Hayes v. Bakery Confectionery & Tobacco Workers International Union of America
Docket: Civ. A. No. C 85-0207-L(A)
Court: District Court, W.D. Kentucky; September 25, 1989; Federal District Court
Marvin Hayes, the plaintiff, alleges he was wrongfully discharged by Ralston Purina Company in violation of its collective bargaining agreement with Local 213, the union representing him. He asserts that the Union failed to fulfill its duty to fairly represent him in his grievances concerning his termination and suspension. Hayes began his employment in 1975 and served as a union steward and negotiator. In September 1984, while working for Bremner Biscuit Company, a subsidiary of Ralston Purina, he was informed he would be bumped from his position. Exercising his seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement, he bumped a less senior employee but contested the insufficient training period of fifteen days for his new role. His grievances were dismissed by the Company.
On November 29, 1984, Hayes was instructed to take a qualification test the following day in Frankfort. After realizing he lacked adequate car insurance, he and his foreman, Will Groover, attempted to rent a car, but complications arose due to Hayes not having his driver’s license. On the day of the test, Hayes was told Groover would drive instead, which he contested. A meeting with the personnel manager, Keith Locke, escalated into a confrontation where Hayes felt he could not defend himself against accusations of refusal to go to Frankfort. Following this, Hayes changed back into street clothes and left for his car, where he encountered Ricky Simpson, the union business agent, who allegedly cursed and struck him.
Simpson alleged that the plaintiff initiated the altercation by striking him first, resulting in a fractured nose. Two independent witnesses, Roden and Mills, confirmed that the plaintiff struck Simpson first, while guard Carolyn Smiley testified she saw the plaintiff hit Simpson, although she did not include this in her initial report, which only noted a fight. Following the incident, the plaintiff returned to work in an agitated state, insulted a colleague, and was ordered by personnel manager Mr. Locke to leave the premises, resulting in his suspension pending investigation.
On December 4, 1984, a meeting was held with the plaintiff, union stewards Diane Johnson and Joe Lynch, and Locke, where Johnson, despite lacking experience, advocated for the plaintiff. Three days later, the plaintiff was discharged. On December 12, 1984, after consulting his attorney, the plaintiff filed grievances regarding his suspension and termination. The suspension grievance was denied for being untimely, and the termination grievance was denied on its merits.
The Union, after agreeing to extend the time to decide on arbitration for the termination grievance, met again where the plaintiff reiterated his claim of being the victim. During this meeting, union members confirmed the existence of the Company's rules of conduct, which the plaintiff claimed he had not seen. On January 4, 1985, union president Baker informed the plaintiff that the Union would not pursue arbitration, citing disbelief in the plaintiff’s account and the precedent that aggressors in employee fights typically do not get reinstated. Baker did not contest that the fight occurred on Company property or that the conduct rules applied, arguing instead for the plaintiff's reinstatement based on his good employee record.
Both the plaintiff and Simpson later presented their accounts at a union executive meeting on January 15, 1985, with their testimonies remaining consistent. The Union subsequently sought legal advice on whether to proceed with arbitration and was advised against it.
Defendants have referenced various arbitration decisions indicating a consensus that an employee who initiates a fight is typically not eligible for reinstatement after termination. Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, plaintiffs must demonstrate both a breach of contract by the employer and a failure of fair representation by the union to succeed in a fair representation claim. In this case, the plaintiff has not established that the Company breached any contract, as the employee conduct rules permit termination for fighting or violent conduct on Company property.
Regarding the Union's representation, it is required to act in good faith while processing grievances. A union's unfair representation must be shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Courts have emphasized that unions must treat all members equitably and exercise their discretion honestly. The Sixth Circuit has defined arbitrary conduct, stating that a union cannot ignore a valid grievance or handle it superficially.
The plaintiff alleges hostility from the Union's representative, Simpson, during a meeting preceding the fight. However, the assessment of whether the Union, through John Baker, failed in its duty of fair representation is negative. Although the Union could have contested the occurrence of the fight on Company grounds, it acted reasonably since the plaintiff had no witnesses to corroborate his account and independent witnesses identified him as the aggressor. Additionally, recorded statements from the plaintiff indicated his admission of anger and physical aggression towards Simpson. The excerpt also references a case, Griffin v. International Union, illustrating a scenario where a union was found liable for not adequately representing a member after a violent incident leading to discharge, highlighting the complexities of fair representation cases.
J.W. Brown, chairman of the Union Committee, filed a grievance for the reinstatement of Griffin, which was denied by Cashion. After Griffin received a $50 fine for assault, Brown recommended withdrawing the grievance, threatening resignation when faced with opposition. The grievance was eventually withdrawn, but Griffin appealed to the Union membership, which decided to pursue the grievance, leading to Brown's resignation. The appeals committee of the international Union upheld the House Committee’s decision. Ford later agreed to process the grievance, but after two years, it was denied by the Ford Umpire. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the Union's insistence on filing the grievance with Cashion was unjustified, breaching arbitration standards set in Vaca v. Sipes. The court noted potential bad faith in the Union's handling of the grievance due to longstanding personal connections between Cashion, Brown, and a committee member who testified against Griffin.
In a comparative case, Hellums v. Quaker Oats Co., the court emphasized that a union must make informed and reasoned judgments in cases of conflict between employees. The Union was found to have met its duty of fair representation, and the plaintiff's argument regarding an unemployment commissioner’s decision was overruled. The Kentucky Supreme Court clarified that collateral estoppel does not apply to civil rights claims without a formal judicial proceeding involving testimony, cross-examination, and a comprehensive record.
The plaintiff alleges a conspiracy between Ralston Purina and the Union to violate his rights, claiming gross negligence and seeking punitive damages for conduct intended to cause emotional distress. However, the court finds these allegations meritless, noting the plaintiff has not demonstrated collusion aimed at depriving him of his rights. The plaintiff's actions constituted a dischargeable offense, and the Union's decision not to pursue arbitration was within its rights. The court references Craft v. Rice, establishing that claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress require conduct that is extreme and intolerable, which was not present in this case. The defendants' actions were legally permissible, and the Union also claims damages due to the plaintiff's behavior affecting its operations, detailing expenses incurred for investigations related to the plaintiff's grievance. The court concludes that the Union should not have to charge members for processing grievances and dismisses the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
