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Ortega-Melendres v. Arpaio
Citations: 836 F. Supp. 2d 959; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148223; 2011 WL 6740711Docket: No. CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS
Court: District Court, D. Arizona; December 22, 2011; Federal District Court
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is partially granted and partially denied. Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment regarding Equal Protection claims is denied, while their motion for summary judgment on Fourth Amendment claims is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is granted, and Defendants’ motion for leave to file a sur-reply is dismissed as moot. The case involves a putative class action civil rights suit against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), alleging racial profiling and unlawful stops without reasonable suspicion, violating the Fourteenth and Fourth Amendments. MCSO had previously been certified to enforce federal immigration law under an agreement with the Department of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which was modified in October 2009 to limit enforcement authority to jails only. Plaintiffs assert that MCSO officers, under the pretext of enforcing immigration laws, engage in racial profiling against Latinos. The five named Plaintiffs report being stopped during incidents from September 2007 to March 2008. Additionally, the nonprofit Somos America claims harm from MCSO's alleged policies. The complaint includes violations of the Equal Protection Clause, Fourth Amendment, Arizona's search and seizure protections, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 concerning race discrimination in federally funded programs. Plaintiffs are seeking class certification for all Latino individuals who, since January 2007, have been or will be stopped, detained, questioned, or searched by MCSO agents while in vehicles on public roadways or parking areas in Maricopa County, Arizona. They are requesting equitable relief, including a declaratory judgment, an injunction against the Defendant, attorneys’ fees, and additional relief deemed appropriate by the Court. In response, Defendants have filed for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing for future injury claims, asserting that traffic stops of the named Plaintiffs were lawful under probable cause, and claiming there is no evidence of intentional discrimination, thereby contesting the Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI claims. Plaintiffs are also seeking summary judgment on two specific claims and the proposed class certification. The legal background references the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which governs immigration and naturalization through both criminal and civil provisions. It is noted that while entering or remaining unlawfully in the U.S. is a crime, mere unauthorized presence is treated as a civil violation, and deportation proceedings are civil actions to determine eligibility to stay in the country. The Supreme Court has clarified that no federal law specifically criminalizes simple presence without legal authority, and this legal standing remains unchanged by prior rulings. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a state trooper did not commit an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment that would necessitate the exclusionary rule in a civil case. The court clarified that reasonable officers could misinterpret prior case law, but neither Lopez-Mendoza nor Martinez v. Nygaard suggested that an alien's unauthorized presence in the U.S. constitutes a crime. The court reaffirmed that an alien overstaying a visa is subject to civil violation, not criminal prosecution. Law enforcement must adhere to the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring probable cause for arrests. Probable cause exists when trustworthy information would lead a prudent person to believe a crime was being committed. In urgent situations, officers may conduct brief investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Vehicle stops are similar to Terry stops and can be made based on reasonable suspicion. Federal ICE officers have the authority to enforce immigration laws, including stopping vehicles if they have specific facts suggesting that occupants may be illegally present. Reasonable suspicion for such stops relies on the totality of the circumstances. A border patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to stop a minivan based on several factors: the vehicle turned onto a dirt road known for smuggling, it slowed down upon seeing the officer, the children in the back were waving in a mechanical manner, and they appeared to have cargo concealed beneath their knees. However, the officer's reliance on generalizations, such as Hispanic appearance, is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion as it risks implicating innocent individuals. While inability to speak English can indicate immigration status, it alone doesn't provide reasonable suspicion without additional factors. