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Yamada v. Weaver
Citations: 872 F. Supp. 2d 1023; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38358; 2012 WL 983559Docket: Civil No. 10-00497 JMS-RLP
Court: District Court, D. Hawaii; March 21, 2012; Federal District Court
A permanent injunction has been issued against the enforcement of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) 11-358 as applied to specific contributions to Aloha Family Alliance-Political Action Committee (AFA-PAC), which only makes independent campaign expenditures. The court upheld the constitutionality of HRS 11-302 and HRS 11-391, as challenged by the plaintiffs, in light of evolving campaign finance law and the precedent set by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The plaintiffs, Jimmy Yamada, Russell Stewart, and A-l Alectrician, Inc., initiated this action in August 2010, asserting that several Hawaii campaign finance laws were unconstitutional following the Citizens United ruling, which invalidated limits on corporate independent campaign expenditures. Previous court rulings, including Yamada I and Yamada II, had granted preliminary injunctions against these laws. The court reiterated that while independent campaign spending can occur freely, transparency through disclosure is essential for informed electoral decisions. The requirements for disclosure under HRS 11-302 and 391, aimed at influencing candidate elections, were confirmed as constitutional, reinforcing the importance of political speech and public accountability in campaign finance. Citizens United did not address the limitations on direct campaign contributions to candidates, which may be justified to prevent corruption or its appearance, as established in precedent cases like Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont. The court upholds Hawaii’s law (HRS 11-355) banning direct contributions from government contractors, applying it to A-l due to its past and planned donations and contractor status. The law is deemed constitutional as applied to A-l. The court partially grants and denies the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiffs’ First Amended Verified Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against five Hawaii campaign finance laws affecting their activities, including restrictions on contributions to noncandidate committees (HRS 11-358), definitions of noncandidate committees and expenditures (HRS 11-302), electioneering communication disclosure requirements (HRS 11-341), advertisement disclaimer requirements (HRS 11-391), and the ban on contributions by government contractors (HRS 11-355). The complaint is verified by individuals Yamada and Stewart, as well as A-l and AFA-PAC, with all defendants being current members of the Hawaii Campaign Spending Commission, sued in their official capacities. The verified complaint is treated as an affidavit, supporting the request for injunctive relief. Yamada and Stewart, residents of Hawaii, attempted to contribute $2,500 to AFA-PAC but were restricted by the $1,000 limit under HRS 11-358. After a preliminary injunction was issued against enforcing this limit, they contributed $2,500 each and intend to contribute again in 2012. AFA-PAC is a registered non-candidate committee focused on independent expenditures, with no direct contributions to candidates or coordination with them. The court finds no genuine issues of material fact, allowing for a legal resolution based on the Cross Motions. Gerakas confirmed his role as chairman of AFA-PAC, an independent political action committee established in July 2010, aimed at influencing legislation that supports traditional marriage and the right to life, among other community issues. AFA-PAC is dedicated to endorsing and financially supporting candidates from any party who advocate for Hawaii's families, encouraging voter registration and contributions to support aligned candidates. The defendants did not contest that AFA-PAC only makes independent expenditures. A-l, an electrical contractor and government contractor, previously held state contracts and anticipated future contracts when the plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (FAC) in September 2010. A-l, registered as a noncandidate committee, seeks to avoid the regulatory burdens of this classification while making contributions and running advertisements identifying candidates. A-l claims its primary purpose is not political advocacy, and it fears that functioning as a noncandidate committee would impose ongoing compliance burdens. A-l contributed $20,100 to fourteen state office candidates before the September 18, 2010 primary election and expressed intentions to contribute additional amounts to candidates in future elections. It also contributed $12,500 to the Hawaii Republican Party and $1,000 to AFA-PAC before the primary. A-l published three advertisements identifying candidates in the Honolulu Star-Advertiser during the 2010 elections, with costs exceeding $2,000 each. A-l seeks a declaration to terminate its noncandidate committee registration and avoid related requirements. Yamada asserts that advertisements from A-l A-Lectrician, Inc. identify candidates for state office, stating phrases like "PEOPLE WE PUT INTO OFFICE" and "THE REPRESENTATIVES WE PUT INTO OFFICE." Each ad specifies it is "paid for by A-l A-Lectrician, Inc." and includes required disclaimer language indicating it was "published without the approval and authority of the candidate," as mandated by HRS 11-391(a)(2)(B). A-l is resistant to including such disclaimers in future advertisements despite the legality of doing so. Yamada notes that while it is premature for A-l to plan future ads for September or October 2012, the Plaintiffs intend to create similar advertisements in the future, which will comply with Hawaii law. Yamada plans to run no more than three ads similar in size to those from 2010, costing over $2,000 in total, and addressing the loss of freedom in the U.S. He mentions candidates Blake Oshiro and Calvin Say not as targets but as examples of a broader issue regarding community leadership. The Plaintiffs challenge five aspects of Hawaii campaign finance law: 1) limits on contributions to noncandidate committees; 2) the definitions of noncandidate committees and expenditures; 3) disclosure requirements for electioneering communications; 