Hudson v. National Academy of Sciences

Citations: 816 F. Supp. 774; 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3996; 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 721; 1993 WL 92188Docket: Civ. A. No. 90-2882 SSH

Court: District Court, District of Columbia; March 24, 1993; Federal District Court

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The court, presided over by District Judge Stanley S. Habeis, addressed a Title VII race discrimination case involving a plaintiff who is black and alleged both race discrimination and retaliation by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The plaintiff claimed she was denied a promotion to financial specialist, faced harassment in her role as Division Secretary, and was ultimately terminated due to her race and her participation in protected activities under Title VII. 

The NAS, a private nonprofit established by Congress, primarily conducts government-funded studies, with staff positions primarily filled through internal selections or external advertising. The plaintiff worked in various clerical roles at NAS from 1974 until her termination on May 31, 1991. She had previously held a grade 8 position and later transferred to the Division of Health Sciences Policy, where she reported to Dr. Ruth Bulger. Following the expiration of funding for her position, she accepted a temporary role with a grade reduction but maintained the same salary. After her temporary assignments ended without securing new employment, her position at NAS concluded. 

The court, after reviewing credible evidence, concluded that the defendant did not engage in discrimination or retaliation against the plaintiff. The opinion emphasizes the importance of factual evidence in determining the outcome of Title VII cases.

In September 1988, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) posted two job openings for financial specialists, positions 160.010 and 160.011, in the Institute of Medicine (IOM). The plaintiff applied orally and was interviewed but was not selected. The Court determined that the plaintiff did not prove her qualifications for the position or that the reasons provided for her nonselection were pretextual, concluding that there was no evidence of intentional discrimination.

The job descriptions required a B.A. degree or equivalent in business administration or a related field, along with administrative and financial experience. Key responsibilities included financial planning, payroll, budget preparation, and maintaining an accrual accounting system. The plaintiff, who held a high school diploma and had completed some business coursework, had primarily clerical experience, including a role as a Financial Technician. The Court found that her previous job responsibilities did not align with the qualifications necessary for the financial specialist positions, as she did not perform key tasks such as budget preparation or financial reporting.

Cranford's testimony supported the conclusion that the plaintiff was unqualified. Additionally, the Court identified legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the hiring of the selected candidates, Lisa Chimento and Luciana Frost, who were both white.

Cranford made the hiring decision for position 160-010, selecting Chimento, who held a B.A. in economics from the University of Virginia with a GPA of 3.25 and was a valedictorian in high school. Cranford considered her educational background and relevant financial experience, including spreadsheet skills, as impressive. For position 160.011, Cranford chose Frost, citing her extensive financial background and prior experience with the FNB, which was critical to Dr. Sushma Palmer, the FNB director, due to ongoing restructuring. Although Frost lacked spreadsheet experience, her familiarity with the FNB was a significant factor. The court concluded that the plaintiff was unqualified for both positions and that the reasons provided by the defendant for hiring Chimento and Frost were legitimate and nondiscriminatory. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that these reasons were pretextual or that her race was a factor in her nonselection, thus failing to meet her burden of proof for race discrimination.

Regarding her retaliation claim, the plaintiff needed to show a causal link between her protected activity—testifying for a colleague—and the adverse employment decision. The court found this claim unfounded, as the decision-makers were unaware of her testimony until after the hiring decisions were made, negating any causation. The plaintiff’s claims of harassment and demotion due to race or retaliation were also dismissed, as the defendant provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions, and the plaintiff presented no credible evidence establishing a causal link for her retaliation claim.

