Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.

Citations: 764 F. Supp. 1543; 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7778; 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 171Docket: Civ. No. 86-048-ALB/AMER(DF)

Court: District Court, M.D. Georgia; June 4, 1991; Federal District Court

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A court ruling on August 11, 1989, identified Buckeye Cellulose Corporation's Pay and Progression System as a discriminatory practice negatively impacting Black employees. Following this, the court issued findings in a second ruling on April 2, 1990, regarding the defendant's liability to individual plaintiffs based on their disparate impact claims. The court is now finalizing damage awards for prevailing plaintiffs and addressing their request for attorney's fees, while reaffirming its prior decision regarding the timeliness of plaintiffs' charges against the defendant.

In determining damages, the court aims to restore each plaintiff to the position they would have held absent the discrimination, primarily through back pay and equitable relief. This includes interest, overtime, shift differentials, and fringe benefits, calculated to reflect what plaintiffs would have earned without discrimination, minus what they actually received. Plaintiffs will also receive prejudgment interest based on prevailing IRS prime rates. Additionally, current employees will be placed on the appropriate pay scale, reflective of their rightful earnings absent discriminatory practices.

To establish the exact back pay amounts, the court will reconstruct the employment histories of affected individuals and estimate potential advancements without the discrimination, recognizing that while precision is not required, uncertainties will be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs.

The defendant, Buckeye, engaged in a discriminatory practice by systematically failing to fairly evaluate and reward the plaintiffs, which complicates the determination of back pay damages. However, the court has gathered sufficient evidence from months of testimony and extensive documentation to accurately assess the plaintiffs' skills and potential advancements had discrimination not occurred. 

To calculate damages, the court first established each plaintiff's average annual hourly rate and hours worked annually. It then compared this to the average pay of a similarly situated white technician, projecting the salary the plaintiffs would have earned without discrimination by multiplying the white technician's hourly rate by the plaintiff's actual hours worked. The difference between this projected salary and the plaintiff's actual salary constitutes the back pay damages awarded.

The comparison period for determining damages spans from two years prior to each plaintiff's EEOC complaint until they received equal compensation as their comparators or until their employment ended. For plaintiffs Taylor and Palms, this period extends to the present, as they remain employed at Buckeye but have not reached the wage levels of comparable white technicians.

Specifically, for John Taylor, the court found that his skills and contributions made him a valuable employee, similar to top-rated white technicians. The court decided that Taylor's compensation should be aligned with that of the highest-paid technicians, exemplified by Walter “Sonny” Ard. Consequently, Taylor's damages will be calculated to reflect what he would have earned had he been compensated equally to Ard.

Taylor is awarded back pay damages of $57,963.00, along with prejudgment interest and profit-sharing benefits that include 126.498 shares of Buckeye common stock, 3.572 shares of preferred stock, and $150.23 in cash. These calculations were verified and adopted by the court, following the defendant's compliance with the court's earlier instructions. Buckeye is ordered to pay Taylor a wage rate equivalent to a curve 5 pay rate, maintaining this rate contingent on satisfactory job performance.

Tabitha Herring, whose career progression was hindered by Buckeye's discriminatory practices, is entitled to back pay damages of $17,510.00, plus prejudgment interest and profit-sharing benefits amounting to 47.146 shares of Buckeye common stock and $24.15 in cash. The court’s findings suggest that Herring would have achieved greater compensation absent discrimination, using the career trajectories of similarly situated white technicians as benchmarks.

Johnnie Lee Palms, recognized for his skills and training, is awarded back pay damages of $31,982.00, as well as prejudgment interest and profit-sharing benefits totaling 66.896 shares of Buckeye common stock, 1.388 shares of preferred stock, and $68.85 in cash. The court determined that Palms, despite his qualifications, faced discriminatory practices that prevented him from receiving promotions and compensation on par with higher-rated white technicians. Buckeye is ordered to pay Palms a wage rate comparable to a curve 4 pay rate, contingent on satisfactory job performance.

James C. Homer, a mechanical maintenance technician at Buckeye, faced discrimination under the company's Pay and Progression System, which denied him the opportunity to acquire additional skills and higher pay, despite being equally qualified as white colleagues. He claims damages of $13,759.00 in back pay, along with prejudgment interest and 37.149 shares of Buckeye stock plus $19.09 in cash.

Gerry Plant, another technician known for exceptional mechanical skills, also suffered under the discriminatory system. He asserts damages of $23,760.00 in back pay (after accounting for a prior $10,000.00 jury award), plus prejudgment interest and profit sharing benefits totaling 85.100 shares of Buckeye common stock, 0.769 shares of preferred stock, and $63.37 in cash, minus a $1,000.00 deduction for a previous award.

