Court: District Court, D. Delaware; October 26, 2012; Federal District Court
The memorandum opinion addresses a motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' claims of procedural due process violations and workers’ compensation retaliation against Red Clay Consolidated School District and Debra Davenport. The plaintiff, who began employment as a secretary on November 10, 2003, filed two workers’ compensation claims in March 2007, which were denied by April 11, 2007. Following these claims, the plaintiff filed a short-term disability claim and took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). On July 18, 2007, she received a letter from Davenport indicating her disability request was denied, although it had not been officially denied by Hartford until July 30, 2007.
On August 2, 2007, the plaintiff filed a petition with the Delaware Industrial Accident Board to appeal her workers’ compensation claims. Subsequently, on August 9, 2007, she was informed of her termination effective August 15, 2007, due to the exhaustion of all sick time and FMLA benefits, despite the misrepresentation of the status of her benefits requests. The plaintiff chose to resign to avoid a termination on her record. Following her resignation, she appealed Hartford's denial of her disability claim, which was later awarded, and her workers’ compensation claim was resolved through a settlement.
After settling, the plaintiff requested return-to-work services but was deemed ineligible due to the end of her employment period before receiving disability benefits and her acceptance of another position. The plaintiff subsequently filed suit alleging violations of her property interest in returning to work and retaliation for her workers’ compensation claim.
Defendants seek summary judgment on the claims, arguing that the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact, allowing for judgment as a matter of law. The discussion focuses on the procedural due process claim against Red Clay under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, emphasizing that local governments cannot be held liable under respondeat superior for constitutional violations by employees. Liability arises only from actions of the municipality's legislative body or officials whose actions reflect municipal policy. To succeed, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that a Red Clay policy caused her constitutional deprivation and that the entity was deliberately indifferent to the harm caused.
The Plaintiff contends that the denial of her return to work services constitutes a policy or custom, potentially attributable to policy-making officials. However, the Third Circuit requires a clear causal link between the policymaker's conduct and the constitutional harm for a single act to qualify as a policy or custom. The Delaware code mandates reemployment in certain circumstances, and the Plaintiff claims the entire district administration, including several officials, deprived her of this right.
However, the analysis clarifies that only actions of a policy-maker with final discretion can establish liability. The only individual meeting this criterion is District Superintendent Andrzejewski. The Plaintiff fails to show that he specifically authorized the denial of her reemployment, as evidence indicates that the final decision rested with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), not the Superintendent. A letter from OMB confirms that the Plaintiff was deemed ineligible for return to work services due to her employment status and disability approval issues.
Rentz testified that she had no knowledge of any influence from Red Clay in denying the Plaintiff's reemployment. The Plaintiff attempted to counter this by referencing several letters, all of which were written after Rentz's denial and do not alter the fact that the final authority for the decision lay with OMB, not the Superintendent. The first letter, dated June 13, 2008, from Rentz to Jill Floore, indicated that the Plaintiff had successfully appealed her short-term disability denial and requested return-to-work services. Rentz noted that the Plaintiff's request for reinstatement did not clearly fit within the return-to-work statute and acknowledged that timely approval of the disability request would have allowed the Plaintiff to return to her position instead of being terminated.
A subsequent letter from Deputy Superintendent Dunmon, dated July 9, 2008, outlined three reasons for denying reemployment: the Plaintiff had voluntarily resigned, accepted another position with the University of Delaware, and there were no comparable openings due to workforce reductions. The final letter from the Plaintiff on August 2, 2008, addressed to the Superintendent, argued that her termination was based on incorrect assumptions about her disability claim appeals and requested a comparable position as per Delaware law.
The Plaintiff contended that these letters demonstrated the Superintendent's ratification of the denial, but the assertion was found to be incorrect. None of the letters indicated that the Superintendent had specifically authorized or directed the denial of reemployment. The initial decision came from Rentz at OMB, who sought further information from the Superintendent’s office but did not receive any input from the Superintendent himself. The Deputy Superintendent authored the response, and there was no evidence that it reflected the Superintendent's views, nor could the mere act of sending a letter to a high-level official imply that subsequent decisions were influenced by that official.
No evidence indicates that the Plaintiff's August 2, 2008 letter reached the Superintendent or that the Superintendent ratified any decision thereafter, undermining the Plaintiff's claim that the Superintendent’s policy caused her reemployment denial. The final decision for denial was made by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), despite Rentz seeking information from the Superintendent regarding the return-to-work statute. Even if the Superintendent had denied the reemployment request, there is no indication of deliberate indifference to a constitutional harm, as such indifference requires knowledge of a serious risk, exceeding mere negligence.
Plaintiff contends that the statute requires Red Clay to offer her reemployment; however, the Deputy Superintendent noted the absence of suitable vacant positions. The statute does not obligate the creation of a position where none exists, and Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of any available qualifying positions. Therefore, the decision to deny reemployment was based on reasonable considerations, not indicative of a constitutional deprivation risk.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the 1983 procedural due process claim against Red Clay is granted. Additionally, claims against Defendant Davenport in her official capacity are dismissed, as a 1983 claim cannot be brought against a state official in that capacity. Claims against Davenport in her personal capacity remain valid only if she had personal involvement in wrongdoing, which requires proof of gross negligence.
Plaintiff alleges that Davenport's false statements regarding the exhaustion of her disability appeals caused her job loss. Although the termination letter incorrectly noted the denial of her appeal, evidence suggests Davenport relied on third-party information for this status. Davenport’s reliance on Sue Carpenter, a benefits specialist, is challenged by Carpenter's lack of recollection on providing that information, but it does not conclusively prove Davenport's gross negligence in drafting the termination letter.
