Court: District Court, S.D. New York; September 13, 2012; Federal District Court
Anthony and Patricia Dilworth, referred to as the "Dilworths," have initiated a legal action linked to Anthony Dilworth’s confinement at the Westchester County Jail (WCJ), citing multiple federal and state claims against New York Medical College (NYMC), Westchester County, the Westchester County Health Care Corporation (WCHCC), and 47 individuals. A prior ruling dismissed several claims from their second amended complaint, including those against NYMC. The Dilworths have sought permission to amend their complaint for a third time, which the County Defendants oppose, while NYMC submitted a memorandum opposing the motion.
The procedural history reveals that Anthony Dilworth filed a pro se complaint regarding his treatment at WCJ in May 2009 but later dismissed it after retaining counsel. The current action's complaint was filed in March 2010, followed by an amendment in April, and a second amended complaint in September. The court granted some motions to dismiss against the second amended complaint.
In the proposed third amended complaint, which is 89 pages long and assumed to be true for the motion's resolution, key allegations include that from October 3, 2008, to September 23, 2009, Anthony Dilworth, an African-American pretrial detainee, suffered severe injuries from a slip and fall caused by liquid wax spilled on the floor by a trustee. No caution signs were displayed, and a correctional officer had abandoned their post. Following the incident, instead of summoning emergency assistance, staff instructed other inmates to assist Dilworth to the infirmary, violating established protocols.
Klivans, Rogers, James, Kadel, Malfer, and Birrittella were present in the infirmary when Dilworth arrived. James conducted a superficial examination of Dilworth, inaccurately documenting his medical condition. Dilworth was released from medical care contrary to established regulations. Despite his injuries, which were evident to nurse Patricia and correction officers, no emergency code was called, and he received no emergency medical care. After meeting with his wife, Dilworth was returned to his bed in a wheelchair but was left unattended, violating emergency medical protocols. Rogers pressured Dilworth to sign misleading documents that would waive his legal claims against Westchester County and others.
The following day, December 17, 2008, Dilworth expressed severe breathing difficulties and back pain to a group that included Klivans, Malfer, and Rogers. He was taken to the medical clinic, where it was observed that he had a chemical burn from a fall. Dilworth was not provided access to emergency medical personnel, despite a sergeant's recommendation for hospital transport. Instead, he was sent to J2 Dorm, which lacked accessibility for handicapped individuals, contrary to medical guidelines. Throughout his time at J2 Dorm from December 17 to December 22, 2008, Dilworth faced multiple denials of meals, bathing, and pain medication. He was left in unsanitary conditions and was unable to use the restroom due to a lack of medical aids, with his requests for a wheelchair ignored and crutches eventually confiscated by Rogers.
Dilworth was prohibited from filing sick call slips or grievances at the WCJ, facing threats from correction officers, particularly Rogers, who enforced this denial of treatment. Patricia visited him on December 23, 27, and 30, 2008; during the last visit, Dilworth appeared in distress due to extreme pain. While housed in J2 Dorm, officers repeatedly discouraged him from submitting grievances and denied his requests for sick call slips. Rogers instructed staff to deny any requests from Dilworth. Although he submitted grievances to the New York State Commission of Correction, which led to a promise for hospital treatment that was never fulfilled, he faced coercion to waive legal claims in exchange for medical treatment and other benefits.
Dilworth's privileges, including access to the law library and recreation, were revoked, and he received inadequate medical care despite his known injuries. Dr. Goldberg, who prescribed minimal pain relief (Tylenol), dismissed Dilworth's concerns about its effects on his high blood pressure and refused to renew necessary prescriptions due to cost concerns. Although Dilworth was authorized for wheelchair use, this was revoked by Rogers, and both jail logbooks and medical records were falsified to obscure the lack of care. Dilworth was also denied access to his accident report. On February 12, 2008, he was referred to Mental Health Services, where Dr. Schramm noted that J2 Dorm was an inappropriate housing area for him, but no action was taken to transfer him or provide adequate medical attention.
Dr. Schramm did not provide mental health care to Mr. Dilworth. During a physical examination by Dr. Goldberg, Dilworth experienced severe pain when his legs were manipulated, leading him to scream for relief. Despite his distress, Dr. Goldberg continued the examination, which resulted in a painful pop in Dilworth's lower back. Subsequently, Dilworth was forced to walk on his heels, leading to a fall that exacerbated his injuries.
While attempting to shower, a plastic chair broke, causing Dilworth to fall and injure his face and teeth, resulting in the loss of two teeth and a lacerated lip. Despite the visible signs of infection in his gums, Dr. Goldberg dismissed Dilworth's multiple requests for dental care and falsely claimed to have examined him. After two weeks, DOC personnel acknowledged that Dilworth should have received antibiotics and dental care but refused to extract a broken tooth due to its location.
Additionally, Dilworth was forced to witness a violent assault on another inmate by Patrick, while SanMarco ordered him to watch and suggested that signing fraudulent documents would ease his situation. Goldberg, Kadel, and James were present but did not intervene. Neither Patrick, Rogers, nor SanMarco faced any disciplinary action for their actions. In early 2009, when Dilworth sought access to the law library to file a notice of claim against Westchester County, Rogers denied his request but later provided a generic claim form.
