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Johnson v. Dollar General
Citations: 880 F. Supp. 2d 967; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105267; 2012 WL 3072997Docket: No. C 11-3038-MWB
Court: District Court, N.D. Iowa; July 30, 2012; Federal District Court
A former store manager, Todd Johnson, alleges wrongful termination by Dollar General and its district manager, Michael Williams, after missing five days of work, five months post-heart attack. He claims violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), retaliation related to workers' compensation claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and seeks recovery of a quarterly bonus under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL). The defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing there is no genuine dispute regarding Johnson's resignation, his failure to demonstrate a "serious health condition" for FMLA claims, lack of protected activity concerning workers' compensation claims, preemption of the emotional distress claim by Iowa workers' compensation law, and ineligibility for the bonus due to his employment status at the time of payout. Johnson concedes the emotional distress claim's viability but opposes summary judgment on the remaining claims. The court will determine if Johnson’s disputed claims warrant a jury hearing. Notably, Johnson was trained on FMLA policies and aware of relevant guidelines while employed at Dollar General. Dollar General's attendance policy mandated that employees notify their supervisors if unable to work, with store managers required to discuss absence situations in person. The company did not offer sick leave but had a "Teamshare" bonus plan for eligible store managers, contingent on active employment during the fiscal year and through the bonus calculation period. Johnson, an employee, suffered a knee injury in October 2008, for which he received workers compensation benefits, although Dollar General claimed no communication occurred about this claim. Johnson contended that his supervisor, Williams, was aware of the injury. On November 18, 2008, Johnson experienced a heart attack at work, leading to a week-long hospitalization. He reported the incident to corporate offices and was granted company leave since he was not yet eligible for FMLA leave. Medical records indicated a diagnosis of severe coronary artery disease, and Johnson claimed the heart attack was work-related. It was undisputed that Williams was unaware of this claim. There was no clarity on whether Johnson received workers compensation or company leave for the heart attack. Upon returning to work in January 2009, Johnson received a "good" performance evaluation from Williams but alleged that he faced pressure to restore his store to "model store" status without additional payroll, unlike a peer who received extra resources. Johnson acknowledged he did not request extra payroll and faced no disciplinary actions for not meeting the "model store" criteria. Disputes arose over events from April 30 to May 6, 2009, but it was agreed that Johnson felt unwell on April 30 due to flu-like symptoms and worked until noon, when his assistant manager arrived. Johnson informed Eckert of his illness and intention to go home. He claimed to have contacted his doctor's office multiple times between April 30 and May 1, 2009, but the only medical record from that period is a note from Mercy Family Clinic detailing a call on May 1, 2009. In that call, Johnson reported symptoms of diarrhea, fever, and extreme fatigue, and was advised to seek emergency evaluation, which he refused, stating he believed his condition was not serious and was related to exposure to co-workers. He declined an office appointment, indicating he would call if his condition worsened. There is a dispute regarding whether Johnson worked on May 1 or only called Eckert, but he did request five days of vacation, stating he might return earlier if his condition improved, although he did not communicate this plan to Dollar General. On the same day, Johnson left a voicemail for Williams, claiming he had seen a doctor due to chest pains and that he was advised to rest; however, this instruction was not supported by the medical notes from his call. Williams left Johnson several voicemails that Johnson deemed threatening, asserting that Williams pressured him to return to work. Johnson did not communicate with Dollar General from May 1 to May 5, 2009. On May 5, Williams left a message indicating a need for a prompt response or risk termination, which Johnson contested. Johnson finally called Williams on May 6, 2009, explaining that, due to ongoing health issues, he needed to resign for medical reasons. Johnson resigned from Dollar General on May 6, 2009, but claims this was a constructive discharge. He alleges he was entitled to a quarterly bonus that Dollar General did not pay, arguing that state law mandates payment despite not being employed on the payout date, June 5, 2009. Johnson filed his original lawsuit in the Iowa District Court on July 22, 2010, against Dollar General, Dolgencorp, L.L.C., and Michael Williams, asserting claims for retaliation related to workers' compensation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law for the unpaid bonus. The defendants answered with denials and affirmative defenses. Concurrently, Johnson filed a federal lawsuit on July 26, 2010, claiming violations of the FMLA and ERISA concerning COBRA benefits. However, this federal action was dismissed without prejudice on February 15, 2011. Johnson later amended his state-court petition to include an FMLA claim, leading to the removal of the case to federal court on August 10, 2011. His Amended Complaint includes three state-law claims: 1. **Retaliation for Workers’ Compensation Claims** - Alleging wrongful termination in relation to ongoing workers' compensation disputes. 