Studway v. Feltman

Citations: 764 F. Supp. 133; 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7220; 1991 WL 90862Docket: No. 90-C-0767-C

Court: District Court, W.D. Wisconsin; May 20, 1991; Federal District Court

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The court, led by Chief Judge Crabb, addresses a motion to dismiss a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by a plaintiff claiming violations of due process rights due to delayed disciplinary hearings. The plaintiff, an inmate, alleged that the failure to hold a hearing within the 21-day timeframe mandated by Wisconsin Administrative Code DOC 303.76(3) constituted a due process violation. The court found that the state court ruling previously considered did not establish a protected liberty interest for the plaintiff in a timely hearing. 

Key facts include that the plaintiff was charged with theft and possession of contraband, received a conduct report the day after the alleged incident, and waived certain rights but not the hearing time limits. The disciplinary hearing occurred late, on July 9, 1990, despite the plaintiff's objections. Although acquitted of theft, the plaintiff was found guilty of possession of contraband and received a punishment of fifteen hours of extra duty. 

The opinion emphasizes that while the Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process, not all state regulations create protected liberty interests. For a state regulation to establish such an interest, it must include mandatory language and directives that compel specific outcomes based on the presence of substantive predicates. The court concludes that procedural guidelines alone do not constitute a protected liberty interest, as illustrated by prior case law, leading to the decision to grant the motion to dismiss.

The court identified a logical inconsistency in treating state procedural rights as constitutionally protected. It argued that if a hearing is a liberty interest under due process, then interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment to imply that the state cannot deny a hearing without providing one is flawed. In the case of Culbert, the court of appeals dismissed the argument that Wisconsin procedural regulations created a liberty interest requiring constitutional safeguards. The court stated that despite the mandatory language of the regulations, they merely suggested criteria for prison officials in classifying offenses without imposing substantive limits on their authority. 

The court referenced Hewitt, asserting that it would not assume the state intended to restrict prison administrators’ discretion without explicit statements. Consequently, DOC 303.68 was seen as establishing procedural guidelines rather than substantive limits on discretion. The court acknowledged conflicting decisions from an intermediate Wisconsin court but distinguished those cases based on their focus on the arbitrariness of specific decisions under state review standards, rather than assessing if a liberty interest was implicated. 

In analyzing DOC 303.76(3) in relation to a previous case (State ex rel. Jones v. Franklin), the court recognized that while the state court deemed the regulation mandatory, it failed to analyze whether it imposed substantive limits necessary to establish a liberty interest. Ultimately, DOC 303.76(3) was interpreted solely as a procedural regulation, specifying the timing of due process hearings without imposing substantive limits on disciplinary decisions. The only liberty interest recognized was the inmate's right to due process protections against disciplinary punishment. A violation of procedural requirements could lead to state claims regarding jurisdiction but not to constitutional claims. Therefore, the plaintiff's complaint under the Fourteenth Amendment was dismissed, and the motion to dismiss was granted. The Clerk of Court was instructed to enter judgment in favor of the defendant.