Rogers unlawfully modified a notice of claim by designating an unauthorized recipient for Mr. Dilworth’s claims against Westchester County. Correction officers, including Rogers, encouraged inmates to physically assault Dilworth, who suffered repeated attacks, including being hit with hard objects and later beaten in a bathroom. Despite his reports to officers like Maccabee, Poggi, and Rogers, they did not intervene. One inmate, Thomas, indicated the beatings were done at Rogers' behest. Officer Freeman was present during a severe beating but also failed to act.
After rejecting protective custody, Dilworth was moved to J1 Dorm, where he faced denial of access to the law library and neglect of medical needs. Officers dismissed his injuries, calling him "delusional," while Garrett subjected him to painful confinement that led to incontinence. An Imam suggested Dilworth needed medical attention, but Klivans remarked, "We’re breaking him." Dilworth's requests for basic care were denied, and he faced threats and racial slurs from correctional officers, including an incident where Officer Santos displayed a racist tattoo and threatened violence. Dilworth filed a grievance regarding Santos's conduct, but was told it would not be addressed due to the officer's right to expression. On January 8, 2009, Dilworth had an appointment with an optometrist due to vision issues stemming from an earlier incident.
Dr. Bailey-Wallaee misdiagnosed Mr. Dilworth as having poor vision to justify the denial of medical care for his severe head injury. In February 2009, Kadel informed Dilworth that he had chronic nerve damage linked to his head injury, which likely caused his blurry vision, uncontrollable shaking, and incontinence, and indicated a possible pinched nerve in his spine. While in J Dorm, Dilworth submitted several commissary orders, many of which were unfilled. He was incorrectly told that a lack of funds was the reason for this, and when he complained to Rogers, he was denied commissary privileges due to his outspoken nature. Rogers offered to restore these privileges if Dilworth signed a document waiving his legal claims, which Dilworth refused. Despite bringing his complaints to various correction officers, no investigations were conducted, and his commissary orders continued to be disrupted.
After being reassigned to A Block for access to a handicap cell, Dilworth faced threats from Goldberg, who threatened to stop his pain medication unless he revealed who assigned him to the cell. During his time in A Block, Dilworth did not receive consistent pain medication, meals, or assistance with daily needs. In May 2009, Goldberg arbitrarily discontinued his pain medication. Dilworth was also prevented from filing grievances, as officers were instructed not to accept them. Garrett interfered with Dilworth's visits and inflicted pain by forcing him into uncomfortable positions. Dilworth experienced retaliatory acts for his legal actions, including threats against his family and continuous cell lighting ordered by Rogers, who also mandated searches of Dilworth by newly hired correction officers without justification.
Smiley, a member of the Special Investigation Unit, informed Dilworth that his torture was a consequence of his federal lawsuit. On May 15, 2009, Dilworth was moved to a handicap-accessible cell. From May 21, 2009, he was confined for 41 days due to false disciplinary charges. While in A-Block, Dilworth submitted 50 grievances concerning unfulfilled commissary orders, all of which went uninvestigated. Donna Blackmon from Aramark confirmed that Dilworth’s funds were improperly withdrawn and that she had received no documentation regarding his complaints. On June 12, 2009, Blackmon found that several of Dilworth's Aramark orders were wrongly stored and noted that another inmate with a legal claim against Westchester County faced similar issues. A correctional officer remarked to Dilworth, "What do you expect, you’re suing the County."
Dilworth's medical chart was reviewed by Schramm, who noted the cessation of his pain medications by Dr. Goldberg. Despite Dilworth reporting ongoing torture, he was denied medical and mental health care. On June 13, 2009, officers Rogers, Wyatt, and Tejeda entered Dilworth’s cell demanding his legal documents. Upon his refusal, they conducted an illegal strip search in view of others, during which Rogers mocked Dilworth about his injuries. They confiscated all of Dilworth’s personal belongings, including important legal papers, and Rogers made derogatory comments about Dilworth's lawsuit. The officers also inflicted pain on him using an illegal technique, and his belongings were not returned. On June 15, 2009, another search led to the confiscation of writing materials and approved medical supplies. Subsequent searches occurred frequently, including another strip search at the end of June, during which Dilworth reported severe back pain, to which Rogers responded with indifference and suggested Dilworth waive his legal claims against Westchester County.
Rogers ordered the removal of a mattress prescribed for Dilworth’s injuries. On August 11, 2009, the Dilworths informed Spano about Mr. Dilworth’s severe injuries and mistreatment by Goldberg, Rogers, and others, including eavesdropping by correction officers. Spano asked Soychak about these claims, but Soychak falsely claimed it was his first hearing of the complaints. Despite this, no changes occurred for Dilworth, who faced ongoing threats, mail tampering, increased searches, confiscation of belongings, and restrictions on commissary orders due to account inaccuracies. Dilworth discussed these issues with Lantz, who relayed the information to Amicucci and Spano.
On September 1, 2009, Dr. Goldberg expressed interest in treating Dilworth post-release and revealed concerning health issues, including ineffective medication for back pain, a chipped elbow bone, nerve damage causing hand shaking, impotence from a slip and fall, a cracked vertebra leaking fluid, and inadequate medical care due to budget constraints. He advised Dilworth needed a CT scan but could only receive either that or an MRI.
