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Perez-Garcia v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority

Citations: 873 F. Supp. 2d 435; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94550; 2012 WL 2686080Docket: Civil No. 08-1448 (GAG)

Court: District Court, D. Puerto Rico; July 9, 2012; Federal District Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the plaintiff sought damages from the Puerto Rico Ports Authority, Caribbean Airport Facilities, Inc., and their insurers following a golf cart accident at San Juan International Airport. The defendants filed a third-party complaint against additional parties for contribution or indemnity. Central to the case was the exclusion of expert testimony from Rick Galdos, whose qualifications and methods as an accident reconstructionist were scrutinized. Both the plaintiff and Club Car filed motions in limine to exclude Galdos' testimony, arguing it lacked factual and scientific basis, and did not meet the standards set by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert. The court, acting as a gatekeeper, found Galdos' opinions inadmissible, as they ventured into legal conclusions and lacked reliable methodology. The court emphasized the need for expert testimony to assist the jury with factual understanding rather than determining legal outcomes. The motions were granted, excluding Galdos as an expert witness, based on his testimony's failure to meet admissibility standards and its potential to mislead the jury. The court's ruling underscores the importance of maintaining the jury's role in resolving legal questions and ensuring expert testimony remains within its proper scope.

Legal Issues Addressed

Admissibility of Expert Testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702

Application: The court excluded Galdos' testimony, determining it lacked a factual basis and did not meet the reliability standards required under Rule 702.

Reasoning: The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which requires that expert opinions assist the trier of fact, be based on sufficient facts, derive from reliable methods, and apply those methods reliably to the case facts.

Application of Daubert Standards

Application: The court applied the Daubert factors to assess the reliability of Galdos' testimony, ultimately finding it inadmissible due to insufficient scientific grounding.

Reasoning: The court serves as a gatekeeper to ensure relevance and reliability of the testimony, utilizing the Daubert factors: testability, peer review, error rate, and acceptance in the relevant discipline.

Exclusion of Cumulative Evidence under Rule 403

Application: Galdos' opinions were excluded as cumulative since similar testimony had already been admitted from another expert, Renfroe.

Reasoning: In Opinion No. 11, Galdos relies on speculation about the circumstances under which the Plaintiff pressed the accelerator, adopting conclusions from David Renfroe's report. The court views this as cumulative evidence since Renfroe's testimony has already been permitted, and thus excludes Galdos' opinion under Rule 403.

Limits of Expert Testimony on Ultimate Issues

Application: The court found Galdos' opinions improper under Rule 704 for addressing ultimate issues beyond factual conclusions, which are reserved for the jury.

Reasoning: Both Club Car and Plaintiffs question the necessity of Galdos' testimony and argue it violates Rule 704, which allows experts to address ultimate issues but does not permit them to replace the jury's role in making legal conclusions.

Scope of Expert Testimony on Legal Matters

Application: The court determined Galdos was not qualified to opine on legal matters such as potential liability, which are reserved for legal professionals.

Reasoning: Lastly, Opinion No. 15 addresses potential liability issues between PRPA and CAF. Galdos states that such legal matters fall under the purview of attorneys or the court. The court agrees, noting that Galdos lacks the legal authority to opine on contractual obligations, and grants the Plaintiff’s motion to exclude this opinion.