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that various benign characteristics do not collectively establish reasonable suspicion for immigration stops. Local law enforcement officers certified under section 287(g) can act as immigration officers in investigating and detaining unauthorized aliens but do not possess inherent authority to investigate civil immigration violations. Following the loss of 287(g) authority by MCSO after October 16, 2009, its officers can only enforce federal criminal laws or state laws not subject to injunction. Non-287(g) officers are not prohibited from enforcing federal criminal law, including criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). They can detain individuals suspected of criminal immigration violations, but mere knowledge of an alien's illegal status does not suffice for reasonable belief of a criminal violation. The Ninth Circuit confirmed that an alien's admission of illegal presence alone does not establish probable cause. Consequently, MCSO officers, lacking 287(g) certification, cannot investigate civil immigration violations, and any seizure without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity would violate the Fourth Amendment. Local law enforcement may still enforce state laws, including enforceable immigration-related state laws. Arizona has enacted several state laws addressing immigration issues due to concerns about illegal immigration, drug and human trafficking, and perceived federal inaction. Among these is Senate Bill (SB) 1070, where certain provisions have been enjoined while others remain active. Valid portions permit local law enforcement to report individuals convicted of state crimes to federal authorities for immigration status verification (A.R.S. 11-1051(C)). A new offense is created for individuals who transport unauthorized aliens if they recklessly disregard the alien's illegal status (A.R.S. 13-2929(A)(1)). However, only federal officers or authorized law enforcement can determine an alien’s immigration status (A.R.S. 13-2929(D)(1)), limiting local enforcement capabilities. Additionally, the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007 allows suspension or revocation of business licenses for employers knowingly hiring unauthorized workers (A.R.S. 23-211, 212). This law, upheld by the Supreme Court, includes a process for individuals to lodge complaints with the Attorney General, who investigates before any license revocation occurs (A.R.S. 23-212). Notably, the law does not penalize employees and exempts independent contractors from its definition of 'employee' (A.R.S. 23-211(3)(b)). Since 2005, human smuggling has been a state crime (A.R.S. 13-2319). The statute prohibits intentionally engaging in human smuggling for profit (A.R.S. 13-2319(A)) and defines it as transporting individuals knowing they are in the country illegally (A.R.S. 13-2319(F)(3)). To be guilty, one must transport or harbor a person while knowing their illegal status and do so for profit. If a driver is unaware of a passenger's illegal status or if the transport is not for profit, no offense is committed. Crossing the international border at an unauthorized location constitutes a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. However, this does not equate to violating Arizona's human smuggling statute (A.R.S. § 13-2319) unless specific elements are satisfied. Law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion that human smuggling is occurring to initiate a brief investigatory stop. This suspicion must demonstrate that (1) a person is being transported or harbored, (2) by someone who knows or should know that the person is illegally present in the U.S., and (3) that this transport or harboring is for profit or a commercial purpose. Merely suspecting or knowing that a passenger is illegally present does not establish reasonable suspicion of smuggling. Moreover, a passenger's illegal status alone does not indicate that the driver is transporting them for profit. Knowledge of illegal presence is insufficient for establishing probable cause regarding a smuggling violation. A minor traffic infraction can provide probable cause for stopping a vehicle, and the officers' ulterior motives for investigating another crime do not negate the legal justification for the initial stop. However, this does not grant officers unlimited authority to detain passengers for unrelated offenses, as there must be a clear justification for the detention. Any detention under the Fourth Amendment must be appropriately tailored to its purpose, meaning that questioning should not unreasonably prolong the stop. Officers may question a driver about unrelated matters as long as it does not extend the duration of the stop. If questioning does not yield probable cause for arrest, the officer must release the detainee. Passengers are considered 'seized' based on the reasonable suspicion justifying the stop, without the need for further evidence of their involvement in criminal activity. An officer must have specific suspicion related to a passenger to conduct a search or interrogation beyond the initial reason for a stop, such as reasonable suspicion that the passenger is armed and dangerous. Local law enforcement cannot detain passengers solely on the basis of knowing they may not be lawfully in the U.S., as this does not constitute reasonable suspicion of a violation of enforceable law, even if the vehicle is stopped for valid reasons like a traffic violation. Defendants argue that reasonable suspicion of one element of a crime allows an officer to investigate further. Ninth Circuit precedents suggest that probable cause does not require evidence for every element of an offense, but officers must still have an objectively reasonable belief that a crime has occurred. For example, finding photographs of nude children does not necessitate probable cause that they meet the strict definition of child pornography to justify further searches. However, even with some crimes, mere admission of illegal presence does not alone provide probable cause for illegal entry. To justify a Terry stop, reasonable suspicion that a crime is imminent is essential, and a lack of satisfaction of necessary crime elements negates the commission of a crime. A prosecutor must demonstrate all essential elements of guilt for a conviction. If circumstances do not establish reasonable suspicion, the officer cannot initiate a stop, and they cannot use a stop to gather the suspicion necessary to justify it, emphasizing the need for specificity in law enforcement actions as mandated by Fourth Amendment principles. Defendants reference several cases, including U.S. v. Cortez and Scarbrough v. Myles, to support their arguments regarding the legality of stops and frisks by law enforcement. In Cortez, federal immigration officers conducted a lawful stop based on reasonable suspicion