On September 11, 2009, after hiring a lawyer, Dilworth was subjected to a full body search by Watson and Tejeda, who claimed to have received a tip from Spano’s office. Following this, his legal documents were sent to Spano. Later, Garrett confined Dilworth to a holding cell, confiscated his crutches, forced him to stand for 45 minutes, and denied him pain medication while responding in a derogatory manner when Dilworth requested to speak to a sergeant.
Throughout his stay in A-Block, Dilworth faced numerous adverse actions: denial of pain medication and haircuts, arbitrary confinement, shortened visits with his family and attorney, reduced food portions due to Dr. Goldberg's diet orders, and repeated confiscation of his crutches. His food was tampered with, and he was made to stand without crutches for up to thirty minutes. Despite submitting multiple sick call slips for medical care related to incontinence and discussing the issue with Dr. Goldberg on three occasions, his grievances were consistently denied or ignored, and he faced obstacles in obtaining grievance forms. Santos claimed he was merely following orders when Dilworth questioned his treatment.
Goldberg documented Mr. Dilworth's incontinence and stamped his file. Between December 22, 2008, and September 23, 2009, Rogers confiscated multiple religious items from Dilworth, including four Bibles and various prayer books, severely restricting his ability to practice his faith. Additionally, personal belongings like family pictures, a diary, and prescribed medical items (crutches, extra mattresses, sneakers, and portable urinals) were taken, with Rogers labeling them as "contraband." Despite Dr. Goldberg's awareness of these confiscations and his promise to intervene, the items continued to be taken, and he failed to prevent Rogers from denying the use of sneakers, even directing others to erase computer entries that authorized them.
From January 21, 2009, to September 2009, Rogers, Quinoy, and other officers fabricated around twenty disciplinary charges against Dilworth, most of which were dismissed. Dilworth was released from custody on September 23, 2009, but faced threats from Rogers, who made racially charged remarks towards him. Upon release, his personal belongings were mishandled, leading to contamination with hygiene products.
Dilworth struggled with impotence and physical injuries post-release, which were confirmed by a social services evaluation that deemed him permanently disabled due to his detention-related injuries. After filing a complaint on March 15, 2010, Westchester County began investigating the allegations. On April 7, 2010, Bourhill placed a marked prison uniform at Dilworth's home, accompanied by racially derogatory writings. Tejeda, an accomplice, informed Dilworth about this incident. On August 30, 2010, at a service station, Garrett and Bourhill were present, with Garrett warning Bourhill of Dilworth's arrival, subsequently yelling racial slurs at him.
On December 28, 2011, SanMarco threatened Mr. Dilworth during a medical appointment by mimicking the gesture of donning leather gloves, a known precursor to physical force among correction officers, which resulted in severe emotional trauma for Dilworth. A subsequent investigation by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) from February 25 to 28, 2008, revealed significant constitutional violations at the Westchester County Jail (WCJ), including a pattern of inadequate protection for inmates from staff harm, insufficient medical and mental health care, and excessive use of force by the Emergency Response Team (ERT). The DOJ noted that WCJ's documentation of use of force incidents was inadequate and that the grievance system for detainees was poorly maintained and inconsistently implemented. It found that correction officers often did not provide grievance forms to inmates, leading to confusion about how to file complaints. The DOJ's findings prompted recommendations for remedial actions to address these deficiencies. The inadequate medical and mental health care identified was provided by various entities, including WCHCC and NYMC, which were responsible for the medical request process and grievance procedures from January 1, 2006, to September 23, 2009.
Westchester County, WCHCC, and NYMC allegedly failed to adequately train or supervise their employees regarding the treatment of inmates at the Westchester County Jail (WCJ), particularly concerning instances of gross negligence, recklessness, and deliberate indifference to the serious medical, dental, and mental health needs of inmates. NYMC is described as a private medical school in New York, and since 2004, it has maintained a written Affiliation Agreement with WCHCC to facilitate medical care for inmates. WCHCC is claimed to have acted as NYMC’s agent in contracts with Westchester County for providing medical services to inmates. These contracts stipulated that medical services must adhere to constitutional and statutory standards. NYMC was responsible for overseeing the medical care provided by its physicians, including Drs. Bailey-Wallace, Goldberg, and Schramm, who are individually named in the lawsuit. The excerpt also outlines the legal standard for amending complaints under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), which allows amendments unless there is undue delay, bad faith, prejudice to the opposing party, or futility. An amendment is considered futile if it cannot survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal of claims that fail to state a viable legal claim. The excerpt emphasizes that while allegations in a complaint are presumed true, this does not extend to legal conclusions.
Plaintiffs must provide more than mere labels and conclusory statements to support their entitlement to relief; a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements is insufficient. Courts should disregard conclusory statements and instead assess whether the complaint presents sufficient factual matter that, if accepted as true, establishes a plausible claim. A claim is considered facially plausible when the factual content allows for a reasonable inference of the defendant’s liability, requiring more than just a possibility of unlawful conduct. If the well-pleaded facts only suggest a possibility of misconduct without demonstrating entitlement to relief, the complaint is inadequate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
The proposed Third Amended Complaint (TAC) includes four causes of action against NYMC: 1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on Monell v. Department of Social Services; 2) a respondeat superior liability claim; 3) a breach of contract claim; and 4) a claim for negligence, medical negligence, gross negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court had previously dismissed the Monell and respondeat superior claims from the second amended complaint. NYMC argues that the amendments in the TAC are futile as they fail to establish valid claims.
