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United States v. Amaya
Citations: 853 F. Supp. 2d 818; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50151; 2012 WL 1188456Docket: No. CR 11-4065-MWB
Court: District Court, N.D. Iowa; April 10, 2012; Federal District Court
Defendant Angel Amaya filed a Motion to Suppress evidence obtained through the installation and use of GPS devices on his vehicles without a warrant, asserting a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The procedural background includes a Superceding Indictment from July 28, 2011, charging Amaya with drug trafficking and money laundering alongside five co-defendants. The case has faced two mistrials, the first occurring due to improper witness testimony on October 12, 2011, and the second on December 19, 2011, when defense counsel discovered the prosecution's failure to disclose GPS-related evidence. The court denied a subsequent motion to dismiss the case with prejudice on January 26, 2012, determining no prosecutorial misconduct was present. On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Jones that the installation of a GPS device constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Following this decision, the court invited Amaya to file motions to suppress GPS evidence. Amaya filed his motion on February 9, 2012, to which the Government responded on February 15, 2012, and Amaya replied on February 22, 2012. An evidentiary hearing took place on March 5, 2012, where Special Agent Jensen testified, and Amaya presented DEA reports relevant to the surveillance in question. Supplemental briefing was requested regarding the applicability of the good faith exception and potential sanctions for the prosecution’s failure to disclose GPS surveillance used by law enforcement. The prosecution submitted its brief on March 14, 2012, followed by Amaya’s response on March 26, 2012. Law enforcement utilized GPS devices on nine vehicles during their investigation, with Amaya seeking to suppress evidence from GPS data collected from his black GMC Yukon, a black Nissan Maxima (not registered to him but used by him), and his sister’s blue Nissan Murano while borrowed. The parties acknowledged Amaya’s expectation of privacy in these vehicles, and the prosecution indicated their intention to use GPS-derived evidence despite the absence of a warrant for such surveillance. The GPS devices were battery-operated, affixed externally, and could be remotely turned on and off, pinging every fifteen seconds to transmit location data. Agents first attached a GPS device to Amaya's GMC Yukon on March 18, 2011, while it was parked in his driveway, which lacked any obstructions. Prior to this, Amaya had been stopped by a state trooper for speeding, during which he mentioned traveling to a bank to transfer money to an individual linked to drug trafficking. The investigation established a probable connection between Amaya's vehicle and drug-related activities. GPS devices were replaced or had their batteries changed four times while the Yukon was parked, once occurring in a Best Buy parking lot. Evidence gathered through GPS tracking indicated Amaya was at a Wells Fargo bank on April 29, 2011, shortly before a planned money transfer. The GPS device was ultimately removed on May 6, 2011. On April 12, 2011, agents attached a GPS device to a black Nissan Maxima in Amaya's driveway, following wire intercepts suggesting a large amount of cash would be concealed in the vehicle and transported to California. The GPS was tested twice while the Maxima was stationary. On April 30, Amaya delivered the car to a former WalMart parking lot, where it was loaded onto a tractor-trailer. After Amaya left, agents instructed the truck driver to take the vehicle to South Sioux City, Nebraska, where they searched the Maxima and seized about $29,200 in cash. The GPS was reactivated, and agents tracked the vehicle to California, removing the device around August 10, 2011. Separately, a GPS was attached to a blue Nissan Murano on April 5, 2011, during a traffic stop in Kansas, where Amaya was traveling to Texas. Prior phone interceptions indicated the trip was secretive, but no evidence was collected from the subsequent traffic stop. The GPS device was removed on May 12, 2011, and the prosecution hinted at using evidence from the Murano at trial without specifying how. The discovery file did not include information about the GPS devices used in the investigation. Agents had applied for a Title III wiretap on March 11, 2011, and indicated prior failed attempts to track vehicles with GPS due to their locations. The prosecution acknowledged the omission of the T3 affidavit in discovery as a possible violation of discovery obligations, attributing it to procedural differences in their office and misplacement of the document. Additionally, reports provided to Amaya did not explicitly mention GPS surveillance, using ambiguous language instead. Special Agent Jensen did not explicitly mention 'GPS' during his testimony due to concerns over protecting a sensitive investigative technique and adhering to DEA policy, which prohibits disclosure of surveillance technology details. Following the suppression hearing, the prosecution provided a written policy for in camera review. Amaya contends that evidence obtained from GPS devices should be suppressed for two reasons: first, the GPS usage violated the Fourth Amendment, and second, the prosecution's failure to disclose this information before trial constituted a discovery violation, warranting suppression of the evidence or dismissal of charges as a sanction. In analyzing the Fourth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court's ruling in Jones