Court: District Court, D. Hawaii; November 28, 2012; Federal District Court
The court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the County of Hawaii and the State of Hawaii, concluding that George K. Young, Jr.’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity concerning the State and State Officials. The court found that Young did not sufficiently allege a constitutional violation against the County and County Officials. Young's lawsuit alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, claiming that the denial of his application for a public carry weapon license under Hawaii Revised Statute (HRS) 134-9 infringed upon his constitutional rights, including those protected by the Second, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint also challenged HRS 134-6, which was repealed in 2006, asserting it was unconstitutional. The legal claims included violations of the U.S. Constitution regarding bills of attainder, obligations of contracts, and various amendments. Young sought damages, punitive damages, and an injunction against enforcing HRS Chapter 134, along with a three-year permit to carry a weapon. The procedural history outlined the timeline of the complaint, motions to dismiss, and responses, leading to the court's decision to resolve the matter without a hearing.
Plaintiff has previously filed two similar cases in the Federal District of Hawaii regarding the denial of his application to carry a weapon. In the first case, Young v. Hawaii (2008), the District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling that sovereign immunity barred the suit against State and State officials, and that Plaintiff lacked standing to sue for a Second Amendment violation as per the law at that time. The second case, Young v. Hawaii (2009), involved similar allegations after a subsequent denial of a permit, with three key differences: Plaintiff sued County Officials in both individual and official capacities, the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller provided a limited right to keep and bear arms, and the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the Second Amendment applies to the states. Despite these developments granting standing, Plaintiff was estopped from relitigating his claims due to the preclusive effect of the first case.
Defendants are moving to dismiss Counts I through V under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal if the complaint fails to state a claim. The court must accept all factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, but cannot accept conclusory allegations or those contradicting judicially noticeable facts. The pleading standards established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal require that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim for relief, moving beyond mere labels and unadorned accusations.
A claim is considered facially plausible when the plaintiff presents factual content that allows the court to reasonably infer the defendant's liability for the alleged misconduct. This plausibility standard requires more than mere possibility; it necessitates sufficient factual allegations to provide fair notice to the defendant and to justify the costs of discovery and litigation. Plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaints unless no amendment could remedy the deficiencies or if such an amendment would be futile, such as when claims are likely to fail at summary judgment.
In this case, the plaintiff's allegations stem from a denial of a firearm carry permit under HRS 134-9. The County and State Defendants seek to dismiss the claims, asserting that the plaintiff lacks standing and that the suit against the State of Hawaii is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The plaintiff's claims against the State and specific officials for violations related to civil rights are protected under sovereign immunity, which prevents lawsuits against states unless immunity is waived or abrogated by Congress. The Eleventh Amendment specifically restricts federal court jurisdiction over suits against a state by its own citizens or citizens of other states, and this immunity extends to state agencies.
Sovereign immunity prohibits federal statutory and constitutional claims for money damages against state officials in their official capacities unless there is a clear waiver. The State of Hawaii has not waived its sovereign immunity regarding civil rights actions in federal court, as established in Linville v. State of Hawaii. Additionally, Congress has not abrogated state immunity through 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, or 1986, as these statutes do not explicitly indicate such intent, following precedents like Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police. States and state officials are not considered "persons" under Section 1983 for claims seeking money damages, and similar rules apply to claims under 1985 and 1986. Consequently, the court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff's federal constitutional claims against the State of Hawaii and for money damages against the Governor and Attorney General of Hawaii, resulting in dismissal with prejudice. However, claims seeking prospective injunctive relief against the Governor and Attorney General in their official capacities are permitted under the Ex parte Young doctrine, which allows such suits to address ongoing violations of federal law.
Actions against state officials for ongoing violations of federal law are permissible if the relief sought is prospective, as established by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Young. Claims for retroactive relief are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, which prevents federal courts from awarding compensation for past injuries from state funds. A suitable connection between the state officer and the law's enforcement must be demonstrated, and general obligations to enforce state laws do not suffice. In this case, the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Hawaii's Firearm Carrying Laws, specifically arguing that restrictions in HRS Chapter 134 violate the Second Amendment. However, the analysis concludes that these laws are constitutional, and the plaintiff's claims against Governor Abercrombie and Attorney General Louie lack the necessary nexus to the alleged violations, leading to the dismissal of these claims with prejudice.
