Rosenberg v. Chesapeake Pharmaceutical & Health Care Packaging

Citations: 888 F. Supp. 2d 302; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121448; 2012 WL 3704691Docket: No. 10 CV 2336(DRH)(WDW)

Court: District Court, E.D. New York; August 27, 2012; Federal District Court

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Plaintiff Virginia Rosenberg filed a gender discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, Arlington Press (later Chesapeake Pharmaceutical Health Care Packaging), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and New York Executive Law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. Rosenberg was hired in 2006 as Human Resources Manager and received satisfactory performance reviews and raises for over three years. Following a corporate restructuring in early 2009 due to bankruptcy and acquisition, she volunteered for a significant project but was later informed her position was eliminated. A new, expanded human resources position was created, and Rosenberg was not considered for it; instead, a male candidate, Christopher Mathews, was hired. Rosenberg claims Mathews was less qualified for the role. Her qualifications included a Bachelor's in Psychology, a Master's in Applied Psychology, and a Senior Professional Human Resources certification, along with ten years of relevant experience. Her responsibilities encompassed various HR functions, including policy implementation, recruitment, compliance with employment standards, and training.

The job description for the plaintiff included responsibilities for administering employee benefits and handling wage and salary administration. However, the plaintiff did not actually perform these duties for Chesapeake I, with the role being managed by corporate employee Janet Whitley. Throughout her employment, the plaintiff received positive performance reviews and raises, indicating a good relationship with supervisors, including Henfling.

After Chesapeake I declared bankruptcy in December 2008, it was acquired by Chesapeake II in May 2009, leading to the termination of all Chesapeake I employees, including the plaintiff. Chesapeake II subsequently rehired the plaintiff and others. Henfling oversaw the restructuring and sought to manage benefits and payroll internally rather than through the Richmond headquarters. The plaintiff volunteered to assist with this transition, although the parties differ on her expected leadership role.

Defendants claim the plaintiff's performance during the transition was inadequate, citing her disorganization and lack of attention to detail, which required Henfling to intervene significantly. They allege she made errors such as mixing up meeting dates and failing to organize necessary documentation. Conversely, the plaintiff asserts she received no prior criticism until May 7, 2009, when during a lunch meeting, McKeough informed her of Henfling's lack of confidence in her abilities, with the only specific feedback being about her untidy workspace.

McKeough presented the plaintiff with two options: continue in her current role with a written warning in her file or accept an unspecified severance package. The plaintiff chose to remain with the company. Shortly thereafter, she was informed that her position was eliminated due to the establishment of a new Human Resources role, resulting in the rescission of her prior offer. The plaintiff's last working day was June 30, 2009.

Mathews began his employment at Chesapeake II as the Human Resources and Benefits Manager for North America on July 6, 2009, and has remained in that role. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Business Management and has experience managing human resources for approximately 500 employees across multiple sites, handling union-related issues, and overseeing payroll transitions. Though he does not possess a SPHR certificate, his responsibilities include providing leadership in human resources operations, managing benefits for three facilities, and serving as a liaison with the company's European parent. Mathews supervises three employees, including a Human Resources Manager.

Regarding the standard of review for summary judgment, it should be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue exists if a reasonable jury could potentially return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Material facts are determined by relevant governing law, and only disputes affecting the outcome of the case will prevent summary judgment. If undisputed facts demonstrate all required elements of a cause of action, summary judgment is warranted. Rule 56(c) allows for summary judgment against a party that fails to establish an essential element of their case.

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must present sufficient evidence to establish an element of their case, drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor. Merely providing a minimal amount of evidence or conjecture is insufficient; the non-movant must present more than a "scintilla of evidence" and cannot rely on conclusory statements or allegations. 

In the context of gender discrimination claims under Title VII and the New York Human Rights Law (NYHRL), the plaintiff asserts that the defendants discriminated against her based on gender. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Claims under the NYHRL are analyzed using the same standards as Title VII.

The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to these discrimination claims. Initially, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. If the employer meets this burden, the focus shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer's stated reason is a pretext for discrimination. Throughout this process, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff to show intentional discrimination. Establishing a prima facie case is considered a modest or minimal burden of production and does not involve credibility assessments. The employer's burden to articulate a legitimate reason is also not particularly challenging, as courts typically do not second-guess non-discriminatory personnel decisions.