2. **Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress** - Claiming the defendants' actions were reckless and caused him severe emotional distress. 3. **Violation of Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law** - Asserting the defendants willfully refused to pay a rightfully earned bonus. For these claims, Johnson seeks compensatory and punitive damages, interest, costs, and other appropriate relief. Count IV of Johnson’s Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612-2615, against both defendants. The complaint claims that Johnson took leave due to a serious medical condition and that he was entitled to FMLA protections. The defendants are accused of violating the FMLA by: a) failing to provide appropriate notices regarding FMLA rights; b) not granting his FMLA leave; c) retaliating against him for exercising his FMLA rights; d) discriminating against him for utilizing those rights; and e) using a pretext to justify his termination. Johnson asserts that the defendants acted willfully and seeks various forms of relief, including a judgment confirming FMLA violations, injunctions to rehire him, place him on FMLA leave, and restore his employment benefits retroactively to May 5, 2009, as well as compensation for lost wages, emotional distress damages, attorney fees, liquidated damages, and additional relief deemed appropriate by the court. The defendants removed the case to federal court based on Johnson's FMLA claim but did not file an answer to the Amended Complaint in either court. The Scheduling Order established deadlines for dispositive motions and set a trial date. Despite the lack of an answer, the defendants eventually filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 30, 2012, seeking dismissal of all claims. Johnson responded on May 31, 2012, and the defendants replied on June 11, 2012. Although no party requested oral arguments as required, the court scheduled them for July 19, 2012. During the oral arguments, Johnson's attorney questioned the absence of an answer in the federal records. The defendants claimed they had filed an answer in state court, later submitting it for supplementation of their pleadings. Defendants were allowed to supplement their pleadings and filed their Answer to the Plaintiff's Amended Petition on July 23, 2012. Their Motion for Summary Judgment has been fully submitted. The legal analysis outlines that summary judgment is used to clarify disputed facts and eliminate unmeritorious claims. According to established case law, summary judgment is proper when the record shows no genuine issue of material fact, allowing the moving party to prevail as a matter of law. Material facts are those that could influence the case's outcome under applicable law. An issue of material fact is considered genuine if it has a basis in the record, and a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. The moving party carries the burden of demonstrating the lack of genuine issues of material fact as per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must then present specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations. Additionally, the Eighth Circuit emphasizes that facts must be viewed favorably towards the nonmoving party only when genuine disputes exist, reserving credibility assessments and evidence weight for jury considerations. In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, the Supreme Court emphasized that a nonmovant in a motion for summary judgment must provide specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial, rather than merely asserting doubt about the material facts. The Eighth Circuit, in Torgerson v. City of Rochester, clarified that there is no separate standard for summary judgment in employment discrimination cases and that the same standards apply as in any civil case. The court rejected suggestions that summary judgment is disfavored in such cases, reinforcing its utility as a pretrial tool. However, the application of these principles in employment discrimination cases is complex, as they often rely heavily on experience. Discrimination and retaliation cases are particularly challenging to prove, especially as employers have become more adept at concealing discriminatory intent and creating plausible justifications for adverse actions. The historical evolution of anti-discrimination laws has not simplified the burden of proof for plaintiffs, as employers can easily fabricate reasons for adverse employment actions due to the discretionary nature of such decisions. Discrimination and retaliation claims in employment law often involve workers of average or below-average performance, as high-caliber employees are less likely to pursue such claims due to the economic implications for employers. The focus then shifts to Johnson's claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as outlined in his Amended Complaint. The defendants argue against Johnson's FMLA claim in several key areas: 1. **Eligibility for FMLA Leave**: The defendants assert that Johnson did not qualify for FMLA leave due to lacking a "serious health condition," as he only spoke with a medical assistant and did not receive inpatient care or ongoing treatment from a healthcare provider. 2. **Notice Requirement**: They contend that Johnson failed to provide adequate notice of his need for FMLA leave, as his actions constituted merely calling in sick. His single voicemail did not sufficiently inform his employer of his condition, and he did not follow the company's FMLA notification procedures. 3. **Resignation as Adverse Action**: The defendants argue that Johnson's voluntary resignation precludes him from claiming he faced an adverse employment action or retaliation under the FMLA, as there was no indication of termination communicated to him prior to his resignation. 