Court: District Court, D. New Mexico; October 17, 2011; Federal District Court
Martha Wilson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 6, 2011, concerning claims against Defendants Jennifer Jara and Daniel Vazquez related to an incident on August 16, 2007. The primary legal issues include potential violations of Wilson's Fourth Amendment rights due to an alleged unlawful seizure and search of her home, an arrest without probable cause, and the applicability of qualified immunity for the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as protections under New Mexico's Family Violence and Protection Act.
The Court found that Jara and Vazquez did unconstitutionally seize Wilson in her home and ruled that they are not entitled to qualified immunity regarding this claim, thus granting Wilson's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the unconstitutional seizure. However, due to factual disputes surrounding other claims, the Court denied Wilson's Motion for Summary Judgment concerning those claims in Count III.
The factual background indicates that on the incident date, Wilson was at her apartment with her son Timothy Chabot and daughter Haley Chabot. The police were dispatched in response to multiple 911 calls reporting a fight involving T. Chabot, with concerns about potential weapons and possible domestic violence. Upon arrival, Jara contacted Haley Chabot, who reported that T. Chabot had been aggressive and intoxicated.
A disturbance call escalated to a domestic violence investigation after H. Chabot's statements. Defendants had probable cause to arrest T. Chabot based on these allegations. The incident reportedly occurred one to two hours prior to the police's arrival. Vazquez was aware that H. Chabot did not plan to return home that night. Following interviews, Officers Jara and Vazquez approached the Wilson residence, where they identified themselves and requested to speak with T. Chabot, who was reported to be in bed and intoxicated. Wilson informed the officers that T. Chabot was not involved in the incident but expressed concern about potential police actions against her son. Despite this, the officers insisted on speaking with T. Chabot, indicating they would enter the home if Wilson did not comply. Wilson claimed she felt unable to end the encounter, but ultimately agreed to retrieve T. Chabot after being told the officers could enter the apartment.
Jara and Vazquez permitted Wilson to retrieve her son alone, disregarding officer safety concerns. Wilson left the door open while retrieving T. Chabot, who remained inside the apartment. Jara indicated she would not allow Wilson to close the door. T. Chabot was asked to speak with Jara and Vazquez downstairs, but Wilson opposed this request, asserting he did not need to comply. Eventually, Jara and Vazquez ordered T. Chabot to go downstairs, insisting he had no choice, which T. Chabot did not voluntarily do.
When Wilson blocked T. Chabot from descending, Jara and Vazquez decided to arrest him due to an alleged battery incident. They reached into the apartment to effectuate the arrest, prompting T. Chabot to retreat further inside. Wilson then grabbed Vazquez's arm, which caused him to enter the apartment. Vazquez attempted to make physical contact with Wilson to have her step back, and she objected to their entry.
Jara and Vazquez believed they had a legal right to enter the apartment, especially given the heightened alertness required during domestic violence calls. They expressed concerns about safety while trying to communicate with T. Chabot in confined spaces, such as the stairwell and doorway. After arresting T. Chabot, they instructed Wilson to remain upstairs, threatening her with arrest if she followed. Despite this warning, Wilson ignored their request and attempted to follow them downstairs.
Wilson and T. Chabot were involved in an incident where Wilson physically confronted Vazquez, who was trying to create space. This altercation attracted the attention of neighbors, prompting them to call 911 due to disturbances caused by Wilson and T. Chabot. Despite police orders, Wilson continued her disruptive behavior, leading to her arrest by Jara for battery on a police officer, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest.
On July 15, 2010, Wilson and T. Chabot filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District of Bernalillo County, New Mexico, alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for: (i) arrest and prosecution without probable cause, (ii) excessive use of force under the Fourth Amendment, and (iii) warrantless arrest and unlawful entry into their home. The case was removed to federal court on August 25, 2011, where the defendants denied the claims and asserted defenses including qualified immunity and immunity under the Family Violence Protection Act.
Wilson subsequently moved for summary judgment regarding her claim of unlawful in-home detention and arrest, arguing the officers exceeded their authority and lacked probable cause. The defendants countered that their actions were justified as a threshold arrest and that exigent circumstances existed. During an October 4, 2011 hearing on the motion, it was noted that T. Chabot was no longer pursuing his claims, leaving only Wilson's claims before the court. Wilson contended that the officers’ instructions constituted a seizure that violated her rights, claiming an unconstitutional search occurred when the officers reached into her home to retrieve her son, who had not exited the apartment.
