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State v. Eid.
Citations: 126 Haw. 430; 272 P.3d 1197; 2012 WL 503231; 2012 Haw. LEXIS 34Docket: SCWC-29587
Court: Hawaii Supreme Court; January 26, 2012; Hawaii; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Hatem A. Eid was charged with excessive speeding under HRS § 291C-105(a)(1) following an incident where Officer Benjamin Perez allegedly paced Eid's vehicle at 65 mph in a 25 mph zone. Prior to trial, Eid sought to exclude evidence of speed checks and speedometer readings, arguing the State could not establish a sufficient foundation. The District Court held a five-day pretrial hearing, ultimately denying Eid's motion. During the trial, the court admitted the contested evidence, leading to Eid's conviction. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) found that the District Court erred in admitting the evidence, citing insufficient foundational proof required as per State v. Fitzwater. The ICA remanded the case to consider if there was enough evidence to convict Eid of a lesser offense. The State of Hawai#i sought review, questioning whether the ICA erred in its foundational assessment. The Supreme Court concluded that the State successfully established a sufficient foundation for the speed check evidence, vacated the ICA’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. In addition, Eid filed a Motion to Compel Discovery, alleging the State failed to produce several items relevant to his defense, including HPD policies for speeding citations and details related to the speed checks conducted on vehicles involved in the case. Maintenance records for vehicles involved in pacing Eid's speed are requested for one year before and after the alleged offense, focusing on tires, drivetrain, speedometer, and odometer calibration. Certifications from relevant agencies regarding speed checks, speed readings for Eid's vehicle, and police maintenance records for speed measuring devices are also sought. Additionally, the manufacturer’s manuals and established procedures for verifying device functionality, along with written confirmations of proper operation and maintenance, are requested. Eid contends that the accuracy of the pacing method relies on proper operational procedures by the Honolulu Police Department (HPD), making the requested information crucial for his defense. He argues that these materials are necessary for effective trial and pretrial preparation and could potentially exonerate him. The State opposes the motion, claiming it exceeds the discovery scope defined by HRPP Rule 16, asserting that Eid did not demonstrate that the requested documents were material or reasonable. On February 29, 2008, Eid filed a Motion in Limine to exclude evidence related to the HPD speed check, arguing that it does not qualify under hearsay exceptions and that its admission would violate his confrontation rights. He further claims that the evidence lacks the necessary foundation and that issues of accuracy pertain to admissibility rather than the weight of the evidence. The State did not oppose this motion. A pretrial hearing regarding Eid's motion to compel began on April 16, 2008, lasting five days. The parties agreed to admit certain exhibits into evidence. The State presented five witnesses: Roy Ozaki, Duane Ozaki, Michelle Oki, Sergeant Sherman Dowkin, and Officer Benjamin Perez, while the defense called Marcus Ho as its sole witness. Roy Ozaki, the owner of Roy’s Automotive and a licensed automotive mechanic, testified about conducting speed checks on vehicles, including the one used by Officer Perez in citing Eid. Both Roy and Duane are the only individuals performing speed checks at their establishment. Roy explained the use of a speedometer dynamometer, which includes a master head, rollers, and a cable, obtained from mechanic Jack Higa under a contract to check HPD vehicles. He conducted multiple preliminary checks on his vehicles before testing HPD vehicles to ensure accuracy. In 2007, Roy performed over 1,200 speed checks for HPD. He stated that no special training was needed for the speedometer dynamometer, as it is straightforward for licensed technicians. Roy did not receive a manual for the equipment but felt one was unnecessary. During tests, vehicles are placed on rollers connected to the master head, with the speed measured mechanically, without the use of computers. The process involves comparing the speed indicated on the car's speedometer with the master head's readings at ten-mile-an-hour increments from 25 to 95 mph. Roy confirmed that he accurately recorded the speed check data on a card, noting discrepancies between the two readings. Roy testified about his observations regarding speedometer accuracy in early 2007, noting that the master head readings and speedometer were accurate up to 75 mph, but at higher speeds, the speedometer showed discrepancies (2-5 mph fast). He communicated these findings to Hartmut Behrens at North Hollywood Speedometer, the manufacturer of the master head, who reassured him that the readings were acceptable and within a 2% margin of error. In January 2008, Roy sent the master head to North Hollywood Speedometer for further inspection, providing measurements of his rollers. Behrens later sent two letters confirming that the master head was overhauled and calibrated to Roy’s specifications, stating it was in working condition despite some external damage, and affirmed its accuracy within a ±2% tolerance. Additionally, a speed check card from July 23, 2007, indicated that Officer Perez's vehicle speedometer was accurate up to 65 mph, but showed discrepancies at higher speeds, with readings up to 3 mph slow at 110 mph. Roy performed the speed check, and he also explained how tire size and pressure could impact speedometer accuracy. Duane Ozaki corroborated Roy's testimony about the dynamometer's purpose in checking speedometer accuracy, detailing his method of confirming readings through vehicle acceleration and acknowledging the necessity of all components functioning properly for accurate results. He also discussed the influence of tire size and pressure on speedometer readings. Marcus