For a § 1983 claim to proceed, plaintiffs must demonstrate that a constitutional or federal statutory right was violated and that this deprivation occurred under color of state law. § 1983 does not create substantive rights but serves as a mechanism for redress for rights established by law.
NYMC does not contest that it acted under color of law. The Supreme Court's ruling in Monell allows for municipalities to be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when unconstitutional actions stem from officially adopted policies or regulations. Although Monell specifically applies to municipal governments, case law has extended this doctrine to private entities acting under state law. However, private employers cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees' constitutional violations; instead, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy of the private entity. To establish a claim under § 1983 against a private entity, a plaintiff must show the entity acted under color of state law and identify the existence of a policy through one of several means, such as a formal policy, actions by policy-making officials, a widespread custom, or failure to train employees leading to deliberate indifference.
The plaintiff's proposed third amended complaint alleges that from January 2006 to September 2009, NYMC controlled the medical care provided to inmates at the Westchester County Jail (WCJ) and was responsible for training the physicians involved. Additionally, in 2007, NYMC officials had discussions with Westchester County officials regarding prior allegations of improper medical treatment, as referenced in the case Jones v. Westchester County Department of Corrections Medical Department.
As of March 31, 2008, Westchester County policy officials engaged with New York Medical College (NYMC) regarding preliminary findings and recommendations from the Department of Justice (DOJ) following an inspection of the Westchester County Jail (WCJ) conducted from February 25-28, 2008. These preliminary findings aligned closely with a DOJ letter dated November 19, 2009, which identified deficiencies in medical and mental health care at the jail, attributed to Westchester County, WCHCC, NYMC, and individuals Bailey, Goldberg, and Schramm. The plaintiffs assert that from January 1, 2006, to September 23, 2009, these entities provided inadequate care and failed to properly train or supervise employees regarding inmates' serious medical needs.
Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the medical request process and grievance mechanism (CHS-A-11) were managed by NYMC and/or WCHCC during the aforementioned period. They argue that the severity of Dilworth's injuries indicated a clear need for medical attention, supported by testimony that he required a wheelchair and hospitalization.
The plaintiffs seek to establish a "policy" under the Second Circuit's Monell analysis by demonstrating failures in training and supervision. However, the court finds the allegations insufficient to meet the criteria for Monell liability. The claims do not identify any NYMC employees as final policymakers, which is essential to establish a municipal policy. Merely having individuals implement potentially unconstitutional policies does not suffice; actions must be taken by authorized final policymakers. The proposed third complaint fails to demonstrate that the doctors involved were final policymakers or that their actions represented official NYMC policy. Additionally, to show constructive knowledge of unconstitutional actions, plaintiffs must prove that policymakers were aware and chose to ignore persistent and pervasive misconduct.
A plaintiff under Section 1983 can demonstrate a custom or policy by proving that the entity, aware of unconstitutional actions by its employees, displayed deliberate indifference. To prove this indifference, a plaintiff must show that the need for further action to prevent constitutional violations was evident. The plaintiffs argue that their proposed third amended complaint meets the criteria for establishing an official policy, as it alleges that “policy level officials” were aware of another plaintiff's allegations in a separate case. However, a single lawsuit does not suffice to indicate the pervasive constitutional violations required by legal precedent, as evidenced by prior decisions stating that one or two complaints are insufficient to demonstrate a widespread practice.
The plaintiffs' assertion that NYMC’s policy officials were informed of preliminary findings by the Department of Justice does not prove awareness of systemic constitutional violations, particularly since these findings pertained to WCJ, not NYMC, and indicated only inadequate medical care, not a broader unconstitutional practice. Furthermore, allegations concerning deficiencies in the medical grievance process do not satisfy the higher standard of deliberate indifference. Although the complaint suggests NYMC had some influence over the assignment of doctors at WCJ, it acknowledges that other entities, like WCHCC, were also involved in providing medical care. Simply labeling an NYMC employee as a “policy level official” does not suffice to establish them as a policymaker without factual support regarding their responsibilities and influence in policymaking.
Regarding the failure to supervise or train municipal agents, such negligence constitutes deliberate indifference only if the need for improved supervision to prevent constitutional violations was clear. The plaintiffs claim that NYMC was responsible for the medical training of certain individuals providing care at WCJ, suggesting a potential failure in oversight.
NYMC is accused of failing to adequately train or supervise its employees regarding the serious medical, dental, and mental health needs of inmates, which led to alleged gross negligence and intentional infliction of pain by DOC employees. However, this claim lacks specificity as it does not demonstrate that the named doctors—Bailey-Wallace, Goldberg, and Schramm—were inadequately trained for their medical duties. The implication that further training was necessary is not substantiated and cannot support a Monell claim against NYMC. Furthermore, attempts to amend the complaint to include this claim are deemed futile due to insufficient grounds.
In relation to respondeat superior liability, the doctrine holds employers vicariously liable for torts committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment. However, employers are not liable for acts motivated by personal interests rather than the employer's business. While employees exhibiting human failings in the course of their work do not absolve the employer from liability, the key consideration is whether the act was performed while the employee was engaged in the employer’s work, regardless of how irregular or unauthorized the actions may have been. The First Department has articulated that there is no singular test to determine if an employee is acting within the employer's business; instead, various factors are considered, such as the employer's control over the employee’s actions, whether the employee acted with the employer's authority, and whether the act served the employer's interests.