Wilson contended that the legal framework for determining the validity of a threshold arrest is established by Payton v. New York and McClish v. Nugent, asserting that Jara and Vazquez were aware since 2007 that entering a home without a warrant constitutes an unlawful search. Wilson stated that the Defendants did not dispute any material facts, which supported her motion, including their directive for her to retrieve her son. The Defendants argued that this request was not mandatory, claiming it was presented as an option, and they had no intention to seize Wilson. They acknowledged that their statement to her implied a police order but later argued that the overall context indicated she felt free to challenge their authority. Citing United States v. Abdenbi, the Defendants maintained that the request did not constitute a seizure, asserting Wilson was free to disregard it. They further argued that a valid threshold arrest occurs even if it starts at the doorway and extends into the home, although they recognized the general prohibition against warrantless arrests in homes, claiming the situation changed when an individual came to the door in public view. The Defendants distinguished their case from Payton, emphasizing that they did not force entry into the home. In relation to Wilson's arrest, they described her behavior as confrontational and resistant, asserting officer safety concerns due to the domestic violence context, and highlighted a disputed fact regarding H. Chabot's potential return to the apartment as relevant to exigent circumstances. They argued that any unconstitutional seizure finding would depend on whether Wilson's actions were reasonable, contending that her physical confrontations with the officers were not justified. Finally, the Defendants posited that Wilson's arguments primarily concerned her son's Fourth Amendment rights rather than her own.
Wilson challenges the Defendants' request for the Court to recognize an "open door exception" to the warrant requirement, arguing that existing case law does not support this exception. She claims a clear violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, differentiating her case from McKinnon v. Carr, where the defendant consented to police entry. Wilson asserts a connection between the alleged unconstitutional seizure and her arrest, stating that the Defendants' unlawful actions forced her to assert her constitutional rights. She argues that her protest's reasonableness is a legal question. Regarding the Defendants' claim of exigent circumstances, Wilson contends that potential future events cannot justify a warrantless entry, and asserts that a broad interpretation of "officer safety" would undermine the Fourth Amendment.
Wilson did not dispute the additional facts presented by the Defendants but deemed them immaterial. The legal standard for motions for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that judgment be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact. The burden is on the movant to demonstrate the absence of evidence for the nonmoving party's case, who must then provide specific facts to show a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations.
Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 establishes a right to sue for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, but it does not create substantive rights; such rights must originate from the Constitution or federal statutes. Without enforceable rights under federal law, Section 1983 does not provide a remedy.
§ 1983 enables individuals to file claims against persons who, while acting under state law, infringe on federally protected rights. To succeed in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) a violation of federally protected rights; (2) that the violation was proximately caused; (3) by a "person"; (4) acting under state law or regulations. However, civil rights statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment do not allow federal courts to create a general federal tort law that supersedes state law. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to intentional actions by government officials that deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property, and a bystander cannot make a due-process claim under § 1983 without evidence of deliberate misconduct directed at them.
Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability arising from discretionary functions and aims to encourage the exercise of official authority. It should be resolved early in litigation. It shields officials from liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable person would know. When a defendant claims qualified immunity at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show: (i) the defendant's actions violated constitutional or statutory rights; and (ii) that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. A right is considered clearly established if it is well-defined and recognized in law, often demonstrated through relevant Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decisions, although a direct precedent for the specific action is not always necessary.
In assessing whether a right is “clearly established,” courts evaluate the objective legal reasonableness of an official's actions at the time of the alleged violation, determining if a reasonable official would recognize that their conduct infringes upon that right. The Supreme Court, in Pearson v. Callahan, clarified that lower courts have discretion in deciding which prong of the qualified immunity analysis to address first based on the specifics of the case.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring warrants to be issued based on probable cause and specific descriptions. The Tenth Circuit categorizes police-citizen interactions into three types: consensual encounters, investigative stops, and arrests. A consensual encounter is defined as a situation where an officer approaches a person for questioning, under circumstances that allow the person to decline.
