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New York City Housing Authority v. Kemp

Citations: 751 F. Supp. 1123; 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16038; 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 847; 1990 WL 191002Docket: No. 89 Civ. 7183 (PKL)

Court: District Court, S.D. New York; November 28, 1990; Federal District Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the New York City Housing Authority (Plaintiff) sought a permanent injunction against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and federal officials to prevent the discontinuation of financial assistance due to a Rehabilitation Act complaint. The dispute originated from HUD's deferral of grant applications because the Housing Authority did not reinstate an employee after surgery nor agree to a compliance agreement on back pay. Although HUD argued compliance and claimed no deferral of subsidies, the Housing Authority maintained HUD threatened to discontinue assistance. The court initially granted a temporary restraining order, followed by a permanent injunction, preventing HUD from deferring federal assistance without due legal process, as per HUD regulations (24 C.F.R. § 8.57(c)). The plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act was denied because the defendants' claims were not deemed meritless, nor was there clear evidence of bad faith or improper purpose. The court applied the Browning-Wells standard and found the defendants' actions did not demonstrate the requisite level of obstinacy to justify attorney fees. The court emphasized that mere weakness in legal arguments does not equate to bad faith. Consequently, the Housing Authority's claim for attorneys' fees was unsuccessful, and the permanent injunction remained in place.

Legal Issues Addressed

Application of Pre-litigation Bad Faith Standard

Application: Applying the Browning-Wells standard, the court concluded that the defendants' actions did not demonstrate the required level of obstinacy to warrant attorney fees.

Reasoning: The court decides to apply the Browning-Wells standard, concluding that the defendants' behavior did not demonstrate the 'unreasonable, obdurate obstinacy' required to warrant the plaintiff's fees.

Attorney Fees Under Equal Access to Justice Act

Application: The plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees was denied as the defendants' claims were not entirely without color, and the plaintiff failed to provide clear evidence of bad faith.

Reasoning: Plaintiff's motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) is denied.

Bad Faith Exception to the American Rule

Application: The court found no evidence of meritlessness or improper purpose required for awarding attorney fees under the bad faith exception.

Reasoning: The plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong of the Second Circuit’s test for obtaining attorneys’ fees, and thus the Court will not address the second prong.

Interpretation of HUD and DOJ Regulations

Application: The court ruled that HUD regulations took precedence over DOJ regulations, preventing deferral of financial assistance before a hearing on claims.

Reasoning: The Court ruled that HUD regulations (24 C.F.R. § 8.57(c)) took precedence, preventing any deferral before a hearing on the claims.

Permanent Injunction Under Rehabilitation Act

Application: The court issued a permanent injunction preventing HUD from deferring federal assistance based on Rehabilitation Act complaints unless due legal processes were followed.

Reasoning: On December 22, 1989, the Court issued an order permanently enjoining defendants from taking action against the Housing Authority based on the Finkel Complaint or any future complaints unless due legal processes were followed.