The plaintiff alleges harassment involving meetings with her supervisor, Bulger, and Stoll, who oversaw personnel issues, aimed at discussing her work performance. The plaintiff disputes the necessity for performance improvement and finds the two-on-one meeting format objectionable. The first meeting occurred on March 1, 1989, leading to extensive memoranda exchanges, wherein the plaintiff contested Bulger's performance evaluations. On March 29, 1989, Bulger placed the plaintiff on probation until July 1, 1989, a memorandum of which the plaintiff received on March 31. Following this, the plaintiff took extended sick leave, returning briefly in July before requesting two weeks of annual leave. Upon her return in August, her probation was extended to November 1, 1989, due to her previous absences. Meetings to discuss her performance resumed but were unproductive as the plaintiff refused to engage verbally, opting instead to respond in writing for her attorney's review. On November 7, 1989, Bulger completed a performance review, recommending against the continuation of the plaintiff's employment, to which the plaintiff rebutted on November 9. Subsequently, she voluntarily transferred to a different position effective December 1, 1989. The Court found the defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, crediting Bulger's testimony regarding the plaintiff’s inadequate performance. The Court deemed the plaintiff's claims of discrimination as unsubstantiated, noting that previous supervisors had similar concerns and highlighting Bulger's efforts to improve their working relationship, which the plaintiff did not reciprocate.

Plaintiff's retaliation claim is dismissed due to a lack of proven causation between her protected activity and the alleged harassment. The evidence indicates that the defendant’s actions were based on the plaintiff's inadequate job performance rather than her protected activities. The timeline shows that the plaintiff's relationship with Bulger was already strained by June 1988, before her November 1988 testimony at an OHR hearing, undermining any causal link. Bulger was unaware of the plaintiff's testimony until August 1989, after she had been placed on probation, and neither Bulger nor Stoll knew of her protected activities until late July 1989. The Court concluded there was no reliable evidence connecting the harassment or transfer to her protected activity, emphasizing that the issues stemmed from legitimate management concerns rather than discrimination. 

In response to the termination claim, the Court found it unsubstantiated, noting that the plaintiff was aware her position with the End-Stage Renal Study would end with the termination of funding on March 15, 1991. The plaintiff and her supervisor faced the same employment situation post-funding, and while her supervisor found another position, the plaintiff did not. The claim that Bond failed to assist her in finding a new position was rejected, as the NAS had a standard hiring process and Bond extended her employment by 75 days to seek new opportunities, during which she applied for only two of at least eleven available positions.

The plaintiff was not selected for two positions—senior marketing assistant and administrative secretary/senior program assistant. The Court found no credible evidence of racial discrimination or retaliation affecting her employment at the NAS. The plaintiff's failure to secure employment was attributed to insufficient job-seeking efforts. Therefore, the Court ruled in favor of the defendant on all claims, including age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), following a partial summary judgment granted on February 25, 1993. The District of Columbia Department of Human Rights (DHR) investigated her complaint and found "no probable cause." After 180 days without resolution, the plaintiff received a right to sue from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Court noted that all other individuals mentioned were white and referenced the plaintiff's previous roles at NAS, including project secretary. The NAS employed two rating systems—grade (G) for support staff and professional grade (PG) for professional staff—and all of plaintiff's positions were under the G rating. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's claim of a third unadvertised position for financial specialist, determining only two legitimate openings existed. It was noted that one position was transferred to Cindy Abel, and the Court questioned whether the plaintiff applied for the second opening, as she was not listed on the applicant log.

Plaintiff testified at trial that she applied orally to Stoll for two Financial Specialist positions but initially claimed in her March 23, 1989, complaint to the D.C. Office of Human Rights (OHR) that she applied only for position 160.010. The Court found her assertion that Frost was unqualified for the position unconvincing, affirming that the reasons given by the defendant for selecting Frost were credible and not pretextual. The Court noted that even if Frost was later deemed unqualified, the defendant was unaware of this at the time of selection, and the plaintiff's lesser experience would have further indicated her own lack of qualifications. 

Plaintiff's attempt to demonstrate discrimination through statistical evidence was deemed inconclusive and insufficient to establish intentional discrimination. The Court emphasized that once a Title VII case is fully tried, the determination of a prima facie case becomes irrelevant. By the time of the events, Chimento had already been appointed to position 160.010. 

The Court addressed delays in communication regarding a memorandum from Bulger, which was explained as a considerate delay until the plaintiff returned to work. Bulger, who initiated the adverse employment actions, was found to be unaware of the plaintiff's discrimination complaint when she wrote the memorandum. While Starliper was consulted, his role was deemed advisory, and his knowledge of the plaintiff's testimony did not influence the actions taken. Bond's testimony was credited, indicating she was also unaware of the plaintiff's testimony prior to their meeting in March 1989. The study in question was extended for an additional month beyond its original end date of February 1991.