of immigration violations, clarifying that criminal elements do not need to be satisfied in such cases. Scarbrough established that an officer could have 'arguable probable cause' for qualified immunity, but it does not imply that a Terry stop can occur without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Believing someone is not legally authorized to be in the U.S. is insufficient for reasonable suspicion under state human smuggling laws, as affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Without reasonable suspicion, officers lack the authority to detain individuals under Terry. The excerpt also details the legal standard for summary judgment, stating it is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists, as defined by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party must demonstrate the absence of such a dispute, after which the nonmoving party must provide specific facts to show a genuine issue for trial. The excerpt emphasizes that affidavits must be based on personal knowledge and that uncorroborated self-serving testimony is insufficient to establish a genuine issue. Additionally, a plaintiff cannot seek injunctive relief without demonstrating ongoing adverse effects. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate a "sufficient likelihood" of being harmed again in a similar manner, as established in Lyons. However, standing is not granted if the plaintiff's injury is contingent on illegal conduct. Plaintiffs cannot enjoin police actions if they can avoid harm by following the law. To obtain an injunction related to Fourth Amendment violations, plaintiffs must genuinely question the likelihood of being unlawfully seized, beyond claims of discriminatory practices in traffic stops. In this case, the defendants' claims regarding their authority to stop individuals for suspected human smuggling provide sufficient grounds for the plaintiffs to have standing, as the MCSO concedes it cannot enforce federal immigration laws but claims authority under Arizona's human smuggling statute. Defendants argue that reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence allows for brief detention; however, mere unlawful presence does not equate to reasonable suspicion of human smuggling. The assertion that state or federal laws permit detention based solely on unlawful presence is legally incorrect. Although the likelihood of a specific plaintiff being stopped again may be low, the MCSO's policy of detaining individuals without reasonable suspicion constitutes an ongoing harm and indicates a likelihood of future violations of rights. The authority of certain MCSO officers to enforce federal immigration law has been revoked, further complicating their claims. Prior case law indicates that victims of police misconduct can seek injunctions if they show that officials authorized such conduct. MCSO asserts that its officers are authorized to stop individuals based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause regarding their immigration status, which supports the named Plaintiffs' standing to seek injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs claim that this assertion is legally incorrect, entitling them to partial summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims if Defendants detain individuals without reasonable suspicion of violating state human smuggling laws. Defendants do not need an injunction against enforcing federal civil immigration law, as they admit they lack such authority. To obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm without relief, a favorable balance of equities, and that the injunction serves the public interest. The loss of constitutional rights constitutes irreparable injury, and both the balance of equities and the public interest favor upholding the Fourth Amendment rights of class members, making injunctive relief appropriate. In the case of Ortega-Melendres, MCSO conducted an undercover operation at a church where day laborers sought work, finding no evidence of forced labor or human smuggling. Subsequently, MCSO stopped a vehicle that had picked up laborers from the church, where Ortega-Melendres was a passenger. Deputy DiPietro, involved in the operation, followed the vehicle and pulled it over for speeding. He developed reasonable suspicion based on his belief that the passengers were illegal day laborers, although he was unsure if they had violated state laws or were involved in human smuggling. Criminal activity was suspected in a parking lot, prompting Deputy DiPietro to summon Deputy Rangel, who was 287(g) certified and fluent in Spanish, to investigate the immigration status of truck passengers, including Ortega-Melendres. While both parties agree Ortega-Melendres provided his tourist visa, there is a dispute regarding whether he also provided his I-94 form. The vehicle's driver received a warning instead of a ticket and, after 15 to 21 minutes of questioning, Ortega-Melendres and the other passengers were detained for approximately two hours at an MCSO substation before being taken to an ICE office for an additional six hours, ultimately leading to Ortega-Melendres's release. There is uncertainty regarding whether the initial observing officers were certified under the 287(g) program. If they were, they required reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, which must be based on facts and reasonable inferences. Defendants argue that ICE training permits the use of race as one factor in establishing reasonable suspicion, but the Ninth Circuit has held that Hispanic appearance alone is insufficient for determining which individuals to stop. The court acknowledges that while racial or ethnic appearance can be a factor if a specific suspect is identified, there was no evidence that Ortega-Melendres matched any description of a suspect prior to the stop. His appearance and attire, as well as his behavior in a known day laborer area, were deemed insufficient for establishing reasonable suspicion. The HSU