Swinney v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc.

Citations: 829 F. Supp. 2d 1358; 2011 WL 5434265; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128819Docket: Civil Action File No: 1:09-CV-0585-JEC

Court: District Court, N.D. Georgia; November 7, 2011; Federal District Court

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Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment was partially granted and partially denied, while their Objection to the Affidavit of Harry Edmondson was sustained. The case stems from a June 2008 accident on I-285, resulting in the death of Michael Swinney, whose surviving spouse is the plaintiff. Defendant Allen Ledford, a truck driver for Schneider National Carriers, is alleged to have caused the accident. The case was removed from state court based on diversity jurisdiction.

Key facts include that Swinney's car broke down in the right lane before 4:00 a.m., was visible for at least 250 feet, and was struck by Ledford's truck. Following the impact, Swinney was either hit by Ledford's truck or his own moving car, resulting in multiple injuries from being run over by other vehicles. Ledford initially misrepresented events but later admitted he didn't see the stopped vehicle due to distraction. Witness testimony suggested Ledford was weaving between lanes, possibly indicating he was dozing off.

A central issue is whether Swinney was standing in front of his car at the time of the collision. Plaintiff's expert, Harry Edmondson, asserts that the damage to the car indicates Swinney was in front and that he was propelled into the windshield upon impact, subsequently rolling onto the roadway. However, none of the investigating officers could confirm Edmondson's conclusions.

Investigating Officer Harper believes that Ledford’s truck ran over Swinney’s body, causing significant injury. The Georgia State Patrol's crash reconstruction team was unable to determine Swinney's exact position during the accident or the cause of his death, which could have resulted from impact with his own vehicle, Ledford's truck, or another vehicle. An autopsy found alcohol and cocaine in Swinney's system, with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.12 grams, exceeding the legal limit of 0.08 grams. Swinney’s wife indicated he had attended a party the night before and was late for work. However, there is no evidence linking the substances in his system to the accident. The plaintiff alleges that Ledford’s negligent driving caused Swinney’s death and has filed a negligence claim against both Ledford and his employer, Schneider, seeking damages for wrongful death, pain and suffering, and pre-impact fright and shock. 

The defendants have objected to the expert testimony of Harry Edmondson and filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, arguing that without Edmondson’s testimony, there is insufficient evidence to establish proximate cause, a critical element of the negligence claim. They also seek partial summary judgment on pre-impact damages and Swinney's potential negligence per se. Regarding Edmondson's testimony, the defendants argue it should be excluded under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires that expert testimony be competent, reliable, and assist in understanding the evidence. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that Edmondson's opinion meets these criteria. The district court's role is limited to ensuring the basic requirements of Rule 702 are met, without determining the ultimate persuasiveness of the testimony.

Vigorous cross-examination, opposing evidence, and clear instructions on the burden of proof are established methods for challenging questionable expert testimony. The court recognizes A. Edmondson's qualifications as an expert due to his mechanical engineering degree from Georgia Tech and 40 years of professional engineering experience, particularly in forensic engineering and accident reconstruction. However, the court finds Edmondson's opinions unreliable. The court's role as a "gatekeeper" is to prevent the admission of speculative testimony, guided by the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Daubert, which include the testability of methodology, peer review, error rates, and general acceptance in the scientific community. In this case, Edmondson fails to present a discernible methodology for his opinions, as his affidavit does not clarify the specific testing or evidence used to form his conclusions. His statements appear to be mere assumptions about the accident without factual support. Additionally, his engineering report lacks objective data or testing to substantiate claims regarding the damage to the vehicle or its correlation to the accident. The plaintiff's assertion that Edmondson's general experience in accident reconstruction suffices for reliability is insufficient without a clear explanation of how that experience applies to this case. Consequently, Edmondson's testimony does not meet the standards under Rule 702.

The trial court rejected the plaintiff's argument to admit expert testimony from Edmondson, emphasizing that the court's role involves more than accepting an expert's assertions without scrutiny. The plaintiff failed to establish the reliability of Edmondson's opinions or provide sufficient justification for bypassing the defendants' objections based on their inability to depose him. The record indicated that the defendants were hindered in scheduling Edmondson's deposition due to the plaintiff's cancellations and lack of alternative dates. Even if the defendants had missed an opportunity to depose Edmondson, the plaintiff still bore the burden of proving the reliability of his testimony under Rule 702. Citing case law, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not meet this burden, resulting in the exclusion of Edmondson's testimony.