4. **Nexus**: Finally, they claim there is no causal link between the actions of the supervisor, Williams, and any alleged FMLA violation, asserting that Johnson did not engage in the actions protected by the FMLA that could give rise to retaliation. Overall, the defendants maintain that Johnson has not provided sufficient evidence to support his FMLA claims, warranting summary judgment in their favor. Johnson contends that he is entitled to protections under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) despite the defendants’ claims that he cannot rely on any changes in attitude from Williams after his heart attack in November 2008. They assert that Johnson's leave was “company” leave, not FMLA leave, as he was ineligible for FMLA. Additionally, they argue that Johnson's failure to request FMLA leave in April or May 2009 demonstrates an absence of causation, and they claim he relies solely on speculation to establish a connection between his health issues and any alleged retaliation. In response, Johnson argues he had a “serious health condition” due to significant heart issues, which he claims qualifies him for FMLA protections. He cites medical evidence supporting his claim and maintains that his contact with his doctor's office on May 1, 2009, was significant, providing documentation that suggests he was advised to seek immediate medical attention. Johnson challenges the defendants' assertion that his doctors did not regard his condition as serious enough for inpatient care. Johnson also argues that a “serious health condition” is not necessary to substantiate a retaliation claim under the FMLA. He asserts that the defendants are liable for retaliation regardless of whether they had a complete understanding of his health status when they terminated him. He states that any adverse employment action that would deter a reasonable employee from exercising FMLA rights qualifies as retaliation, emphasizing that retaliatory actions can occur even if the employee does not ultimately possess a “serious health condition.” Regarding the defendants’ claim of insufficient notice of his need for FMLA leave, Johnson maintains that the context of his May 1 phone call to Williams indicated he might require such leave, especially given his recent heart attack. He contests the defendants’ argument that he did not experience an “adverse employment action” because he resigned, asserting that there are genuine material facts regarding whether Williams's threatening voicemails constituted a “constructive discharge.” He concludes that his failure to explicitly reference the FMLA in his notice does not negate Williams's awareness of his need for FMLA leave. Johnson contends that Williams's aggressive voicemails and threat of termination if he didn’t respond within thirty minutes created an intolerable work environment, suggesting an intent to compel him to resign. He argues a clear link exists between his protected leave and adverse employment actions, as Williams appeared troubled by Johnson’s request for leave. The defendants counter that Johnson cannot attribute his health condition from a 2008 heart attack to his subsequent absences. They assert that on May 1, 2009, Johnson reported flu-like symptoms rather than chest pains, declined emergency treatment, and did not seek necessary medical care prior to his resignation. They argue that his vague communication regarding his condition did not sufficiently notify his employer of a need for Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, which requires clear indication of both the need and the reason. The defendants also highlight that Johnson's failure to respond to Williams's inquiries about his health and his absence without providing further information did not fulfill his responsibilities. Moreover, they maintain that eligibility for FMLA leave is essential for an FMLA retaliation claim, citing precedents that require proof of entitlement to FMLA leave. The defendants dispute Johnson's late assertion of constructive discharge, arguing it was not properly raised and, even if it were, the circumstances—namely a few unreturned voicemails—do not constitute intolerable working conditions. Finally, they note Johnson did not give Dollar General an opportunity to address the issue before resigning. The excerpt also summarizes the FMLA provisions, stating that eligible employees are entitled to twelve weeks of leave for serious health conditions that impede their job performance, with potential for intermittent leave under employer agreement. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) establishes rights for employees to take leave and prohibits certain employer actions against those exercising these rights. Specifically, it is unlawful for employers to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of any FMLA rights, as well as to discriminate against individuals for opposing unlawful practices related to the FMLA. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interprets these prohibitions to include both "interference" with FMLA rights and "retaliation" for exercising these rights, based on the "Stallings dichotomy." Interference claims arise when an employee alleges that an employer denied or interfered with their substantive rights under the FMLA. An employee can succeed in such a claim by demonstrating that they were denied a benefit under the FMLA linked to their leave. Interference claims cover situations where an employee is terminated while on FMLA leave, where FMLA leave is negatively factored into employment decisions, or where employers manipulate circumstances to evade FMLA responsibilities. In interference claims, the employer's intent in denying benefits is not considered, and the initial burden of proof lies with the employee to show entitlement to the denied benefit. FMLA benefits require an employee to demonstrate the existence of a "serious health condition" that prevents them from performing their job functions. To establish an interference claim, the plaintiff must prove they suffered from such a condition. The Eighth Circuit