officers did not stop the vehicle but requested Deputy DiPietro to do so. He initiated the stop for a traffic violation without the claim centering on the probable cause for the initial stop. DiPietro acknowledged dismissing a driver but called Deputy Rangel to check the immigration status of the vehicle's passengers due to reasonable suspicion that they were illegal day laborers. Defendants initially conceded that DiPietro had no basis to believe any passengers had violated criminal law. However, in supplemental briefings, they claimed he had reasonable suspicion that Ortega-Melendres was violating a human smuggling statute and conspiring to smuggle himself. Despite this assertion, there is no evidence indicating reasonable suspicion of any other federal or state crime, as previous investigations revealed no evidence of human smuggling or related activities. DiPietro's vague assertion that a church might have been involved in criminal activity was deemed insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion against Ortega-Melendres. Although the stop itself was justified under Whren, questioning the driver must not exceed the limits of reasonable suspicion; if no probable cause arises from the detainee's responses, he must be released. The Defendants contended that making traffic stops to verify immigration status was permissible under Arizona law, but cited a deposition stating that officers must have a legal basis for detaining someone on state charges before calling a federal officer to check immigration status. MCSO lacked a legal basis under state criminal law to detain Ortega-Melendres and the other passengers while Deputy DiPietro called Deputy Rangel, and to continue detaining Ortega-Melendres after the driver was permitted to leave. Passengers in a stopped vehicle are considered seized under the Fourth Amendment and can challenge the stop. While there was probable cause to stop the driver for a minor vehicular offense, DiPietro had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain the passengers. His suspicion that they might be in the country without authorization does not suffice unless it is reasonable under his authority as a 287(g) certified officer. Material facts regarding the driver’s provision of information about Ortega-Melendres’ legal status and whether Ortega-Melendres verified his status to Deputy Rangel remain disputed. Thus, summary judgment in favor of Ortega-Melendres is warranted to prohibit MCSO from detaining individuals without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, summary judgment on Ortega-Melendres's underlying claims is premature. In claims involving plaintiffs Jessika and David Rodriguez, they were stopped by Deputy Matthew Rateliffe for driving on a closed road, despite their assertion that they could not see the "Road Closed" sign. While there is disagreement over whether Deputy Rateliffe requested a social security card, he issued a citation to them. The deputy had probable cause for the stop, regardless of the Rodriguezes' claim about visibility of the sign. For the purpose of the defendants' summary judgment motion, it is accepted that Deputy Rateliffe asked for a social security card, and that such a request may not be standard practice for MCSO during traffic stops. However, the presence of probable cause for the traffic stop remains critical. The officer's deviation from standard police practices is not relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis, as established in Whren v. United States. The MCSO's Arizona Traffic Ticket and Complaint form includes a section for a suspect's social security number, and a social security card is a recognized document for verification. The plaintiffs have not provided evidence that Deputy Ratcliffe's request for the card extended the duration of the Rodriguez stop. Their assertion of selective enforcement in stopping their vehicle is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment considerations. Additionally, the claim of Deputy Ratcliffe following the vehicle post-summons does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, since individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their movements on public roads, as noted in U.S. v. Knotts. Consequently, partial summary judgment is granted in favor of the Rodriguezes, preventing MCSO from detaining individuals without reasonable suspicion of a crime. However, summary judgment is granted to the defendants on the remaining claims. In the case of plaintiffs Manuel Nieto and Velia Meraz, on March 28, 2008, they encountered MCSO Deputy Charley Armendaris while he was conducting a traffic stop. There is a disagreement between the parties regarding the specifics of the encounter, but it is agreed that Deputy Armendaris ordered them to leave and called for backup. By the time backup arrived, Nieto and Meraz had left the area and were subsequently pursued by backup officers into a nearby auto repair shop's parking lot. Disputes exist over the actions of both the officers and the plaintiffs during this encounter, particularly regarding the forcible removal of Nieto from the vehicle and the legality of the stop. Given the material facts in dispute, summary judgment on Nieto and Meraz’s claims is deemed inappropriate, as differing accounts exist about the initial stop and the officers' justification for their actions. Partial summary judgment is granted in favor of Nieto and Meraz, specifically preventing MCSO from detaining individuals for further investigation without reasonable suspicion of a crime. However, summary judgment for either party on the underlying claims is deemed inappropriate at this time. For the discrimination claims (Counts One and Four), plaintiffs must demonstrate a "sufficient likelihood" of future violations of their Equal Protection rights to seek injunctive relief. Established case law supports that racially discriminatory law enforcement policies constitute ongoing harm, thus providing standing for injunctions. To succeed