Norfleet v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

Citations: 796 F. Supp. 1194; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8719Docket: No. LR-C-91-745

Court: District Court, E.D. Arkansas; June 1, 1992; Federal District Court

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Taurean Norfleet died after being taken into protective custody by the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) and placed in a foster home. His death is attributed to the defendants' alleged failure to provide adequate medical care, leading to a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The DHS administers social services in Arkansas, with Richard Dietz as Director of the Division of Children and Family Services, Robert Brooks as a case worker, and Johnnie Armstrong as a certified foster parent.

The defendants filed for summary judgment on multiple grounds: 1) DHS's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; 2) qualified immunity for Dietz, Brooks, and Armstrong; 3) state law immunity for Brooks and Armstrong; and 4) lack of actionable negligence under § 1983. They also sought dismissal of claims from Aaron and Toi Norfleet for not sufficiently alleging deprivation of a constitutional right.

The case details include that on August 17, 1991, Toi Norfleet left her children with a neighbor while on a trip. Taurean, who had asthma, suffered an attack and was taken to the hospital. After treatment, he was released into DHS custody without proper medical follow-up by Brooks or Armstrong. Taurean consumed his medication without supervision and later experienced breathing difficulties, leading to a delayed emergency response. He was pronounced dead shortly after being transported to the hospital. Upon her return, Toi Norfleet could not reach the DHS for information about her son.

Ms. Norfleet sought help from the police to locate her son and spoke with a DHS worker who assured her that her son was fine and could likely be returned the next morning. Although she inquired about her son's condition after he had been treated at the hospital, she was informed she could not speak with the foster parent. Despite her discomfort, she believed she had to wait until the next day for custody or visitation, leading her to take no further action. Early the following morning, she was informed that her son had died. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants were aware of deficiencies in DHS that resulted in inadequate medical care for children in foster care. They contend that the defendants continued to operate under policies that did not ensure foster parents had the necessary medical training. Additionally, they claim that the defendants inadequately trained and supervised DHS personnel regarding Taurean’s medical needs and acted with deliberate indifference to those needs. 

The text elaborates on the standards for summary judgment under Rule 56(c), explaining that it is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate entitlement to judgment, which then shifts to the nonmovant to show a genuine issue exists. The mere presence of a factual dispute does not prevent summary judgment unless the dispute is outcome determinative. 

It is also noted that a state is not considered a "person" under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and thus cannot be sued under this statute, as established by case law, including the Eleventh Amendment, which bars federal suits against state governments. State agencies, like DHS, are included in this definition, and state officials sued in their official capacity are treated as suits against the state itself rather than the individual officials.

A suit against a state official in their official capacity for money damages is equivalent to a suit against the state itself, preventing recovery from the state treasury. However, state officials can be sued for injunctive relief under Section 1983, as these actions are not considered suits against the state. Personal liability for money damages may also apply to state officers for actions taken in their official capacities. State agencies, including the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS), cannot be sued in federal court unless sovereign immunity is waived or overridden by Congress, which has not occurred for Section 1983 claims. Consequently, claims against the DHS and against individual defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages are legally barred. Nonetheless, the court allows claims for prospective injunctive relief related to the DHS's alleged failures in foster care, as these claims are not prohibited and present disputed material facts.

Defendants Dietz, Brooks, and Armstrong assert qualified immunity for their individual actions under Section 1983, which protects officials unless they violate clearly established constitutional rights. The court may assess whether the relevant law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, determining if a reasonable official would recognize their actions as unlawful. Summary judgment is appropriate if the court concludes that even if the alleged violations occurred, the rights in question were not clearly established at the time.

A court must determine whether a legal standard governing an official’s conduct was clearly established before allowing a qualified immunity defense to proceed, as established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. If the standard is clear, the defense typically fails. Rulings denying qualified immunity are immediately appealable, and the relevant inquiry is whether, in August 1991, a reasonable official would have recognized their duty to safeguard a child removed from parental custody, specifically regarding serious medical needs under the Due Process Clause. 