The Tenth Circuit has ruled that entering a home under police direction is not voluntary if done under authority. Absent exigent circumstances, police cannot seize a person inside their home without a warrant. This principle is illustrated in several cases: in United States v. Maez, police actions constituted an unconstitutional seizure when they surrounded a home and forced an individual out, and in United States v. Flowers, ordering a suspect to open the door for arrest was deemed unconstitutional. In United States v. Reeves, officers, without a warrant, approached a motel room to arrest a suspect suspected of carrying weapons; the Tenth Circuit concluded the police presence and actions constituted a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
The excerpt analyzes the concept of "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing that actions such as police knocking on doors and making loud announcements can constitute a seizure within a home. In *United States v. Reeves*, the Tenth Circuit found that the police's persistent knocking and loud identification effectively acted as a command for the suspect to open the door, particularly given the late hour of the encounter. The Court in *Smith v. Kenny* similarly held that a seizure occurs when an officer instructs a person via phone to exit their home, asserting that a reasonable individual would not feel free to ignore such an order. The case also highlights that the means of communication do not affect Fourth Amendment analysis; rather, the individual's location is key to determining if an arrest occurs within a home.
The excerpt references additional cases to support this interpretation: *United States v. Al-Azzawy* recognized a seizure when officers surrounded a home and ordered the suspect out with a bullhorn, determining that a reasonable person would feel their freedom of movement was restricted. Similarly, *United States v. Morgan* concluded that the police's show of force during the surround of a home effectively arrested the suspect without a warrant, violating *Payton*. Lastly, *United States v. Johnson* established that a seizure occurs within a home when officers confront a suspect with drawn weapons outside, affirming that the location of the suspect, not the officers, determines the nature of the arrest.
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that if officers could avoid illegal entry by controlling suspects from outside a doorway, it would undermine Fourth Amendment protections. A person is considered seized under the Fourth Amendment when a reasonable individual would feel they are not free to leave, as outlined in United States v. Mendenhall. In cases where a person could not or would not leave, the key question is whether a reasonable person would feel free to reject an officer's requests, as reaffirmed in Florida v. Bostick. Factors indicating a seizure include the intimidating presence of multiple officers, display of weapons, physical contact, or authoritative language.
For an arrest to be valid, it must be supported by probable cause, which is characterized by significant intrusion or lengthy detention (Oliver v. Woods). Probable cause exists when officers have sufficient trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable person to believe an offense is being committed (United States v. Valenzuela). While probable cause is more than mere suspicion, it does not require evidence sufficient for a conviction. The distinction between reasonable suspicion and probable cause is crucial; reasonable suspicion allows for investigatory stops and can be based on less reliable information, whereas probable cause requires a higher standard of objective evidence (Alabama v. White, Beck v. Ohio).
The subjective belief of an officer regarding probable cause for an arrest does not determine its validity; rather, the focus is on whether a reasonable officer would have perceived probable cause based on the available information. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals rather than locations, emphasizing the necessity of a reasonable expectation of privacy. This expectation must be both subjective (actual privacy concern) and objective (societal recognition as reasonable). While individuals have a strong expectation of privacy in their homes, this protection does not extend to what they expose to the public. The Fourth Amendment principally safeguards against unlawful police entry into homes, reinforcing the warrant requirement for searches and seizures therein, which are generally presumed unreasonable without a warrant. Although some exceptions to the warrant requirement exist, warrantless searches are inherently unreasonable unless they meet specific criteria defined by the Supreme Court, as established in relevant case law.
One exception to the warrant requirement is when police have a reasonable belief that an emergency exists, making it impractical to obtain a warrant. The government must demonstrate that the exigency exception applies, which is particularly burdensome when justifying warrantless entry into a home. Generally, warrantless entry under exigent circumstances necessitates probable cause and an emergency; however, the Tenth Circuit has recognized a subset of exigent circumstances known as "emergency-aid" situations that do not require probable cause. In these cases, police must be responding to a genuine emergency where they reasonably believe a person inside needs immediate assistance to protect or preserve life or prevent serious injury.
The Tenth Circuit applies a two-pronged test in emergency-aid situations: (1) officers must have an objectively reasonable basis to believe there is an immediate need to protect lives or safety, and (2) the manner and scope of the search must be reasonable. Courts assess the situation based on the perspective of prudent and trained officers, using a less stringent standard than probable cause. Officers do not need absolute certainty of a serious, life-threatening injury to invoke the emergency aid exception, but they cannot create their own exigent circumstances to justify warrantless entry. In limited situations where imminent danger to officers or others exists, no separate probable cause showing is required. A warrantless arrest in a public place based on probable cause does not violate Fourth Amendment protections.
