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Pratt v. City of New York
Citations: 929 F. Supp. 2d 314; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35649; 2013 WL 979431Docket: No. 11 Civ. 8355(JGK)
Court: District Court, S.D. New York; March 14, 2013; Federal District Court
Anthony Pratt, a prisoner at the Watertown Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against multiple defendants, including the City of New York and various officials associated with the Anna M. Koss Center (AMKC) on Rikers Island. He claims damages and injunctive relief for alleged exposure to asbestos while incarcerated at AMKC. The defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In evaluating the motion, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The court's role is to assess the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not to evaluate evidence. A claim is considered plausible if it contains sufficient factual content to suggest the defendants' liability. Legal conclusions, however, are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. The court may consider documents referenced in the complaint or those the plaintiff relied upon, as well as matters of which judicial notice can be taken. In pro se cases, complaints are construed liberally to identify the strongest arguments. However, mere conclusory statements without factual support are insufficient. The Amended Complaint alleges that since October 2011, Pratt was exposed to friable asbestos due to deteriorating pipes and heating systems at AMKC, which released asbestos particles into the dormitory through leaks and the heating system. The plaintiff, a licensed asbestos remover with over two years of experience, identified asbestos contamination in his living area at AMKC and filed a grievance on October 17, 2011, alleging the presence of asbestos. After receiving an unsatisfactory response, he sought to have his grievance presented to a committee, but was informed by Supervisor Elizabeth Landan that no such committee existed. On October 20, 2011, Hemmings, the AMKC Director of Asbestos, inspected the plaintiff's dormitory but allegedly ignored the plaintiff's input on areas to test, instead taking samples from recently replaced floor tiles. An X-ray after his arrival at AMKC indicated a 9 millimeter nodule on one of his lungs, contrasting with a prior negative X-ray taken upon his entry into custody. The plaintiff filed an Original Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 15, 2011, regarding his asbestos exposure, which was dismissed on December 14, 2011. He subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on January 13, 2012, leading the court to vacate the previous dismissal. The defendants argue that the plaintiff failed to comply with AMKC's grievance procedures, claiming this bars his action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing a suit. The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense, meaning the plaintiff is not obligated to demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint. The court found that the Amended Complaint does not indicate a failure to comply with the grievance procedures. The Amended Complaint asserts that the plaintiff filed a grievance regarding his living conditions and expressed dissatisfaction with the response, which he communicated to Mrs. Landan. She informed him that no grievance committee existed at AMKC. The clarity of whether the plaintiff adhered to AMKC grievance procedures is questioned; however, this uncertainty does not warrant dismissal, as per Jones, which does not mandate exhaustion to be demonstrated in the complaint. The determination of grievance procedure adherence and the implications of Mrs. Landan's statement should be addressed during summary judgment, not dismissal. Defendants presented briefs claiming the plaintiff failed to follow grievance procedures. A district court can either disregard additional materials when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or convert it to a summary judgment motion under Rule 56, permitting further evidence submission. The Court opts not to convert the motion, thus excluding external materials not in the Amended Complaint. Questions regarding the availability and effectiveness of administrative remedies are factual issues unsuitable for resolution at this stage. Consequently, the defendants' motion to dismiss based on the plaintiff's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies is denied. Additionally, the defendants contend that the plaintiff's claims do not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment's applicability to state actions is affirmed, and conditions of confinement within prisons are subject to this constitutional standard. To prove that conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment by constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) a serious deprivation of basic needs and (2) that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The objective element requires demonstrating that the deprivation is sufficiently serious, while the subjective element necessitates showing that the officials had a culpable state of mind. Exposure to friable asbestos is considered a serious health risk, satisfying the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim. To demonstrate deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show that the defendants' actions went beyond mere negligence; they must have known about the health risks and chosen to ignore them. In this case, the plaintiff alleges that friable asbestos was present in his dormitory, which was contaminated due to rainwater leaking from deteriorated pipes and being circulated by the heating system. Despite the plaintiff's grievance regarding asbestos contamination, the response indicated that prior inspections had found the heating pipes to be asbestos-free, and the Director of Asbestos Control failed to test the deteriorated pipes upon request, only examining newly replaced floor tiles. This suggests a deliberate avoidance of addressing potential contamination. At the preliminary stage, the plaintiff's allegations raise a plausible inference that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the health risks posed by the friable asbestos, indicating sufficient grounds to survive a motion to dismiss. The Court has reviewed all party arguments and found that any not specifically addressed are either moot or lacking merit. The motion to dismiss filed by the defendants is denied, and the Clerk is instructed to close Docket No. 43. The Court corrected the spelling of the AMKC director of asbestos from "Himmons" to "Hemmings." Although the plaintiff may not have exhausted administrative remedies, alleged misleading statements by Landan could potentially excuse this failure, as established in Hemphill v. New York. However, since the Amended Complaint does not demonstrate a failure to exhaust, evaluating special circumstances is unnecessary for this dismissal motion. The defendants' request to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim based on reasoning from a vacated December 14, 2011 Order is denied. The Court emphasizes that an amended complaint supersedes the original and is the effective pleading for motions to dismiss. The vacated Order holds no precedential value, as all aspects of a vacated judgment are extinguished, and such decisions lack any authority.