the addition of a powder bathroom. The plaintiff did not contest certain undisputed facts related to this claim. Erdreich's complete deposition, referenced in the defendants' submissions, contains insights into his qualifications and methodologies, while the plaintiff's motion to exclude suggests that both Erdreich and another expert, Dauphin, could be considered qualified. Testimony based on lay opinion is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which limits such opinions to those based on personal perception, that aid in understanding or fact determination, and do not rely on specialized knowledge as defined in Rule 702.
Defendants submitted various depositions and evidentiary exhibits, including those from Jeffrey Michael Benton, Alabama Heritage Homes, Inc., and Stoneridge Homes, highlighting facts relevant to the case. The plaintiff's brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment included additional undisputed and disputed facts, which the defendants did not contest in their reply, resulting in those facts being deemed admitted for summary judgment as per the Uniform Initial Order. Furthermore, multiple depositions revealed significant details regarding the case, including the opinions of experts and the comparison of architectural works. Notably, the court noted that Defendants' Exhibit 16, which listed differences between certain house plans, lacked proper authorship and could not be considered evidence. The court referenced the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in Miller’s Ale House, emphasizing that the analysis extended beyond bar settings to architectural works in general. Ultimately, due to the lack of substantial similarity in the architectural designs, the court found no need to address other arguments by the defendants, including the validity of the plaintiff's copyright registration and claims of waiver regarding the copyright violation. Summary judgment was granted based on these findings.