established that installing and using a GPS device on a vehicle constitutes a search. However, the Court did not decide whether a warrant is necessary for such monitoring, as the prosecution had not contested that the search was reasonable based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Amaya, yet to be tried, can invoke the Jones ruling retroactively to suppress evidence, as he remains eligible until his conviction is finalized. Both parties agree that the use of GPS devices constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Despite this, the prosecution argues that the evidence should not be excluded under the good faith exception established in Davis v. United States, which affirms that evidence obtained through searches conducted in reliance on binding precedent, even if later overruled, is not subject to the exclusionary rule. The Court in Davis noted that suppression would not deter police misconduct in such cases, thereby allowing for the good faith reliance of law enforcement on existing legal standards at the time of the GPS surveillance. To determine whether evidence from GPS searches should be suppressed, the analysis begins with the existence of binding appellate precedent regarding GPS device use at the time of the searches and whether the searches were conducted with objectively reasonable reliance on that precedent. The prosecution cites *United States v. Marquez*, which established that police can install a GPS device on a parked vehicle without a warrant if they have reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is involved in drug transport. In contrast, the defendant, Amaya, argues that *Marquez* is not binding for several reasons: 1) the court's ruling on lack of standing renders its discussion on GPS legality as dicta; 2) *Marquez* contradicts the earlier ruling in *United States v. Knotts*, which left open the question of whether extensive GPS tracking constitutes a Fourth Amendment search; and 3) *Marquez* did not address whether placing a GPS device constitutes a trespass necessitating a warrant, which is pertinent to Amaya's Fourth Amendment claim based on *United States v. Jones*. The court rebuts Amaya's claims, asserting that *Marquez*'s conclusion about the warrant requirement for GPS monitoring is an alternative holding, not dicta, as a decision can rest on multiple grounds. While acknowledging that *Marquez* first found the defendant lacked standing, the court notes that it also ruled against the Fourth Amendment challenge regarding GPS use, thereby establishing binding precedent. Each ground independently supports the decision, affirming that neither can be dismissed as non-binding. Marquez’s ruling establishes that police do not need a warrant to install a non-invasive GPS tracking device on a vehicle parked in a public place if they have reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is transporting drugs. This decision was binding at the time agents monitored Amaya in 2011. Marquez does not conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Knotts, which held that monitoring a beeper did not violate a defendant’s privacy rights, although Knotts did not address whether warrantless GPS surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment. The Knotts Court acknowledged that future issues regarding prolonged surveillance could be addressed later. Marquez's ruling on GPS monitoring is authoritative, even though it focused on the reasonable expectation of privacy rather than common law trespass. Amaya argues that his Fourth Amendment challenge relates to trespass, which was not addressed in Marquez, suggesting that this impacts the binding nature of the precedent. However, this argument is deemed unpersuasive. While law enforcement is expected to understand the Fourth Amendment, courts have not required them to fully analyze the theoretical foundations behind its directives. The Fourth Amendment’s requirements are to be applied practically, without necessitating deep legal analysis by law enforcement, ensuring compliance during urgent criminal investigations. Binding appellate precedent in the Eighth Circuit establishes that law enforcement agents do not require a warrant to use GPS monitoring if they have reasonable suspicion that a vehicle is being used for drug trafficking, provided the GPS device is attached while the vehicle is in a public location. The case of Marquez confirms this principle. Amaya's argument, which attempts to invoke Eighteenth Century property law based on the Jones decision—which treats GPS monitoring as a search due to trespass—cannot invalidate the binding nature of Marquez. The Davis decision clarifies that searches conducted in reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule, emphasizing compliance with existing precedent rather than the officers' subjective awareness of it. In this context, the analysis focuses on whether the agents acted in compliance with the Marquez ruling when monitoring Amaya. The prosecution argues that they did, while Amaya fails to contest this point. Marquez permits the installation of non-invasive GPS devices without a warrant when there is reasonable suspicion, the devices are installed in public, and the monitoring period is reasonable. The agents had reasonable suspicion regarding three specific vehicles (Yukon, Maxima, and Murano) based on objective facts indicative of drug trafficking. This suspicion was further supported by a prior Title III wiretap order that established probable cause for Amaya's involvement in drug trafficking, thus satisfying the lower threshold of reasonable suspicion necessary for the GPS monitoring to be lawful. Special Agent Jensen's testimony corroborates that agents had