A potential communication breakdown may indicate simple negligence, but there is no evidence suggesting greater culpability from Davenport. The termination letter dated August 2007 is central to the case, yet the Plaintiff is challenging a decision made by Faith Rentz of OMB in May 2008. Establishing liability against Davenport would be easier if the Plaintiff solely attributed her constitutional deprivation to the initial termination. However, the Plaintiff struggles to connect Davenport's termination letter with Rentz's decision. The Plaintiff argues that Davenport's letter initiated a series of events leading OMB to deny her reemployment, relying on a statement made by Davenport on May 23, 2008, which incorrectly suggested that the Plaintiff’s resignation was voluntary. While these statements could be seen as false, as they contradict the termination letter referencing the Plaintiff's exhaustion of leave, there is no evidence that they influenced OMB's reemployment decision. OMB's letter indicated awareness of a voluntary resignation after the termination letter was issued. Additionally, Faith Rentz testified that she was unaware of any influence from Red Clay employees on the reemployment decision. OMB's rationale for denying reemployment was unrelated to the voluntariness of the Plaintiff's employment termination, citing her acceptance of a position with a different agency and the timing of her disability benefits. Consequently, there is no evidence that Davenport's misstatement causally affected the denial of reemployment. The court grants summary judgment in favor of Davenport concerning the procedural due process claim. Regarding the workers’ compensation retaliation claim against Red Clay, which is based on 19 Del. C. 2365, the court agrees to adopt the Title VII standard for retaliation. To establish a prima facie case, the Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) exercise of rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act, (2) an adverse employment action by Red Clay, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of rights and the adverse action.
To establish an adverse act in a retaliation claim, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the action is 'materially adverse' enough to dissuade a reasonable worker from seeking workers’ compensation. Causation can be shown through (1) evidence of antagonism or retaliatory intent, (2) temporal proximity between the claim and the adverse action, or (3) an overall record suggesting retaliation. If the Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Red Clay to provide a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions. The Plaintiff argues she has sufficient evidence for a prima facie case, asserting that both her termination and denial of reemployment are adverse actions. However, the court clarified that the denial of reemployment was attributable to OMB, not Red Clay, thus only the termination stands as an adverse action. The court ruled that the termination letter qualifies as an adverse action, even though the Plaintiff resigned before it took effect, as such a letter could dissuade a reasonable worker from making a workers’ compensation claim.
Regarding causation, the Plaintiff must provide facts indicating that her termination letter was a result of her workers’ compensation request. She cites the temporal proximity between her appeal to the Delaware Industrial Accident Board on August 2, 2007, and the receipt of her termination letter on August 9, 2007, as evidence of retaliatory motive. However, the court noted that the timing is not as compelling as the Plaintiff claims, given that her initial claims were filed over four months prior, suggesting that the August petition was merely a continuation of earlier requests rather than a new trigger for retaliation. Additionally, there is a lack of other supporting evidence to strengthen the argument of causation.
Plaintiff was not terminated for filing workers’ compensation but because Red Clay believed she did not return to work after exhausting her FMLA leave and disability appeals. A letter from Davenport on July 18 indicated Plaintiff's expected return to work within five days following the denial of her disability request, which was not officially denied until July 30, 2007. Red Clay misinterpreted the situation, leading to Plaintiff's termination for failing to report to work. Plaintiff contends this termination was improper because her appeals were not fully exhausted and were eventually granted. However, the key issue is whether Red Clay acted with retaliatory intent regarding her workers' compensation request. Despite Plaintiff's claims of antagonism, Davenport testified she relied on others for information about Plaintiff's benefits. Plaintiff's counterargument regarding Carpenter’s lack of recollection does not substantiate her claim. Additionally, evidence that Davenport misrepresented her reaction to Plaintiff's resignation occurred long after the termination letter was issued and does not indicate retaliatory intent at that time. Thus, Plaintiff failed to prove the causation element of her retaliation claim, resulting in the granting of Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court also notes that the relationship between the August 2007 workers' compensation petition and earlier denied requests remains unclear. Finally, the court highlighted that once discovery is complete, a lack of evidence supporting the plaintiff's claims does not create a genuine issue of material fact.
An email from Leslie Ramsey, which claims to relay statements made by Ms. Davenport, lacks admissibility as hearsay since Ms. Davenport is not included in the correspondence. The deposition excerpts from Davenport and Ramsey do not clarify the content of the statements. For the ruling, the Court presumes Ramsey would affirm the accuracy of her email, but whether this impression is true does not affect the retaliation claim; the focus is solely on the motive behind the termination. The email may imply that Davenport sought to evade accountability for mistakes in the termination letter. The Plaintiff's state law claim is deemed unsuitable for supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c), as guided by Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., which declined supplemental jurisdiction after federal claims were resolved. The Court notes a lack of Delaware case law interpreting statute 2365, prompting reliance on federal standards, and suggests state court analysis would be preferable. Additionally, while there is an assumption of a jury trial right in a 2365 claim, the Court is not persuaded, referencing Pekala v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. Inc., which only assumes jury involvement. The language of 2365 indicates decisions are made post-hearing, which does not inherently suggest a jury trial right, contrasting with 11 Del.Code. 4121(e)(2) regarding hearings without jury rights. The Court finds grounds to withhold supplemental jurisdiction under both 1367(c)(3) and 1367(c)(1).
