Carnival Corp. v. Operadora Aviomar S.A. de C.V.

Citations: 883 F. Supp. 2d 1316; 2012 WL 3260310; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111176Docket: Case No. 11-20687-CV-JLK

Court: District Court, S.D. Florida; August 8, 2012; Federal District Court

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The Court, presided by Judge James Lawrence King, has granted Defendant Operadora Aviomar S.A. de C.V.’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. This case involves a breach of contract claim by Plaintiff Carnival Corporation against Defendant Aviomar regarding indemnification for maintenance and care expenses incurred due to an employee injury during an ATV excursion in Acapulco, Mexico. Carnival, a Panamanian corporation based in Miami, entered into a contract with Aviomar in 2004 which obligated Aviomar to provide shore excursions and indemnify Carnival for related claims. Following the employee's injury on February 29, 2008, Carnival has paid over $500,000 in maintenance and cure and sought reimbursement from Aviomar, which has refused. Carnival claims the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332, and 1333, primarily citing federal question jurisdiction due to the maintenance and cure payments governed by federal maritime law. The Court has determined it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, resulting in the dismissal of the action.

Plaintiff Carnival asserts that the court has admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 due to an indemnification contract it claims is maritime in nature, seeking defense and indemnification for maintenance, cure, and unseaworthiness claims. Additionally, Carnival argues that diversity jurisdiction is established under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, citing an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, with its principal place of business in Florida and Defendant Aviomar's in Mexico. In response, Defendant Aviomar contests Carnival's jurisdictional claims, stating that the disputes arise solely from contract law rather than federal or maritime law, implying that neither 28 U.S.C. § 1331 nor § 1333 applies. Aviomar further argues that complete diversity is absent since Carnival is incorporated in Panama. The court notes that federal courts possess limited jurisdiction and must dismiss cases that do not meet jurisdictional requirements. 

Examining Carnival's claims for breach of contract and related relief, the court finds that while Carnival’s obligations to its employee involve federal law, the claims against Aviomar stem solely from the indemnification contract, lacking a federal question basis under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Regarding admiralty jurisdiction, Carnival contends the agreement is maritime, but the court emphasizes that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 depends on whether the contract pertains to maritime services or transactions, referencing legal precedents.

A maritime contract involves activities related to a ship's use, commerce, navigation on navigable waters, sea transport, or maritime employment, as established in J.A.R. Inc. v. M/V Lady Lucille. Contracts for the transportation of goods by sea, even partially on land, and contracts for ship repairs are typically classified as maritime contracts. In contrast, contracts that are incidental to maritime activity, such as those made and performed on land (e.g., shipbuilding), do not establish admiralty jurisdiction. 

In the current case, Plaintiff Carnival claims that an Agreement allowing Defendant Aviomar to sell shore excursion tickets to Carnival's passengers constitutes a maritime contract because the excursions are linked to the passengers' cruise experience. Defendant Aviomar counters that the excursions are merely convenient and not essential to the cruise. The Court examines the Agreement, which permits Aviomar to sell land-based excursions that occur off the cruise ship and do not impact ship operations or passenger safety while aboard. Ultimately, the Court concludes that the Agreement is incidental to Carnival's primary maritime activity of passenger carriage, thus failing to meet the criteria for admiralty subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.

Additionally, regarding diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Plaintiff Carnival asserts that complete diversity is required, with a minimum amount in controversy of over $75,000. However, Defendant Aviomar contends that both parties are alien corporations under § 1332(a)(2), resulting in a lack of diversity.

Defendant Aviomar contends that Plaintiff Carnival's dual citizenship as a Florida corporation and a foreign corporation (specifically, a Panamanian corporation) undermines complete diversity because both parties are foreign corporations, with the other being a Mexican corporation. This is supported by the case of Vaka v. Embraer, which emphasizes that complete diversity is absent when both a plaintiff and a defendant qualify as aliens. Conversely, Plaintiff Carnival argues that its status as a Florida corporation, due to its principal place of business, establishes sufficient grounds for diversity jurisdiction. Carnival cites Crist v. Carnival Corp. to assert that it is always considered a Florida citizen for diversity purposes.

The Court acknowledges that while the Crist opinion is relevant, its finding that Carnival is a Florida corporation is limited to that case's specific facts. In Crist, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a corporation is deemed a citizen of both its chartering country and the state of its principal place of business, concluding that complete diversity was lacking when both the individual plaintiff and the foreign corporation were citizens of the same state. Applying this rationale, the Court finds that, similar to the Crist case, complete diversity does not exist in the current situation, where Carnival, with dual citizenship, is suing another foreign corporation.

As a result, the Court concludes that complete diversity is lacking based on the facts presented in the Amended Complaint. Consequently, the Court grants Defendant Aviomar's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, dismisses the case without prejudice for re-filing in an appropriate court, directs the Clerk to close the case, and denies all pending motions as moot. Additionally, it notes that unpublished opinions, while not binding, can be cited as persuasive authority.