NYMC contends that it cannot be held liable for tort claims against Drs. Goldberg, Bailey-Wallace, and Schramm due to a lack of allegations regarding their employment scope. However, the proposed third amended complaint specifies that all three doctors are employed by NYMC, detailing their roles in providing medical and mental health care to WCJ inmates. Tort claims against the doctors stem from their professional responsibilities, which typically fall within the scope of their employment. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a hospital can be vicariously liable for its employees' malpractice if the acts were performed in furtherance of the hospital's business. NYMC's argument that vicarious liability requires awareness of employee misconduct is incorrect; foreseeability of the tortious conduct is sufficient. Although NYMC's arguments against vicarious liability are dismissed, the state law claims against the doctors are found to fail on the merits. Additionally, plaintiffs assert a new breach of contract claim against NYMC, alleging that they are third-party beneficiaries of a contract between NYMC and Westchester County for inmate medical treatment, despite not being parties to the contract.
A party claiming rights as a third-party beneficiary must demonstrate three elements: 1) the existence of a valid contract between other parties, 2) that the contract was intended to benefit the claimant, and 3) that the benefit to the claimant is sufficiently immediate to establish a duty of compensation from the contracting parties if the benefit is lost. In the referenced case, the plaintiff's claim was dismissed due to a failure to plead the relevant contract provisions, which is necessary for a breach of contract claim. Case law requires specific allegations regarding the agreement's terms and the breach, rather than vague assertions. The proposed third amended complaint did not identify specific provisions violated or provide a factual basis for the claim, merely asserting that defendants had binding contracts intended for the plaintiff's benefit. Furthermore, references to local laws did not resolve these issues, as they only authorized contracting but did not constitute contracts themselves, nor did they involve the defendant NYMC. Consequently, the complaint failed to provide the necessary detail to inform the court and the parties about the relevant transactions and elements of the claim, falling short of the pleading standards established in Twombly.
In New York, a negligence claim requires plaintiffs to establish that the defendant owed a duty of care, breached that duty, and that the breach caused damages. A breach occurs when a party fails to exercise reasonable care. Without a duty of care, there can be no breach or liability. In this case, plaintiffs allege that NYMC had a duty to protect Mr. Dilworth but do not specify the origin of this duty or provide sufficient support for their claims in their proposed third amended complaint. Their only argument for negligence against NYMC is based on respondeat superior for the actions of individual doctors, but they fail to assert a direct duty of care from NYMC to the plaintiffs. Consequently, the proposed claims for negligence, medical negligence, and gross negligence against NYMC are deemed insufficient, leading to the denial of the motion to amend.
For claims of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law, plaintiffs must demonstrate extreme and outrageous conduct, intent to cause severe emotional distress, a causal link to the injury, and resultant severe emotional distress. Both types of claims require a showing of conduct that is beyond the bounds of decency and intolerable in a civilized society. In this instance, no extreme conduct by NYMC is alleged, and plaintiffs have not countered the defendants' arguments, indicating they may have abandoned this claim.
Claims against NYMC cannot proceed as they would not survive a motion to dismiss, resulting in the denial of plaintiffs' request to amend the complaint to include NYMC as a defendant. Regarding the County Defendants, plaintiffs aim to amend their second amended complaint with new factual allegations. Defendants object, asserting that these facts were known or should have been known at the time of prior pleadings, and argue that amendments after an inordinate delay should be scrutinized. Case law stipulates that a party seeking to amend after substantial delay must provide a satisfactory explanation for that delay; otherwise, the court may deny the amendment if it prejudices other parties or prolongs proceedings by introducing new issues. In this case, the district court ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss on September 30, 2011, and plaintiffs expressed their intent to file a third amended complaint on October 18, 2011. Discovery was stayed on January 27, 2012, and had not significantly progressed by that time, which means defendants did not demonstrate any prejudice from the proposed new allegations. Although courts have denied amendments due to delay in different circumstances, those situations involved lengthy delays after discovery had closed or significant shifts in case strategy. Consequently, the plaintiffs' motion to amend will not be denied on the basis of delay in asserting previously known facts, leading to a review of the County Defendants' substantive objections to the proposed amendments.
The County Defendants contend that the proposed amendments to allegations of unconstitutional conditions of confinement by Dilworth are futile and should be denied, as they do not sufficiently state a claim. Dilworth asserts that 46 employees of the WCJ conspired to subject him to unconstitutional conditions from September 16, 2008, to September 23, 2009, intending to inflict physical and psychological harm in retaliation for his court access. As a pretrial detainee, Dilworth's claims are assessed under the Fourteenth Amendment, mirroring the Eighth Amendment's standard for deliberate indifference. The Supreme Court has clarified that while the Constitution does not require comfortable prisons, it prohibits inhumane conditions. The Eighth Amendment mandates humane confinement conditions, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must demonstrate that the defendants acted with "deliberate indifference" to his health or safety, which involves both an objective component—showing the deprivation is sufficiently serious—and a subjective component—demonstrating the official's culpable state of mind. The objective aspect requires the alleged deprivation to deny the prisoner minimal civilized necessities, while the subjective element requires the official to be aware of and disregard a substantial risk to inmate health or safety.