Ho, qualified as an expert on dynamometers, testified that he lacked formal training in auto mechanics but believed practical experience sufficed for operating a speedometer dynamometer. He owned a chassis dynamometer with a digital readout, manufactured by Dyno Jet, capable of measuring horsepower, torque, and speed based on setup. Ho identified various factors affecting test accuracy, such as cable tension, tire size, and pressure, and noted that the number of variables affecting readings was greater than with Roy’s Automotive’s dynamometer. He confirmed that proper calibration of all three components of the dynamometer is necessary for accurate results. Officer Benjamin Perez did not testify during the pretrial hearing; instead, the defense and State stipulated to certain facts regarding his vehicle's purchase and maintenance but did not stipulate facts related to the speed check due to existing evidence. Michelle Oki, a supervisor at HPD Vehicle Maintenance, stated that Roy was the vendor for speed checks and that HPD did not perform speedometer calibrations. With nearly 20 years of experience, she noted that speedometer issues were rare, occurring approximately nine times in the last six years, and discussed potential job impacts if compelled to provide requested items for every traffic case. Sergeant Sherman Dowkin, a Traffic Enforcement Supervisor, explained the 'pace-clock method' for measuring vehicle speed by following a target vehicle while maintaining a steady distance and using the officer's speedometer. He acknowledged the lack of a manual for this method and mentioned that while he was familiar with departmental policies for issuing speeding citations, there were restrictions on sharing this information publicly. The district court, after five days of testimony and reviewing memoranda from both parties, determined that the defendants’ expert, Marcus Ho, lacked persuasive evidence to support the motion to compel discovery regarding the use of his Dynojet device, which is primarily for assessing engine performance rather than speed. Consequently, the court denied the defendants' motion and indicated that relevant information for pace cases would be obtained through direct or cross-examination of the citing officer, specifically allowing access to the speed check card from the date of citation, any speedometer repairs since that date, and any changes in tire size. The court ruled that a hearing on the defendants’ motion in limine was unnecessary and denied it, setting the matter for trial. Eid subsequently sought clarification on whether the court’s denial of the motion in limine was based on evidence presented during the earlier hearings related to the motion to compel. At a hearing on October 3, 2008, the court confirmed that its denial was indeed based on the same reasoning used for the motion to compel. On December 19, 2008, a one-day bench trial took place where the parties agreed that the entirety of the prior hearings on the motion to compel could inform the ruling on the motion in limine. They also agreed to admit the transcripts of testimonies from Roy and Duane into evidence. During the trial, the State’s witness, Mark Kikuchi, testified that not all streets are listed in the speed schedules and specifically noted that Oneawa Street’s speed limit is 25 mph, as indicated by signage and the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu. The court took judicial notice of this default speed limit. Officer Perez testified about the maintenance of his vehicle, detailing that speed checks were conducted regularly to ensure the accuracy of his speedometer for pace clocking other vehicles. Officer Perez provided testimony regarding two speed checks relevant to a citation issued to Eid on September 19, 2007. The first speed check occurred on April 5, 2007, at Roy’s Automotive, where Officer Perez had his vehicle's speedometer tested, and the results were documented on a card. Defense counsel objected to the admission of this speed check card as hearsay and argued it did not qualify under the business records exception due to its use in anticipation of litigation. The State contended it was establishing a foundation under HRE Rule 104 and argued that the card met the criteria for regular activity under HRE Rule 803(b)(6). The court admitted the speed check card into evidence as State’s Exhibit 1. Officer Perez explained that the April speed check showed that his speedometer accurately read 65 mph when tested at that speed. He also mentioned a second speed check conducted on July 23, 2007, which similarly indicated that his speedometer was accurate at 65 mph. Both speed check cards were admitted into evidence despite defense objections. During his testimony, Officer Perez described the events leading to the citation, indicating that he observed Eid's vehicle accelerating above the posted 25 mph limit and subsequently monitored the speed with his speedometer, which recorded 65 mph during the pacing. On cross-examination, defense counsel highlighted discrepancies between the two speed check cards, noting that in April the speedometer was reading five miles fast at 95 mph, while in July it was three miles slow at the same speed. Officer Perez expressed that he was not concerned about these variations, as they had been explained to him and seemed reasonable, asserting he had no opinion on the relative accuracy of the two cards. Officer Perez concluded his testimony, leading the State to rest its case. The defense moved for judgment of acquittal, claiming the State did not establish a prima facie case regarding the speed limit zone, which the district court denied. Eid opted not to testify, and it was stipulated that witness Ho's previous testimony would be admitted. After a discussion, the defense rested, and both parties waived closing arguments. The court found that the evidence, including stipulations and exhibits, demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that Eid was accurately paced by Officer Perez at 65 mph in a 25 mph zone, resulting in a guilty verdict. Eid was sentenced to a $500 fine, various fees totaling $132, completion of a driver’s education course, 36 hours of community service, and a 30-day license suspension. The sentence was stayed pending appeal. Eid filed a Notice of Appeal on January 13, 2009, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel and his motion in limine regarding Officer Perez’s speed check card and speedometer evidence. Eid claimed that the requested items were material and that the denial was unreasonable under HRPP Rule 16(b)(vii) and (d). The State countered that the requested information had been sufficiently disclosed and that additional discovery would be an overreach. The State also asserted that Officer Perez’s speedometer was calibrated and accurate at various speeds, arguing that any potential error did not exceed a reasonable margin. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) issued its lead opinion on June 9, 2011. Insufficient evidence was presented to meet the foundational requirements for the admissibility of the speed check card and the associated speedometer reading in the case against Eid. The lead opinion indicated that the State did not prove the manufacturer of the complete speed check testing assembly used, which was critical for establishing admissibility under the precedents set in Fitzwater. Consequently, the lead opinion ruled that denying Eid’s motion in limine to exclude this evidence was erroneous, leading to the conclusion that there was not enough evidence to uphold Eid’s conviction for Excessive Speeding, necessitating a reversal of that conviction. The case was remanded to the district court to determine if remaining evidence could support a conviction for a lesser offense of Noncompliance with Speed Limit. In dissent, Chief Judge Nakamura argued that Fitzwater's foundational requirements should be interpreted with regard to the context and assumptions made due to the limited information available about the speed check. He contended that the State sufficiently established a foundation for admitting Officer Perez's speedometer reading and the speed check evidence based on the testimony and evidence from the pretrial hearing. The standards of review specify that a motion in limine's grant or denial is assessed for abuse of discretion, with the actual harm evaluated based on whether improperly admitted evidence affected the trial outcome. Regarding evidence admissibility, the trial court holds discretion in determining whether the proper foundation is established, and its decision will not be overturned without clear evidence of abuse. Eid’s appeal emphasized that the district court erred in denying his motion to exclude the speed check cards and related testimony. Eid contended that the State did not provide adequate foundational evidence to demonstrate the reliability of the speedometer and its proper working order, referencing principles established in State v. Wallace and State v. Manewa. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) determined that the State failed to meet the necessary foundation for admitting speedometer readings due to insufficient proof of the dynamometer's manufacturer's identity. However, the court found that the pretrial hearing evidence was adequate to establish the speed check's reliability as a substantive fact, thus supporting the district court's decision to admit the speed check evidence and Officer Perez's testimony. The leading case, Fitzwater, clarified the foundational requirements for the admissibility of speed check evidence, which has roots in earlier cases concerning other testing instruments. In Wallace, the court ruled that test results require a foundation demonstrating the measuring instrument's reliability, including proof that it is "in proper working order." The chemist's testimony regarding the weight of cocaine was deemed inadmissible due to a lack of personal knowledge about the scale's calibration. Similarly, in Manewa, the court addressed the need for reliable testimony concerning test results, reinforcing the necessity of laying a proper foundation for evidence. An analytical balance was used to weigh methamphetamine in a trial, where the HPD criminalist testified about the weight but lacked direct knowledge of the balance's calibration or servicing. Testimony indicated that a manufacturer's representative services the balance biannually and verifies its proper functioning, but no representative testified about the calibration process, nor did the State present business records confirming the balance's accuracy. Consequently, the court found that there was an inadequate foundation to trust the weight measurement as a substantive fact, referencing prior case law. In another case involving a laser gun for measuring speed, the officer claimed certification and training in operating the device but could not sufficiently establish the accuracy of the laser gun’s readings without the manufacturer’s recommended testing procedures being demonstrated. The court ruled that the prosecution failed to meet the burden of proof regarding the laser gun's reliability and the officer's qualifications. A similar situation occurred in the Fitzwater case, where an officer provided testimony about a speed check conducted on his vehicle, but did not detail the methods used during the speed checks, leading to defense objections regarding the admissibility of the results. Overall, these cases illustrate the necessity for proper foundational evidence to support the admission of scientific measurements in court. The vehicle in question was tested at a maximum speed of 75 miles per hour, with this speed confirmed as accurate. The court accepted a speed check card into evidence despite defense objections. During cross-examination, Officer Ah Yat admitted he did not personally verify the speed check or the calibration process. Based largely on Officer Ah Yat's testimony, the court found Fitzwater guilty of excessive speeding. Fitzwater challenged the conviction on several grounds, particularly regarding the speed check card's admissibility and the calibration of the speedometer. The court initially evaluated whether the speed check card could qualify as a business record under HRE Rule 803(b)(6). It was determined