4) disclaimer requirements for advertisements; and 5) restrictions on contributions from government contractors to candidates. The limitation on contributions stipulates that no individual may contribute more than $1,000 to a noncandidate committee in an election, as outlined in HRS 11-358, with exceptions for ballot issue committees. The definition of a "noncandidate committee" under HRS 11-302 encompasses organizations or individuals whose purpose is to influence elections or ballot issues, excluding candidate committees and individuals using their own funds for non-evading purposes. HRS 11-302 defines "expenditure" to encompass any purchase, transfer of money or value, or agreements related to influencing elections or ballot issues. A noncandidate committee, such as AFA-PAC, must register and comply with various provisions, including filing organizational reports, maintaining a treasurer, and adhering to specific reporting and contribution regulations. A-l challenges the constitutionality of these requirements, arguing they impose undue burdens and asserting it should not have to register as a noncandidate committee, despite acknowledging that such status entails certain obligations. Additionally, A-l questions the legality of electioneering communication requirements, particularly in relation to its intent to publish advertisements mentioning candidates. If A-l engages in electioneering communications exceeding $2,000 in a calendar year, it must adhere to disclosure requirements mandated by HRS 11-341(a), which necessitate filing a statement of information within twenty-four hours of each disclosure date. "Electioneering communication" is defined as advertisements broadcast via cable, satellite, television, or radio, published in periodicals or newspapers, or sent by bulk mail, which: 1) Clearly identify a candidate; 2) Are made within 30 days before a primary or initial special election, or within 60 days before a general or special election; 3) Are interpreted solely as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate. Exclusions from this definition include: 1) News stories or editorials from independent broadcasters or publishers unless controlled by a candidate; 2) Expenditures by the disbursing organization; 3) In-house bulletins; 4) Candidate debates or forums promoted by the sponsors. HRS 11-302 defines "advertisement" as any communication that identifies a candidate or ballot issue and advocates for or against them, excluding items like bumper stickers. A-l contests the disclaimer requirement for advertisements under HRS 11-391(a)(2), which mandates that any advertisement include: 1) The name and address of the person or entity paying for it; 2) A notice indicating if the advertisement has the approval of the candidate, with specific exceptions for candidate-paid ads. Violations incur fines up to $25 per advertisement, capped at $5,000 total. A-l also challenges the constitutionality of Hawaii's prohibition on campaign contributions from government contractors. The statute prohibits individuals with state contracts from making or soliciting contributions to candidate or noncandidate committees during the contract period if funded by legislative appropriations. Establishment or administration of noncandidate committees by individuals, excluding state or county contractors, for influencing elections is permissible under this section, as outlined in subsection (a). "Completion of the contract" is defined as either termination of the contract prior to performance or full performance of contractual duties with no outstanding disputes. The procedural background indicates that plaintiffs filed their action on August 27, 2010, followed by an amended complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction. An evidentiary hearing on the injunction was held on October 1, 2010, leading to a preliminary injunction against enforcing HRS 11-358 concerning proposed contributions to AFA-PAC. Defendants withdrew their appeal after a related party was released. The Ninth Circuit's decision in *Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle* addressed relevant issues, resulting in further proceedings and a denial of the remaining injunction issues. A stay was placed on the case pending Supreme Court review, which was denied, leading to the resumption of proceedings. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed by December 5, 2011, with subsequent oppositions and replies, culminating in a hearing on February 6, 2012. The court will evaluate the constitutionality of the challenged provisions according to the standards of summary judgment, emphasizing the burden on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of material fact issues. When a moving party fulfills its burden under Rule 56, the opposing party must provide specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, rather than merely suggesting doubt about material facts. An issue is considered 'genuine' if there is enough evidence for a reasonable fact finder to rule for the non-moving party, and a dispute is 'material' if it could influence the case's outcome under applicable law. The court must interpret evidence in favor of the non-moving party when assessing summary judgment motions. The Supreme Court has differentiated between limits on contributions to candidates and restrictions on political speech expenditures. Contribution limits impose minimal restrictions on First Amendment activities and are analyzed under "closely drawn scrutiny," requiring the government to show that limits align with a sufficiently important interest. In contrast, expenditure limits directly inhibit speech, affecting political dialogue and the ability of groups to amplify their voices, thus needing to pass strict scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The court's First Amendment evaluation of campaign finance laws begins by assessing the government's interests in justifying any limits. If no valid interest exists, the court need not consider whether the regulation is appropriately tailored to that interest. The Supreme Court has identified preventing corruption and its appearance as the only legitimate and compelling interests for restricting campaign finances, which informs the constitutionality of the specific contribution limits in question. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission overruled the precedent set by Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, rejecting the government's interest in preventing the "corrosive and distorting effects" of corporate wealth in elections. The ruling emphasized that while limits on direct contributions could be justified to prevent quid pro quo corruption, no government interest could justify restrictions on independent corporate campaign expenditures, which are not coordinated with candidates. Independent expenditures, by definition, do not create corruption or the appearance of corruption, even if they might lead to influence or access. Subsequent court decisions, including City of Long Beach, affirmed that anti-corruption interests do not apply to contributions for organizations solely making independent expenditures. Therefore, limitations on such contributions lack a legitimate government interest, as established by both the Ninth Circuit and other circuits, including the District of Columbia and Seventh Circuits. Thus, the anticorruption rationale cannot justify restrictions on fundraising by groups that only engage in independent spending for political speech. The government can impose limits on contributions made directly to candidates or parties; however, these limitations diminish as the connection between the candidate and the entity receiving contributions becomes more distant. When an organization only engages in independent expenditures, the relationship is severed, rendering anti-corruption justifications for contribution limits void. Consequently, restrictions on contributions to such organizations infringe upon the First Amendment. Specifically, Section 11-358 restricts contributions to noncandidate committees, but if those committees, such as AFA-PAC, solely make independent expenditures, Hawaii cannot impose limits per the Citizens United ruling. Contributions from Yamada and Stewart to AFA-PAC are expected to result in independent expenditures, with no evidence suggesting a close relationship between AFA-PAC and candidates that could imply corruption. Therefore, Section 11-358 is deemed unconstitutional as applied to these contributions, and the defendants are permanently barred from enforcing this limitation. Additionally, A-1 challenges Hawaii's definitions of “noncandidate committee” and “expenditure” under Section 11-302, particularly criticizing the inclusion of terms like “to influence” and the alleged requirement that a committee must have a campaign-related “major purpose” to be regulated. A-1 argues that these definitions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Although courts often view vagueness and overbreadth as related doctrines, A-1 presents distinct arguments for both. The court will first evaluate these challenges separately and then determine if the definitions withstand First Amendment scrutiny under an “exacting scrutiny” standard. A-1's overbreadth argument asserts that the government cannot regulate an organization’s speech in an electoral context unless it is clearly campaign-related. The reliance on the term “to influence” is problematic, as it can encompass a wide array of non-campaign-related speech, which imposes regulatory burdens that could violate the First Amendment. The ambiguity surrounding the phrase “for the purpose of influencing” in federal statutes further complicates the issue. The excerpt addresses constitutional issues related to the definition of a "political committee" under the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) as interpreted in Buckley v. Valeo. The Supreme Court determined that the vague definition of expenditures “for the purpose of influencing” elections could infringe upon First Amendment rights due to potential overbreadth, which could regulate a significant amount of protected speech. The Court applied "constitutional avoidance" to narrowly construe terms in FECA, asserting that only organizations controlled by a candidate or primarily aimed at candidate election should be classified as political committees. A-1 argues that Hawaii's broader definition of noncandidate committees imposes unwarranted burdens on organizations engaged in limited political activities, contending that the state can only require registration as a political committee if the organization has political advocacy as its major purpose. However, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Human Life refuted this argument, stating that the absence of a sole major purpose for advocacy does not automatically render regulation burdensome and that the First Amendment does not prevent the imposition of disclosure requirements on organizations with multiple primary purposes. The 'major purpose' test, as articulated in Buckley, is viewed as a mere artifact of the Court's interpretation of federal law and has not been applied to state regulations of political action committees. The Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United dismissed the idea that disclosure requirements should only apply to speech that closely resembles express advocacy. Consequently, the argument that such requirements cannot extend to issue advocacy is untenable. Post-Citizens United, the "unambiguously campaign related" standard from Buckley serves only as a regulatory safe harbor, allowing legislative discretion as long as regulations do not significantly restrict non-electoral speech. Disclosure requirements can be imposed on issue advocacy, provided they do not inadvertently encompass groups that primarily engage in issue advocacy rather than political campaigning. The Court has clarified that there is no absolute First Amendment right to issue advocacy, and imposing disclosure obligations is not inherently unconstitutional. The constitutionality of regulations affecting such speech hinges on whether they withstand the appropriate level of scrutiny. Furthermore, A-l contests the phrases “for the purpose of influencing” and “to influence” as unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing they do not clearly define prohibited conduct and could lead to arbitrary enforcement. However, inherent vagueness exists in many statutes, and absolute clarity is not a requisite for regulations that limit expressive activities. A vagueness challenge in the First Amendment context focuses on whether a substantial amount of legitimate speech is chilled, rather than if some speech is affected. A-l’s