Issiah Ross, Jr., a competent employee, was similarly underpaid compared to white technicians performing the same tasks. His qualifications were recognized when Buckeye selected him to train others. Ross claims damages of $21,971.00 in back pay, along with prejudgment interest and profit sharing benefits of 54.410 shares of Buckeye common stock and $27.88 in cash. Each plaintiff seeks compensation to rectify the financial disparities resulting from Buckeye's discriminatory practices.

The court is addressing the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees, which involves calculating the reasonable number of hours worked by the plaintiffs’ attorney and multiplying that by a reasonable hourly rate to establish the "lodestar." The appropriate hourly rate is determined to be $135.00, based on the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services. The plaintiffs’ attorney submitted 2242.50 hours of work, which the court found to be reasonable and free of excessive or unnecessary hours. This results in a lodestar amount of $302,737.50. However, the court must adjust this amount based on the outcomes achieved in the case, which involved claims from thirteen individual plaintiffs, of which six received damages. Given that the overall results were considered limited in relation to the scope of the litigation, the court decides to reduce the lodestar by 25%, resulting in an awarded attorney’s fees of $227,053.12.

The court's decision to reduce attorney's fees is not based solely on the ratio of successful to unsuccessful plaintiffs or issues presented. Instead, it acknowledges that some of the attorney's efforts were directed at unsuccessful plaintiffs, though most of the time was spent on work relevant to all cases. The court considered whether an enhancement of fees was warranted due to exceptional results; however, it concluded that the outcomes, while significant for guiding future actions of Buckeye, were not exceptional given the clear legal precedent against the discrimination faced by the plaintiffs. Furthermore, although a contingency fee arrangement might justify an enhancement, the court found no evidence that attorneys were unavailable in its district. Therefore, it declined to enhance the fees based on this factor. The court noted a delay in payment since the attorney began work in 1985, leading to a decision to calculate the reasonable hourly rate at current rates, set at $135.00. The attorney also requested reimbursement for mileage expenses totaling $2,009.41, which the court granted as reasonable. However, the court denied the request for expert witness fees totaling $85,992.50 based on recent case law, specifically referencing the Fifth Circuit's ruling in International Woodworkers of America v. Champion International Corp., which determined that such fees are not awardable in Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981 cases.

American courts traditionally lack the authority to tax expert witness fees beyond what is explicitly authorized by statute. Prior to the ruling in *International Woodworkers of America*, courts creatively interpreted Senate reports to award additional expert fees in civil rights cases, a practice that was later overruled. The *International Woodworkers* court held that there is no judicial authority to award expert witness fees beyond those specified in 28 U.S.C. 1821, emphasizing that Congress must explicitly provide for such costs. Consequently, since neither 42 U.S.C. 1988 nor 2000e-5(k) includes provisions for excess expert witness fees, the prevailing plaintiff was entitled only to the fees outlined in 28 U.S.C. 1821. 

The Supreme Court affirmed this interpretation, ruling that federal courts are bound by the limits of 28 U.S.C. 1821(b) for reimbursement of expert witness fees absent explicit statutory authority. The court also denied a request for reimbursement of $1,875 for services rendered by Terri C. Long, determining her work was overhead within the attorney's hourly rate and not a recoverable legal expense. However, fees for services provided by law students and a paralegal were deemed part of reasonable attorney’s fees that a prevailing plaintiff can recover.

A review of the hours logged by legal support staff indicates that their hourly rates are reasonable and consistent with prevailing market rates. Law student Ray Brooks recorded 292.75 hours at $25.00 per hour, totaling $7,318.75. Law student Thomas Bond logged 35 hours at the same rate, amounting to $875.00. Paralegal Cathy Hires recorded 75 hours at $50.00 per hour, totaling $3,750.00. All claimed hours are deemed reasonable, without excessive or redundant entries. After applying a 25% lodestar reduction, the adjusted compensation for the legal support staff is $5,489.06 for Brooks, $656.25 for Bond, and $2,812.50 for Hires. 

The court orders that the defendant pay damages totaling $57,963.00 plus prejudgment interest and various shares of stock and cash to plaintiff Taylor; $17,510.00 to plaintiff Herring; $31,982.00 to plaintiff Palms; $13,759.00 to plaintiff Homer; $23,760.00 to plaintiff Plant (with a $1,000.00 deduction from profit sharing benefits); and $21,971.00 to plaintiff Ross, all with associated prejudgment interest and profit sharing benefits.

Defendant Buckeye is ordered to pay $175,794.10 in attorney’s fees. The court also rules that all outstanding motions not addressed in this order are rendered moot and are dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, the document details various back pay awards for multiple years, totaling $57,963, $17,510, $31,982, $13,759, $23,760, and $21,971 for different claimants, with specific deductions noted for one claim. It references Section 1821, which stipulates a witness attendance fee of $30 per day, including travel time. The total attorney's fees and expenses amount to $238,020.34, from which previously awarded interim fees of $62,500.00 are deducted, resulting in a final total of $175,520.34.