The Supreme Court has established that a warrantless arrest initiated at the doorway of a home is valid if the individual retreats inside. In *United States v. Santana*, the open doorway was deemed a "public" place under the Fourth Amendment, allowing for a warrantless arrest when the individual is exposed to public view. The Tenth Circuit's decision in *McKinnon v. Carr* supported this by affirming the validity of a warrantless arrest when the individual voluntarily answered the door. However, in *United States v. Flowers*, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the case from *McKinnon* based on the individual's lack of a legitimate expectation of privacy when he opened the door under police orders. The court reiterated that such an opening does not negate privacy rights, as seen in *United States v. Reeves*.
The Court will grant Wilson’s Motion for Summary Judgment in part, acknowledging that Jara and Vazquez violated her Fourth Amendment rights by seizing her person in her home. However, it cannot conclusively determine that the Defendants violated Wilson’s rights when they reached across the threshold or when they arrested her for resisting arrest. Factual disputes necessitate the denial of Wilson’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding other claims in Count III. Furthermore, New Mexico’s Family Violence Protection Act does not exempt civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court finds that the order to “go get your son” constituted a seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court is unable to determine whether the act of breaching the threshold of Wilson's apartment to reach T. Chabot constitutes a search violating the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, it cannot conclude that officers Jara and Vazquez lacked probable cause for Wilson's arrest. A significant point made is that the order to "go get your son" qualifies as a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even in the absence of physical restraint or direct contact with Wilson. Legal precedents indicate that a seizure can occur without the citizen's awareness of the officer's presence, as illustrated in cases like Florida v. Bostick and United States v. Mendenhall. The key factor is whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the officer's command, taking into account the surrounding circumstances. Indicators of a seizure include the presence of multiple officers, display of weapons, physical contact, or language that implies compliance is mandatory.
In this case, Jara and Vazquez approached Wilson, requested to speak with T. Chabot, and upon her refusal, continued the conversation at her door. Jara indicated to Wilson that she was "not abiding by the law" and ordered her to retrieve T. Chabot, threatening to enter if she did not comply. Wilson argues this constituted a seizure, while the Defendants claim it did not, asserting she was not a suspect and had the option to comply or not. They also reference United States v. Johnson, which supports the notion that officers can approach citizens and ask questions without infringing on Fourth Amendment rights.
Defendants argue that Jara and Vazquez did not intentionally acquire physical control over Wilson, as their intent was to speak with T. Chabot. They acknowledge that the command to "go get your son" constitutes a police order but claim it was not directed at Wilson. This position is refuted by the fact that the command aimed at Wilson was intended to secure her compliance. Legal precedents indicate that all individuals possess a right against unreasonable seizures, regardless of their status as suspects. Notably, the Fourth Amendment safeguards the innocent from unreasonable police conduct, and a seizure is deemed unconstitutional in the absence of suspicion of criminal activity.
The determination of whether a seizure occurred depends on whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter. In this case, the context—a late-night encounter with two officers at Wilson's doorstep—contributes significantly to the perception of coercion. Wilson had consistently refused to comply with officers seeking her cooperation, and they threatened to enter her home if she did not retrieve her son. This scenario suggests that a reasonable person would feel compelled to obey the officers' command.
Further legal precedents illustrate that even implicit commands from law enforcement, such as those resulting from police identification or pressure at a residence, can constitute a seizure. The Tenth Circuit's rulings emphasize that the nature of an encounter within the home is critical, asserting that warrant requirements apply to all seizures inside a residence.
The Sixth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Saari established that the relevant location for assessing an arrest is where the individual is located, specifically noting that police actions that compel a person to submit to arrest in their home constitute a "constructive entry." In this case, Wilson was commanded by officers Jara and Vazquez to retrieve her son, leading her to submit to their authority while inside her home. This scenario exceeded the boundaries of a consensual "knock and talk," which is a non-coercive interaction that does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. A consensual encounter may transform into a non-consensual encounter when police actions become coercive, suggesting that an individual has no right to refuse compliance.
