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Graham v. Hamilton
Citations: 872 F. Supp. 2d 529; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71962; 2012 WL 1898667Docket: Civil Action No. 3:11-609
Court: District Court, W.D. Louisiana; May 23, 2012; Federal District Court
Plaintiffs Mackie Hamilton and Peggy Brinkley have filed a Motion in Limine to exclude evidence of decedent Kathy Hamilton’s marijuana use in their products liability case against Defendants Motors Liquidation Co., GUC Trust, GM Corporation, and General Motors of Canada. The Plaintiffs allege that the door latch design in Mrs. Hamilton’s Camaro was defective and unreasonably dangerous, leading to her ejection during an accident, which ultimately resulted in her death and the inability to save her child from a fire. Defendants have opposed the Plaintiffs' motion and filed their own motions in limine regarding the Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. The court is also considering a Proposed Pretrial Order and a Supplemental Pretrial Order that include contested legal issues and objections to the trial designations of deposition testimony. The court’s analysis of the motions in limine regarding expert testimony will adhere to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702, which permits expert opinions based on specialized knowledge if they assist the trier of fact, are grounded in sufficient facts, utilize reliable methods, and are applied reliably to the case's facts. The reliability of expert testimony is assessed using factors established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, including the testability of the expert's theory, peer review status, error rates, and general acceptance in the scientific community. The district court must ensure that experts maintain the intellectual rigor typical of their field when presenting testimony. Questions regarding the basis and sources of an expert's opinion typically influence the weight given to that opinion rather than its admissibility, which is a matter for the jury. The adversarial system is responsible for addressing weak evidence through cross-examination, opposing evidence, and clear burden-of-proof instructions. Andrew Gilberg, a professional engineer specializing in automobile safety, was retained by the plaintiffs to assess an accident and opined that Mrs. Hamilton likely wore her seatbelt at the time of the incident. The defendants sought to exclude Gilberg's testimony on two grounds: his opinion on Mrs. Hamilton's seatbelt use and any claims of the defendants' conscious indifference, which the plaintiffs have stipulated Gilberg will not address. The defendants argue that Gilberg's report lacks adequate disclosure of the basis and methodology required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26 and point to the absence of evidence showing Mrs. Hamilton's seatbelt was buckled post-accident. Conversely, the plaintiffs argue that Gilberg's report provides a sufficient factual foundation and reliable methodology for his conclusion, citing a thorough vehicle examination and accident scene analysis. They present evidence of a deformed shoulder harness, suggesting it indicates the seatbelt was in use. The court concludes that Gilberg’s report is based on sufficient facts, highlighting his detailed examination and observations, which led him to reasonably conclude that Mrs. Hamilton was "probably" using her seatbelt at the time of the accident. Defendants possess evidence suggesting Mrs. Hamilton was not wearing her seatbelt, but Andrew Gilberg’s report meets Rule 702 standards, allowing Defendants to present their evidence at trial. Consequently, Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Gilberg's Opinions is DENIED. Regarding Kelly Kennett, Plaintiffs will not call him as a witness, rendering Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Kennett's Opinions DENIED AS MOOT. Dr. Brian Frist, Cobb County's Chief Medical Examiner, was retained by Plaintiffs to determine the causes of death for Mrs. Hamilton and Joshua. Frist concluded that Joshua died from thermal injuries. Defendants seek to exclude Frist's testimony on three points: whether Joshua experienced pain from breathing superheated air, the occurrence of an explosion during the accident, and whether Joshua experienced shock from a possible explosion. Defendants challenge Frist's reliability, noting he did not examine Joshua but relied on Dr. Frank Peretti’s autopsy report, which could not rule out blunt force trauma due to extensive burns. They argue that if Joshua did not survive the initial collision, Frist's opinion about him breathing superheated air is unreliable. Plaintiffs counter that Peretti did conclude Joshua died from thermal injuries and leaned towards the likelihood that Joshua died because of the fire. They also highlight Frist's qualifications as a board-certified pathologist who often determines causes of death without direct examinations. The Court deems Frist’s opinion on Joshua's suffering from superheated air as reliable, citing his thorough review of medical records, accident reports, and evidence from law enforcement. Frist's analysis included considerations of the accident scene's damage and the survival of another child, Brittany, who had minimal injuries, suggesting that a child in a less damaged area could have survived. Despite potential differing expert opinions, Frist employed a reliable methodology in his conclusions. Defendants seek to exclude Dr. Frist's opinion that there was an explosion linked to a fire and that Joshua may have experienced shock from it, arguing that Frist lacks the qualifications and fails to provide a factual basis or methodology for