challenge regarding the term "influence" is akin to the previously discussed overbreadth issue. The term “influence” raises significant vagueness concerns as it could encompass a wide range of activities, including advocating for or against a candidate, promoting issues for a candidate's platform, or urging candidates to support public funding. Without further context, the term's meaning is unclear enough to leave a reasonable person guessing about its interpretation. Defendants propose that the court apply a “narrowing gloss” to limit the term to communications that constitute express advocacy or its functional equivalent. The court is hesitant to adopt this narrowing construction, especially given Citizens United's stance that disclosure requirements are not confined to express advocacy alone. However, to alleviate any vagueness concerns, the court considers the Defendants' request. It clarifies that federal courts can adopt a narrowing construction of state statutes only if such a construction is reasonable and readily apparent. The court also notes that when evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, it must consider any limiting constructions offered by state courts or enforcement agencies. In this case, the Defendants present strong arguments for a narrowing gloss, asserting that the interpretation of "to influence" aligns with express advocacy, supported by the historical context of Hawaii’s campaign statutes, which were substantially revised in 1979 to reflect similar terminology. Hawaii enacted Act 224 in 1979 to align its campaign finance laws with the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo. The Hawaii Legislature, aware of Buckley's "narrowing construction," adopted terms like "to influence" based on their interpretation in federal law. The state's definition of "independent expenditures" mirrors federal provisions, emphasizing "express advocacy" as expenditures that explicitly support or oppose a candidate without coordination with that candidate. The Legislature also incorporated the "appeal to vote" test, a standard established by the Supreme Court, into its definition of "electioneering communications." Hawaii Administrative Rule 3-160-6 further details "expressly advocating" as communications that, when considered in context, can only be interpreted as urging a vote for or against a candidate. This includes criteria such as clarity, a clear call to action, and an unambiguous intent to promote or oppose a candidate. The court recognizes that it can narrowly construe Hawaii's campaign provisions to avoid constitutional vagueness, as seen in precedents like McKee. The terms "to influence" and "for the purpose of influencing" will thus be interpreted to align with express advocacy or its functional equivalent, ensuring clarity and reasonable notice of the law’s scope for the average person. The court will next evaluate whether the definitions related to noncandidate committees and expenditures withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment. Hawaii's definition of a noncandidate committee withstands exacting scrutiny, which is a standard applied to assess whether such definitions align with significant governmental interests. Unlike strict scrutiny, exacting scrutiny requires that a disclosure requirement be substantially related to an important government interest. The Supreme Court has established that campaign finance disclosure laws are constitutional if they meet this criterion. The definition of a noncandidate committee is considered a disclosure requirement, essential for transparency and accountability in political funding. Various court rulings have classified the requirements for political committees as disclosure regulations, emphasizing that these regulations aim to inform voters about contributors and participants in political discourse. The primary governmental interest identified is to provide voters with necessary information to evaluate competing messages in the electoral marketplace, which is deemed sufficiently important to justify such disclosure laws. An appeal to influence voting behavior can vary in effectiveness depending on the source of funding. The significance of this informational interest is likely to grow, particularly in light of recent legal precedents, including a court’s permanent injunction limiting independent expenditures. Disclosure requirements play a crucial role in deterring corruption and mitigating its appearance by making large contributions and expenditures public, enabling voters to identify potential post-election favors. Such transparency is essential for detecting violations of contribution limits. The public has a vested interest in understanding who supports a candidate financially, regardless of the nature of the contributions. Disclosure also serves to prevent circumvention of campaign finance laws, as highlighted by a Supreme Court case regarding valid contribution limits. Analysis of Washington’s Disclosure Law indicates that groups could evade regulations by merging with larger organizations unless comprehensive rules are in place. Hawaii’s campaign finance laws were crafted with similar considerations in mind, focusing on informational value, deterrence of corruption, and the collection of data to identify violations. Legislative history reveals that Hawaii's legislature aimed to enhance public awareness and promote First Amendment values through disclosure requirements, ensuring fair electoral practices and closing existing loopholes. Reforming campaign spending laws is essential for restoring public confidence in the political process. The implementation of detailed reporting requirements holds candidates, contributors, and organizations accountable. The court identifies a significant government interest in enforcing disclosure mandates, particularly for noncandidate committees that engage in political advocacy. Hawaii law defines a noncandidate committee as any group involved in making or receiving contributions or expenditures aimed at influencing elections. Organizations solely focused on producing educational communications not intended to sway election outcomes are exempt. Additionally, Hawaii’s law specifies that disclosure requirements activate only after a group surpasses $1,000 in contributions or expenditures within a two-year election period. The court references a similar