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United States v. Harris
Citations: 884 F. Supp. 2d 383; 2012 WL 3230963; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109617Docket: Criminal No. 11-196
Court: District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania; August 6, 2012; Federal District Court
Defendant Ernest Thomas Harris filed a motion to suppress evidence, specifically 9 mm Luger caliber 'R-P' ammunition seized by Pittsburgh Police during a search warrant execution on July 31, 2010, arguing that the warrant lacked probable cause and contained falsehoods or omissions undermining the Magistrate Judge's probable cause finding. The Government opposed the motion. A suppression hearing occurred on April 24, 2012, with both parties submitting pre-hearing briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law thereafter. The Court considered all submissions and evidence presented during the hearing before denying the motion to suppress. Defendant faces two counts of possession of a firearm and/or ammunition by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Count One pertains to the unlawful possession of the aforementioned ammunition, while Count Two involves a .40 S.W caliber Glock pistol and corresponding ammunition. The Indictment details Defendant's prior convictions, including crimes related to stolen property, drug offenses, and terroristic threats. The Court accepted Defendant's nolo contendere plea for Count Two on December 20, 2011, and outlined potential penalties, including a statutory maximum of ten years for each count, with advisory guideline ranges subject to recalculation based on future convictions. Credible evidence presented at the April 24, 2012 suppression hearing established several key facts. The Government's Exhibit 1, which included an Application for Search Warrant and Authorization, a supporting Affidavit of Probable Cause, and a Receipt/Inventory of Seized Property, was admitted without defense objection. On July 31, 2010, Pittsburgh Police Officer Brian Schmitt submitted an application for a search warrant to Magisterial District Judge Richard D. Olasz, Jr., which was granted at 5:00 p.m. upon a finding of probable cause. The warrant authorized the search of a residence at 8 Roberts Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, specifically targeting items taken from robbery victim Thomas Boyd, including a white gold diamond ring and a black and gray semi-automatic handgun. It also allowed for the seizure of documents establishing ownership or control of the residence. The premises were described as a red brick row house located in the Hill District, with the number 8 marked on the door, including the home's curtilage. The application identified Marsha Bacon and Earnest Harris as the individuals associated with the premises. The warrant referenced an attached sworn affidavit by Officer Schmitt. Officer Schmitt, with nearly five years of experience as a Police Officer in Pittsburgh, primarily focused on combating drug and gun violence during his time in plain clothes from May 2007 to September 2009. He has participated in numerous drug arrests and conducted over fifty controlled buys and narcotics-related search warrants. Schmitt has received specialized training in drug trafficking and interdiction. On July 30, 2010, at 4:15 PM, Officers Spangler, Thiros, Rosato, and Carruba responded to a robbery at Big Tom's Barber Shop located at 2042 Centre Ave. The barber, Thomas Boyd, reported that the suspect, Ernest Harris, who had just received a haircut, demanded payment for "security." After Boyd declined, Harris became aggressive, returning later with a firearm, assaulting Boyd, and robbing him of $205 in cash and a silver diamond ring valued between $2,500 and $3,000. Harris threatened Boyd, stating, "You should have paid me for security," before fleeing in a red SUV. Officers subsequently located Harris's residence at 8 Roberts Street, where they confirmed his address with his aunt, Marsha Bacon. An arrest warrant was obtained for Harris, who was apprehended on the same day at approximately 11:27 PM, about one block from his home. Harris has prior convictions, including a guilty plea for CS13A30, rendering him prohibited from firearm possession under CC6105. A search warrant was requested for 8 Roberts Street, Pittsburgh, PA, to recover a stolen silver diamond ring belonging to victim Thomas Boyd and to potentially locate a semiautomatic handgun used in a robbery. The warrant was executed on July 31, 2010, with the property search resulting in the seizure of items including suspected cocaine, a digital scale, silver spoons, a syringe, indicia, and ammunition relevant to the charges against the defendant. At a motion hearing, Ms. Dorothy Littlejohn testified regarding an alleged illegal search by Pittsburgh Police prior to the robbery. While the court found her generally credible about her relationship with the defendant and their shared drug use, it did not accept her claims regarding the police search. Littlejohn confirmed her extensive drug use and acknowledged that the residence at 8 Roberts Street, leased to the defendant's aunt Marsha Bacon, was a known location for drug use, where she and the defendant frequently consumed drugs. They often stayed at this location despite having a separate residence, leaving behind personal belongings due to their frequent presence there. Belongings left at 8 Roberts Street included electronic equipment, clothing, and shoes, indicating that the couple maintained two residences. Littlejohn testified they stayed at 8 Roberts Street "whenever" they wanted. The defendant sought to have Littlejohn discuss an alleged illegal search of the property that purportedly occurred days before a robbery on July 30, 2010. Littlejohn struggled to recall specific dates, but described an all-night drug use session followed by a loud argument in the morning that likely prompted a neighbor to call the police. When officers arrived, they handcuffed the defendant and questioned Littlejohn about the argument and potential drugs and guns in the home, subsequently searching the residence for about 20 minutes without seizing any evidence. Littlejohn asserted that any drugs had been used and paraphernalia disposed of prior to the police's arrival. The defendant claimed that government disclosures corroborated Littlejohn’s account of the search, although he did not provide the referenced documentation to the Court. In contrast, the government found no police reports or logs regarding any incidents at 8 Roberts Street between June 25 