Heneghan v. Crown Crafts Infant Products, Inc.

Citations: 868 F. Supp. 2d 1153; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52528; 2012 WL 1309174Docket: Case No. C10-05908RJB

Court: District Court, W.D. Washington; April 13, 2012; Federal District Court

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William Sears, M.D., operating as Sears Pediatrics and Family Medicine, Inc., had his motion for summary judgment denied by District Judge Robert J. Bryan. The case involves the tragic death of 3-month-old C.R. in October 2004, who was found unresponsive after being placed in a Nojo sling by her mother, Ann Heneghan. Dr. Sears, a pediatric specialist, is linked to the Nojo sling through his endorsement of "babywearing" and a licensing agreement with Crown Crafts, which manufactured the sling. Heneghan purchased the sling after seeing it referenced in Dr. Sears' book, "The Baby Book." On October 23, 2004, after using the sling for 10-15 minutes, Heneghan found C.R. unresponsive; paramedics revived her heartbeat and breathing, but she was declared brain dead shortly after and died on October 27, 2004.

The procedural history reveals that an initial lawsuit for wrongful death was filed against Crown Crafts on December 14, 2010, without including Dr. Sears. Subsequently, he was added as a defendant in April 2011, along with C.R.'s father, John Ross. An amended complaint was filed on May 2, 2011, asserting claims against both Dr. Sears and Crown Crafts under the Washington Products Liability Act, alleging the Nojo sling was defective and unsafe. Dr. Sears initially sought to dismiss the claims against him in December 2011.

Dr. Sears contended that the Plaintiffs’ amended complaint did not sufficiently allege facts to support a claim under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA) against him. The court denied his motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on March 8, 2012, Dr. Sears filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting he is not a product seller of the Nojo sling, the product in question. Plaintiffs opposed this motion on March 26, claiming it mirrored his earlier motion to dismiss and argued that Dr. Sears is liable under the WPLA as both a product seller and manufacturer. They also alleged he misrepresented the Nojo sling in a misleading manner. On March 29, Dr. Sears replied, stating that the court's previous ruling did not negate his summary judgment motion and that Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of his sale of the Nojo sling. He maintained that liability for negligent misrepresentation depended on his sale of the product and denied involvement in its marketing or promotion.

The excerpt also outlines the standard for summary judgment, which requires no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party must show that the nonmoving party has not made a sufficient showing on essential claim elements. A genuine dispute exists if there is enough evidence to warrant a trial, and the court must consider the required evidentiary burden for the nonmoving party. Disputes of fact are resolved in favor of the nonmoving party only when their facts contradict those of the moving party, and mere assertions of discrediting evidence are insufficient.

Conclusory and nonspecific statements in affidavits are inadequate, as established in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, which emphasizes that missing facts cannot be presumed. In diversity cases, federal courts apply state substantive law and federal procedural law, following the principles outlined in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. In this case, Washington substantive law governs. The court is tasked with determining the appropriateness of summary judgment for Plaintiffs' claims against Dr. Sears under the Washington Product Liability Act (WPLA). Summary judgment is warranted when the nonmoving party fails to demonstrate a sufficient showing on an essential claim element. A genuine dispute over material facts exists if evidence supports differing factual claims. 

Dr. Sears' motion for summary judgment centers on the assertion that he did not sell the Nojo sling, which is crucial for liability under the WPLA. He contends that Plaintiffs lack evidence of any sale of the relevant product. In contrast, Plaintiffs argue that genuine issues of fact exist regarding Dr. Sears’ involvement in the sling's design, marketing, and promotion through his writings and website. 

The WPLA defines a "product seller" as any entity engaged in selling products, including manufacturers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers. A "manufacturer" is defined as an entity that designs or produces the product, and even a retailer can be considered a manufacturer if they contribute to the product's creation. Importantly, a seller who merely assembles a product per the manufacturer’s instructions does not qualify as a manufacturer. The definitions within the WPLA are broader than the narrow interpretation suggested by the defendants. The "relevant product" encompasses the product or its components that gave rise to the liability claim.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient connection between Dr. Sears' involvement in the design, promotion, and sale of Nojo slings and the sling purchased by Plaintiff Ann Heneghan. This connection necessitates a determination by the trier of fact regarding whether Dr. Sears qualifies as a product seller or manufacturer. The plaintiffs reference RCW 7.72.040, which outlines the liability of product sellers apart from manufacturers, arguing that even if Dr. Sears is not classified as a manufacturer, he is still liable for negligence and for breaching express warranties related to the product due to alleged false and misleading representations. In response, Dr. Sears contends that he should not be held liable for negligent misrepresentation unless he directly sold the sling in question. RCW 7.72.040 states that a product seller is liable if the claimant's harm results from their negligence, breach of warranty, or intentional misrepresentation or concealment. Furthermore, if a product is marketed under the seller's name, they assume manufacturer liability. The determination of Dr. Sears' status as a product seller is to be made by the trier of fact, indicating that his potential liability under both RCW 7.72.040 and RCW 7.72.010 should be resolved at trial. Consequently, the court denies Dr. Sears’ motion for summary judgment. An order is issued to deny the motion and direct the Clerk to send copies of this Order to all relevant parties.