Jones v. Alpha Rae Personnel, Inc.

Citations: 903 F. Supp. 2d 680; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150566; 2012 WL 5195989Docket: Case No. 3:11-CV-0302

Court: District Court, N.D. Indiana; October 18, 2012; Federal District Court

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Christina Jones filed a retaliation claim under Title VII against her employer, Alpha Rae Personnel, and its contractor, Affiliated Computer Services (ACS), alleging she was removed from the ACS South Bend job site in retaliation for filing complaints about race-based discrimination. Jones also raised a defamation claim but seems to have abandoned it. Alpha Rae and ACS moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jones's employment record showed she was not a satisfactory employee, with multiple performance deficiencies cited prior to her complaints and ongoing issues leading to her termination. Jones relied on the timing of her removal as evidence of retaliation; however, the court noted that the protected activity occurred months before her removal, and that suspicious timing alone does not establish a retaliation claim, especially given the strong evidence indicating non-retaliatory reasons for her termination. The court concluded that Jones’s discrimination complaints did not substantially influence the decision to remove her from the job site, affirming the summary judgment in favor of Alpha Rae and ACS. Jones had been assigned to ACS as an eligibility specialist, and her performance history included numerous informal citations for errors and failure to meet production goals, further undermining her claims.

On October 13, 2009, Charles Smith, a supervisor, received a complaint via email about Jones’s disruptive behavior. The case involves the potential conversion of Jones from an Alpha Rae employee to full-time employment with ACS, which would provide benefits such as health insurance. Jones inquired about her conversion status on October 23, 2009, suggesting this inquiry led to increased scrutiny, although she did not clarify the connection to prior coaching moments or the October 13 complaint. Starting in November 2009, ACS's criticism of Jones intensified. On November 6, 2009, Richie emailed Alpha Rae with complaints about Jones’s behavior and performance, leading to a formal Employee Warning Notice citing deficiencies in her work and placing her on a thirty-day probation, with a reconsideration for conversion after an additional ninety days. Jones contested the criticism and filed a Charge of Discrimination with the South Bend Human Rights Commission and EEOC on November 13, 2009. Following her complaint, ACS's criticisms escalated, including a request on December 22, 2009, for Jones to sign quality review forms she had previously refused. 

On January 22, 2010, Richie acknowledged some productivity improvement but noted ongoing issues with respect and work quality. Jones met with Richie and an Alpha Rae representative on January 29, 2010, to discuss conversion but was told more improvement was needed. She filed a second discrimination complaint ten days later. An EEOC mediation on June 4, 2010, did not resolve her claims. Throughout spring and early summer 2010, issues persisted, including Jones's unexplained absence on March 23, 2010, and her failure to provide medical records when hospitalized in June. On June 28, 2010, she was sent home for violating the dress code by wearing ripped jeans. The situation escalated due to a computer tracking system implemented in June or July 2010, revealing that Jones had over sixteen hours of unaccounted time during scheduled hours from July 12-16, 2010, which contributed to her dismissal.

ACS requested Alpha Rae to remove Jones from her assignment due to significant nonproduction and her history of disciplinary issues, leading to her removal on July 20, 2010. Afterward, Jones sought alternative work in South Bend but found none available, prompting her to file a third charge with the South Bend Human Rights Commission and the EEOC on July 21, 2010, alleging retaliation for her previous discrimination complaints. The EEOC responded with a no probable cause determination and issued a right to sue letter on May 4, 2011. Jones initiated legal action on August 1, 2011. 

ACS and Alpha Rae each filed motions for summary judgment on July 2, 2012. Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine dispute exists regarding material facts, and all evidence must be viewed favorably toward the non-moving party. Jones alleges that her removal constituted retaliation for her earlier race discrimination complaints. Under Title VII, retaliation is prohibited for opposing unlawful employment practices or participating in investigations. 

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Jones must demonstrate that she engaged in a protected activity, suffered an adverse action, and that a causal connection exists between the two. She does not utilize the indirect method of proof but relies on the direct method requiring evidence of the decision-maker’s discriminatory intent. Jones has not provided direct evidence of such intent but can rely on circumstantial evidence, which might include suspicious timing or comparisons with similarly situated employees. 