and July 2, 2010, except for a single call for medical assistance unrelated to police activity, which undermined Littlejohn's testimony regarding an illegal search. The Court acknowledges that the Government initially disputed the Defendant's standing to file a suppression motion, claiming that 8 Roberts Street was not his residence. However, both parties later agreed that the location was indeed a residence used by the Defendant, establishing his standing. As a result, the Court does not need to assess whether the Defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the search of 8 Roberts Street. The Court emphasizes that the burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy lies with the proponent of the suppression motion. The Defendant contends that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacks probable cause, is nonspecific about the search locations, fails to demonstrate a connection between the alleged crime and the residence, and contains materially false information or omissions that undermine probable cause. In response, the Government argues that the affidavit clearly establishes probable cause, with sufficient specificity regarding the location and an inferred nexus between the crime and the residence. The Government also asserts the applicability of the good faith exception, claiming that the police acted in good faith based on the warrant. Finally, it argues that the evidence presented does not reveal any significant falsehoods or omissions that would necessitate a hearing under Franks v. Delaware or weaken the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination. The Court plans to first analyze the probable cause issues, followed by discussions on the good faith exception, and finally the claims regarding falsehoods or omissions in the affidavit. Defendant claims that evidence gathered at 8 Roberts Street violated his Fourth Amendment rights, which protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and require warrants to be based on probable cause. The Pittsburgh Police obtained a warrant from Magistrate Judge Olasz, who determined that the application and supporting affidavit provided probable cause to search for stolen items and a firearm linked to a June 30, 2010 robbery. Courts afford great deference to a magistrate’s probable cause determination, as established in Illinois v. Gates. A trial court’s review of this determination is deferential, focusing on whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. While reviewing courts do not merely accept a magistrate's conclusions without scrutiny, they tend to favor warrants in marginal cases. A magistrate's role is to assess whether there is a fair probability of finding contraband or evidence at the specified location; thus, a warrant should be upheld if there is substantial evidence supporting such a probability. Importantly, a reviewing court is limited to the facts presented to the magistrate and cannot consider information outside the affidavit. A supporting affidavit for a search warrant must be read in its entirety and in a common-sense manner. Probable cause is a flexible concept dependent on the specific factual circumstances, not strictly defined by legal rules. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary for establishing probable cause. The Defendant's challenge regarding the specificity of the location to be searched—8 Roberts Street—was found to be without merit. The Defendant claimed that the affidavit lacked specificity, but this argument was unsupported and not further elaborated during the motion hearing or in proposed findings. The Court determined that the description in the warrant met the required particularity, as it provided a clear street address, identified the neighborhood, and included a description of the residence, allowing for reasonable identification of the location. Consequently, the Court denied the Defendant's motion to suppress based on insufficient particularity and concluded that the affidavit sufficiently established a connection between the alleged criminal activity and the location to be searched. To establish probable cause for a search warrant, a sufficient connection between the suspected criminal activity and the location to be searched must be demonstrated. Direct evidence linking the location to the crime is not mandatory; probable cause may be inferred from the nature of the crime, items sought, opportunities for concealment, and reasonable inferences about where evidence might be stored. The likelihood of finding evidence can increase if a defendant has been arrested, although this does not automatically grant probable cause to search the arrestee's home. In the specific case referenced, there is no direct evidence connecting the residence at 8 Roberts Street to the alleged robbery or the firearm involved. Nonetheless, the absence of direct evidence does not negate the existence of probable cause when considering the overall circumstances, indicating a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be located at that address. The Court determined that there are reasonable inferences establishing a connection between the evidence from a robbery and the search location. Key findings include: 1. Officers confirmed with the Defendant's aunt that he resided at 8 Roberts Street after conducting a 'knock and talk.' 2. The items stolen in the robbery—a firearm, cash, and a ring—are typically concealed in residences and were unaccounted for following the Defendant's arrest. 3. The proximity of the robbery location (2042 Centre Avenue) and the search location (8 Roberts Street) suggests that the contraband could easily have been moved between the two sites. 