Jara and Vazquez's persistent requests for Wilson to comply and their implied threats about the consequences of her refusal shifted the nature of the encounter from consensual to non-consensual. Previous cases illustrate that coercive questioning, especially with threats of punitive action, can convert a consensual interaction into a seizure. The defendants argued that Wilson could have ended the encounter by closing the door or refusing to engage; however, the critical query is whether a reasonable person in Wilson's position would feel free to terminate the encounter. Evidence suggested that a reasonable person would not perceive they could refuse the officers' commands given the implied legal repercussions communicated by Jara and Vazquez.
Jara and Vazquez made two statements that imply differing levels of authority and coercion. The first statement, ordering Wilson to "go get your son," is seen as a show of authority that could constitute a seizure under Tenth Circuit precedent. The second statement, threatening that if Wilson does not comply, they would enter her home, suggests Wilson had options, which the Defendants argue indicates she was not seized. However, this assertion is challenged, as it implies that complying with police authority could terminate her contact with them, effectively defining a seizure. The statement about entering the home represents a threat of punitive consequences for exercising her constitutional rights, which is coercive in nature. It reinforces the initial order and suggests that Wilson had no right to refuse, akin to precedents where coercive choices were deemed unconstitutional. The legal framework acknowledges that police cannot enter a home without a warrant to make an arrest, and the officers' actions presented Wilson with a false choice—submit to their authority or face an illegal search. Overall, the combined effect of the statements indicates that Wilson was not free to refuse their request, highlighting the coercive nature of the police conduct.
Defendants argue that Wilson believed she had the right to argue with the police and could terminate the encounter; however, the Supreme Court has established that a police officer’s show of authority constitutes a seizure only if the individual submits to it. In this case, Wilson complied with the officers' order to retrieve her son, which was deemed an intentional act that restricted her freedom of movement. The actions of Officers Jara and Vazquez were intentional and not accidental, indicating that their order required compliance. The officers lacked a warrant or cause for the seizure, rendering their actions a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
To overcome the Defendants' claim of qualified immunity, it must be shown that the right to be free from seizure without a warrant was clearly established at the time of the incident. The Court confirms that such a right was clearly established as of August 16, 2007, supported by relevant case law. As the right against unreasonable seizures in one’s home is well-established, and a violation occurred, Jara and Vazquez are not entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, when Wilson complied with their order, she was seized unlawfully. The Court grants Wilson's motion for summary judgment regarding her claim of unlawful seizure against Jara and Vazquez.
The court is unable to conclude that crossing the threshold of Wilson's apartment to reach T. Chabot constituted a search of Wilson's home that violated the Fourth Amendment. Wilson claims the Defendants overstepped their authority by unlawfully entering her home to arrest T. Chabot. The Defendants argue that the threshold is a public space, negating the need for probable cause, and assert that the precedent set in Payton v. New York is not applicable since the officers did not forcibly enter the home. The Tenth Circuit differentiates between voluntary and compelled appearances at a door, referencing McKinnon v. Carr, which allows warrantless arrests when an individual voluntarily opens the door, and United States v. Flowers, where an involuntary appearance does not waive Fourth Amendment protections.
Although Wilson initially answered the door voluntarily, she was seized and not free to leave when ordered by the officers, which means she was not voluntarily exposing her home to public view at the time. Extending McKinnon v. Carr to allow police entry under these circumstances would compromise Fourth Amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit has not applied McKinnon v. Carr in the manner the Defendants suggest. The court highlights that the legality of T. Chabot’s presence at the door hinges on whether he came voluntarily, a fact that remains undetermined as neither party has provided evidence clarifying why T. Chabot appeared at the door.
The Court will deny the motion for summary judgment regarding the claim of an unreasonable search, as it must view reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. If T. Chabot did not voluntarily appear at the door, the actions of officers Jara and Vazquez could be deemed an unconstitutional search, as any unconsented police entry into a residence constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Exigent circumstances cannot justify the search if the initial arrest of Wilson was invalid. The Tenth Circuit's exigent circumstances test requires an objectively reasonable belief of immediate threat to safety, which the Defendants did not satisfy, particularly as they had knowledge that H. Chabot was not present in the apartment. The Court cited precedents indicating that domestic violence situations do not create a per se exigency and that generalized concerns about officer safety do not suffice. Jara and Vazquez failed to provide specific facts demonstrating that Wilson or T. Chabot posed any danger prior to their entry. The Court also ruled that it would not conclude, as a matter of law, that the Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Wilson, who contends her assertion of constitutional rights did not equate to resisting arrest, and that resisting an unlawful arrest is permissible.