Federal courts lack the authority to review business judgments, as established in case law. Evidence of poor business judgment alone does not question the credibility of an employer’s non-discriminatory reasons for an employment action. To prove that an employer's stated reasons are pretextual, a plaintiff only needs to show that the prohibited factor was one of multiple motivating factors, rather than proving the employer's reasons were false. However, to counter an employer's non-discriminatory rationale and avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide substantial evidence beyond mere conclusory allegations. 

For a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) membership in a protected class; 2) qualification for the position; 3) suffering an adverse employment action; and 4) circumstances suggesting discriminatory intent. In this case, defendants concede the first three elements but challenge the fourth. The plaintiff claims to have established an inference of gender discrimination by showing her replacement by a male shortly after her termination. The Second Circuit permits that being replaced by someone outside the protected class can suffice for this inference.

The dispute centers on whether the male replacement, Mathews, actually took over the same position or if he was hired for a new role with additional duties. Defendants argue that Mathews's position included expanded responsibilities not previously held by the plaintiff, while the plaintiff contends that Mathews assumed her exact duties, despite acknowledging that he now manages benefits, a role she had not previously undertaken. This presents a nuanced question regarding the nature of Mathews's employment.

Mathews has assumed all responsibilities previously held by the plaintiff, with no additional hire for those duties at Chesapeake II, establishing a prima facie case for discrimination based on the assumption that Mathews replaced the plaintiff. The court does not need to explore this point further. Defendants argue that the plaintiff was terminated not due to gender but because she failed to adequately manage the conversion project. They cite several incidents illustrating her shortcomings, including missed deadlines, mistakes with enrollment meeting logistics, and a lack of initiative in coordinating vendor meetings. Notably, senior management had to intervene in aspects of the conversion that the plaintiff was expected to manage. Complaints also arose regarding errors in critical spreadsheets, including incorrect 401(k) deductions affecting Henfling. Despite the plaintiff's claims that the errors were addressed, the defendants maintain that her performance did not meet expectations, which they assert justified her termination and the decision to pass her over for a newly expanded position.

Henfling inquired whether the vendor had verified spreadsheet entries against employees' 'election' forms, to which the plaintiff admitted the vendor had not and offered to do so once the forms were uploaded. The plaintiff also neglected to compile and distribute human resources information and forms to local employees in a single package, despite Henfling’s recommendation. This lack of organization was evident when Henfling found the completed forms on the plaintiff's desk in a disorganized state. The plaintiff claimed she preferred a piecemeal approach, but Henfling noted that such disarray would lead to significant delays in data entry, especially with a looming deadline for transitioning Chesapeake II employees to a new payroll system. Consequently, Henfling and others had to reorganize the plaintiff’s files.

On May 7, 2009, Henfling communicated with Valerie Schmitt about the increased responsibilities following Richmond's departure, expressing doubts about the plaintiff's ability to meet the new demands and suggesting she might be added to a release list.

In response to her termination, the plaintiff contended that the claim of poor work performance was a pretext for gender discrimination. She attempted to challenge the credibility of the reasons given for her dismissal, asserting that the allegation of her 'mixing up' enrollment meeting dates was false and that any errors originated with the vendor. However, she provided no substantial evidence to support her claims. The core issue raised was her organizational skills, particularly in failing to maintain a list of essential project details. Despite her claims, she did not dispute that Henfling had to create his own spreadsheet with the necessary information she was expected to compile. Regarding the 401(k) spreadsheet, she noted that it was a collaborative effort involving multiple contributors, including herself, and derived from various internal sources.

Plaintiff asserts that multiple individuals may have contributed to the creation of a 401(k) spreadsheet, but it is undisputed that she was responsible for delivering it to Henfling and other staff without verifying its accuracy against employee election forms. Henfling raised concerns regarding the lack of error checking, which plaintiff's defense does not adequately address, failing to counter the defendants' broader criticism that she did not meet new job demands. Plaintiff's arguments about her work performance rely on cases where positive evaluations were contrasted with later criticisms, suggesting a genuine issue of fact. In referenced cases, courts found that discrepancies between prior commendations and subsequent negative assessments could indicate discrimination. The courts emphasized that a lack of logical rationale for adverse employment actions can be strong evidence of discriminatory intent.