specific facts to support their reasonable suspicion regarding the vehicles in question. Agents had reasonable suspicion to install GPS devices on Amaya's vehicles based on multiple factors. Before installing the GPS on Amaya's Yukon on March 18, 2011, agents were aware of his traffic stop and his travel to Omaha to transfer money to a marijuana source. Special Agent Jensen testified that drug traffickers typically use their primary vehicle for such activities. On April 12, 2011, prior to installing a GPS on the Maxima, agents intercepted calls suggesting a large cash shipment to California, where Amaya's marijuana source was located. For the Murano, before installation on April 5, 2011, agents overheard calls indicating a secretive trip to Texas, enhancing their belief that Amaya was engaged in drug trafficking. The GPS devices were non-invasive, installed on the outside of vehicles, and powered by their own batteries. They were installed in public areas, including a driveway, a store parking lot, and during a traffic stop. The monitoring durations were deemed reasonable, with the Yukon tracked for two months, the Maxima for four months, and the Murano for one month, aligning with court precedent allowing non-invasive monitoring under reasonable suspicion. Even if the warrantless searches might violate the Fourth Amendment, under the ruling in *Davis*, the exclusionary rule would not apply. Furthermore, the prosecution admitted a discovery violation regarding the non-disclosure of GPS monitoring. In considering sanctions for this violation, factors such as government bad faith, prejudice to the defendant, and appropriateness of lesser sanctions are relevant. The prosecution's failure to inform Amaya of the GPS usage before trial had two identified causes. The prosecution did not provide the affidavit supporting the Title III wiretap application in discovery, which would have informed Amaya of the use of GPS monitoring in his case. Although the prosecution claims this omission was an inadvertent error, it is accepted without doubt. Special Agent Jensen intentionally withheld information about GPS monitoring in his reports, instead using vague language, citing a desire to protect a sensitive investigative technique and to comply with DEA policy. However, an in-camera review of the policy revealed that it allows agents to disclose the use of electronic transmitters on vehicles, contradicting Jensen’s rationale. The concealment of GPS monitoring was deemed to be in bad faith. Although Amaya did not have the opportunity to prepare a defense or file a motion to suppress GPS evidence before trial, a mistrial was granted to allow him to access this information. Amaya has since filed a motion to suppress and argued that the prosecution continues to provide vague reports regarding GPS monitoring. An evidentiary hearing was granted, allowing Amaya to investigate and cross-examine Jensen. While Amaya contends he suffered prejudice from the prosecution's actions, it is deemed modest and largely remedied. Additionally, the local drug task force has since revised its policies to prevent similar issues in the future. The court denies Angel Amaya’s Motion to Suppress evidence from GPS devices, opting not to impose the severe sanction of evidence suppression despite concerns about Special Agent Jensen's conduct, which is characterized as bad faith and has resulted in a second mistrial. A hearing on potential sanctions for the prosecution's discovery violation is scheduled for April 20, 2012, at 1:30 p.m., where the parties will discuss alternatives to evidence suppression, such as revoking the prosecution's peremptory strikes or limiting rebuttal arguments. Participation by counsel for Javier Amaya is welcome but not mandatory. Following a previous order regarding the motion to suppress, the prosecution filed a Motion to Reconsider the finding of bad faith. The hearing on sanctions was later moved to April 30, 2012, during which Special Agent Jensen testified. The judge ultimately retracted the bad faith finding, believing Jensen's omission was in line with directives from his DEA supervisors, who had instructed agents to avoid mentioning GPS devices in reports. A written order explaining this decision will follow. Special Agent Jensen has consistently prepared reports in line with DEA policy, which has been deemed somewhat ambiguous. The policy instructs agents to disclose observed information without specifying the method, while simultaneously cautioning against creating an impression of hiding evidence from defense counsel. Jensen's misunderstanding of the policy was determined to be honest rather than indicative of bad faith. The prosecution's recent Motion To Reconsider included previously unavailable testimony from Jensen indicating he utilized electronic surveillance on Amaya, supporting the assertion that he did not intend to conceal evidence. Consequently, the finding of bad faith against Jensen is retracted, and no sanctions are imposed on the prosecution for the non-disclosure of GPS device usage. Factors considered for potential sanctions, based on Eighth Circuit guidelines, included the absence of bad faith from the prosecution, limited prejudice to Amaya which has been largely addressed by a mistrial and the opportunity to file a motion to suppress, and the sufficiency of current compliance measures given that DEA policy has been updated post-United States v. Jones. The original indictment against Angel Amaya and co-defendants, involving serious drug charges, remains intact despite the other co-defendants having pleaded guilty. The prosecutor is acknowledged for his experience and adherence to procedural norms regarding motions in limine prior