case under Washington law, highlighting that most organizations have multiple primary purposes, meaning that a political committee does not need to be solely focused on advocacy. Thus, Hawaii's definition allows for groups with mixed purposes to fall under noncandidate committee regulations, provided their activities include political contributions or expenditures. This approach balances the necessity for public awareness with the protection of nonpolitical organizations from undue regulation. The Washington law’s use of the term “primary” for a political committee purpose arose from judicial interpretation, emphasizing the nuanced understanding of organizational intents. A political committee is defined as an organization whose primary or one of its primary purposes is to influence governmental decision-making through support or opposition to candidates or ballot propositions. This definition is crucial for ensuring that the electorate is informed about groups focused on political advocacy, without unintentionally including groups that engage in such advocacy only incidentally. Hawaii's definition lacks the term "primary," which leads to a different analysis than in Washington state, where the absence of such a limitation was found not to impose on nonpolitical organizations unnecessarily. The Ninth Circuit noted that while the term “primary” might not be constitutionally required, it is sufficient for tailoring disclosure laws to governmental interests. Hawaii's definition is evaluated to determine if it improperly encompasses nonpolitical organizations by including those engaged in incidental political activity. The court infers that an organization with a purpose of political advocacy is not incidental, which supports the law's constitutionality against a facial First Amendment challenge. Hawaii's definition is deemed adequately tailored as it: 1) excludes organizations focused solely on issue advocacy, 2) includes those with multiple purposes, and 3) requires contributions or expenditures exceeding $1,000 within a two-year election period. These criteria prevent undue imposition on nonpolitical groups. The court contrasts Hawaii's definition with North Carolina's broader definition, which was found unconstitutional for encompassing groups engaged only incidentally in political advocacy. Ultimately, the challenge to Hawaii’s definition of noncandidate committees is dismissed, affirming that it aligns with significant governmental interests. The law promotes informed electoral participation while respecting the boundaries of nonpolitical organizations. This conclusion is consistent with the principles established in Citizens United regarding transparency in political financing and the public's right to know about organizations involved in electoral politics, even if influencing elections is not their primary aim. Thus, the law does not violate the First Amendment on its face. Hawaii's noncandidate committee regulations do not violate the First Amendment on their face. A-l challenges the constitutionality of Hawaii's noncandidate committee definition as it applies to its activities, arguing it lacks a “major purpose” of political advocacy, is not controlled by a candidate, and only engages in political advocacy incidentally. However, A-l’s interpretation of the "major purpose" test is flawed and does not exempt it from regulation as a noncandidate committee. The court notes that A-l's significant election-related activities during the 2010 election cycle, including substantial contributions to candidates and political parties, as well as electioneering communications, demonstrate active political engagement. A-l intends to continue such activities in future elections, which necessitates compliance with Hawaii's campaign finance laws. The state has a legitimate interest in enforcing disclosure requirements to prevent circumvention of campaign finance regulations, ensuring that organizations like A-l do not obscure their political activities under broader operational purposes. The Ninth Circuit emphasizes that exempting groups with only a minor political advocacy purpose from registration could enable them to evade transparency, undermining the effectiveness of campaign finance laws. A-l's choice to register as a noncandidate committee rather than creating a separate political action committee exemplifies this concern. Avoiding registration based solely on minimal political activity relative to an organization's overall functions could lead to a circumvention of disclosure requirements, allowing affiliated noncandidate committees to evade regulations by integrating into larger entities. This rationale supports the interpretation of noncandidate committee definitions to encompass “multipurpose” organizations. The court determined that the registration and disclosure obligations associated with noncandidate committee status do not impose an undue burden on A-l, which has complied with these requirements for several years. These requirements withstand both facial and as-applied challenges, as they are proportionate to organizations with political advocacy objectives. Although A-l contends that compliance burdens hinder its operations, the court found no evidence of significant hardships in practice or law. Regarding electioneering communication registration, the court ruled that A-l is unlikely to prevail in its challenge to Hawaii’s noncandidate committee definition. Registered noncandidate committees are not mandated to file separate reports for electioneering communications, with such disclosures integrated into noncandidate committee provisions. Since A-l must register as a noncandidate committee, the court did not need to evaluate its challenge to specific disclosure requirements under HRS 11-341, particularly concerning the timely reporting of disbursements exceeding $2,000. Finally, the court addressed A-l's challenge to the disclaimer requirement for advertisements that identify a candidate and advocate for their election. This requirement mandates a prominent notice stating that the advertisement is published without the candidate's approval and authority. A-l had placed such advertisements on specific dates in September 2010. Advertisements included a disclaimer stating they were "published without the approval and authority of the candidate." A-l opposed these disclaimers and seeks to exclude