this opinion, rendering it speculative. Plaintiffs counter that Frist's opinion is one of several explanations for the absence of soot in Joshua's lungs and cite testimony from truck driver Roger Scherbeh, who reported hearing an explosion. The Court determines that Frist is qualified and his opinion is sufficiently supported by medical records, asserting that it will assist the jury in understanding the evidence. Defendants also aim to exclude Frist's testimony regarding injuries to Alexis, claiming her heirs are no longer part of the case, thus rendering the injuries irrelevant. They invoke the Daubert standard, which requires expert testimony to assist the trier of fact. Plaintiffs argue that evidence of Alexis’ injuries is pertinent to countering Defendants’ assertion that Joshua died from blunt force trauma. The Court agrees, finding that Frist’s testimony concerning Alexis' cause of death is admissible as it aids the jury's understanding of Joshua's cause of death, particularly given the absence of blunt force trauma evidence for both victims. Additionally, the Court addresses the request to exclude Steve Jackson's accident reconstruction findings. Jackson concludes that the Camaro experienced a minor change in velocity upon impact and that Mrs. Hamilton’s seat moved backward, loosening her seatbelt. Defendants seek to exclude Jackson’s testimony on the impact force, the seat's movement, and the effect on seat restraint. The Court will consider these motions further. Ultimately, Defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude certain opinions from Dr. Frist is DENIED. Defendants contest the qualification of Jackson as an expert witness, arguing that his experience as a state trooper does not meet the standards necessary for discussing accident reconstruction, which they believe should be limited to automotive engineers. In contrast, Plaintiffs assert Jackson's qualifications, citing his investigation of 2,000 accidents, reconstruction of 350 accidents, extensive training in accident investigation, and experience as an expert witness in over 1,000 trials. The Court determines Jackson is qualified to provide expert opinions on accident reconstruction, including the effects of impact forces and seat movement during accidents, noting his relevant training, including a physics course on vehicle accident forces. Defendants also challenge the reliability of Jackson's methodology, claiming he presents conclusions without supporting methods. Plaintiffs defend his approach as typical for accident reconstruction, emphasizing that Jackson's conclusions regarding the impact speed and seat movement do not require complex methodologies; they were based on direct observations and established formulas. Jackson's report outlines the impacts on the vehicle, detailing a speed reduction upon collision with a signpost and the resultant movement of the seat, which affected the seatbelt's effectiveness. The Court finds Jackson's methodology reliable and notes that Defendants do not dispute his initial speed assumption of 70 miles per hour or his conclusions. As a result, Defendants’ Motion in Limine to exclude Jackson's opinions is denied. Regarding expert John Stilson, the Defendants' request to exclude his opinion is rendered moot as Plaintiffs will not present him as a witness. Lastly, Dr. Frank Peretti, the associate medical examiner for Arkansas, conducted autopsies on victims Mrs. Hamilton, Joshua, and Alexis, concluding that Joshua and Alexis died from thermal injuries. Defendants seek to exclude portions of Peretti's testimony regarding Joshua's cause of death, arguing it lacks sufficient evidence and reliability under Rule 702. They highlight that Peretti indicated extensive postmortem burns may have obscured any pre-fire head injuries and contend that listing thermal injuries as the cause of death does not ensure the reliability of his conclusion. Plaintiffs counter that Peretti's acknowledgment of limited evidence does not undermine the reliability of his conclusion that thermal injuries likely caused Joshua's death. The Court determines that Peretti's testimony satisfies Rule 702 standards, noting that while limited evidence was available, it sufficiently supports the conclusion that Joshua most likely died from the fire. Consequently, Defendants’ objections regarding Joshua’s cause of death are denied. Regarding Mrs. Hamilton’s marijuana use, Plaintiffs request the exclusion of Peretti's testimony based on her toxicology report, asserting it is irrelevant and prejudicial. They emphasize that Peretti could not ascertain the effect of marijuana on her driving skills and reference their pharmacology expert James Norris, who states that the THC metabolite found in her samples collected thirty hours post-accident does not provide a reliable estimation of her impairment at the time of the crash. Plaintiffs argue that discussing drug use would skew jury deliberations, potentially leading to an unjust outcome concerning the alleged defect of the Camaro. In contrast, Defendants argue the evidence is pertinent as it suggests Mrs. Hamilton's negligence and impacts her ability to rescue Joshua. The Court finds the evidence of Mrs. Hamilton's marijuana use relevant and not unduly prejudicial, aligning with Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 401 regarding the relevance of evidence in determining the case. Evidence suggests that Mrs. Hamilton’s negligence likely contributed to her injuries and that she would not have been able to swiftly remove Joshua from the vehicle. Under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403, the court may exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Although evidence of