New York Ex Rel. Cutler v. Dibble

Citations: 62 U.S. 366; 16 L. Ed. 149; 21 How. 366; 1858 U.S. LEXIS 653

Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 21, 1859; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court

Combined Opinion SummaryCombined Opinion Original

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

The case involves a writ of error from the Supreme Court of New York concerning the validity of a New York statute from 1821 related to Indian land intrusions, with the plaintiffs (Asa Cutler, John Underhill, and Arza Underhill) challenging its constitutionality under federal law. The core issues presented include whether the 1821 statute conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, any treaties, or acts of Congress, and whether it unlawfully deprived the plaintiffs of property or rights.

The plaintiffs' counsel argued that Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate commerce with Indian tribes, citing the act of 1802, which they claimed was still applicable to tribes east of the Mississippi following a later act in 1834 that modified its scope. They asserted that the New York law was incompatible with federal statutes and that subsequent treaties with the Indians in 1838 and 1842 had superseded the 1821 law.

In contrast, the defendant's counsel contended that the 1802 act did not apply to New York tribes, emphasizing the historical jurisdiction of New York over Indian affairs and the state's rights to regulate land use, particularly asserting that the Seneca tribe had been under state protection since the Revolution. They argued that the Tonawanda band had not consented to the treaties in question and maintained their rights to the land they occupied.

The case originated from actions taken by the district attorney under the 1821 act, highlighting the legal conflict between state and federal authority regarding Indian lands and rights.

The act prohibits non-Indians from settling or residing on lands belonging to or occupied by any Indian tribe, rendering any contracts allowing such residency void. If violations occur, county judges must issue warrants for removal upon proof of settlement. The relators contested the judge's jurisdiction, claiming title to the land based on a written instrument and asserting their right to a jury trial under state law. Their plea was rejected. They argued that the 12,800-acre Tonawanda reservation was not owned by the Seneca Indians and referenced a treaty from May 20, 1842, which they claimed conveyed the land to Thomas Ludlow Ogden and Joseph Fellows, confirmed by Massachusetts and New York. The judge ruled against them, leading to an appeal to the Supreme Court. The court found the legislation constitutional, reaffirming that individuals settling on Indian lands before the extinguishment of Indian title cannot claim protection under the Constitution for property rights. The statute is characterized as a police regulation aimed at protecting Indians from white intrusions and maintaining peace, affirming New York's sovereign power to enforce such protections.

The State possesses absolute authority to enact regulations for community peace, which aligns with the U.S. Constitution. The statute in question does not conflict with any federal law, as there is no congressional authorization for white individuals to trespass on Indian lands. The rights of Ogden and Fellows under the 1842 treaty are contingent upon their ability to demonstrate a right of entry, which is not established since the United States has not removed the Indians from their territory. The Tonawanda band occupies its reserve peacefully and cannot be forcibly ousted without government intervention. The legitimacy of the treaty's enforcement regarding the Tonawanda band falls under the political realm, not judicial review. The New York statute protects the Indians' possession without requiring them to prove ownership, allowing them to resist white intrusions as long as they remain in peaceful possession. The court previously ruled in Fellows v. Blacksmith that the treaty does not dictate the process for Indian removal, which must occur through government action. Consequently, until the government facilitates their removal, the Indians are safeguarded against encroachments. The court affirms that the statute and proceedings do not violate the treaty, any federal law, or the Constitution, and upholds the judgment of the New York Court of Appeals with costs.