Torres v. ProCollect, Inc.

Citations: 865 F. Supp. 2d 1103; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76985; 2012 WL 1969280Docket: Civil Case No. 11-cv-02989-LTB

Court: District Court, D. Colorado; June 1, 2012; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Defendant ProCollect, Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, a Motion for Summary Judgment in response to Plaintiff Mary Torres's lawsuit, which alleges a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), specifically 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6). Torres claims that a voicemail left by an employee of ProCollect failed to disclose the company’s true corporate name, which she contends is a violation of the FDCPA. The court, presided over by District Judge Babcock, has determined that jurisdiction is proper under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) and, after reviewing the arguments presented, has denied the motion.

In evaluating the Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court noted that a complaint must provide sufficient factual content to support a plausible claim for relief. The court assumes the truth of well-pleaded facts and draws reasonable inferences favoring the plaintiff. Conversely, for summary judgment under Rule 56, the movant must demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute regarding material facts. The court must view evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

ProCollect argues that the FDCPA does not mandate the disclosure of its identity during phone communications with consumers, asserting that Torres's claim should be dismissed. However, Torres maintains that the statute requires such disclosure. The court's denial of the motion indicates that the case will proceed, as it found merit in Torres's arguments regarding the application of the FDCPA.

1692d(6) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) applies to voicemails, as established in Doshay v. Global Credit Collection Corp., which recognizes voicemails as 'communications' under the FDCPA. The court must interpret 1692d(6) to ascertain whether it mandates a debt collector to disclose its company name in voicemails directed at consumers. The statute prohibits debt collectors from engaging in conduct that harasses or oppresses individuals during debt collection, specifically stating that calls must involve a 'meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity.' The interpretation of 'meaningful disclosure' concludes that it necessitates revealing the name of the debt collection company, as a mere personal name or alias lacks significance to the consumer. The intention behind the statute is to ensure consumers can identify the entity seeking payment, as they cannot satisfy debts or pursue legal claims based on a caller's personal identity. The FDCPA is designed to protect consumers and should be interpreted liberally to achieve that end. The purpose of the FDCPA is to eradicate abusive collection practices, and this requirement for disclosure aligns with Congress's intent to safeguard consumers from deceptive practices, regardless of the validity of the debt.

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) holds debt collectors accountable for abusive, deceptive, and unfair practices, irrespective of the debt's validity. Mandating disclosure of the debt collection company's name reduces the risk of abuse that could arise from anonymity and helps consumers make informed decisions in the debt collection process. Case law supports the requirement for debt collectors to disclose their name, the company’s name, and the nature of their business. Notably, while this Court has not directly ruled on the issue, other jurisdictions have consistently required such disclosures. The FDCPA does permit employees to use aliases during calls, provided they accurately disclose the company's name and the nature of its business. A cited case, Savage v. NIC, Inc., illustrates this principle, where the court found a violation due to failure to disclose the company's name in a voicemail. The defendant's reliance on the Doshay case is challenged; the court in Doshay emphasized the necessity for meaningful disclosure but did not specifically address whether a debt collector must disclose the company name. The lack of discussion on this point limits the precedential value of Doshay.

Defendant's reliance on the Hosseinzadeh case is noted as unhelpful since it confirms that failing to disclose a defendant's identity in messages violates section 1692d(6). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) commentary on section 1692d(6) emphasizes that a debt collector must disclose their employer’s identity when discussing debts with consumers. Courts have established that leaving a voicemail constitutes placing a telephone call under this section. Thus, meaningful disclosure requires stating the debt collection company's name. However, the plaintiff must plausibly allege that such disclosure was lacking. The plaintiff's complaint includes factual details like the call's time, date, and content of the voicemail, which, if true, do not identify the defendant. These facts make the claim plausible, as they exceed mere speculation. The defendant's assertion that the claim is implausible due to its singular nature is rejected, as the plausibility is based on the sufficiency of factual allegations rather than the number of claims. Importantly, a debt collector's failure to identify itself does not necessitate the presence of harassing language in the calls. Therefore, the portion of the motion seeking dismissal is denied. Additionally, the defendant's alternative request for summary judgment is also denied, as 1692d(6) requires the disclosure of identity in voicemails. The conclusion is that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment is denied.