Defendants claim their actions were lawful due to their authority to enter Wilson's home and that Wilson's conduct was unreasonable. The Court must first determine if Jara and Vazquez lawfully entered and arrested T. Chabot, as conflicting accounts exist regarding the interactions between Vazquez and Wilson. Wilson asserts she grabbed Vazquez after he entered the apartment while Defendants argue that she interfered with the arrest by grabbing Vazquez’s arm, which led to her physical obstruction of the arrest. Jara ordered Wilson to stay upstairs, but she disobeyed and continued to interfere, creating a disturbance. In this context, the Court suggests that Jara and Vazquez may have had probable cause to arrest Wilson for resisting arrest or obstruction, thus denying the motion for summary judgment on this issue.
The Defendants also contend that under the New Mexico Family Violence Protection Act, officers responding to domestic violence calls are immune from civil liability. However, precedent establishes that wrongful conduct by state actors cannot be shielded by state law under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985(3). The Supremacy Clause ensures that state laws do not undermine federal civil rights protections, reaffirming that state immunity cannot protect against violations of federal rights.
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not confined by state law limitations, as established in Palmer v. City of Monticello. The federal constitutional claim regarding a violation of liberty interests is unaffected by state defamation laws. According to the Supremacy Clause, state laws that conflict with federal laws must yield; thus, the New Mexico Family Violence Protection Act cannot limit recovery under § 1983, which aims to provide remedies for constitutional violations. The court granted in part and denied in part Martha Wilson's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding her claims. Specifically, the motion was granted concerning the unconstitutional seizure claim in her home, but denied for all other claims in Count III of her complaint. During a hearing, Wilson acknowledged that she did not dispute the additional facts presented by the Defendants, which the court will deem admitted due to lack of specific contestation. Wilson alleged that law enforcement officers were aware of H. Chabot's intention not to return home, a claim disputed by the Defendants. The deposition of Officer Vazquez indicated he had knowledge that H. Chabot intended to stay elsewhere, contradicting any assertion of uncertainty.
Wilson's assertion that she explained to officers Jara and Vazquez about a male friend of H. Chabot arguing with T. Chabot is deemed partially admitted by the Court. According to D.N.M.LR-Civ. 56.1(b), all material facts in the movant's memorandum are considered undisputed unless specifically contradicted. The Defendants dispute Wilson’s claim, arguing that she did not mention an argument but instead stated that the situation "escalated into a fight," which is supported by a recording from Jara's Belt Tape. The Court will modify Wilson's statement to reflect her exact words as recorded.
Wilson also asserts that she told the officers she did not want them to speak to her son, but the Belt Tape reveals a different interaction where she indicates her son is in bed and not available to talk. Consequently, the Court will amend Wilson's assertion to include her actual statements from the recording.
The Defendants contest the timeline of events surrounding their requests to speak with Wilson's son, claiming they repeatedly asked for the son while Wilson argued with them, ultimately leading to a demand that she either retrieve her son or they would enter to do so. The Court acknowledges several of the Defendants' additional material facts that adjust the sequence of events, recognizing that while the Defendants do not dispute the substance of Wilson's claims, they present a similar fact that supports their position. Wilson continues to refuse the officers' requests to bring her son, prompting Officer Jara to insist that she do so while Officer Vazquez warns they may have to enter the house.
The Court considers Wilson's asserted facts as admitted due to the Defendants' failure to contest their substance. The Defendants argue that Wilson did not express a lack of freedom to terminate the encounter, citing United States v. Abdenbi to assert that her subjective intent is irrelevant. Wilson's claim that the door to her apartment was left open for the Defendants to observe her is disputed by the Defendants, who state there is no evidence supporting this rationale. During Jara's deposition, she confirmed that the door was not closed and asserted that she would not have allowed Wilson to close it. Although the Defendants assert Wilson voluntarily left the door open, Wilson’s statement indicates she believed Jara would not permit her to close it. The Court finds that the Defendants have not provided evidence contradicting Wilson’s assertion regarding the door, therefore deeming it admitted. Additionally, Wilson claims that T. Chabot approached the open door to discuss a dispute, a fact the Defendants dispute by stating he merely came to the doorframe.
