Amerititle, Inc. v. Gilliam County

Citations: 912 F. Supp. 2d 968; 2012 WL 6085273; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173661Docket: No. 2:09-cv-00318-MO

Court: District Court, D. Oregon; December 4, 2012; Federal District Court

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Plaintiff seeks attorney fees after a jury trial and a court-awarded declaratory and injunctive relief. The jury found that Gilliam County had an unconstitutional policy favoring local businesses, violating the Equal Protection and Commerce Clauses, but awarded no damages to the plaintiff. The court granted post-trial equitable relief, despite initial rulings that the claim was moot. Prior to trial, the plaintiff presented new evidence regarding wind farm projects that countered the mootness claim. The court determined that the evidence necessitated a reconsideration of the equitable relief request. Consequently, the court granted a declaration and injunction based on the jury's verdict. 

The defendants argue against awarding fees, citing Farrar v. Hobby, which allows courts discretion not to award fees when only nominal damages are granted. They also contend that the injunctive relief did not significantly alter the parties' legal relationship beyond the jury's verdict. Despite these arguments, the plaintiff is recognized as the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which permits fee awards in civil rights cases, though the limited success may justify a reduction in the amount awarded.

Nominal damages alone may not justify an attorney fee award, as indicated by the case of Farrar. However, subsequent Ninth Circuit rulings clarify that fees can be awarded if the litigation resulted in more than just a nominal damages judgment. In Mahach-Watkins v. Depee, the court established that fees are appropriate if the plaintiff achieved tangible results, such as policy changes or findings with collateral estoppel effects. Three critical factors influence this determination: 1) the disparity between the damages sought and the amount recovered, 2) the significance of the legal issues on which the plaintiff prevailed, and 3) whether the plaintiff accomplished a public good.

In this instance, while the first factor is unfavorable for the plaintiff due to the minimal recovery compared to the millions sought, the second and third factors favor the plaintiff significantly. Unlike Farrar, the jury's verdict in this case declared a county policy unconstitutional, addressing an important public issue related to government involvement in economic development. Therefore, the verdict supports a fee award.

The defendants contend that equitable relief does not support the fee request, as it merely enforces the jury verdict. However, the relationship between the equitable relief and the verdict is relevant to the fee's size. Although the injunction closely mirrors the jury's verdict, the plaintiff does gain some benefit for future enforcement. The concern arises that this argument could apply to all cases where an injunction aligns with a verdict. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Lefemine v. Wideman suggests that a party receiving injunctive relief qualifies as a prevailing party entitled to fees unless special circumstances exist.

The court finds no special circumstances justifying a different outcome and concludes that equitable relief warrants a fee award. The reasonable fees are determined using the lodestar calculation, assessing the reasonable hourly rates and hours worked, all deemed reasonable based on the case's nature and the practitioners' experience. The primary contention lies in the reasonable number of hours worked, but the court emphasizes that the degree of success is the most crucial factor. In nominal damage cases, courts may award low or no fees without evaluating all reasonableness factors, especially when a plaintiff achieves limited success. Here, the substantial difference between the millions sought and the one dollar awarded indicates limited success, which the court acknowledges as the primary focus of the litigation. While the plaintiff made efforts towards equitable relief that held some value, the overarching factor remains the degree of success. Consequently, the plaintiff is awarded half of the requested fees due to this limited success. The court finds no persuasive objections to costs and awards the plaintiff attorney fees totaling $315,420.00 and costs amounting to $55,579.40, culminating in a total award of $370,999.40.