Thanks for visiting! Welcome to a new way to research case law. You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.
Benham v. City of Charlotte
Citations: 682 F. Supp. 2d 549; 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1342; 2010 WL 143719Docket: No. 3:07cv395
Court: District Court, W.D. North Carolina; January 7, 2010; Federal District Court
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted by the Court in this case concerning the City of Charlotte's denial of a public assembly permit requested by Rev. Philip Benham for Operation Save America. The City amended its Code in 2004 to regulate public assemblies while protecting First Amendment rights and maintaining public order and safety. The amended Code requires a permit for public assemblies, defined as events that obstruct traffic or occur in specific city-controlled areas, while picketing does not require a permit. Picketing is permitted in public spaces as long as it does not obstruct traffic and adheres to noise regulations.
On December 14, 2006, an application for a public assembly titled "Roe vs Wade Memorial" was submitted, planned for January 22, 2007. The application indicated the event would not disrupt traffic, involve sales, or charge admission, with an expected attendance of 100 people and activities focused on evangelical outreach.
On December 20, 2006, Emily Westbrook, a Permit Official, informed Rev. Benham via letter that his application could not be processed because the planned event was classified as a demonstration, not a festival, under City Code. Permits for demonstrations at Independence Square Plaza are not issued; instead, such events fall under the picketing ordinance, which does not require a permit. Westbrook advised Benham to notify the police if expecting 50 or more attendees and to obtain a permit for amplified sound if amplification was used.
Rev. Benham appealed this decision to Appeals Official Keith Parker, who upheld the classification of the event as a demonstration during a hearing on January 3, 2007. Parker noted that the event, scheduled for January 22, marked the anniversary of Roe v. Wade and would primarily involve speaking and singing about abortion, thus qualifying as a public demonstration under the Public Assembly Ordinance and a picket under the Picket Ordinance. He confirmed that the event could proceed without a permit, subject to picketing regulations.
Benham did not seek judicial review of Parker’s decision, and the event took place on January 22, 2007, without a permit. Sgt. Oliver Cunningham of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department monitored the event and reported no arrests or citations, though two warnings for noise ordinance violations were issued. Cunningham observed that the event proceeded as planned without any suppression of speech or expressive conduct due to the absence of a public assembly permit.
On September 20, 2007, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the Defendants hindered their free speech and free exercise rights as protected by the U.S. and North Carolina Constitutions. The excerpt also outlines the standard for summary judgment in First Amendment cases, stating that it may be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact, relying on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant case law. The initial burden is on the movant to demonstrate the absence of such issues, after which the burden shifts to the nonmoving party.
The nonmoving party in a summary judgment motion must provide specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations or denials. Evidence must be sufficient for a reasonable jury to potentially favor the nonmoving party. When evaluating a summary judgment motion, courts must view evidence favorably to the nonmoving party, but a minimal amount of evidence ("a scintilla") is inadequate; substantial evidence is necessary for a jury to find in favor of the plaintiff. In this case, the plaintiffs' summary judgment response disputes the legal conclusions drawn from the facts of the case, specifically regarding the classification of events under Charlotte's ordinances. The plaintiffs challenge how the Roe vs. Wade Memorial was classified compared to other events, while defendants assert differences justify the classifications. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims, but the plaintiffs' response focuses solely on First Amendment and Equal Protection challenges, implying that all other claims have been abandoned. The parties agree that the plaintiffs' speech is protected under the First Amendment and the location qualifies as a traditional public forum. The government can impose reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in such forums. Charlotte's regulations include a public assembly ordinance requiring permits for events that may obstruct traffic and a picketing ordinance allowing expressive conduct without prior approval. Claims against individual defendants Westbrook and Parker regarding the facial challenge to these ordinances must be dismissed as they were not involved in their enactment.
Defendants assert that the picketing and public assembly ordinances provide a constitutionally adequate alternative for communication in the absence of a public assembly permit. The Court previously ruled that the 2004 amendments to the Code are content neutral, aimed at protecting free speech, public safety, and maintaining traffic flow, without regard to the content of speech. The Court also permitted City officials to consider speech content solely for determining the applicable ordinance. At the summary judgment stage, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence of any unconstitutional motive behind the enactment of these ordinances, although their claim that the public assembly ordinance discriminates against their speech will be further examined.
The public assembly ordinance has been deemed narrowly tailored, with a reasonable alignment between the regulation and the interests of Charlotte. A similar picketing ordinance has also been upheld as narrowly tailored by the Fourth Circuit. The restriction on picketing at locations reserved for festivals does not unconstitutionally favor certain speech and maintains opportunities for communication by allowing picketing on nearby public property.
Charlotte views the picketing ordinance as a viable alternative for demonstrations not qualifying as public assemblies. Plaintiffs argue that a public assembly permit is essential for their free speech, citing additional discretionary restrictions in the picketing ordinance. They express concern that Charlotte could entirely deny their speech due to regulations against picketing at reserved locations. However, regulations must leave open ample alternative communication channels, even if these alternatives are less effective. Courts have previously affirmed that access to municipal services or control of amplification systems does not equate to a ban on speech, as the ability to gather and convey messages in public remains intact.