The complaint also names the County of Hawaii, the Hilo County Police Department, and officials Kenoi and Kubojiri in their official capacities. Claims against these officials are treated as claims against the County itself under Section 1983, which allows for challenges to unconstitutional actions by government officials but does not create substantive rights. The plaintiff has not served the County or the Police Department, and the officials moved to dismiss all claims. The analysis of municipal liability under Section 1983 indicates that claims against the officials are directly linked to the County of Hawaii's potential liability.
To establish a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show a violation of a right protected by the Constitution or U.S. laws and that the defendant acted under state law. Municipalities can be liable under two theories: first, for injuries stemming from an unconstitutional policy or custom, as established in Monell v. Department of Social Services, which requires actual municipal responsibility for the unconstitutional act. A municipality may still be liable even if the unconstitutional practice is not officially documented, provided it is entrenched enough to be considered a 'custom or usage' with legal force. Second, municipalities can be liable for failing to adequately train, supervise, or discipline employees, as outlined in City of Canton v. Harris.
In this case, the County Official Defendants acted under state law, and the plaintiff argues that the County's enforcement of Hawaii's Firearm Carrying Laws violates civil rights under the U.S. Constitution, specifically referencing Article I and the Second, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The claims focus on the licensing scheme for pistols and revolvers detailed in HRS 134-9, which allows the chief of police to grant licenses under certain conditions, including a background check, and mandates procedures to ensure that licensees are qualified and suitable. The statute prohibits carrying a firearm without proper licensing.
A fee of $10 is required for each firearm license, which is to be deposited in the county treasury. Hawaii law mandates that firearms must be confined to the holder’s business, residence, or temporary location, but allows for lawful transport to specific places such as repair shops and shooting ranges. Carrying a loaded firearm on public highways is prohibited, except for licensed carriers. County officials are seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims, arguing that the plaintiff has not demonstrated a deprivation of constitutional rights or standing.
To establish standing, the plaintiff must prove a concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent, linked to wrongful conduct by the defendants, and likely to be remedied by court action. The plaintiff's claims of rights violations are assumed valid for the standing inquiry. For injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show ongoing or imminent injury. The plaintiff contends that Hawaii’s firearm laws violate his Second Amendment rights, which protect the right to keep and bear arms. Denial of a gun license could constitute an ongoing injury and provide standing to challenge the regulations. Relevant case law supports that denial of a license can create standing for challenges to both the permit issuance and possession laws. The plaintiff claims that the enforcement of Hawaii’s firearm laws infringes on his right to carry a firearm in public.
Hawaii's Firearm Carrying Laws may infringe upon the Plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights, providing sufficient grounds for standing to seek injunctive relief, as a ruling against these laws would address the alleged injury. However, the Plaintiffs lack standing for monetary damages, as their complaint does not substantiate a claim for compensatory damages exceeding one million dollars. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have not successfully stated a Second Amendment claim following the dismissal of their previous challenge in Young v. Hawaii. Two critical developments in Second Amendment jurisprudence are highlighted: the Supreme Court's acknowledgment in District of Columbia v. Heller of an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense within the home, and in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the extension of this right to state actions via the Fourteenth Amendment. Both decisions emphasize that while the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms for lawful purposes, it does not guarantee an unrestricted right to carry any weapon in any manner outside the home. Uncertainty remains regarding the application of Second Amendment rights beyond the home and the applicable scrutiny for regulations. Various circuit courts have adopted a two-step approach to evaluate Second Amendment challenges, first determining if the law regulates protected activity, then assessing whether it imposes an unconstitutional burden requiring heightened scrutiny. Ultimately, the core right recognized in Heller is for responsible citizens to use arms in defense of their homes, not for unlimited public carry.