on Equal Protection claims, plaintiffs must show both a discriminatory effect and a discriminatory purpose behind law enforcement policies. While official actions resulting in racial disparities are not unconstitutional solely due to their impact, intentional discrimination must be proven under Title VI. Discriminatory intent can be inferred if a policy is partly based on explicit racial characteristics. Frequent stops of minorities may indicate a discriminatory policy, yet a single discriminatory stop is insufficient for standing. Evidence presented suggests that MCSO racially profiles Latinos, supported by public statements from Sheriff Arpaio that could be interpreted as endorsing racial profiling and a lack of training aimed at preventing such profiling. Sheriff Arpaio maintains a file of letters and news clippings that support racial profiling, including sentiments expressing that stopping individuals based on their ethnicity is not racist. Some individuals expressed that profiling, including targeting Mexicans, is justified due to the presence of illegal immigrants. Arpaio personally thanked several authors of these sentiments and highlighted pro-profiling letters from local newspapers. Additionally, he made derogatory comments about Judge Mary Murguia, suggesting her rulings were influenced by monetary favors. The evidence indicates that the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) conducted operations in response to citizen requests targeting areas where Latinos were reported to congregate, despite no evidence of criminal activity. These requests were often forwarded by Arpaio with notes indicating they were for operational planning. MCSO's operations appeared to be based on racial characteristics rather than actual crimes. Furthermore, MCSO officers were found to have circulated emails that dehumanized Mexicans and perpetuated negative stereotypes. The cumulative evidence suggests that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that MCSO engaged in a policy of racial discrimination, with both discriminatory intent and effect. While the defendants challenge the plaintiffs' expert report on discriminatory effects, they have not adequately demonstrated that no reasonable fact finder could support it. If it is determined that MCSO's operations were based solely on racial characteristics from citizen complaints, this would substantiate claims of intentional discrimination. Private biases are not actionable under the law, but the law cannot endorse them either. Actions taken by municipal officials in response to community biases may violate the Equal Protection Clause if racial animus is a significant factor. The law does not allow majoritarian morality to justify discriminatory laws against suspect classes. If evidence suggests that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) operated based on biased citizen complaints, even after losing their 287(g) authority, it raises concerns about racial profiling. Plaintiffs may be subject to scrutiny based on their appearance or language, despite not having been stopped again during litigation, which does not negate their right to seek injunctive relief. Past cases indicate that a single instance of being stopped is insufficient to establish a pattern of profiling unless supported by broader evidence of a policy. Here, Plaintiffs have shown sufficient evidence of an alleged racial profiling policy, indicating a likelihood of ongoing harm. This grants them standing for their Equal Protection claims, making it unnecessary to determine the standing of other parties involved, such as Somos America. The existence of a genuine issue regarding MCSO's profiling policy prevents the court from ruling in favor of the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Claims One and Four. However, the Defendants assert that their operations are driven by multiple criteria, including crime data, rather than solely by race or citizen complaints. MCSO deputies’ deposition statements regarding alternate reasons for operations cannot singularly justify summary judgment in their favor. The intent to discriminate is crucial for establishing an equal protection violation, making the officers' states of mind pertinent to Claims One and Four. Officers' claims about their intent present material fact issues that challenge Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. For instance, Lieutenant Sousa cited citizen complaints about street behavior and littering as factors for conducting operations at a specific church, despite those complaints lacking descriptions of criminal activity. Analyzing whether MCSO's actions were influenced by potentially racially discriminatory citizen complaints requires careful examination of available circumstantial and direct evidence, which is best suited for trial rather than summary judgment. Regarding class certification, plaintiffs seek to certify their claims under Rule 23(a) requirements: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation, alongside one of the Rule 23(b) conditions for class actions. The burden of proof for meeting these standards lies with the party seeking certification, and the trial court must perform a rigorous analysis to verify compliance. Defendants argue against certification, claiming that the plaintiffs lack standing for injunctive relief and that their legal claims are insufficient. However, named plaintiffs have demonstrated standing for injunctive relief related to Search and Seizure claims, as MCSO has indicated a policy of stopping individuals based on suspected immigration status, and for Equal Protection claims due to evidence of racial profiling practices. If plaintiffs are later found to lack standing for any claim, class decertification may occur. Defendants acknowledge that the proposed class by Plaintiffs is numerically sufficient but contest the demonstration of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation as required by Rule 23. They assert that the class does not meet the