The claim of "unconstitutional conditions of confinement" involves several defendants, including Feaster, Vega, and others. The County Defendants argue that the plaintiff, Dilworth, fails to demonstrate how his allegations align with established case law governing such claims. Specific incidents attributed to Feaster include preventing meal deliveries and erroneously denying Dilworth sufficient funds for commissary purchases, as well as arbitrary confinement to his cell. Despite Dilworth's assertions that the cumulative misconduct of the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, he does not adequately explain each defendant's personal involvement in the alleged unconstitutional conditions, which is essential for liability under Section 1983. The court notes that even if numerous minor incidents could collectively suggest deliberate indifference, individual defendants cannot be held accountable for actions they did not personally commit. Additionally, the claim of conspiracy among the defendants is deemed vague and insufficient to establish personal involvement, violating the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine. Consequently, the inclusion of these defendants in the claim is considered futile, and the request for leave to amend to add them is denied. Officer Garrett is also included in the claim, but his arguments regarding his conduct’s relevance to deliberate indifference are minimal.
Sufficient allegations exist in the proposed pleading to support a claim against Garrett, despite his argument for dismissal based on plaintiffs' prior knowledge of the facts and their omission of this amendment in their motion to amend. The court finds these arguments insufficient to prevent the amendment, allowing the addition of a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement against Garrett.
Regarding Officer Driesen, the County Defendants assert that the statute of limitations has expired on the § 1983 claim. However, the claim accrued on January 23, 2009, when Driesen allegedly coerced Mr. Dilworth into signing fraudulent documents. This claim was initially filed in a timely manner within the Second Amended Complaint on September 17, 2010, despite its later dismissal. The Third Amended Complaint can relate back to this filing date since it arises from the same conduct.
Finally, the County Defendants argue against allowing a new claim for substantial burdens on religious exercise under § 1983, citing undue delay. However, the Second Amended Complaint already contained a similar claim against the same defendants, countering the assertion that this claim was omitted previously.
Claims have been made against Foy, Quast, Rogers, Schmidt, Tejeda, and Wyatt for violating Mr. Dilworth's religious exercise rights as a pretrial detainee at the WCJ, asserting substantial burdens without a legitimate penological interest, thereby breaching the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. The defendants argue that the Third Amended Complaint fails to establish that the WCJ is a program receiving federal financial assistance, a requirement for RLUIPA claims, which the plaintiffs do not contest, leading to the conclusion that this claim should be dismissed.
Additionally, a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is brought against Bourhill, Tony Freeman, Garrett, Patrick, Quinoy, Rogers, SanMarco, Santos, Christopher Smith, Tejeda, Turner, Wyatt, and unidentified "Frank Foe" defendants. This claim alleges that these individuals conspired to deny Mr. Dilworth benefits based on his race, specifically regarding medical care and other rights associated with contracts and legal claims. The factual allegations include racial discrimination, denial of medical care and pain medication, interference with commissary purchases, tampering with financial accounts, coercion to waive legal claims, and various forms of mistreatment while in custody. The actions attributed to the defendants include using racial slurs, threatening harm, and misrepresenting Mr. Dilworth's medical condition, contributing to claims of unconstitutional conditions of confinement and retaliation for pursuing civil rights litigation.
Mr. Dilworth was threatened in his doctor's office on December 28, 2011. To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) they are a member of a racial minority, (2) there was intent to discriminate based on race by the defendant, and (3) the discrimination pertains to activities outlined in the statute. While § 1981 can be the basis for a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, it does not independently provide a remedy for conspiracy violations. A claim for conspiracy under § 1985 requires: (1) an agreement between two or more parties, (2) an intention to deprive the plaintiff of a legal right, (3) an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (4) resulting injury to the plaintiff. However, allegations fail to support a § 1985 claim if the conduct in question reflects a single act by one corporation through its agents, as these individuals cannot conspire with one another within the scope of their employment. This principle extends to municipal entities, such as counties. Since the alleged conspirators were employees of Westchester County acting within their employment scope, the conspiracy claim is invalid as the county cannot conspire with itself. An exception exists if the plaintiff shows that the defendants were pursuing personal interests separate from the entity.
The court recommended the dismissal of conspiracy claims in Roniger v. McCall due to violations of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which was upheld by the district judge. The claims in the proposed third amended complaint, alleging that County Defendants conspired to violate civil rights under §1981, faced similar deficiencies. All defendants were employees of the same entity, Westchester County Jail (WCJ), and their actions were within their employment scope. Plaintiffs' claims lacked evidence that the defendants acted with interests distinct from the WCJ. Although plaintiffs argued that various officers pressured a detainee, Dilworth, to drop legal claims, this pressure was directed at claims against Westchester County, indicating that the defendants were not pursuing independent interests. The plaintiffs also contended that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply in cases of ongoing discrimination, referencing a precedent that suggests a single act does not constitute a conspiracy. However, the Seventh Circuit has rejected this "multiple acts" exception, and the court aligned with this reasoning, reaffirming that such an exception does not align with the purpose of §1985. Multiple cases were cited to support this position, reinforcing the court's stance against the purported exception.