Plaintiff asserts that her employment history includes positive performance evaluations and salary increases, indicating satisfactory work. However, the defendants demonstrate that there is a contemporaneous record of her inadequate performance during a transition period, which distinguishes this case from those cited by the plaintiff. Key evidence includes an email from Henfling expressing concern about her ability to handle new human resources duties, as well as documentation of her disorganization regarding open enrollment meetings and deficiencies in managing 401(k) spreadsheets. While the plaintiff received positive reviews prior to taking on additional responsibilities, the defendants' dissatisfaction arose specifically from her performance in these new roles, not her original position.

The argument that the plaintiff was unaware of criticisms is deemed irrelevant, as established in legal precedent. The plaintiff's claims are further undermined by her own emails and deposition testimony, which acknowledge her awareness of performance issues before her termination. Ultimately, the evidence does not support her claim that the reasons for her dismissal were a pretext for gender discrimination. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that her replacement, Mathews, had less experience and education in human resources, noting his lack of a Senior Professional Human Resources Certificate and a master's degree, which she possessed.

Defendants assert that Mathews, despite lacking a master’s degree or a professional human resources certification, was well qualified for his position due to extensive experience in human resources, managing about 500 employees across multiple sites, and overseeing the transition to a new payroll and benefits system. Mathews had supervisory responsibilities for at least six HR employees, a qualification not matched by the plaintiff. The excerpt emphasizes that evidence of an employer misjudging an employee's qualifications can suggest pretext for discrimination, but plaintiffs face a significant burden to prove that such discrepancies indicate unlawful discrimination. A plaintiff must demonstrate that their qualifications are so superior that no reasonable employer could choose another candidate over them. In this case, the qualifications of the plaintiff do not meet this burden, especially considering her performance during the transition period. The court concludes that no reasonable jury could find Mathews unqualified for the role or that Henfling acted unreasonably in hiring him. Additionally, the plaintiff's arguments regarding pay discrepancies between Mathews and another HR manager do not support her discrimination claims, as they lack evidence that the other manager is less qualified or that any pay difference indicates discrimination, particularly since the plaintiff herself was paid more than Mathews.

Plaintiff alleges that Henfling and Yves Regnier, the Finance Director, exhibited gender bias by treating women differently than men and holding different expectations for them. However, these claims are deemed conclusory and unsupported, leading the Court to disregard them. Additionally, the plaintiff suggests that two unidentified men hired for unspecified positions were paid more than a more qualified female employee, but after identifying these individuals, defendants demonstrated that the female employee earned more than the men. 

The plaintiff further claims that Ro Torrisi, the only female in senior management, was paid less than her male counterparts, but fails to provide documentation, while defendants counter that the new Finance Director for North America, a woman, is the third-highest paid employee in the company. Even if Torrisi's pay was lower, it does not establish a pattern of gender discrimination within a large workforce.

The plaintiff also asserts that an "overwhelming number" of those laid off in June 2009 were female, citing six laid-off individuals, five of whom were female. However, evidence shows that 25 employees were laid off in total, with only six being women. 

Ultimately, the plaintiff fails to demonstrate any pattern of gender discrimination or that the reasons for her termination were a pretext for such discrimination. Consequently, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. The Court notes deficiencies in the plaintiff’s response to defendants’ Rule 56.1 statement and affirms that statements lacking personal knowledge or admissible evidence will be disregarded.

The Court will utilize the defendants' Rule 56.1 statement for relevant facts due to the plaintiff's failure to submit a properly formatted fact statement. The spelling of Mathews’s last name will follow the defendants’ version, which aligns with the resume. The defendants’ office transitioned from Lake Success to Hicksville, New York, collectively referred to as the "Long Island office." Defendants assert that Mr. Henfling expected the plaintiff to lead the payroll and benefits conversion project, while the plaintiff viewed her role as assisting in a group effort with multiple employees involved. The plaintiff denies any confusion regarding her role, attributing issues to a vendor's mistake. Although Henfling was aware that McKeough was discussing the plaintiff's termination with her, he did not know that McKeough suggested the plaintiff could remain with a written warning. The plaintiff incorrectly cited McPherson v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ. when she likely intended to reference Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ. The only performance issue mentioned by McKeough was the condition of the plaintiff's desk, which was cluttered with unorganized employee election forms—a problem the plaintiff was aware of prior to her lunch meeting with McKeough. Additionally, the plaintiff’s reference to layoffs in "June 2011" likely pertains to layoffs from June 2009, based on documentary evidence connected to Henfling's deposition on May 5, 2011.