Smith v. Kanawha River Terminals LLC

Citations: 829 F. Supp. 2d 401; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127881; 2011 WL 5358832Docket: Civil Action No. 3:10-1154

Court: District Court, S.D. West Virginia; November 4, 2011; Federal District Court

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Defendant Kanawha River Terminals, LLC, and Kanawha River Terminals, Inc. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Court has denied. The plaintiff, who began working for KRT in July 2004 and was reassigned to transloading at the Ceredo facility three weeks before a December 1, 2007 accident, is suing under the Jones Act and general maritime law for injuries sustained during his work as an excavator operator on a transloader barge. The accident occurred when the plaintiff fell into the river after stepping out of the excavator cabin to inspect the coal barge.

The Court must determine if the plaintiff qualifies as a “seaman” under the Jones Act, which allows injured seamen to sue their employers. To establish seaman status, the plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) his contribution to the vessel’s function or mission, and (2) a substantial connection to a vessel in navigation. While the plaintiff did not demonstrate that the customer barges constitute an identifiable group of vessels, the transloader barge is recognized as a vessel under the Jones Act. The plaintiff's relationship with the transloader barge is deemed sufficient to support his claim under the Jones Act.

A seaman can establish his status concerning a specific group of vessels, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Chandris. The “fleet doctrine,” developed by the Fifth Circuit, necessitates that a plaintiff demonstrate a common ownership or control among the vessels in question, defining a fleet as an identifiable group acting together, rather than any vessels an employee happens to work upon. This doctrine aims to maintain the distinction between crew members and transient workers like longshoremen. Defendants argue that even if the customer barges qualify as a fleet, the plaintiff would struggle to prove a sufficient connection to them to qualify as a seaman. The Supreme Court endorses a guideline where a worker must spend at least thirty percent of his time on a vessel or group of vessels under the employer’s ownership or control. The plaintiff has not claimed the customer barges meet the identifiable fleet requirement nor provided case law supporting his status as a seaman in relation to those barges. Consequently, the Court concludes that the customer barges do not constitute an identifiable fleet and the plaintiff's connection is insufficient.

Regarding the transloader barge, maritime law categorizes the Jones Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) as complementary, with the Jones Act offering tort remedies for sea-based workers. A “vessel” under the Jones Act is defined in reference to the LHWCA, encompassing all watercraft used or capable of being used for transportation on water. The Supreme Court has maintained the distinction between watercraft temporarily located and those permanently affixed, emphasizing that a vessel cannot be considered capable of maritime transport if it is permanently moored or unable to move.

The Court clarified that, under 1 U.S.C. § 3, a structure's classification as a vessel can be compromised if it has been out of water for an extended period. A key consideration is whether the watercraft's use for transportation on water is a practical possibility. In this case, there were no factual disputes regarding the transloader's position or mooring; the only issue was whether it remained practically usable for transportation at the time of the accident. Consequently, summary judgment was deemed appropriate.

The Court referenced various cases to support its conclusion that the transloader barge was still considered a vessel under the Jones Act at the time of the incident. In *Bunch v. Canton Marine Towing*, the Eighth Circuit ruled that a cleaning barge moored in the Mississippi River qualified as a vessel. Similarly, in *Board of Commissioners v. M/V Belle of Orleans*, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a riverboat casino, despite being moored and receiving utilities from land, was still a vessel.

Additionally, two Fourth Circuit cases from 1952, *Summerlin v. Massman Const. Co.* and *Jeffrey v. Henderson Brothers*, were discussed as relevant precedents. In *Summerlin*, a derrick anchored in a river was deemed a vessel despite lacking self-propulsion and living quarters. *Jeffrey* involved a barge used for coal cleaning, which also had no self-propulsion or living quarters but was engaged in maritime commerce. Both cases support the Court's position that the transloader retains its status as a vessel. The determination of whether the transloader had been removed from navigation is critical to the maritime lien issue raised in the context of the workers' wages.

The defendant contended that the barge was effectively removed from navigation due to being secured to the land and argued that the workers were not seamen but rather machine shop workers, performing duties akin to those on land. However, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the barge remained a vessel, asserting it had not been withdrawn from navigation despite being moored to the riverbank for eleven months. The transloader barge lacked living quarters, self-propulsion, and was accessed via a steel walkway, with operations powered by onshore electricity. The court distinguished this case from a previous one (Jeffrey), noting that while the transloader did not move and relied on a conveyor system, the focus should be on whether the barge could be used for transportation, which was deemed a practical possibility.

The plaintiff's connection to the barge needed to be substantial in both duration and nature to qualify under the Jones Act. The Supreme Court's Chandris decision established a general guideline that workers spending less than 30% of their time in service of a navigable vessel do not qualify as seamen. The plaintiff exceeded this threshold after being reassigned to the transloader, fulfilling the durational requirement. The nature of his connection was also analyzed in light of the Harbor Tug and Barge Co. v. Papai case, which emphasized that the inquiry should focus on whether the employee's duties involved work at sea. The substantial connection requirement is intended to differentiate maritime employees entitled to Jones Act protection from land-based workers with only sporadic ties to vessels, thereby reinforcing the legislative intent behind the Act.

The Court finds the Fifth Circuit's ruling in In Re: Endeavor Marine relevant, particularly regarding the definition of a Jones Act seaman. The Fifth Circuit determined that the 'going to the sea' language in Harbor Tug signifies that an employee's regular connection to a vessel exposes them to maritime perils. In Endeavor, a crane operator's claims were initially dismissed because his work only occurred when the barge was moored. However, the Fifth Circuit ruled that, as a matter of law, he was a seaman, given his permanent assignment to the barge, his primary role in operating cranes for loading and unloading, and his regular exposure to maritime risks.

The Court contrasts this with the case of Lara v. Arctic King Ltd., where a day laborer performing repairs on a docked vessel was deemed not to qualify as a seaman due to lack of engagement in maritime activities or crew compensation. In the current case, the plaintiff, serving as an excavator operator and dockhand, was essential to the transloader's operation, which was exclusively dedicated to unloading coal. The Court also references Jeffrey v. Henderson Brothers, which, while older, similarly illustrated that even minimal maritime activity can establish a connection to the sea. The plaintiff’s job duties involved securing barges and transferring coal, demonstrating regular exposure to maritime perils. 

Consequently, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion and instructs the Clerk to distribute the written Opinion and Order to relevant parties.