them from future advertisements. According to Section 11-302, an "advertisement" is defined as any communication that identifies a candidate or an issue on the ballot and advocates for the candidate or the ballot issue. A-l argues that the terms "advocates or supports" and "opposition" are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, claiming the disclaimers detract from their message by suggesting the advertisements are campaign speech instead of issue advocacy. While disclaimer requirements can burden speech, they do not limit campaign activities and undergo "exacting scrutiny" to ensure a substantial relationship between the requirement and a significant government interest. A-l's challenge to the terms "advocates," "supports," and "opposes" parallels a previous unsuccessful challenge regarding the term "to influence" in definitions relating to "noncandidate committee" and "expenditure." A-l references cases about state laws defining "political committee" that cover groups supporting or opposing candidates or influencing elections. The concern is that these terms could encompass both express advocacy and issue advocacy. Courts have addressed vagueness by applying a narrowing construction, limiting definitions to communications that clearly advocate for or against specific candidates. The concept of "express advocacy" has evolved to include its "functional equivalent," which is defined objectively and should minimize the role of contextual factors in interpretation. Background information relevant to advertisements is considered when determining if a communication qualifies as such. The definition of an advertisement, particularly in Hawaii, which includes language advocating for or against a candidate, is not unconstitutionally vague. Citizens United previously rejected a challenge concerning disclaimer requirements under federal law, clarifying that disclosure rules do not need to be limited to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Public interest necessitates transparency regarding who communicates about candidates close to an election. Consequently, disclosure requirements can apply to issue advocacy, provided that they meet strict scrutiny standards. The court ruled against A-l's facial challenge to the disclaimer requirement in 11-391(a)(2)(B), affirming that the advertisements in question fall within a regulatory safe harbor as “electioneering communications.” These ads mention specific candidates and aired on election day or the preceding days, asserting that these candidates do not represent the people's interests and criticizing their actions. The court determined that these advertisements could only be reasonably interpreted as calls to vote against the candidates, thus fitting the definition of “electioneering communications” under Hawaii law. Citizens United further upheld the validity of disclaimer requirements for advertisements categorized as electioneering communications, reinforcing the court's decision regarding the ads in question. Advertisements that include "issue advocacy" can be regulated if they mention a candidate shortly before an election. Disclaimers are required to inform voters about the source of the ads, ensuring clarity that they are not funded by candidates or political parties. The court rejects the "as-applied" challenge to the disclaimer requirement and the definition of advertisement concerning electioneering communications. A-l challenges the constitutionality of Hawaii’s ban on direct campaign contributions by government contractors (HRS 11-355). A-l, a recurring government contractor, argues that the ban forces it to choose between business operations and political contributions. A-l claims its desired contributions are to legislators who do not influence the awarding or oversight of its contracts, making its challenge “as-applied” rather than facially unconstitutional. It contends that there is no justification for the contribution ban since there is no perceived conflict regarding contributions to legislators not involved in contract decisions. The court applies "closely drawn" scrutiny to analyze the contribution restrictions, distinguishing it from strict scrutiny used in expenditure limitations as established in Citizens United. Recent case law supports the application of closely drawn scrutiny even for outright contribution bans, affirming its relevance in assessing Hawaii's legislation against campaign contributions from government contractors. A legal standard requires that regulations be ‘closely drawn’ to serve a sufficiently important government interest to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Laws prohibiting direct corporate campaign contributions, established since the late 19th century, aim to prevent both actual corruption and its appearance in elections. Such regulations are supported by a historical context of congressional efforts to mitigate corporations' negative impacts on electoral integrity. Contribution limits, particularly on direct donations to candidates, are justified by the government's interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption and maintaining public perception of fairness. The legislature can regulate indicators of corruption, such as large contributions from businesses with interests in municipal contracts, to address concerns about the appearance of corruption. In the case of Hawaii’s regulations, specifically HRS 11-205.5 and 11-355, the legislature aimed to prevent perceptions of a “pay to play” environment among government contractors. The challenger, A-l, concedes the existence of a significant government interest in preventing corruption but argues that the broad ban on contributions to all candidates, including those not involved in contract oversight, is unconstitutional. A-l contends there is no link between its contributions and corruption under these circumstances. The court asserts that the ban on contributions is appropriately tailored to an important governmental interest. A-l's argument against the ban, claiming it is overly broad because it does not engage in "pay to play," is rejected, referencing the Second Circuit's decision in Ognibene, which upheld a similar restriction on campaign contributions from businesses associated with the City of New York. The court emphasizes the necessity of eliminating not only corrupt contributions but also the