has defined the elements of an interference claim to include proof of serious health conditions, emphasizing that absences not resulting from these conditions are not protected under FMLA. Conditions typically not covered include minor ailments like colds, flu, or headaches, unless they meet regulatory criteria. A "serious health condition" is defined as an illness or impairment that requires either inpatient care or "continuing treatment" by a healthcare provider. The latter requires that the employee shows a period of incapacity lasting more than three days and that they received continuing treatment. Treatment must involve an in-person visit occurring within seven days of the incapacity onset. Employees must also provide adequate and timely notice to their employer regarding their need for FMLA leave. This notice should include enough information to alert the employer to the employee's potential need for leave, as failure to provide adequate notice can undermine an interference claim. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals clarifies that an employee does not need to explicitly mention the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) to notify an employer of a potential need for leave. The adequacy of such notice is assessed based on the totality of circumstances and typically falls to a jury to decide. Routine doctor visits may not suffice as notice; however, “non-routine” visits linked to previous conditions may meet the notice requirement. Employers can mandate health care provider certification for leave requests. While intent from the employer is not necessary for an interference claim, such claims do not operate under strict liability; an employer is not liable if adverse actions are unrelated to FMLA leave. If interference is established, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that termination reasons were unrelated to the employee's FMLA usage. Employees retain no additional protection from termination for non-FMLA related reasons. Johnson's claims include failures by the defendants to provide proper FMLA notices and to grant his FMLA leave, suggesting manipulation to avoid FMLA responsibilities. However, Johnson does not contest material facts regarding his receipt of FMLA policy information and his appropriate notification of the need for medical leave post-heart attack, which undermines his first interference claim. Summary judgment is permissible when there are no genuine issues of material fact, allowing judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is warranted when, viewing the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The nonmoving party must present specific facts through depositions, affidavits, or other means to show a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on allegations or denials. The defendants are granted summary judgment on one claim. Regarding Johnson's second claim of interference related to FMLA leave, the analysis reveals that Johnson fails to establish any genuine issues of material fact regarding whether his absence in late April 2009 was due to a “serious health condition.” FMLA benefits require proof of a serious health condition that prevents an employee from performing job functions. Johnson did not demonstrate that his severe coronary artery disease met the criteria for a serious health condition as defined by relevant regulations, nor did he show any agreement with Dollar General for taking intermittent leave. Routine doctor visits or absences not linked to a serious health condition do not invoke FMLA protections. Even if his absence was related to coronary artery disease, there is insufficient evidence that it rendered him unable to work at that time. Additionally, Johnson's medical records only suggest flu-like symptoms without confirming the necessity for inpatient care, further undermining his claim. An illness, injury, impairment, or mental condition qualifies as a "serious health condition" under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) if it involves inpatient care or ongoing treatment by a healthcare provider. Johnson's claims regarding a serious health condition are undermined by his failure to pursue necessary treatment after he experienced incapacity beginning April 30, 2009. Despite a suggestion from his doctor’s medical assistant to seek emergency care or consult an on-call doctor, Johnson refused both options and did not provide evidence of receiving in-person treatment within the required timeframe. Consequently, he cannot establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding his serious health condition, leading to the failure of his FMLA interference claim. Additionally, Johnson's FMLA retaliation claims are more contentious. Although the FMLA does not explicitly prohibit retaliation, courts, including the Eighth Circuit, interpret that it does protect against retaliation for exercising FMLA rights. There are two claim types: interference, where an employee alleges denial of FMLA rights, and retaliation, where the employee claims discrimination for exercising those rights. The court affirms that Johnson's claims of interference are not substantiated, which impacts the viability of his retaliation claims as well. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes claims of retaliation for exercising FMLA rights but has not consistently defined the statutory basis for these claims. In Lovland, the court classified retaliation claims under the discrimination prohibition of 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) but limited interference claims under § 2615(a)(1) to scenarios where an employee proves denial of a FMLA benefit. Notably, a concurring opinion in Lovland suggested that framing retaliation claims under § 2615(a)(1) is more appropriate, a view supported by subsequent opinions without fully abandoning the Stallings dichotomy. The court highlighted a 2009 Department of Labor amendment clarifying that FMLA interference includes employer discrimination or retaliation against employees for exercising FMLA rights, although this was described as having no practical effect. The Eighth Circuit, in Scobey, argued that § 2615(a)(1) offers a more logical basis for retaliation claims, citing a case where demotion was linked to both interference (due to absences) and retaliation (for using leave related to health issues). The court noted the difficulties in distinguishing between interference and retaliation claims under the FMLA. Ultimately, it was concluded that retaliation for exercising FMLA rights is encompassed within the interference definition, arguing for § 2615(a)(1) as the appropriate statutory basis for such claims. Section 2615(a)(1) of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) allows for a claim of retaliation for exercising FMLA rights as a type of “interference.” However, Section 2615(a)(2) does not support a retaliation claim for exercising FMLA rights, as it refers specifically to retaliation against an employee for opposing unlawful practices under the FMLA. Similarly, Section 2615(b) prohibits retaliation for asserting a claim or participating in an inquiry regarding FMLA violations but does not extend to retaliation for the act of taking FMLA leave itself. Since January 2009, it has been established that the prohibition against retaliation for exercising FMLA rights is included under the broader category of “interference” as outlined in 29 C.F.R. 825.220(c). This regulation mandates that employers cannot discriminate against employees for exercising FMLA rights, including during unpaid leave, and states that such leave cannot negatively impact employment actions or attendance policies. The Eighth Circuit has generally deferred to Department of Labor regulations regarding the FMLA while maintaining the authority to reject interpretations contrary to congressional intent. Although the court has invalidated certain FMLA regulations, it has not challenged the validity of the amended 29 C.F.R. 825.220(c). Conversely, the Sixth Circuit has affirmed this regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the FMLA deserving of judicial deference. Ultimately, the crux of FMLA retaliation claims lies in how they are defined by Eighth Circuit case law, which has consistently recognized a distinction between interference and retaliation claims, including in decisions made after the 2009 amendments. Under Eighth Circuit law, an FMLA "retaliation" claim involves allegations that an employer discriminated against an employee for taking FMLA leave, in contrast to an "interference" claim, which pertains to the denial of FMLA rights. In interference claims, the employer's intent is deemed immaterial, whereas retaliation claims require proof of discriminatory intent, often evaluated using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, an employee must demonstrate: (1) engagement in protected conduct, (2) suffering a materially adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between the adverse action and the protected conduct. If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action, after which the employee must rebut this justification or present additional evidence of discrimination. Dollar General contends that an employee cannot claim retaliation for exercising FMLA rights unless they were actually entitled to FMLA leave due to a serious health condition. This position is supported by decisions from the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, which indicate that to satisfy the "protected activity" element of an FMLA retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show they suffered from a serious health condition that prevented them from performing their job. These courts have rejected the notion that individuals can seek protection under the FMLA for leave requests made without eligibility, reinforcing that the statute only protects rights available to eligible employees. Interference and retaliation claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) necessitate that an employee demonstrates a serious health condition. In *Cash v. Smith*, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that a plaintiff could not substantiate the "protected activity" element of an FMLA retaliation claim without a serious health condition. The Tenth Circuit, in *Wilkins v. Packerware Corp.*, examined whether an employee must prove FMLA eligibility to assert a retaliation claim, concluding that the issue remains unsettled in that circuit. The plaintiff argued that asserting an FMLA right constitutes "protected activity" regardless of eligibility. The court acknowledged that some past rulings allow claims without proof of an actual disability, suggesting a similar rationale could apply to FMLA cases. However, it emphasized that FMLA protection is limited to specific qualifying situations, including caring for a seriously ill family member or the employee’s own serious health condition, and is restricted to eligible employees—those who have been employed for at least 12 months and have worked a minimum of 1,250 hours. It noted that merely claiming a desire for FMLA leave without eligibility does not shield an employee from adverse employment actions. Precedent suggests that lawful FMLA leave is a prerequisite for bringing a retaliation claim, as seen in *Campbell v. Gambro Healthcare, Inc.*, which indicates that a retaliation claim may only arise after successfully taking FMLA leave. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit in *Walker v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ.* rejected the notion that FMLA protections extend to requests for leave regardless of eligibility. The statute does not protect attempts to exercise rights not provided by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), as established in Wilkins, 260 Fed. Appx. at 103. