Court: District Court, District of Columbia; April 21, 1993; Federal District Court
In September 1989, a special meeting of the Georgetown University Alumni Association's 1987 Board of Governors was convened to ratify changes in its relationship with the University. Attendance was restricted to Board members and certain specified individuals, and counsel advised against accepting powers of attorney for attendance. Eugene L. Stewart, a Board member, designated Manuel A. Miranda as his agent for the meeting. When Miranda attempted to enter, he was informed by University Public Safety officers that he had to leave, as powers of attorney were not accepted. After refusing to comply and stating he would only leave if arrested, Miranda was arrested for unlawful entry. The U.S. Attorney’s Office chose not to prosecute him. Following his removal, the Board ratified the meeting’s agenda. Miranda subsequently filed a lawsuit against Georgetown University, the District of Columbia, and several individuals for false arrest and related claims, seeking $8 million in damages. The court assessed the legality of his arrest and determined that it was lawful because Miranda was unlawfully present at a closed meeting. The court rejected Miranda's claim of a right to attend based on the power of attorney, stating that the relevant bylaw provision concerning voting rights did not pertain to board meeting conduct. The court characterized the case as a straightforward legal issue rather than a significant civil rights matter.
The Corporation’s by-laws empower the President, as chief executive officer, to preside over board meetings and exercise executive powers. The President acted within this authority. Even if the plaintiff had a right to attend, he lacked the authority to remain after being ordered to leave by those lawfully in charge of the premises. The University, which was in control of the room, had the right to revoke any license for use and its agents could lawfully order the plaintiff to exit. Consequently, the order for the plaintiff to leave and his subsequent arrest were deemed valid. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants, affirming that a conviction was not necessary for asserting unlawful entry. The plaintiff’s reliance on Robert’s Rules of Order was misplaced, as these rules do not grant non-members the right to attend meetings before an assembly's decision. Moreover, the plaintiff's argument regarding the intent required for unlawful entry was unfounded, as specific intent is not relevant in this context. The officers had probable cause to believe the plaintiff was committing unlawful entry, which also negated his tort claims. Finally, the plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was dismissed, as he did not demonstrate deprivation of any constitutional right.