The Supreme Court clarified that the Second Amendment does not guarantee the right to possess any weapon for any purpose. It determined that the Amendment does not protect the possession of weapons not commonly held by law-abiding citizens for legal purposes. The Court also provided a non-exhaustive list of regulations that are deemed not to infringe on Second Amendment rights, such as prohibitions against firearm possession by felons and the mentally ill, restrictions in sensitive locations (e.g., schools, government buildings), and regulations on the commercial sale of firearms, labeling these measures as presumptively lawful.
Lower courts have faced challenges interpreting these principles. There is ambiguity regarding whether certain conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's scope or if such regulations are presumptively lawful under the relevant scrutiny standard. The predominant view in the Ninth Circuit and other jurisdictions is that the Second Amendment, as delineated in Heller and McDonald, establishes a limited individual right to maintain an operable handgun at home for self-defense, with the right to carry firearms outside the home being less clear and not part of the core right.
The Fourth Circuit ruled in Masciandaro that public carrying rights are more restricted than home possession due to public safety concerns. Most federal district courts have upheld similar firearm carrying laws to Hawaii’s, concluding such laws do not infringe on Second Amendment rights. In Piszczatoski v. Filko, a New Jersey court found that the carrying law did not burden protected conduct since the Second Amendment does not guarantee an absolute right to carry a firearm for self-defense outside the home. In Kachalsky v. Cacace, a New York court upheld a more stringent law requiring a permit for concealed carry, determining that the law did not violate the Second Amendment as it was not a total ban on carrying firearms and the Amendment does not protect the right to carry weapons outside the home.
Hawaii Federal District Court rulings affirm that Hawaii’s firearm carrying laws do not violate the Second Amendment. In the case of Young II, the court determined that the firearm licensing scheme under HRS 134-9 does not involve rights protected by the Second Amendment, as the Heller decision did not recognize the right to carry an unconcealed firearm in public as fundamental. Additionally, in Baker v. Kealoha, it was reiterated that Hawaii’s Firearm Carrying Laws do not infringe upon Second Amendment rights.
The plaintiff claimed civil rights violations due to the denial of his applications for concealed and unconcealed firearm licenses, arguing that these laws are unconstitutional. HRS 134-9 allows a police chief to issue permits for concealed carry only in exceptional cases demonstrating a fear of harm, while also allowing for the issuance of unconcealed firearm licenses based on urgency. The Places to Keep Statutes limit firearm possession to specific locations, permitting transport among these and certain other venues.
Section 134-26 prohibits loaded firearms on public highways, but licensed individuals are exempt. The court concluded that the Carrying Laws do not infringe upon core Second Amendment protections, as they do not constitute a total ban on firearms; they govern public carrying under specific conditions. The plaintiff's argument that the right to bear arms includes unrestricted carrying was dismissed, citing Heller's clarification that the right does not extend to carrying any weapon in any manner.
Further, the Hawaii laws were deemed to pass constitutional scrutiny, with the understanding that even if the Second Amendment includes the right to carry outside the home, regulations on such conduct remain permissible as long as they do not impose unconstitutional burdens. The Ninth Circuit has yet to provide a definitive ruling on the level of scrutiny applicable to these regulations.
Intermediate scrutiny is applied by many courts to laws that impose burdens on protected conduct outside the core Second Amendment right of law-abiding citizens to possess weapons for self-defense in the home. This standard, influenced by First Amendment case law, requires that the government demonstrate a significant, substantial, or important interest while ensuring that the regulation reasonably fits the asserted objective. Hawaii's licensing scheme under HRS § 134-9 mandates that individuals show urgency, need, or fear of injury to obtain a license for carrying a concealed or unconcealed pistol or revolver. Additional laws (HRS §§ 134-23 through 134-27) restrict situations for carrying weapons in public without a license, aiming to protect public safety from the dangers of firearms.
The government’s interest in regulating firearms is deemed substantial, as evidenced by case law emphasizing the importance of such regulations. The Firearm Carrying Laws facilitate the differentiation between individuals who require firearms for self-defense and those who do not. These laws do not constitute an outright ban on firearms and specifically regulate only pistols and revolvers. Other federal district courts have upheld similar licensing schemes under intermediate scrutiny, confirming that Hawaii’s laws do not unconstitutionally infringe upon Second Amendment rights.