that because the card was likely prepared by a private shop and integrated into HPD records, the state failed to demonstrate the document's reliability, resulting in its inadmissibility. Fitzwater also contended that the State did not sufficiently prove the speedometer's calibration, referencing foundational requirements established in prior cases. The court extended these foundational principles, originally applied to narcotics calibration scales, to speed checks, noting similar concerns regarding testing reliability. The parties in this case had pretrial stipulations regarding testimony from Roy and Duane, which provided comprehensive details on speed check procedures and the HPD's contractual relationship with their automotive shop. The court concluded that the same foundational standards should apply to speed checks. For speed check results to be admissible, the State must demonstrate two key elements: (1) the specifics of how and when the speed check was conducted, including adherence to the manufacturer's instructions for the equipment, and (2) the qualifications of the individual performing the check, confirming they received the recommended training from the manufacturer. Previous case law highlighted that in a prior case (Fitzwater), the lack of testimony from the actual testers rendered the evidence insufficient, as the citing officer's knowledge was solely based on an inadmissible speed check card. In contrast, the current case provided extensive evidence, including testimony from certified automobile technicians regarding the procedures and equipment used for speed checks. This included communication with the speedometer manufacturer, confirming calibration. The State successfully established that the speedometer dynamometer was properly functioning and operated by qualified personnel. Officer Perez confirmed that his speedometer was tested for accuracy on two separate occasions, with detailed testimony provided about the testing process, which included the use of a speedometer dynamometer that mechanically calculates speed. This established a reliable foundation for the speed check results, unlike in the Fitzwater case. Roy's testimony included comparisons between the readings of the master head and a vehicle's speedometer at various speeds, noting any discrepancies on a speed check card. Evidence indicated the speedometer dynamometer was functioning properly. In early 2007, Roy contacted the manufacturer, North Hollywood Speedometer, due to slight discrepancies at higher speeds, and was informed that there were no issues with the machine. Roy sent the master head for calibration in January 2008, providing roller measurements needed for accurate calibration. The manufacturer confirmed the master head's accuracy within 2 mph for speeds up to 80 mph. Unlike previous cases where witnesses lacked personal knowledge of calibration, Roy demonstrated direct involvement and understanding of the equipment, which was supported by the qualifications of those conducting the speed checks. Both Roy and another mechanic, Duane, were recognized as experts in automotive mechanics. Although Roy lacked formal training on the speedometer dynamometer, he stated that its operation is straightforward for a mechanic, a sentiment echoed by Eid's expert witness, Ho. While the State proved the dynamometer's reliability and the expertise of those operating it, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) disagreed, noting the State failed to establish the manufacturer of the rollers and cable used in the speedometer dynamometer. Insufficient evidence was found to meet the foundational requirements outlined in Fitzwater regarding the manufacturer of the entire dynamometer assembly. The court clarified that establishing the reliability of the equipment used suffices, even if the manufacturers of certain components, such as rollers and cables, were unknown. Roy, a licensed mechanic, testified about the mechanical operation of the dynamometer, indicating that the rollers are driven by the vehicle being tested, transmitting motion via cables to the master head. The master head, calibrated by North Hollywood Speedometer in January 2008, was provided with roller size information necessary for accurate readings. Prior to testing Officer Perez's vehicle, Roy communicated with North Hollywood Speedometer about his dynamometer's operation and confirmed that the results were within an acceptable margin of error. Evidence supported the method of speed checks, satisfying Fitzwater's requirement that tests be conducted as specified by the equipment manufacturer. The absence of known manufacturers for the rollers and cables was deemed immaterial, given their straightforward mechanical function and Roy's expertise. Additionally, during the second speed check, Roy utilized a digital scanner alongside the dynamometer, with the scanner's readings reinforcing the dynamometer's accuracy, despite a lack of detailed procedural information for the scanner's use. The appellate review focused on whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, which was not found to be the case. The evidence established a sufficient foundation for Officer Perez’s testimony regarding his speedometer, indicating it accurately read 65 mph during the tests prior to citing Eid for speeding, with no repairs made to the speedometer before the incident. A sufficient foundation was established for the speed check evidence presented in the case. Testimony from Roy indicated that he compares readings from the master head, scanner, and vehicle speedometer at speeds up to 100 mph, detaching the master head at that speed to continue checks solely with the scanner. Roy also noted that he updates his scanners' software every two to three years. Officer Perez testified to pacing Eid at 65 mph in a 25 mph zone. The court concluded that the State adequately supported the admissibility of the speed check evidence and the speedometer reading. As a result, the judgment of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) was vacated, and the case was remanded to the ICA to evaluate whether the district court erred in denying Eid’s motion to compel.