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case for plain error since the plaintiff did not raise the issue in the district court. The court determined that the district court's requirement for the plaintiff to prove a “serious health condition” for a retaliation claim was not a “plainly evident error,” indicating the issue was contestable. The appellate court refrained from deciding if actual eligibility for FMLA leave is necessary to bring a retaliation claim. It is argued that § 2615(a)(1) serves as the appropriate basis for retaliation claims under the FMLA. Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's view in Walker, 379 F.3d at 1253, it is posited that the term “attempt” does not imply a successful exercise of FMLA rights; it includes unsuccessful efforts. Definitions from the Oxford English Dictionary and Merriam-Webster support this interpretation, indicating that an attempt can be an unsuccessful effort. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit has held that individuals deemed unqualified under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) can still pursue retaliation claims if they had a good faith belief that their accommodation request was valid. This standard aims to prevent abuse of the FMLA by ensuring that plaintiffs genuinely believe they need FMLA leave for a serious health condition. A retaliation claim under the FMLA necessitates proof of discriminatory animus from the employer, and “materially adverse action” is defined as actions that would deter a reasonable employee from exercising their FMLA rights. This aligns with the standard applied in Title VII retaliation claims, emphasizing the importance of protecting employee rights against employer retaliation. An employer is required to be notified when an employee may need FMLA leave, even if the employee may not ultimately qualify. The Eighth Circuit has established that an employee's good faith notice regarding the potential need for FMLA leave constitutes "protected conduct," safeguarding them from retaliation. It is unnecessary for the employee to explicitly mention the FMLA for the employer to recognize the potential relevance of the Act to the employee’s absence. The employer's obligations arise when they receive sufficient information indicating the possibility of the employee needing FMLA leave. Additionally, the courts have ruled that an employee's termination prior to submitting FMLA paperwork does not negate their exercise of FMLA rights, particularly if the employee's eligibility is uncertain at the time of termination. A causal link has been established between the protected activity (such as notifying the employer of the need for leave) and the employer's adverse action, such as termination, even if the employee does not ultimately have a serious health condition. The plaintiff provided timely notice to the employer regarding a leave of absence due to a condition believed to be covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Johnson claims retaliation under the FMLA for exercising his rights, asserting that Dollar General discriminated against him for this exercise and terminated him using a pretextual justification. The court identifies these claims as FMLA retaliation claims, noting that Johnson's allegations stem from his termination linked to his absence starting April 30, 2009. The court sees no substantial distinction between the retaliation and discrimination claims, as both relate to the same adverse employment action. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Johnson must demonstrate that he notified Dollar General of his need for leave based on a condition he in good faith believed was FMLA-protected and that he faced adverse action in connection with this notice. The court clarifies that Johnson is not required to prove he had a "serious health condition" for his retaliation claim and that if Dollar General provides a legitimate reason for termination, Johnson must show this reason is pretextual or that actual retaliation occurred. The court concludes that Johnson has raised sufficient genuine issues of material fact regarding his notice and the employer's response, which could allow the claim to proceed to a jury. The record indicates that Johnson informed his employer about his absence due to chest pains through a voicemail, providing a basis for his assertion of retaliation. A jury could reasonably conclude that Johnson provided sufficient and timely notice of his need for FMLA leave through a voicemail, which indicated his potential need for leave due to chest pains related to a prior heart attack, despite not explicitly invoking the FMLA. The voicemail's mention of specific symptoms suggested a serious health condition, warranting consideration under the FMLA. However, Johnson must also demonstrate a good faith belief that he was seeking FMLA-covered leave. He failed to establish this belief because he did not receive in-person treatment from a healthcare provider, did not report chest pains during a call with a medical assistant, and no healthcare provider instructed him to take time off. Johnson's assertions were inconsistent with the medical assistant's records, which indicated he attributed his symptoms to the flu rather than a heart condition. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Johnson's FMLA retaliation claim due to his inability to prove he engaged in "protected activity." Additionally, the defendants seek summary judgment on Johnson's workers' compensation retaliation claim, which alleges he was wrongfully terminated while pursuing workers' compensation claims. Johnson contends that the defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied, but the defendants argue he lacks evidence of retaliation linked to his workers' compensation claims. Defendants contend that Johnson failed to demonstrate engagement in any “protected activity” during his absence in late April and early May 2009, arguing that his voicemail reporting “chest pains” is merely speculative in suggesting he might have had a workers’ compensation claim. They assert that Johnson did not file or express intent to file a claim, and thus, they had no basis to assume he intended to do so. Additionally, they claim Johnson's resignation does not constitute retaliatory termination under Iowa law, as threats of termination, if made, are not deemed actionable. The defendants also note that Johnson did not request additional payroll to restore his store's status following his November 2008 heart attack. They argue that without adverse employment action or protected activity, a causal link to a workers’ compensation claim does not exist, emphasizing that Williams was unaware of any claim related to Johnson's heart attack. In contrast, Johnson argues that he did engage in protected activity by taking time off for workers' compensation injuries in 2008 and asserts he was “constructively discharged” in May 2009. He claims that Williams’s actions during his absence indicate a causal connection to his workers' compensation-related absences. Johnson points out that he sought benefits for a knee injury in October 2008, which Williams was aware of, and that he missed work due to his heart attack. He contends that a reasonable jury could find that Williams's voicemails during his absence support the claim of constructive discharge. Johnson argues that Williams's frustration over his request for more time off suggests prior absences were a significant factor in his termination. Furthermore, Johnson cites Iowa Supreme Court precedent allowing for individual liability in cases of wrongful termination based on public policy violations. Defendants only respond to the argument concerning individual liability. Williams, a district manager at Dollar General, is not considered an officer or director and, therefore, is not subject to individual liability for the discharge of Johnson in violation of public policy. The Iowa Supreme Court has established that individual liability for such torts extends only to corporate officers who authorized or directed the discharge, as seen in *Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc.* Williams, acting merely as a supervisor, is not liable, and he is granted summary judgment on this claim. Even if liability could be established for both Dollar General and Williams, the claim fails on its merits. Iowa courts recognize a cause of action for employees discharged contrary to public policy, particularly in cases involving retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims. To prove such a claim, an employee must demonstrate three elements: (1) engagement in protected activity, (2) suffering an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection between the discharge and the protected activity. Though Johnson may have engaged in protected activity by obtaining workers' compensation benefits in October 2008 and suffered adverse employment action through constructive discharge in May 2009, the claim ultimately fails due to an insufficient causal connection. The record does not indicate that Johnson's absence starting April 30, 2009, was a protected activity, as he did not assert workers' compensation rights related to that absence or imply it resulted from a workplace injury. As a result, the claim does not meet the necessary legal standards. The Iowa Supreme Court has established a high causation standard in common-law retaliatory discharge cases, requiring that an employee's engagement in protected conduct be the decisive factor in the employer's adverse action. A determinative factor is one that significantly influences the employer's decision, even if it is not the primary reason. Although this standard is stringent, it typically constitutes a factual question for the jury to resolve in cases of disputed conduct or reasonable inferences. Temporal proximity between the protected conduct and the adverse action can support a finding of causation but is insufficient on its own to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge without additional evidence. In the case at hand, Johnson's claim of retaliatory discharge fails to demonstrate sufficient temporal proximity, as he was not discharged until over seven months after his known workers' compensation leave for a knee injury. There is no evidence that Williams, the employer, was aware of Johnson's claim that a heart attack was work-related or that the absence starting in April 2009 was related to a workers' compensation injury. Thus, the lengthy gap undermines any argument based on temporal proximity. Moreover, Johnson's assertion that prior absences were the pivotal reason for his termination relies on speculation rather than solid inferences, as he has not presented evidence showing that Williams or Dollar General had a pattern of intolerance towards absences due to workplace injuries. A five-day absence seven months prior due to a workers' compensation injury does not reasonably infer causation for Johnson's termination in May 2009, as he must demonstrate a causal link between adverse employment actions and his workers' compensation claims. Johnson's prior longer absences and failure to follow company policy regarding vacation requests or to respond to communications about his absence undermine any claim that the workers' compensation absence was a decisive factor in his termination. Consequently, the high burden of proof regarding causation does not warrant a jury's consideration, leading to the conclusion that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. In Count II of Johnson's Amended Complaint, which alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendants, the defendants argue for summary judgment based on the exclusive remedies provision of the Iowa Workers Compensation Act. Johnson concedes that this claim is barred by the Act, thereby confirming the defendants' entitlement to summary