Mrs. Hamilton's illegal drug use poses a risk of bias against the plaintiffs, this prejudice does not significantly outweigh its probative value. Consequently, the plaintiffs' Motion in Limine regarding parts of Peretti's deposition discussing Mrs. Hamilton’s marijuana use is denied. Regarding deposition testimony, the court has already addressed the defendants’ Daubert challenges to Peretti’s conclusions on Joshua’s cause of death and has sustained several objections to portions of Peretti’s testimony deemed irrelevant. Sherry Hobbs, an eyewitness, testified that Mrs. Hamilton passed her vehicle shortly before the collision. Plaintiffs objected to Hobbs’ answer about whether Mrs. Hamilton was on her cell phone prior to the accident, claiming it was hearsay and non-responsive. The court sustained this objection, noting Hobbs did not address the question directly. However, objections to other portions of Hobbs' testimony regarding Mrs. Hamilton's speed were overruled, as the questions were found not to be leading, and the answers were deemed responsive. Mel McDowell, an accident reconstruction expert, provided testimony regarding the accident. Plaintiffs objected to his comments about Mrs. Hamilton's speed, labeling them as speculative and non-responsive. Defendants countered that McDowell is qualified to provide such insights, leading the court to reject the plaintiffs' objections. Defendants argue that counsel interrupted McDowell during his deposition, claiming his overall response was relevant. However, the court sustains the plaintiffs' objection to McDowell's testimony regarding Mrs. Hamilton's speed before the collision, finding it unresponsive. McDowell's initial dismissal of the question, along with his comments on her aggressive and inattentive driving, are noted, although the plaintiffs did not object to his remarks about her speed. The court also sustains objections to McDowell's speculation about Hamilton's driving behavior, asserting that such inferences exceed his expertise as an accident reconstruction expert and should be left to the jury. Additionally, the plaintiffs object to McDowell's conclusion that Hamilton was driving aggressively based on the police report, which the court again finds speculative and outside his expertise. Regarding legal issues, plaintiffs seek to prevent defendants from claiming immunity under La.Rev.Stat. 9:2798.4, arguing that it is an unpleaded affirmative defense. They cite Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8(c), which mandates that affirmative defenses be included in responsive pleadings. Defendants counter that no case law necessitates explicit mention of this statutory defense and assert they indicated their belief in Hamilton's negligence in their pleadings. They point out that plaintiffs have been aware of Hamilton's marijuana influence at the time of the accident. La.Rev.Stat. 9:2798.4 stipulates that a motor vehicle operator under the influence is not liable for damages if their negligence was a contributing factor, provided certain conditions are met, including that more than 25% of the negligence is attributable to drug influence. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8(c) mandates that affirmative defenses must be articulated in a party's answer, with failure to do so potentially leading to a waiver of that defense. However, if an affirmative defense is raised sufficiently on time and does not prejudice the plaintiff's ability to respond, it may still be considered. The intent behind this requirement is to prevent unfair surprise. In this case, the Court determines that even if 9:2798.4 is an affirmative defense, the Defendants can assert it since it was timely raised. They included Mrs. Hamilton’s negligence as a defense in their pleadings and referenced her drug use in the Proposed Pretrial Order. The Plaintiffs had prior notice of this issue through Peretti’s autopsy report and did not demonstrate that allowing this defense would cause unfair surprise, as they had anticipated it by consulting an expert regarding Mrs. Hamilton’s potential drug influence during the accident. Regarding GM Canada’s status as a manufacturer under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA), the Defendants argue that GM Canada should not be classified as a manufacturer because GM Corporation was the sole designer of the door. In contrast, the Plaintiffs contend that GM Canada qualifies as a manufacturer, citing Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2800.53, which defines manufacturing broadly to include various processes and labeling. The Court finds that GM Canada meets the definition of a manufacturer since it constructed the Camaro and labeled it as such. Finally, the Defendants assert that the LPLA serves as the exclusive remedy in this case, a point that the Plaintiffs do not contest. According to La.Rev.Stat. 9:2800.52, the LPLA establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers regarding product-related damages, leading the Court to conclude that the LPLA is indeed the exclusive remedy available. Defendants argue against being classified as solidary obligors for alleged damages, asserting that their liability should be determined in proportion to their respective degrees of fault under La. Civ. Code art. 2324. In contrast, Plaintiffs contend that both Defendants are strictly liable under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) for harm stemming from a defective door, thereby making them solidarily liable for the same obligation. Plaintiffs reference several Louisiana Civil Code articles that pertain to obligations among multiple parties, claiming that these statutes apply to their case, which involves the manufacture of