standards for certification under Rule 23(b)(3) and argue that it is overly broad. For commonality, it is not necessary for class members to have experienced the same legal violation but rather to share a common contention, such as claims of discriminatory bias from the same supervisor. Despite differing individual circumstances, Plaintiffs allege that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) has a racial profiling policy violating the Fourteenth Amendment, leading to detentions without reasonable suspicion, thus violating the Fourth Amendment. Commonality is established in civil rights cases challenging systemic practices affecting all class members. Differences in motivations among officers do not undermine typicality, which is assessed based on the nature of the claims rather than specific facts or relief sought. Defendants argue that unique defenses exist due to some officers acting under 287(g) of the INA; however, acting under federal authority does not excuse constitutional violations. Since no MCSO officer has held 287(g) authority since October 2009, this defense is moot, especially as Plaintiffs seek only prospective relief. MCSO acknowledges its belief in the legal authority to briefly detain individuals based on reasonable suspicion of unauthorized status in the country. Plaintiffs assert that their claims regarding unconstitutional practices or policies by MCSO are representative of the class members' claims. Adequate representation is established if the named plaintiffs vigorously pursue the action without conflicts of interest. Defendants argue that a conflict exists due to the named plaintiffs lacking standing and failing to substantiate their Fourth Amendment and intentional discrimination claims. However, these arguments are deemed meritless, as the failure of the Rodriguezes' Fourth Amendment claim does not create a conflict with the class members, who share similar grievances against MCSO's authority. Plaintiffs have satisfied the criteria under Rule 23(a) for class certification and may seek certification under Rule 23(b)(2), which allows for relief through a single injunction or declaratory judgment applicable to all class members. Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), Rule 23(b)(2) does not require common issues to predominate; it only necessitates that the class members share a common pattern or practice of alleged wrongdoing. Even if some members have not been harmed, a class can still be appropriate. Defendants contest the class's breadth, citing concerns about protecting absent class members. Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) does not require individual notice or opt-out opportunities, raising potential issues for individuals unaware of the case. However, the equitable relief sought in Counts One and Four mitigates these concerns, as precise class definitions are generally unnecessary. In Rule 23(b)(2) actions, adequate representation typically suffices to protect the due process rights of absent members. The Fourth Amendment class raises overbreadth issues that are not present in the Equal Protection class, necessitating careful consideration of the preclusive effects of the class action. A class action seeking only declaratory and injunctive relief does not prevent class members from later pursuing individual damage claims based on the same events. However, in this case, Ortega-Melendres initially sought damages alongside injunctive relief but later removed his damage claims. As class members cannot opt-out of a 23(b)(2) class, individuals with potential damage claims against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) might face challenges due to the possibility of res judicata stemming from the class action. No other class member sought damages in this case. The Ninth Circuit has established that class notice, rather than the original complaint, determines whether a 23(b)(2) class action bars subsequent damage claims. In earlier rulings, inadequate notice did not preclude later monetary claims, emphasizing that class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) do not block future damage claims if participants were not informed that their involvement would impede individual actions. Currently, this class is certified under Rule 23(b)(2) without any damage claims being sought, allowing for future damage claims against MCSO or its officers. The class definition, which includes future members and is based on defendants' activities, is deemed appropriate for certification. The proposed class encompasses all Latino individuals who have been or will be stopped or searched by MCSO agents since January 2007. The court retains the authority to modify class definitions as circumstances evolve. The motion for a sur-reply from defendants is dismissed as moot since the plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motion was denied. Furthermore, MCSO's justification for detaining Ortega-Melendres relied on a now-defunct officer's federal certification status, and states lack inherent authority to enforce civil provisions of federal immigration law. Hence, the certified class is entitled to injunctive relief against detaining individuals solely based on knowledge of their immigration status without additional probable cause. The Court clarifies that it is not prohibiting the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) from enforcing valid state laws or detaining individuals based on reasonable suspicion of state law violations. However, MCSO is enjoined from violating federal constitutional rights while enforcing state law due to misunderstandings of the law. Detaining individuals without reasonable suspicion of a crime, or based solely on knowledge of their unlawful presence in the U.S., constitutes "continuing, present adverse effects" warranting injunctive relief. MCSO can investigate federal and state laws, including immigration, but must have reasonable suspicion or probable cause of a violation to detain individuals. Plaintiffs