judgment on this issue. Finally, in Count III, Johnson claims under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL) for a bonus he asserts was earned as of May 1, 2009. The defendants seek summary judgment, arguing that eligibility for such a bonus is contingent upon the terms of the parties' agreement or company policy. They reference the 2009 Fiscal Year Retail Incentive Plan, which stipulates that for a store manager like Johnson to qualify for a quarterly bonus, he must have been employed through the bonus calculation period and on the payout date. Johnson disputes the appropriateness of summary judgment for this claim. The bonus plan stipulates that quarterly bonuses are typically paid within 6 to 8 weeks after the financial quarter ends. In this case, the quarter ended on May 1, 2009, and the payout occurred on June 5, 2009, after Johnson's departure from Dollar General. Johnson argues that the bonus qualifies as wages under Iowa law, specifically citing Iowa Code § 91A.2(7), which defines wages and mandates payment within one month of earning them, and Iowa Code § 91A.4, which requires payment by the next regular payday. He contends that the eligibility requirement of being employed at payout violates state law, asserting he should have received the bonus within a month after leaving the company. In response, the defendants argue that Johnson misinterprets Iowa law, asserting that the statutes he cites do not clarify when a bonus is considered "earned." They reference the Iowa Supreme Court's previous rulings, which indicate that bonuses are not "due" if eligibility criteria are unmet and that the timing provisions for wage payments do not apply to bonuses. The Iowa Supreme Court has established that bonuses are classified as wages under Iowa law but can only be claimed when they can be accurately calculated according to the parties' agreement. Previous rulings emphasize that while bonuses can be considered wages, they are not necessarily subject to the same monthly payment requirements as regular wages. The excerpt addresses the legal implications of bonus payments under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL). It references case law establishing that not all bonuses classified as wages are necessarily owed to employees under specific circumstances. The Iowa Supreme Court previously ruled that an employee on probation at the time of bonus payout is not entitled to the bonus, as seen in Phipps, where eligibility criteria were not met. Similarly, in Matzke, a plaintiff was denied a bonus for quitting before the payout, as dictated by the employer's policy. Johnson’s claim for a quarterly bonus from Dollar General fails because he was not employed on the payout date, which was a stipulated eligibility requirement in the company’s bonus plan. Additionally, the excerpt clarifies that the timing of when a bonus is due may extend beyond the end of the relevant performance period. Ultimately, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims, including Johnson's Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) interference claims, which are dismissed because his last absence was not related to a serious health condition. The plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim is dismissed due to a lack of good faith belief regarding a serious health condition related to his absence. His workers' compensation retaliation claim fails to meet the high causation standard necessary to link any adverse employment action by Dollar General to his workers' compensation claim, and he cannot hold Williams individually liable under Iowa law. He acknowledges that his emotional distress claim is legally barred. Additionally, his IWPCL claim fails as he was ineligible for a bonus during the last quarter of his employment because he was not employed on the payout date, which complies with Iowa law. Consequently, the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in full, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that while summary judgment is generally disfavored in employment discrimination cases due to their fact-based nature, the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff to demonstrate intentional discrimination by the defendant. Relevant provisions of the FMLA prohibit discrimination against individuals for participating in related proceedings or inquiries. In Walker, the court dismissed the plaintiff's retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), determining that a request for leave made before eligibility does not constitute an attempt to exercise FMLA rights. The court clarified that the plaintiff's case lacked merit because she sought leave that she would not have been eligible for at the intended start date. The court emphasized that such requests from ineligible employees are not protected by the FMLA, while leaving open the question of whether pre-eligibility requests for post-eligibility maternity leave are protected. Regarding Johnson's state-law claims, the court noted that federal jurisdiction was based solely on his FMLA claims, but it would not decline to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims as the case was well-advanced and scheduled for trial. The court expressed skepticism about Johnson's ability to prove constructive discharge, stating that threatening an employee with termination does not suffice for such a claim under Iowa law, as established in Below v. Skarr. Johnson's allegation of constructive discharge relied heavily on a voicemail threat from Williams, but there was no evidence that Williams acted on this threat. Additionally, the court highlighted that Johnson failed to provide Dollar General a reasonable opportunity to resolve the issues before his resignation, further weakening his claim. The standard for constructive discharge requires an objective assessment of whether the employer was given a chance to address the problem, which Johnson did not do.