This case contrasts with DeShaney v. Winnebago County, where the Supreme Court ruled that the state is not obligated to protect individuals from harm inflicted by private actors, as the Due Process Clause limits state action rather than mandates state protection from private harm. DeShaney established that the Constitution imposes affirmative duties of care only in specific circumstances. Relevant case law includes Estelle v. Gamble, which requires states to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, and Youngberg v. Romeo, which mandates states to ensure the safety and well-being of involuntarily committed individuals. The underlying principle is that when the state restricts an individual's liberty, it incurs a duty to ensure their safety and welfare.

The DeShaney decision establishes that the state's affirmative duty to protect individuals does not arise merely from its awareness of their situations or intent to assist, but rather from the state’s limitations on their liberty, such as through incarceration or institutionalization. The deprivation of liberty that triggers Due Process protections occurs when the state actively restrains an individual's ability to act independently. The Supreme Court has not recognized a broader constitutional duty of care beyond those for incarcerated individuals and involuntarily committed patients. However, lower courts have interpreted this to potentially extend to children in state-placed foster care. If the state removed a child from society and placed them in a foster home, this could create a scenario similar to incarceration, thereby imposing a constitutional duty to protect. Several appellate courts have held that the state might be liable under the Due Process Clause for failing to safeguard children in foster care from abuse. Specifically, children in state-regulated foster homes possess a due process right to personal safety, which includes not being placed with known or suspected abusers. This right was deemed clearly established as of 1986.

Judge Posner, representing the court, emphasized that the state has a constitutional duty to ensure the safety of a child once it removes them from parental custody, as per the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This responsibility is akin to the obligation not to place a criminal defendant in a harmful situation after the state has intervened on their behalf. The State of Illinois is not required to protect children from parental abuse unless it has taken custody; once it does, it assumes a basic duty of care. The judge illustrated this point with analogies, such as the fire department's obligation not to harm those it rescues and the state’s duty not to cause harm to individuals it protects from violence.

The excerpt discusses relevant case law, noting that while a right to care and protection for foster children was established in various circuits by the late 1980s, the Eighth Circuit had previously adopted a narrower view. However, subsequent cases indicated a shift away from this limitation, recognizing that the state's constitutional duty extends beyond prison-like environments. The present lawsuit meets the criteria established in earlier cases, as it involves a state-imposed restriction of a foster child's freedom and placement in a state-operated home. The court concluded that defendants were aware of the constitutional obligation to provide reasonable care and protection to children in state custody, specifically in instances of serious medical need, and therefore could not claim qualified immunity.

Defendants claim absolute immunity from section 1983 liability based on state law, citing Ark.Code Ann. 12-12-517 and 9-28-412. The court clarifies that wrongful conduct under section 1983 cannot be shielded by state law, referencing *Martinez v. California*. The defendants further argue that negligence does not constitute a deprivation of due process, supporting their position with *Davidson v. Cannon* and *Daniels v. Williams*. The court agrees with this but finds that allegations of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights are sufficient to overcome these defenses.

The defendants also seek dismissal of claims from Toi Norfleet and Aaron Norfleet based on qualified immunity and meritlessness. The court notes that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is warranted only when no facts can support the claim for relief. The court recognizes that parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship of their children, allowing Toi's claim under section 1983. However, the question of whether siblings have such a right remains unresolved, as courts differ on the matter. The court finds the law unclear on sibling claims and grants qualified immunity to the defendants regarding Aaron's claims.

The court grants summary judgment for the defendants on claims against the Department of Human Services, individual defendants in official capacities for money damages, and negligence claims. Summary judgment is also granted for Aaron Norfleet's claims. A cause of action under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 is dismissed, as the Supreme Court ruled in *Suter v. Artist M.* that the Act does not provide an implied right of action under section 1983. The court notes differing interpretations of when constitutional rights were clearly established regarding personal safety in foster homes, concluding that the law in this area was not clearly established at the time of the incidents in question.