4. The timeline indicates that the Defendant had sufficient opportunity to return to his residence and hide the contraband between the robbery and his arrest, despite his claims to the contrary. Given these points, the Court rejected the Defendant's motion to suppress, affirming that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for probable cause, thereby validating the search warrant for 8 Roberts Street. The Court ruled that the good faith exception applies even if the warrant lacked probable cause, as the Defendant failed to prove that the warrant and affidavit contained significant falsehoods or omitted critical information, thereby negating the need for a Franks hearing. The Supreme Court's precedent allows evidence obtained under a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate to be admissible, provided officers acted in reasonable reliance on it, as established in United States v. Leon. The exclusionary rule's intent to deter police misconduct does not apply when officers act in good faith under a validly issued warrant. The Third Circuit outlines four exceptions where the good faith exception does not apply: 1) reliance on a false affidavit, 2) the magistrate's abandonment of their judicial role, 3) an affidavit lacking probable cause to the point that belief in its validity is unreasonable, and 4) a facially deficient warrant. The Defendant's claims regarding the first and third exceptions were dismissed, as the Court reaffirmed that the warrant was supported by probable cause, thus upholding the good faith exception. A criminal defendant has the right to challenge the accuracy of factual statements in an affidavit of probable cause supporting a search warrant, as established in Franks v. Delaware. To successfully challenge the affidavit, the defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing" that it contains a false statement made knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, and that this falsehood is material to the probable cause determination. This showing cannot be based on mere allegations; the defendant must provide reliable evidence, such as sworn affidavits or witness statements. If the defendant meets this burden, the court may hold a Franks hearing, where the defendant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant made false statements or omissions that were material to the finding of probable cause. The distinction is made between misrepresentations and omissions: misrepresentations require the removal of false statements from the affidavit, while omissions require the addition of the omitted information to evaluate materiality. In this case, the defendant argued that the affidavit contained materially false information or omissions but failed to provide supporting evidence. Therefore, he did not meet the burden necessary for a substantial preliminary showing. The government contended that the defendant did not meet his burden at the hearing but allowed the defendant’s witness, Dorothy Littlejohn, to testify to aid in meeting this initial burden. Defendant claims that the affidavit used to secure a search warrant contains false statements and omissions, particularly regarding the characterization of 8 Roberts Street as his residence, which he argues is actually a "crack house," and the omission of a prior illegal search. The Government counters that Littlejohn's testimony does not substantiate these claims and maintains that the facts established by the defense do not affect the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination. The Court agrees with the Government, stating that Littlejohn's testimony lacks credibility and fails to provide material facts that would undermine the probable cause. Although Defendant argues that the prior search, which he claims revealed contraband, is relevant, the Court notes that Littlejohn stated there was no contraband present during that time, undermining his argument. Furthermore, the Court finds that the characterization of 8 Roberts Street as a crack house does not materially impact the probable cause assessment, as Littlejohn acknowledged spending significant time there with Defendant and did not contradict the police officer's assertion that Defendant was reported to reside there. Ultimately, the Court concludes that any additional facts from Littlejohn's testimony would not have changed the magistrate's probable cause determination, referencing legal precedent that omitted facts are not material if they would not alter the outcome of the probable cause evaluation. Defendant's assertion that 8 Roberts Street is not his residence contradicts the parties' agreement during the motion hearing, which recognized it as a residence sufficient to establish standing to challenge the warrant under the Fourth Amendment. If 8 Roberts Street were merely a "crack house" where he occasionally spent the night, Defendant would lack a reasonable expectation of privacy and standing to suppress evidence seized in his absence. Even if he proved the affidavit's claim that it was his residence to be materially false, the motion to suppress would still be denied due to lack of standing. Defendant failed to demonstrate that the affidavit contained false statements or omitted material information affecting the magistrate's probable cause determination. Consequently, he is not entitled to a Franks hearing, nor has he provided credible evidence to challenge the warrant's validity. The good faith exception to the warrant requirement applies, serving as an additional basis for denying the motion to suppress. The Court also notes that Defendant filed three other pretrial motions, which will be addressed separately. The credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence are matters for the trial judge to determine. The Court found Littlejohn's testimony implausible regarding the disposal of drugs before police arrival, given the circumstances. The Fourth Amendment protections extend to individuals in their own homes and, under certain conditions, in the homes of others, as established in relevant case law. The motion to suppress is therefore denied. The Supreme Court established that an overnight guest in another person's home has a legitimate expectation of privacy while present there, as this arrangement is a recognized social custom that provides privacy. However, this expectation ceases once the guest leaves the home or if their presence is merely with the householder’s consent. Thus, short-term guests lack an expectation of privacy. In this case, the Defendant, categorized as an "overnight guest," would typically lack standing to contest the search since he was not present during its execution, having been arrested the night before. Nonetheless, the Government conceded standing, making further analysis unnecessary. The warrant's validity is supported by an affidavit incorporated by reference, differentiating this case from precedents where suppression was warranted due to insufficient affidavit consideration. The warrant indicated that Magistrate Judge Olasz, who had over two years of experience by the search date and was located outside the Hill District, likely understood the area's dynamics. Courts can take judicial notice of geographic information, which confirms the proximity of locations relevant to the case. The Defendant did not challenge the warrant's validity regarding the police's knowledge of his whereabouts post-robbery, and no evidence was presented to support claims of such omissions.