appearance of corruption, citing that the potential for abuse in raising large contributions warrants such measures. The court points out that A-l has alternative avenues for political expression, as its officers and employees can make contributions independently. Additionally, the ban does not prevent A-l from making independent expenditures or contributing to organizations that engage in such spending without coordination with candidates. The court highlights the legislative role in overseeing state contracts, noting that legislators are involved in the appropriation of funds and are responsible for holding agencies accountable, thus underscoring the need for restrictions to prevent corruption in the contracting process. Legislators may have close ties with government employees responsible for managing contracts, which raises concerns about potential corruption and the perception of undue influence in awarding government contracts. The government aims to mitigate both actual corruption and the public perception of "quid pro quo" arrangements, where financial contributions may appear to exchange for political favors. Even if legislators do not directly award contracts, contributions from contractors can still give rise to the appearance of corruption. A narrow limitation on contractor contributions would require identifying specific legislators overseeing contracts, a task deemed inappropriate for courts. The Second Circuit upheld a Connecticut ban on contributions from current state contractors, emphasizing the need for such regulations to address past corruption scandals. The court affirmed that a total ban on contractor contributions is closely aligned with the state's interest in preventing corruption and its appearance. Hawaii's Legislature also decided to implement a complete ban on contractor contributions to eliminate perceptions of favoritism in contract awards. The decision reflects the legislature's judgment that such a ban is a necessary measure to combat the notion that contracts are awarded based on personal relationships rather than merit. This total ban, without exceptions for contribution amounts or types of contracts, reinforces the message that financial contributions cannot sway state officials in awarding contracts. Hawaii's campaign finance law, specifically HRS 11-355, was upheld as constitutionally valid concerning proposed contributions from A-l to State Legislators, as it effectively serves the significant government interest of mitigating perceptions of corruption in the electoral process. The court clarified that it is not the role of the judiciary to evaluate the wisdom of legislative choices but to determine if those choices are adequately aligned with important government interests. The ruling addressed cross motions for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part. The court found HRS 11-358's contribution limits unconstitutional as applied to specific individuals' contributions to AFA-PAC, leading to a permanent injunction against enforcement of those limits. Conversely, other provisions, including HRS 11-302 and HRS 11-391, were upheld as constitutionally valid disclosure requirements. The court emphasized that these laws enhance election transparency, consistent with the principles established in Citizens United. The case was concluded with instructions to close the court file, noting that Hawaii's campaign finance laws had been updated and re-codified in 2010 by Act 211, which aimed to clarify existing laws. The document also clarified the status of the Commission members as defendants in the ongoing litigation. An "independent expenditure" is defined under Hawaii law (FIRS 11-302) as a financial outlay made by a person to explicitly advocate for or against a clearly identified candidate, without coordination with that candidate or their committee. The definition of "person" includes various entities such as individuals, partnerships, candidate committees, corporations, and labor unions. Federal law aligns with this definition, stipulating that independent expenditures must also be made without collaboration with the candidate or their authorized committee (2 U.S.C. 431(17)). The document cites the case of Hawaii State representative candidates Blake Oshiro and Calvin Say during the 2010 elections. It outlines the requirements for an "electioneering communication statement of information," which includes details about the disbursement maker, the amount, the elections involved, and any contributions related to the communication. A-l's ability to challenge the electioneering communication requirements depends on its success in contesting the noncandidate committee provisions. If A-l registers as a noncandidate committee, it must comply with relevant disclosure requirements regarding electioneering communications but is not required to file a separate statement of information. Ultimately, the court need not address the specifics of the electioneering communications challenge, as A-l's challenge regarding the noncandidate committee definition is unsuccessful, resulting in A-l lacking standing to contest the requirements. However, the challenge is not moot, as A-l may reasonably anticipate future enforcement of the contested provisions. Human Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle establishes that the distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates remains intact following Citizens United. The court highlights that certain government interests, such as disclosure, can justify regulations on campaign-related speech to inform the electorate about the sources of political funding. Campaign finance disclosure requirements serve the public interest by enabling voters to assess competing messages in the political arena. The court notes that since the anti-corruption interest is deemed invalid under the circumstances, it does not need to determine whether the limitations are properly tailored. The document also addresses the issue of vagueness in regulations, asserting that ambiguity can raise due process concerns if speakers cannot clearly understand what is prohibited. The principle of constitutional avoidance mandates that statutes must be interpreted to uphold their constitutionality whenever possible. The "magic words" requirement established in Buckley, which identifies specific expressions of advocacy, has evolved to include