In addressing the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court outlined that summary judgment is warranted when there are no genuine disputes over material facts, with the movant required to demonstrate the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's claims. The plaintiff must then present specific facts to show a genuine issue for trial. The court reiterated that a failure to prove an essential element of the case renders other factual disputes irrelevant.

The court must evaluate evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but a mere factual dispute does not prevent summary judgment unless there is a genuine issue of material fact. To succeed in a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove that the defendants had a legal duty to prevent unreasonable harm, breached that duty, and caused the resulting damages. Causation, along with assumption of risk and comparative negligence, is typically a jury issue. A driver is expected to exercise reasonable caution, which includes maintaining a diligent lookout. Evidence suggests that Ledford may have breached this duty by swerving or dozing off while driving and not focusing on the road. The defendants acknowledge there is a factual question regarding these elements of negligence.

Regarding causation, evidence indicates a connection between Ledford's conduct and Swinney's death. Although no blood was found on Ledford’s truck, a piece of Swinney’s clothing was located near the truck, leading an officer to conclude that the truck likely struck Swinney. Additionally, there is evidence that another driver, White, who was behind Ledford, hit Swinney's body, supporting the inference that Ledford’s truck made contact first. The defendants did not provide convincing alternative explanations for these facts. Previous cases cited by defendants in support of summary judgment are not applicable here, as those lacked evidence of negligence. In this case, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that Swinney’s death resulted from being struck or thrown onto the roadway by Ledford’s truck. Ultimately, questions of negligence and causation are to be resolved by the jury unless the cases are clear-cut.

Proximate cause issues are generally for juries to decide, except in clear-cut cases, as established in Ontario Sewing Mach. Co. Ltd. v. Smith and Atlanta Obstetrics, Gynecology Grp. P.A. v. Coleman. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's negligence claim, indicating that the case does not fall into the plainly undisputed category. 

Regarding damages for Swinney’s pain and suffering and pre-impact fright, defendants argued they should receive partial summary judgment because there was no evidence of Swinney's awareness of the impending collision or his survival during the accident. The plaintiff did not counter this argument, leading the court to conclude that the claim was abandoned, thereby granting summary judgment for defendants on this issue, supported by Burnette v. Northside Hosp. and Byrd v. Wal-Mart Transp. LLC.

On the defense of comparative negligence, defendants sought partial summary judgment, asserting that Swinney's drug and alcohol use violated Georgia statutes, constituting negligence per se. The court outlined the standard for negligence per se, noting that a statutory violation must connect to the plaintiff's injury and that comparative negligence remains a jury issue even if negligence per se is established. Specifically, under O.C.G.A. 40-6-391, it is illegal to drive with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or higher or under the influence of any controlled substance, aimed at protecting others from impaired drivers.

The Georgia legislature views driving in violation of specific statutes as a direct threat to public safety, asserting that no level of illicit drug use is safe when combined with driving due to the significant risk of fatal consequences. The plaintiff concedes the statute’s purpose and acknowledges that violations constitute negligence per se but argues that O.C.G.A. 40-6-391 does not apply since there is no evidence Swinney was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle during the accident. Both parties agree that Swinney was outside his vehicle at the time, thus the court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment concerning negligence per se under O.C.G.A. 40-6-391.

Regarding O.C.G.A. 40-6-202 and 40-6-203, which prohibit parking on roadways, the defendants claim Swinney was negligent per se for parking in the right lane of I-285. However, O.C.G.A. 40-6-204 provides an exception for disabled vehicles. Evidence suggests Swinney's vehicle broke down in the right lane and he could not move it before the accident, making it a jury question whether the vehicle was disabled to the extent that it was impossible to avoid leaving it in that position. Consequently, the court denies summary judgment on the defendants' negligence per se claims under O.C.G.A. 40-6-202 and 40-6-203.