Defendants challenge T. Chabot's explanation of his actions when he approached Jara and Vazquez. In Jara's deposition, she confirms that Chabot stood behind the door's frame, not in the doorframe itself. The Defendants reference other deposition excerpts to suggest Chabot was in the doorframe, but these do not conclusively establish his position. All testimony consistently indicates that Chabot remained inside the apartment. The Court views the evidence favorably for the nonmoving party and accepts that Chabot was in the doorframe, despite conflicting accounts regarding his initial attempts to explain himself. The recorded conversation on Jara's Belt Tape indicates Chabot did not initially explain his actions, leading the Court to modify Wilson's assertion on this point. The Court deems this fact admitted since Defendants did not specifically dispute it. Wilson claims Chabot stated he would not go downstairs, while Defendants dispute this, asserting that it was Wilson who informed Chabot he was not required to go downstairs.
Vazquez's deposition reveals that T. Chabot did not voluntarily exit the apartment when requested by Vazquez and Jara, contradicting the Defendants' assertion that he simply chose not to go downstairs. The Court notes that while the Defendants do not dispute the core fact that they ordered T. Chabot downstairs, they argue that Wilson's account omits crucial details regarding the sequence of events. The Court modifies Wilson's statement to reflect the Defendants' concerns but ultimately deems Wilson's assertion—claiming that the Defendants ordered T. Chabot downstairs and left him no choice—as admitted due to the lack of specific contradiction from the Defendants.
In depositions, Wilson states that officers demanded T. Chabot come out, but he backed further into the apartment, feeling uncomfortable, which led to the officers entering the apartment. Conversely, Vazquez's testimony suggests he attempted to escort T. Chabot out, only for T. Chabot to resist and pull back, which contrasts with Jara's account of the sequence of events. The Court finds inconsistencies in the testimonies regarding who moved first, creating a factual dispute. To favor the non-moving party, the Court will accept for this motion that Jara and Vazquez reached for T. Chabot before he stepped back into the apartment. The Defendants assert that Wilson obstructed T. Chabot’s exit, and that T. Chabot then pulled Jara and Vazquez into the apartment.
Timothy resisted being escorted out, pulling both himself and Vazquez back into the apartment, during which Martha Wilson grabbed Vazquez's arm. Jara's deposition indicates that while escorting T. Chabot out, Wilson's contact with Vazquez occurred, but does not clarify the sequence of events. The Court identifies a factual dispute regarding the timing of these interactions, leaning towards accepting the Defendants' claim that Wilson grabbed Vazquez first. Vazquez described the incident as Wilson grabbing him, to which he responded by extending his arm to ask her to step back, rather than pushing her. The Defendants dispute Wilson's characterization of the contact as a push, leading the Court to adjust the asserted fact accordingly.
Additionally, the Defendants contest Wilson's claim of objecting to their entry into her apartment, referencing Jara's belt tape, which contains inaudible portions where Wilson's voice is heard. Due to the lack of clear evidence, the Court will accept Wilson's assertion that she objected. Wilson also claims that Vazquez admitted the officers lacked legal grounds to enter the home, a claim disputed by the Defendants, who argue that Vazquez and Jara believed they had a legal basis to enter. Vazquez's testimony presents inconsistencies: he initially affirmed he had no right to enter, but later cited the New Mexico Family Violence Protection Act as justification. This inconsistency creates a factual issue regarding his belief about the legality of entering the apartment. The Court finds that these discrepancies indicate confusion rather than an intent to fabricate facts to avoid summary judgment.
A witness's initial deposition testimony, which contradicts a later affidavit and second deposition, does not automatically warrant disregarding the later testimony unless it is shown to have been introduced to create a misleading issue for summary judgment. The court must view the evidence favorably to the non-moving party, accepting that Vazquez believed he had authority to enter Wilson's apartment. Wilson claims Vazquez pushed her, but the Defendants contest this characterization, asserting that Wilson initiated contact by grabbing Vazquez first. The depositions of Jara and Vazquez support this sequence of events. The court recognizes a factual dispute regarding whether Vazquez pushed Wilson, accepting the Defendants' claim that he was merely trying to create space after being grabbed. The Defendants’ additional material facts have been deemed admitted by the court, as there were no objections raised against the substance of these assertions. The court's references to the hearing transcript are based on the original version, which may differ from final transcripts in pagination.