The plaintiffs' 1985 conspiracy claim, alleging a violation of 1981 rights, is deemed insufficient and must be excluded from the third amended complaint, as it would be futile. The plaintiffs assert that multiple defendants, including Bourhill, Klivans, and others, conspired in 1983 to violate Dilworth’s First Amendment rights in retaliation for his lawsuit against the County Defendants. All defendants were correctional officers employed by the DOC. The plaintiffs allege violations of § 1983, including denial of free association, threats of physical harm, obstruction of religious practices, filing of fraudulent charges, infliction of severe pain, denial of medical care, arbitrary confinement, interference with hygiene, and obstruction of communication with legal representatives.
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is applicable, as all defendants were employed by the same entity and acted within the scope of their employment, which bars the § 1983 conspiracy claim. The plaintiffs' arguments to establish that defendants acted outside their employment scope do not provide sufficient inference to overcome this doctrine.
Regarding the claims of intentional racial discrimination against Muller, Santos, and Tejeda under § 1983, the defendants argue for dismissal due to insufficient allegations. However, since the court allows plaintiffs to amend their pleadings with previously known facts, these claims will proceed.
Claims against SanMarco and Wyatt allege violations of Equal Protection based on race. To succeed, the plaintiffs must demonstrate both a racially discriminatory purpose and effect as established in relevant case law.
The County Defendants contend that the plaintiffs' claims against SanMarco and Wyatt should be dismissed due to a lack of allegations indicating racial animus. Plaintiffs claim that SanMarco’s actions, specifically forcing Dilworth to witness another inmate’s beating, imply racial bias, but the third amended complaint does not mention the race of the beaten inmate, Bowen, nor does it provide context for SanMarco's motivations. Similarly, while plaintiffs argue that Wyatt's execution of Rogers's orders reflects racial animus, the complaint lacks substantive allegations regarding Wyatt's intent or motivations. Thus, the proposed third amended complaint fails to establish a 1983 claim for intentional racial discrimination against either defendant, and allowing such claims would be futile.
Regarding the claims against Bourhill, the plaintiffs assert four allegations: a 1988 violation for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a 1983 violation for intentional racial discrimination, a 1985 conspiracy violation related to Dilworth’s 1981 rights, and a 1983 conspiracy violation regarding Dilworth's First Amendment rights. The court has previously deemed the conspiracy claims insufficient and will not revisit them. The relevant allegations against Bourhill include witnessing an incident where Dilworth was denied toilet access, overhearing a statement about Dilworth’s health, and hanging a mocking prison uniform on the plaintiffs’ residence. However, the plaintiffs fail to specify how long Dilworth was made to wear soiled clothing or the duration of his toilet deprivation, resulting in the conclusion that the claim of unconstitutional conditions does not meet the threshold for an Eighth Amendment violation.
Temporary deprivation of toilet access without serious physical harm or contamination risk does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. In Whitted v. Lazerson, a plaintiff's claim was dismissed when he suffered no injury after being denied toilet access for 90 minutes. Similarly, in Gill v. Riddick, the plaintiff's brief discomfort from holding urine was insufficient for an Eighth Amendment claim, as he did not allege health injury. The case also noted that Bourhill's indifference to a layperson’s opinion regarding an inmate’s medical need did not equate to deliberate indifference. The absence of allegations regarding the inmate’s condition, besides having urinated on himself, did not meet the severity required for an Eighth Amendment claim. Comments made by a correctional officer were deemed irrelevant since the deprivation involved only a brief inability to use the bathroom and change clothing, categorizing it as de minimis. Therefore, the plaintiff's § 1983 claim regarding unconstitutional conditions against Bourhill was dismissed. Bourhill's argument that he wasn't acting under color of state law was rejected, as his role as a correction officer related directly to the detainee's treatment. The court affirmed that the § 1983 claim of intentional race discrimination against Bourhill could proceed. In claims against Tony Freeman, a § 1983 claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement was raised, alleging he notarized fraudulent documents related to the plaintiff's pro se complaint. However, a conspiracy claim under § 1985 was deemed futile by the court.
A claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement necessitates a demonstration of "deliberate indifference" to a plaintiff's health or safety, as established in Farmer v. Brennan. The current allegations do not pertain to such conditions, making them insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Regarding loss of consortium claims under § 1983, these claims are not permissible since they do not involve direct injuries linked to the deprivation of rights. Several cases confirm that § 1983 does not support derivative claims for loss of consortium, leading to the conclusion that any amendment to include this claim would be futile.
The County Defendants initially contested negligence and medical negligence allegations against Westchester County but later withdrew their objections, contingent upon modifications to the proposed complaint to align with a prior order from Judge Holwell. Plaintiffs have asserted they are waiving claims exceeding those allowed by Judge Holwell’s ruling, resulting in granted leave to amend consistent with their representations.
Finally, the County Defendants seek dismissal of state law tort claims against Drs. Bailey-Wallace, Goldberg, and Schramm on several grounds: alleged abandonment of related claims in earlier complaints, the statute of limitations barring claims against some doctors, and failure to sufficiently state claims for gross negligence or emotional distress. The plaintiffs did not assert medical malpractice claims previously and now only claim negligence against the doctors, leading the County Defendants to argue that the abandonment of medical malpractice claims precludes raising new claims related to the physicians' treatment of the plaintiff, Dilworth.
Plaintiffs are allowed to reassert previously abandoned claims unless undue prejudice or delay would result, as established in Georgiadis v. First Bos. Corp. and Ferguson v. Kelly. The County Defendants did not demonstrate any undue prejudice or delay that would arise from permitting the amendments, leading the Court to reject their argument against adding these claims.