Lastly, the defendants argue that Swinney violated pedestrian conduct statutes O.C.G.A. 40-6-95 and 40-6-96. Section 40-6-95 prohibits intoxicated individuals from being on roadways, while Section 40-6-96 requires pedestrians to stay on the shoulder of the road. The court finds insufficient evidence to grant summary judgment on negligence per se under these statutes, as the defendants did not demonstrate that Swinney's intoxication created a hazard, nor is there evidence he wandered onto the highway, with indications suggesting his body was thrown onto the road by another vehicle.

Defendants failed to demonstrate that Swinney was not positioned “as far as practicable from the edge of the roadway” at the time of the incident. Consequently, the Court denies summary judgment regarding the defendants’ negligence per se claims under O.C.G.A. 40-6-95 and 40-6-96. The Court partially grants and partially denies the defendants’ Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and sustains their objection to the Affidavit of Harry Edmondson. The initial motion for summary judgment was denied without prejudice, allowing both parties to supplement the record with additional arguments and evidence. The Court finds no supporting evidence for the defendants’ assertion that Swinney was struck before the collision with Ledford’s truck, noting that speculative theories are inadmissible in summary judgment. 

Defendants claim that summary judgment should be granted due to a lack of evidence for proximate cause, an essential element of the plaintiff’s negligence claim. They seek partial summary judgment concerning pre-impact damages and Swinney’s negligence per se. Defendants objected to Edmondson’s testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires expert testimony to be relevant, reliable, and provided by a qualified individual. The Court finds that Edmondson, with a degree in mechanical engineering and four decades of experience in forensic engineering and accident reconstruction, meets the qualifications to provide an expert opinion. The Court emphasizes that it is not its role to determine the ultimate persuasiveness of the testimony, as that will be assessed through cross-examination and the introduction of contrary evidence.

Edmondson, an expert in accident reconstruction, has completed various courses and conducted computerized crash simulations. However, the Court finds his opinions unreliable, emphasizing its role as a gatekeeper to prevent the admission of speculative testimony. The Supreme Court has outlined several factors to assess expert reliability: the testability of methodology, peer review and publication status, known error rates, and general acceptance in the scientific community. In this case, Edmondson's lack of a discernible methodology undermines his opinions, as his affidavit does not specify which methods or aids were used to form his conclusions. His statements are largely speculative, merely summarizing presumed events without factual support. Additionally, his engineering report fails to provide evidence of tests or objective data linking vehicle damage to the accident, thus not establishing Swinney's position at the time of the incident or the cause of death. While the plaintiff argues Edmondson's experience lends credibility to his opinion, they do not detail how this experience applies to the specific case or meets the standards set by Rule 702. The Court requires more than just the expert's assertion; a thorough explanation of how general experience informs specific conclusions is necessary.

Defendants objected to the admissibility of Edmondson's expert testimony, arguing that plaintiff's failure to depose him during discovery should not preclude their objection. The court found this argument unmeritorious, noting that defendants attempted to schedule Edmondson's deposition, which was canceled by the plaintiff. Ultimately, defendants ceased their efforts after the plaintiff indicated she would not rely on Edmondson's opinion in her summary judgment briefing. Regardless of any potential dereliction by the defendants, the plaintiff still bore the burden of proving the reliability of Edmondson's opinions under Rule 702, which she failed to do. Consequently, the court sustained the defendants' objection, ruling that Edmondson's testimony would not be admitted. 

Regarding summary judgment, the court stated it is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, as determined by the substantive law. A genuine issue exists only if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Summary judgment serves as a means to resolve cases without a trial if the party with the burden of proof fails to establish any essential element of their case. While the movant must assert the basis for their motion, they are not required to negate the opponent's claims but can fulfill their burden by demonstrating an absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case. The nonmoving party must then present specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial.

The court emphasizes that while evidence must be viewed favorably for the nonmoving party, a mere factual dispute does not prevent a properly supported summary judgment motion if no genuine issue of material fact exists. To succeed in a negligence claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the defendants had a legal duty to act with reasonable care, (2) a breach of that duty occurred, and (3) a causal link between the breach and the plaintiff's damages. The court finds that a driver has a duty to maintain a vigilant lookout while driving. The plaintiff has presented evidence suggesting that the defendant, Ledford, breached this duty by swerving and possibly dozing off or by looking in the rearview mirror instead of ahead. The court acknowledges that this evidence raises factual questions regarding duty and breach, which are typically for a jury to decide.