to trial. The prosecutor failed to inquire about the status of a motion in limine during the pre-trial conference, which resulted in a lack of awareness regarding a sealed ruling that had been emailed by the clerk's office but not received. Defendant Javier Amaya did not file a motion to suppress, and the document refers to Amaya exclusively as Angel Amaya. The parties agree that Amaya had an expectation of privacy in his Dodge Ram truck, but the prosecution stated that the GPS on the truck did not yield usable evidence. Therefore, the court will not consider evidence derived from the Dodge Ram. Amaya challenges the evidence related to the Nissan Maxima, arguing that it was located using a GPS device and searched without a warrant. However, he waived the argument about the warrantless search by not including it in his opening brief. Although Amaya was unaware of the GPS's involvement until after a second mistrial, he was already aware prior to trial that the Maxima had been searched without a warrant. The trial management order’s deadline for filing motions to suppress had passed, rendering any argument regarding the warrantless search untimely. Amaya briefly mentions a potential Brady violation concerning the prosecution's failure to disclose the GPS device usage, but he does not substantiate this claim. To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate that the suppressed evidence was favorable, material, and that the government had indeed withheld it. The defendant failed to articulate how the prosecution's non-disclosure of GPS device usage suppressed evidence favorable to him. Instead, the evidence obtained from the GPS devices seems to incriminate the defendant. The defendant claims a violation of the Jencks Act, which mandates the disclosure of witness statements related to their testimony, but this act is not pertinent to the current motion concerning GPS device usage. The defendant asserts that the GPS installation constitutes both a search and a seizure, arguing that it interfered with his possessory interest in his vehicle and that the data collected was used against him. However, he cites no legal authority to support these claims, and the referenced case, Jones, does not affirm his position. Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Jones clarifies that a seizure requires meaningful interference with property rights, which did not occur here. The success of the GPS surveillance depended on it not interfering with the vehicle's operation. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit's previous ruling that another defendant lacked standing to challenge the GPS search does not invalidate the broader context of the ruling. Although courts commonly refer to “standing” in Fourth Amendment cases, it is not a strict requirement but rather part of a substantive analysis of whether a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, as established in Rakas v. Illinois and subsequent cases. Thus, the concept of standing in this context is more about assessing rights violations than about jurisdictional barriers. A court's finding that a litigant lacks constitutional standing prevents it from addressing the merits of that litigant's claims, as established in Starr v. Mandanici. However, a determination that a defendant lacks "standing" to contest a Fourth Amendment issue does not inhibit the court's ability to examine other aspects of the defendant's challenge. The Eighth Circuit often first rules on a defendant’s standing regarding Fourth Amendment claims before addressing the substantive issues, as illustrated in Marquez and United States v. Barragan, where the courts ruled on standing before concluding there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The author expresses disagreement with the court's interpretation of compliance with appellate precedent, arguing that it undermines law enforcement's obligation to stay informed about evolving legal standards. The analysis assumes that Amaya has standing to challenge the GPS monitoring of his vehicles; however, it concludes that evidence obtained from these devices is not subject to the exclusionary rule. The installation of GPS devices on Amaya’s vehicles, whether in the driveway or over the public sidewalk, does not violate the Fourth Amendment, as individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in open areas like driveways visible to the public, supported by precedents such as United States v. Lakoskey, United States v. Reed, and United States v. Vending. The driveway and adjacent yard by the front door of Amaya's residence are deemed public spaces, lacking reasonable expectation of privacy, as established in relevant case law. Amaya's argument regarding the potential mistrial based on surveillance reports is dismissed, as he received these reports prior to his retrial. The court previously determined there was no Brady or Jencks Act violation concerning the prosecution's failure to disclose GPS tracking evidence. Even if the GPS evidence were favorable, the court concluded that any error was remedied by granting a new trial, scheduled for May 29, 2012, after GPS-related evidence was disclosed. Amaya's claim that Special Agent Jensen's surveillance reports should lead to his disqualification as a witness is rejected, as those reports were not in the prosecution's possession during the trial. The Jencks Act applies only to statements available at trial, and Amaya has already received the broadest remedy for any potential violations. The prosecution's motion indicates clarification of evidence, not additional undisclosed evidence, referencing only materials not previously revealed to the court to assess Special Agent Jensen's intent.