Regarding facial challenges to the licensing statute based on the prior restraint doctrine—which applies only to First Amendment issues—the rationale behind it does not extend to the Second Amendment context. Thus, the plaintiffs' facial challenge fails, as the concerns relevant to the First Amendment are not applicable here.
The prior restraint doctrine cannot be used to support any facial challenge to laws, as established in *Hightower v. City of Boston*. Attempts by plaintiffs to apply this doctrine from the First Amendment to Hawaii's Carrying Law are unsuccessful, leading to the dismissal of their Second Amendment claims with prejudice due to failure to state a cause of action. Additionally, plaintiffs lack standing to challenge HRS Chapter 134 based on alleged violations of Ninth Amendment rights, as this amendment does not secure individual rights independently. Consequently, claims related to the Ninth Amendment are also dismissed with prejudice.
Regarding the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs assert that HRS Chapter 134 infringes on their rights; however, this clause offers limited protection, primarily concerning the right to travel or privacy. The Supreme Court's decision in *McDonald v. City of Chicago* rejected the use of this clause to extend Second Amendment rights to states, and thus, the claim under this clause is dismissed with prejudice.
Finally, the complaint's assertion that Hawaii's licensing scheme violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is addressed. The Fourteenth Amendment safeguards against the deprivation of property or liberty without due process, but the court applies a two-step test to evaluate such claims. The complaint fails to establish a valid claim under this clause as well.
A court first needs to ascertain whether a plaintiff has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest that warrants due process protections. If such an interest is established, the court applies a three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, which evaluates: (1) the private interest affected by government action, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through current procedures and the potential benefits of additional safeguards, and (3) the government's interests, including any administrative or fiscal burdens posed by additional requirements. If no protected interest exists, no due process is owed. In this case, the plaintiff must demonstrate that Hawaii's Firearm Carrying Laws negatively impact their right to carry a weapon in public. Previous rulings, including Erdelyi v. O’Brien and Peruta v. County of San Diego, establish that there are no constitutional rights to carry a concealed weapon in public, and due process rights are limited to home carry permits. The plaintiff's complaints about being denied a license to carry a firearm do not implicate protected interests, as there is no fundamental right to public carry under HRS Chapter 134. Therefore, the claim for due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, the plaintiff alleges that HRS Chapter 134 constitutes a bill of attainder, which is prohibited by Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. A statute is considered a bill of attainder if it legislatively determines guilt and punishes an identifiable individual without judicial trial protections. However, mere burdens from legislation do not equate to punishment. A law that applies generally to all individuals with a specific characteristic and serves a non-punitive purpose does not constitute an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
HRS Chapter 134 mandates a permit for carrying firearms, aiming to enhance public safety and is not deemed a bill of attainder. The claim alleging that HRS Chapter 134 violates the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution is dismissed, as the plaintiff failed to show that his contractual rights were significantly impaired by the law. HRS Chapter 134 does not imply any contractual rights enforceable against the State. Additionally, the plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, which relate to conspiracy and negligence in preventing civil rights violations, are dismissed due to the lack of an underlying constitutional deprivation under § 1983. The plaintiff has also failed to serve the County of Hawaii and Hilo County Police Department within the required timeframe, leading to dismissal of claims against these defendants. All dismissed claims are with prejudice.
A court may dismiss an action sua sponte under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff cannot possibly win relief, without prior notice or an opportunity to respond. This includes dismissing claims against unserved parties if they are in a similar position to moving defendants. The Hilo County Police Department and County of Hawaii are considered the same legal entity, similar to the County Officials, and are analyzed under the same standards. The court concludes that the plaintiff cannot win relief against these entities, leading to the dismissal of claims against them with prejudice.
The complaint fails to state a claim for deprivation of a federal right necessary for actions under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and the State Defendants are protected by sovereign immunity. Consequently, both the State Defendants’ and County Officials’ motions to dismiss are granted, resulting in the dismissal of all claims against the County, County Police Department, and County Officials with prejudice. Lastly, the plaintiff's reference to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment should be addressed under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close the case.