While it is undisputed that Jones engaged in protected activities and faced adverse actions, the central issue is whether sufficient evidence exists to establish a causal link between them. Evidence of past racial discrimination by ACS or Alpha Rae is deemed irrelevant to her retaliation claim, as the focus is on whether her removal was a consequence of her filing discrimination complaints.

Evidence of alleged misconduct by ACS and Alpha Rae prior to Jones's first discrimination complaint on November 13, 2009, lacks relevance, as retaliation cannot occur before the underlying event. Jones's claim of a causal connection between her removal from the ACS job site and her discrimination complaints relies on the timing of her removal. However, she continued working for over eight months after her first complaint and more than five months after a subsequent complaint, making the intervals too long to suggest causality.

Jones argues that the relevant suspicious timing should be considered between the June 4, 2010 EEOC meeting and her removal on July 20, 2010, alleging that ACS and Alpha Rae were waiting to retaliate until they felt confident about the outcome of the EEOC process. This theory lacks legal support, as Jones fails to establish that adverse employment actions can be linked to events other than the protected activities that form the basis of retaliation claims. The cited case law, including Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, reinforces that temporal proximity must be very close for causality to be inferred, emphasizing that the timeline begins when the employer first becomes aware of the protected activity.

Ultimately, even if one were to consider the timing between non-protected activities and adverse actions, Jones's case cannot withstand scrutiny due to the lengthy intervals involved, which do not support a claim of suspicious timing necessary for a Title VII retaliation claim.

Jones’s allegations of retaliation based on the timing of her removal from the ACS job site lack sufficient support. Even if the 46-day gap between the EEOC mediation and her removal is deemed suspicious, it alone does not substantiate her claims, as suspicious timing rarely creates a triable issue without additional evidence. Jones’s assertion that formal disciplinary actions only began after her discrimination complaint contradicts the record, which shows her first formal citation occurred prior to the complaint and highlights numerous informal citations received beforehand. The evidence overwhelmingly indicates that her removal was based on documented performance issues, negating any inference of retaliation solely from timing. Courts have established that a decline in performance preceding protected activity does not support a retaliation claim. Furthermore, even if the timing between the EEOC factfinding and her removal were considered suggestive of retaliation, the legal question hinges on whether retaliatory motives must be the “but for” cause of the adverse action or if they can merely be a contributing factor. The prevailing legal interpretation suggests that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the adverse action would not have occurred “but for” the protected activity, a position reinforced by historical case law and legislative intent following the 1991 amendment of Title VII.

The applicable Title VII provision for mixed motive claims is expressly limited to instances where race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is a motivating factor in employment practices. Retaliation claims are not included in this scope, as recognized by multiple federal appellate courts, including the Seventh and DC Circuits. The evidence presented indicates that Christina Jones received numerous documented citations for work quality, productivity, and behavioral issues between April 2009 and July 2010, many of which predated her discrimination complaints in November 2009 and February 2010. This evidence supports the conclusion that her removal was justified, regardless of any potential retaliatory motive. 

Jones’s claim fails the “but for” causation test, which requires her to prove that she would not have been removed had it not been for her discrimination claims. Previous Seventh Circuit cases that suggested a mixed motive analysis for retaliation claims did so without thorough discussion or analysis of the causation issue. The court emphasizes that the better reasoned approach requires a clear demonstration of causation beyond mere speculation of retaliation being a contributing factor. 

As a result, the court grants summary judgment in favor of ACS and Alpha Rae, concluding that Jones is entitled to no relief on her complaint, and terminates the civil action, vacating all further settings. The motions for summary judgment from ACS and Alpha Rae were considered together due to their similar fundamental arguments regarding the evidence supporting Jones’s removal for non-retaliatory reasons.

ACS's status as Jones's employer under Title VII is ambiguous since she was employed and paid by Alpha Rae, despite working at an ACS site and being primarily managed by ACS. Federal courts typically utilize a complex six-factor test to determine employment relationships in such contexts. However, ACS has not contested its potential non-employer status regarding Jones's retaliation claim, so for the current summary judgment motions, both ACS and Alpha Rae are considered her employers. The timing of 46 days is noted as potentially suspicious, referencing case law where shorter intervals supported inferences of retaliation. Jones alleges that retaliation began following her inquiry about her employment status; however, such an inquiry does not qualify as a protected activity under Title VII and cannot support a retaliation claim.