Plaintiffs do not allege malpractice against Drs. Bailey, Goldberg, or Schramm, likely to evade the notice requirements under N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law. 50-d and to avoid statute of limitations issues in N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law. 50-i(l)(c). However, medical malpractice is categorized as a form of negligence, and there is no strict division between the two, as noted in Scott v. Uljanov. The distinction exists primarily for legislative reasons relating to different statutes of limitations for medical negligence and general negligence.
Claims presented as "medical negligence" rather than "malpractice" remain subject to the same legal requirements. Plaintiffs must comply with General Municipal Law 50-d and other statutes governing medical malpractice claims. The nature of the claims against the doctors, which relates to their medical treatment and diagnoses, inherently classifies them as medical malpractice. Thus, the allegations against Drs. Schramm, Bailey-Wallace, and Goldberg pertain to their professional conduct in providing medical services, including treatment and diagnosis failures.
Claims against the County Defendants are primarily characterized as medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence, with the plaintiff not asserting a viable basis for pursuing medical malpractice claims. Consequently, claims of "negligence" and "medical negligence" are insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The County Defendants assert that the proposed third amended complaint fails to adequately allege gross negligence and intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress against Drs. Goldberg, Bailey-Wallace, and Schramm.
To establish gross negligence in New York, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a duty and failed to exercise even slight care, suggesting intentional wrongdoing or reckless indifference. The law indicates that plaintiffs cannot circumvent statutes of limitations for malpractice by recharacterizing their claims as gross negligence. A claim of gross negligence must demonstrate conduct that exceeds ordinary malpractice, bordering on criminality, which the allegations against the doctors do not meet.
For intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, conduct must be extraordinarily outrageous and intolerable. The allegations against the doctors, particularly Dr. Bailey's purported misdiagnosis and Dr. Schramm's failure to provide mental health care, are deemed too conclusory and do not satisfy the required standard. Although allegations against Dr. Goldberg are more detailed, they primarily critique his medical treatment, including failure to provide necessary medications and an incident where he allegedly caused significant distress to the plaintiff. Overall, the claims fail to meet the threshold for gross negligence or emotional distress as defined by case law.
Claims in Count XV against the doctors lack the necessary intent to cause severe emotional distress and do not amount to extreme or outrageous conduct. The plaintiffs failed to cite any relevant case law to support their claims, leading to a determination that these claims could not survive a motion to dismiss, and any leave to amend them must be denied. The plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint is granted in part and denied in part. They are allowed to amend their second amended complaint as proposed, with specific exclusions:
1. All claims against NYMC.
2. 1983 claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement against multiple defendants (Count VII).
3. Claims under RLUIPA (Count VI).
4. Claims of 1985 conspiracy to violate Dilworth’s rights (Count XIII).
5. Claims of 1983 conspiracy to violate Dilworth’s First Amendment rights (Count X).
6. 1983 claims of intentional race discrimination against specific defendants (Count VIII).
7. 1983 claims for loss of consortium (Count XVIII).
8. Claims of negligence and emotional distress against Drs. Goldberg, Bailey-Wallace, and Schramm (Count XV).
The parties collectively referred to as the "County Defendants" include numerous individuals and entities involved in the case. Various documents regarding the motion to amend and oppositions were filed, including a surreply from the County without court permission.
Plaintiffs filed a response on April 24, 2012, addressing the County Defendants’ surreply regarding their motion to amend the Second Amended Complaint. They contended that New York Medical College (NYMC) should not oppose the amendment as it is a non-party, despite being previously named in the Second Amended Complaint and having responded through a motion to dismiss, which was granted without final judgment. Plaintiffs emphasize that they have fully addressed NYMC's arguments in their reply submissions. The findings letter recommended that the WCJ establish comprehensive policies on the use of force, including definitions, prohibitions on punitive force, and effective oversight. It also called for a robust training program, a grievance process that ensures timely responses without requiring inmate confrontation with staff, and adequate access to healthcare for inmates, including a well-tracked medical request process. The plaintiffs clarified that allegations regarding NYMC’s employment of doctors and any contract with Westchester County Health Care Corporation (WCHCC) have been eliminated, acknowledging WCHCC as a distinct corporate entity from NYMC. County Defendants argued that the motion to amend should be denied due to insufficient detail in the proposed changes.
Counsel was expected to specify the amendments sought and provide supporting arguments for the plaintiffs' motion to amend. However, the court determined that the omission of a detailed list of amendments did not warrant a complete denial of the motion. The County Defendants' request to deny leave to amend did not reference applicable standards or case law beyond that related to deliberate indifference, leading the court to disregard their arguments against including claims in counts other than Count VII, as per S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 7.1(a)(2). The court noted that its ruling allows for future motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. The County Defendants had also contended that certain claims should be dismissed under New York General Municipal Law § 50-d, but they appeared to retract this objection, suggesting plaintiffs waived broader claims under a previous notice of claim. The court chose not to consider this retracted argument, especially since the County Defendants did not provide legal authority to support it. Plaintiffs also argued for the dismissal of this point due to the lack of citations from the County Defendants. The court acknowledged the limited legal citations in the plaintiffs' submissions and exercised discretion to consider various arguments made by both parties despite the absence of supporting legal authority.