are granted partial summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims regarding MCSO's authority to detain based on mere knowledge of unlawful presence, which may cause future harm. However, material factual questions regarding the justification of specific stops prevent summary judgment on those claims. The stop of the Rodriguezes was justified by probable cause and not prolonged, leading to partial summary judgment for Defendants on their search and seizure claims. Plaintiffs have raised genuine issues of fact concerning potential race-based policies by MCSO, allowing them to pursue equitable relief for equal protection claims, which are not subject to dismissal. The determination of intentional discrimination requires credibility assessments best suited for trial, thus preventing summary judgment on those claims. Plaintiffs successfully meet the criteria for class certification under Rule 23, resulting in the litigation being certified as a class action with a defined class. All Latino individuals in Maricopa County, Arizona, who have been or will be stopped, detained, questioned, or searched by MCSO agents on public roadways or parking areas since January 2007 are included in a defined class for an equal protection claim. The court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, thus rendering Defendants' Motion to File a SurReply moot. MCSO recognizes that while enforcing immigration law is a purpose of its operations, local law enforcement cannot enforce civil federal immigration law. Defendants are prohibited from detaining individuals solely to investigate civil violations of federal immigration law or based solely on knowledge that an individual is not a legal resident. The court's orders include: 1) Granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; dismissing claims related to Plaintiffs Jessika and David Rodriguez but denying for Melendres, Nieto, and Meraz. 2) Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification. 3) Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Claims One and Four. 4) Partially granting and denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Claims Two and Three concerning future MCSO actions. 5) Dismissing Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply as moot. 6) Enjoining MCSO from detaining individuals based on mere knowledge or reasonable belief of unlawful presence in the U.S. Additionally, the court noted that it is a crime for individuals previously denied entry to be present in the U.S. without consent from the Attorney General. The Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari to review related provisions of SB 1070, but has not been asked to determine state enforcement authority over civil provisions of immigration law. At oral argument, Defendants acknowledged they lacked the authority to enforce federal civil immigration law, while Plaintiffs claimed that local law enforcement does not possess inherent authority to enforce federal criminal immigration law, contradicting their reliance on the Gonzales case without providing supporting authority. The Tenth Circuit determined that probable cause exists for officers to suspect unauthorized border crossing when a vehicle is legally stopped, the driver lacks a valid license, and both the driver and passenger admit to being in the country unlawfully while indicating they are coming from Mexico (U.S. v. Santana-Garcia). Arizona's SB 1070 includes provisions that prohibit stopping vehicles to hire or pick up passengers for work if it blocks traffic, yet these provisions' enforcement status remains uncertain. The district court upheld these provisions, referencing a Ninth Circuit ruling against a similar ordinance in Redondo Beach, which was later overturned by an en banc decision that declared the ordinance unconstitutional as it restricted protected First Amendment activities (Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach). Consequently, it is unclear whether local law enforcement can enforce specific Arizona Revised Statutes concerning traffic stops. Additionally, a preliminary injunction is sought against these statutes based on the en banc ruling. Separately, a lawsuit challenges the policy of detaining non-smuggler migrants for self-transportation (We Are America/Somos America v. Maricopa Cty. Bd. of Supervisors). The court assumes, without ruling, that those smuggled may be prosecuted for conspiring to smuggle themselves. Defendants' use of Muehler v. Mena to support their argument regarding traffic violations providing probable cause is rejected, as Muehler involved a search warrant context, not a traffic stop. The Fourth Circuit has stated that limited requests for passenger identification during a lawful traffic stop do not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure. U.S. v. Soriano-Jarquin clarifies that standards for conducting a frisk are not pertinent to this case. Arizona's employer sanctions law does not impose penalties on employees and specifically excludes independent contractors from the definition of "employee" (referencing A.R.S. 23-211, 212, 212.01). The defendants failed to justify why Deputy DiPietro did not also detain the driver under the human smuggling statute when detaining Ortega-Melendres. They asserted, based on Martinez-Medina, that DiPietro could reasonably believe unauthorized presence in the U.S. is a crime; however, this belief is relevant only for assessing his qualified immunity in a damages suit. The determination of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation is objective, as established in Whren, which indicates that the motivations of officers do not influence the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops. Additionally, the class certified in International Molders included all individuals of Hispanic or Latin American descent in the San Francisco District Office and Livermore Border Patrol Sector who have been or may be affected by INS and Border Patrol operations at workplaces.