the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy—communications that can only be reasonably interpreted as calls to vote for or against candidates. The court interprets the terms “to influence” and “influencing” in the electoral context as referring to actions aimed at affecting election outcomes, recognizing potential vagueness issues, but ultimately rejecting claims that the appeal to vote test is unconstitutionally vague post-Citizens United. The court concurs with McKee’s stance, which dismissed National Organization for Marriage's (NOM) argument that Citizens United v. FEC eliminated the "appeal-to-vote test" as a constitutional limitation on government authority and that this test is unconstitutionally vague. While agreeing that Citizens United invalidated the federal electioneering expenditure statute, the court finds no basis in the Citizens United text to question the constitutionality of statutes using similar language to define their scope. The ruling in Citizens United was based on a reassessment of prior case law regarding the regulation of corporate political speech, rather than the appeal-to-vote test. The court emphasizes that even though disclosure requirements aren't limited to express advocacy, speech that functions as express advocacy remains subject to such requirements. A-l's challenge pertains solely to the contribution ban for government contractors within statute 11-355, and the court will evaluate the government interests justifying this ban alongside its application to A-l's activities. The analysis will reference precedents, including Preston v. Leake, which addressed anti-corruption interests linked to contribution bans, and Beaumont, which remains binding law despite being decided prior to Citizens United and having its rationale partially undermined by it. Additionally, the court notes that Act 203, which amended Hawaii’s campaign finance laws, was influenced by anti-corruption interests as recorded in the legislative history of related bills. Senator Trimble emphasized that corruption distorts decision-making, demoralizes public service, and harms societal integrity, arguing for S.B. 440 to address money's corrupting influence in politics, regardless of its source. Senator Hemmings supported this view, advocating for an amendment aimed at eliminating corruption in the electoral process to ensure a fair playing field. Representative Blake Oshiro, who introduced H.B. 1747, discussed the constitutionality of limiting contributions, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, which allows contribution limits due to their lesser connection to free speech compared to expenditure limits. He expressed frustration with existing transparency measures and proposed lowering campaign contributions comprehensively, arguing that this approach is not extreme compared to other states. Oshiro reinforced the bill's constitutional basis by citing the Montana case, which upheld lower contribution limits. Other representatives echoed the call to ban contributions from government contractors entirely to combat the "pay-to-play" issue, highlighting that such measures are already in place in numerous states and federally. Representative Lee shared supportive testimony from Hawaii County Mayor Harry Kim, urging the legislature to create a program that ensures fair electoral participation and addresses public cynicism regarding money's influence in politics, advocating to prioritize effective reforms over perfection. Additionally, evidence was presented regarding contractor contributions during the 2004 election, illustrating the political context leading to the enactment of the contractor contribution ban in 2005. At least 100 of nearly 850 contributors to Duke Bainum's campaign also supported Mufi Hannemann's campaign, with 44 of these contributors being businesses or their principals that provided goods or services regularly purchased by the City. This situation reflects a "pay-to-play" perception, prompting the enactment of law 11-205.5 in 2005 to address both actual corruption and its appearance, influenced by investigations involving public officials and state contractors. Media reports indicated that this law followed campaign finance scandals, including no contest pleas and over $1.8 million in fines related to illegal donations by engineers, architects, and other donors between 2003 and 2005. Attempts to amend the law have been unsuccessful, largely due to public wariness stemming from past scandals. Legislators argued for a total ban on contributions from state and county contractors, emphasizing the need for integrity in the campaign finance system. A previous attempt to enforce a ban on contributions from businesses and unions was vetoed by former Governor Ben Cayetano, who criticized lawmakers for exempting themselves. The current prohibition applies specifically to contracting entities, not individuals associated with them, with some jurisdictions enacting even stricter measures. The excerpt discusses a legal analysis supporting the constitutionality of a ban on campaign contributions from certain "principals" and family members of government contractors, as established in Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2010). The court upheld Connecticut's restrictions on contributions to prevent corruption and maintain integrity in public office. The defendants argue that A-l's claims are flawed because it cannot predict which candidates will oversee specific contracts post-election, as legislative roles and assignments can change. An example from the 2011 Legislative Session illustrates that A-l contributed to legislators who voted on a relevant bill while also contributing to their opponents, demonstrating the unpredictability of legislative oversight. The excerpt references Ognibene v. Parkes, which emphasizes the increased risk of corruption from contributions by those with direct financial interests in government policy. The court's reasoning aligns with Ninth Circuit decisions that uphold similar corporate contribution restrictions, reinforcing that such bans effectively address perceived corruption, especially in light of recent scandals in Connecticut. The total prohibition on contractor contributions is deemed necessary to eliminate any potential influence on state officials by contractor donations, thus serving the state's interest in combating corruption.