Plaintiffs were not denied the ability to communicate their message but were limited by a decibel restriction in their preferred method of expression. Their belief that a higher decibel level is constitutionally necessary for free speech is unfounded, as the picketing ordinance provides alternative means of communication. The ordinance does not impose significant burdens on speech, and there is no evidence suggesting that demonstrations permitted under it fail to protect free speech rights. Additionally, the ordinance does not grant city officials unbridled discretion, as it includes standards to guide enforcement and ensures that the classification of events does not suppress particular viewpoints. Plaintiffs claim that city officials have arbitrarily classified events as demonstrations rather than festivals, but the definitions within the ordinance are clear enough to prevent discrimination. Furthermore, evidence indicates that permitted demonstrations have occurred in the past, countering claims of discriminatory enforcement. Plaintiffs also allege discrimination regarding the classification of a memorial event, but they lack direct evidence of intentional discrimination, relying instead on claims of unequal treatment compared to other events that received permits.
Plaintiffs argue that their speech was unfairly limited by additional restrictions and faced complete exclusion in favor of a festival. In response, Defendants assert that the event in question was appropriately classified as a demonstration, while other events were considered festivals. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from intentional and arbitrary discrimination, allowing Plaintiffs to establish a claim by showing they were treated differently than similarly situated individuals without a rational basis for this treatment. To assess discrimination, it is necessary to determine if the events in question were alike in all relevant respects.
Plaintiffs' due process claims parallel their equal protection claims and can be addressed together. They presented examples of allegedly disparaging treatment, including:
1. **Roe vs. Wade Memorial**: Proposed at Independence Square Plaza during lunch on a business day, the event did not require street closures and included various religious activities. It was characterized as a community event, akin to a funeral.
2. **Torch Rally**: A permit request for a public assembly in the same location for a human rights event was denied on the grounds that it constituted a demonstration. This event was similar to the Roe vs. Wade Memorial regarding location and purpose, but Plaintiffs' claim of unequal treatment is weakened as both events were similarly denied permits.
3. **Mec Dec Celebrations**: This annual event, honoring the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, has faced varying permit statuses over the years. In 2006, it was classified as a demonstration and denied a permit, while in 2007, it was held with a permit. The inconsistency in permit approval further illustrates complexities in how similar events were treated.
Overall, the Plaintiffs contend they experienced unequal treatment compared to these events, but the evidence suggests their treatment was consistent with other similar gatherings.
Plaintiffs contend that the 2007 permit issuance for the Roe vs. Wade Memorial indicates disparate treatment compared to other events. Both the Roe vs. Wade Memorial and another event occurred on a workday at lunchtime at Independence Square; however, the latter involved street closures and vendors, which made it different. Evidence shows that the Roe vs. Wade Memorial lacked similar features, suggesting that speech can occur at Independence Square without a public assembly permit.
For the Red Cross 90th Anniversary, a permit was granted to close streets for promotional activities, which included displaying emergency response vehicles. This event was not comparable to the Roe vs. Wade Memorial due to differences in location, nature of speech, and the requirement for street closures.
The Charlotte Criterium, which also received a public assembly permit to close streets for a cycling race, further illustrates differences, as it was held on a weekend and aimed to raise funds, distinguishing it from the Plaintiffs' event.
Outreach and Evangelism Explosion involved a street closure on a weekend for church activities, sharing only minimal similarities with the Roe vs. Wade Memorial, primarily in the nature of speech, but was conducted on private property.
The United Family Services event, which similarly received a permit for street closure on a weekend, also exhibited key differences in location and timing compared to the Roe vs. Wade Memorial, undermining the Plaintiffs' claims of mistreatment.
Lastly, while Plaintiffs cite Pride Charlotte events from 2006-2008 as evidence of viewpoint discrimination, they note the 2006 event took place at Marshall Park, a different city-controlled location and not as central as Independence Square, further complicating their argument of inequitable permit treatment.
The events in 2007 and 2008 involved street closures outside the city center. A key distinction between the Pride Charlotte events and the Roe vs Wade Memorial is that the former included both expressive and commercial activities, while Plaintiffs’ event did not share this same context. Evidence presented by Plaintiffs regarding other events with public permits does not substantiate claims of discrimination in how the Roe vs Wade Memorial was classified as a demonstration. Similar events, such as the Torch Rally and Mec Dec Celebrations, also lacked permits. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the city suppressed their speech or treated similarly situated events differently. Their argument regarding differential treatment between those with and without assembly permits does not indicate unlawful discrimination. The Court previously determined that the city’s regulations are content-neutral and provided an alternative communication channel that did not unduly burden the Plaintiffs. The restrictions on picketing at locations with public assembly permits did not adversely affect their event. As a result, the Plaintiffs' claims of equal protection and due process violations are dismissed. The Court concludes that there are no material facts in dispute, granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the case entirely. Additionally, the Court notes that the Plaintiffs did not adequately address the North Carolina Constitution in their filings, considering that claim abandoned. The Plaintiffs’ assertion regarding the denial of their permit is deemed inconsequential, as demonstration permits can be granted under the ordinance, and alternative avenues for expression were available.