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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Gard Corp.

Citations: 795 F. Supp. 1070; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11867; 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1247Docket: Civ. A. No. 92-2023-L

Court: District Court, D. Kansas; July 29, 1992; Federal District Court

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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) initiated an employment discrimination lawsuit against Gard Corporation on behalf of Wilhelmine Bailey and other African-American individuals who were allegedly denied permanent employment based on race. These individuals were temporary employees obtained through an agency, and they were not offered permanent positions like their white counterparts. Gard subsequently filed a third-party complaint against the employment agency, Tall Services, Inc. d/b/a Uniforce Temporary Services, seeking indemnity if found liable for discrimination. Uniforce moved to dismiss this third-party complaint, citing failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The court granted Uniforce's motion to dismiss, emphasizing that a claim cannot be dismissed unless it is clear that no facts could support recovery. The court noted that pleadings are liberally interpreted in favor of the plaintiff and that the determination does not hinge on the likelihood of prevailing but on the right to present evidence. Under Rule 14(a), a third party cannot be impleaded solely based on potential liability to the plaintiff; there must be a direct claim by the defendant against the third party. Gard's claim against Uniforce was characterized as one for contribution or indemnity, which requires demonstrating a right to such claims in Title VII cases. However, the Supreme Court's decision in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America established that no statutory or common law right to contribution exists under Title VII, a principle that extends to indemnity claims as well.

The court ruled that Gard is not entitled to contribution or indemnification from Uniforce in relation to the EEOC's Title VII lawsuit against Gard. This decision was influenced by the precedent set in Northwest and the dismissal of a similar third-party complaint in Germann v. Pekow. Consequently, the court granted Uniforce's motion to dismiss Gard's third-party claim with prejudice. The court clarified that under Rule 14(a), although a defendant can implead a third party who may be liable for part of the plaintiff's claim, there was no contractual basis for contribution or indemnification between Gard and Uniforce. Gard's assertion that both parties could be considered 'joint employers' responsible for discrimination did not alter the court's decision, as the ability of the EEOC to pursue action against Uniforce is not a matter Gard can determine.