a vehicle that is not unreasonably dangerous. The Court concludes that Defendants' obligations are joint and divisible since the Plaintiffs did not allege any conspiracy between the Defendants, which is necessary for solidary liability under art. 2324. The Court notes that the statutes cited by Plaintiffs typically apply to contractual matters, and no cases were presented where these statutes were applied in products liability claims. Regarding the issue of recovery for Joshua's death, Defendants seek to prevent Plaintiffs from claiming these damages, arguing that they were not adequately pleaded. Plaintiffs counter that this matter was addressed in a prior summary judgment ruling and was included in their Answer and Cross-Claim, supported by expert reports shared earlier in the litigation. The Court references Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a clear and concise statement of claims, emphasizing that the standard is designed to provide defendants with fair notice of the claims against them. The adequacy of notice provided by a complaint is determined as a question of law. The Court determined that the Plaintiffs' Answer and Cross-Claim provided adequate notice to the Defendants under Rule 8(a)(2). The Plaintiffs allege that GM Corporation's failure to design and manufacture a crashworthy vehicle led to the deaths of Mrs. Hamilton and Joshua, suggesting a possibility that Mrs. Hamilton could have saved Joshua had she not been ejected from the vehicle. The Plaintiffs aim to introduce evidence regarding the severity of Brittany's injuries compared to Joshua's, asserting that Joshua survived the initial collisions. Brittany, seated in the backseat, escaped with minor injuries, while Joshua, secured in a child seat, did not survive. Plaintiffs argue that the damage to the vehicle was primarily near Brittany, supporting their claim that the jury should consider whether Joshua could have been saved. Defendants, however, request the Court to exclude this evidence, citing prior cases where similar evidence was deemed irrelevant. They reference Perkins v. Volkswagen and Cheek v. General Motors Corp. to support their position. The Plaintiffs counter that these cases indicate trial courts have discretion over the admissibility of evidence and argue that the circumstances in their case differ significantly from those in Perkins. The Court concluded that evidence regarding the relative severity of injuries is admissible, noting that the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Perkins does not categorically deem such evidence irrelevant. The Court found the context of the current case distinct, allowing for the introduction of relative severity evidence to assist the jury in determining the potential for Joshua's survival. Plaintiffs presented expert testimony indicating that Joshua was in a relatively safe position during the incident, which supports the relevance of evidence showing that an unharmed child was in a more damaged location than the decedent, potentially demonstrating whether Joshua survived the collision. Defendants argue against Plaintiffs recovering for Joshua's death due to an alleged defect in a door, claiming that the defect does not constitute the legal or proximate cause of the death and that the circumstances are "unusual" and "too remote." In contrast, Plaintiffs contend that the defect did proximately cause Joshua's death, asserting that proximate cause is a fact-intensive inquiry best determined at trial. They provide hypothetical scenarios to illustrate their position. The Supreme Court of Louisiana defines proximate cause as a policy inquiry regarding whether the risk falls within the duty's scope, emphasizing that rules of conduct protect certain individuals from specific risks. The Court finds that the risk of a mother being unable to rescue her child post-accident aligns with the duty of Defendants regarding the door's design. Defendants cite previous cases where injuries were deemed too remote from the duty owed, but the Court determines the connection between the defective door and the mother's inability to rescue her child is sufficiently direct to support proximate cause. The Court denies motions in limine related to expert testimonies from Peretti, Gilberg, Frist, and Jackson, and finds the motions regarding Kennett’s and Stilson’s testimonies moot. The Court addressed the parties' objections to deposition testimony designations, sustaining Defendants’ objections to portions of Peretti’s testimony, and sustaining Plaintiffs’ objections to sections of Hobbs’ testimony regarding Mrs. Hamilton's cell phone use, while overruling Plaintiffs’ objections on her driving speed. The Court also sustained Plaintiffs’ objections to McDowell’s testimony about Mrs. Hamilton driving carelessly and aggressively. On legal issues, the Court ruled that Defendants may use La.Rev.Stat. 9:2798.4 as a defense, GM Canada qualifies as a manufacturer under the LPLA, which is the exclusive recovery theory in this case. Liability for Defendants will be joint and divisible, and Plaintiffs’ pleadings sufficiently notified Defendants of their claims regarding Joshua’s death linked to the door design. Plaintiffs are permitted to present evidence of relative injury, and the door design is found to have proximately caused Joshua’s death. The facts are detailed in the Court's Summary Judgment Ruling (Doc. No. 80), and although Plaintiffs claimed defective design concerning the Camaro's fuel system, the Court granted summary judgment against these claims (Doc. No. 81). Initially, Mackie Hamilton and Peggy Brinkley were defendants, but they are now pure plaintiffs following the removal of the original plaintiff from the case.