Regarding causation, the court notes sufficient evidence indicating a connection between Ledford's negligence and the death of Swinney, despite the lack of direct biological evidence on Ledford’s truck. Clothing from Swinney was found near the truck, which led an officer to conclude that Ledford likely struck Swinney. Additionally, White, driving behind Ledford, hit Swinney’s body, suggesting that Ledford's truck must have previously made contact. The defendants fail to provide a credible alternative explanation for the evidence presented. The court distinguishes this case from two cited by the defendants, where summary judgment was granted due to insufficient evidence of negligence, indicating that the present case has more substantial evidence to support the plaintiff's claims.

Defendants acknowledge a factual dispute regarding Ledford's negligence, with evidence suggesting Swinney may have died from being struck or thrown by Ledford’s truck. Negligence and causation questions are typically for the jury to resolve unless the case is exceptionally clear. This case does not meet that standard, leading the Court to deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim.

Regarding damages for Swinney’s pain and suffering and pre-impact fright, defendants argue that such damages should not apply since there is no evidence that Swinney was aware of the impending collision or alive at impact. The plaintiff did not contest this point, which results in an abandonment of the claim, thus justifying summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Georgia law necessitates evidence of the decedent's awareness of the impending crash to recover for pre-impact pain and suffering.

Additionally, defendants seek partial summary judgment based on Swinney's alleged comparative negligence due to drug and alcohol violations on the day of the accident. Negligence per se applies when a statutory violation occurs that causes harm to individuals the statute aims to protect. If a violation is established, negligence per se is valid if the injured party falls within the statute's intended protection class and the harm aligns with the statute's purpose.

To establish a claim or defense of negligence per se, a causal link between the negligence and the injury must be demonstrated. Even if a plaintiff is found to be negligent per se, the jury must evaluate the extent of comparative negligence. The defendants argue that Swinney's intoxication and drug use violated O.C.G.A. 40-6-391, which prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or more and driving under the influence of any controlled substance. This statute aims to protect the public from impaired drivers, as the Georgia legislature views such violations as direct threats to safety. 

The plaintiff does not dispute the statute's purpose but claims it does not apply since there is no evidence that Swinney was driving or in actual control of a vehicle at the time of the accident. Both parties agree that Swinney was outside his vehicle during the incident, which the Court recognizes as a fact. Consequently, the Court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of negligence per se related to O.C.G.A. 40-6-391.

The defendants also argue that Swinney was negligent per se for parking his car in the travel lane of I-285, violating O.C.G.A. 40-6-202 and 40-6-203. However, these statutes are subject to O.C.G.A. 40-6-204, which allows for exceptions when a vehicle is disabled. The evidence suggests that Swinney's vehicle broke down in the right lane and could not be moved before the accident. Thus, the qualifications under O.C.G.A. 40-6-204 apply, supporting the plaintiff's position.

The jury must determine if Swinney's car was disabled to the extent that it was impossible to avoid stopping in the right lane of I-285, as per O.C.G.A. 40-6-204. The court references Smith v. Nelson, which establishes a precedent for jury consideration regarding the ability to move a disabled vehicle off the road. Consequently, the court denies summary judgment for the defendants on their negligence per se claims under O.C.G.A. 40-6-202 and 40-6-203(a)(1).

The defendants argue that Swinney was negligent per se for violating pedestrian statutes O.C.G.A. 40-6-95 and O.C.G.A. 40-6-96. Section 40-6-95 prohibits walking on roadways for individuals impaired by alcohol or drugs, while Section 40-6-96 mandates pedestrians to stay on the shoulder as far from the roadway as possible. The court finds no grounds for summary judgment on these claims, noting insufficient evidence to prove that Swinney was a "hazard" under Section 40-6-95 or that he violated Section 40-6-96 by wandering onto the highway. It suggests that Swinney's body was likely thrown onto the highway by a vehicle, not that he walked onto it. The defendants also failed to demonstrate that Swinney was not positioned safely off the roadway when struck.

In conclusion, the court partially grants and partially denies the defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, sustaining their objection to an affidavit. The court previously denied the initial motion without prejudice, allowing for additional evidence and arguments. Importantly, there is no evidence supporting the defendants' claim that Swinney was killed before the incident with Ledford’s truck, emphasizing that speculative theories are irrelevant to summary judgment.