Flint v. Langer Transport Corp.

Citations: 762 F. Supp. 2d 735; 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6975; 2011 WL 253646Docket: Civ. No. 06-3864 (WHW)

Court: District Court, D. New Jersey; January 24, 2011; Federal District Court

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Defendants IMTT-Bayonne, IMTT, and Jeffrey Jackson filed for summary judgment regarding plaintiff Bradley Flint's negligence claims, while IMTT also sought to strike parts of plaintiff's expert Donald T. Aull's certification. Defendant Langer Transport Corp. sought summary judgment on all cross-claims. The court decided the motions without oral argument, granting summary judgment to IMTT and Jeffrey Jackson, while denying IMTT’s motion to strike as moot and Langer’s motion as moot.

The factual background reveals that Jeffrey Jackson, a truck driver for Langer, was tasked with transporting 45,000 pounds of Dow Chemical's corrosive chemical Versene 100 XL from IMTT’s Bayonne facility to Ecolab in Canada. This chemical required transport in a stainless steel trailer due to its corrosive nature. On July 6, 2004, Jackson was assigned an aluminum trailer, which was inappropriate for the load. Despite undergoing checks by IMTT employees that failed to identify the aluminum trailer, Jackson proceeded to transport the load.

Upon reaching Ecolab on July 7, the product was tested and found contaminated, leading to the load's rejection. After notifying Langer of the situation, Jackson was instructed to return to the U.S. He met Flint at a truck stop, where plans were made to transload the contaminated Versene from Jackson's trailer into Flint's trailer. However, they later learned that Flint's trailer, previously used for a marine bio-chemical, could not be cleaned at their intended facility. They were then directed to find an alternative location to transfer the load to avoid further complications.

Jackson and Flint stopped at the Flying J truck stop in Penbrook, New York, to wait out the rain before transferring a load between their tankers. After dinner, they connected a hose from Flint’s tanker to Jackson’s to facilitate the transfer. Flint, wearing rubber gloves, climbed to the top of his tanker to manage the hose, but fell when his hand slipped out of the glove, resulting in injury after impacting Jackson’s trailer and the ground. Jackson transported Flint to the hospital and later, at Langer's direction, drove Flint's trailer to be cleaned before transferring the load back to Flint’s tanker and delivering it to Langer in Jersey City.

In the context of summary judgment, the document asserts that it is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A factual dispute must be both genuine and material to defeat a motion; the non-moving party must provide specific factual evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. The court’s role is to assess whether such an issue exists without weighing evidence.

Regarding IMTT-Bayonne’s motion for summary judgment, it emphasizes the concept of proximate cause in tort law, referencing the landmark case Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. The court concludes that even if IMTT had been negligent in placing Versene in an incorrect tanker, the injuries sustained by the plaintiff were not proximately caused by IMTT’s actions, suggesting that liability is limited to foreseeable harm.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey clarified that the doctrine of superseding cause determines whether intervening events or conduct following a defendant's negligence are so unrelated or unanticipated that they absolve the defendant of liability. According to the Restatement of Torts, a superseding cause can relieve an actor from responsibility regardless of whether their prior negligence was a significant factor in the harm caused. The court assesses superseding causes by examining the closeness of the connection between the intervening cause and the defendant's negligence.

In this case, IMTT's action of putting Versene into Jackson’s tanker did not foreseeably lead to Flint's fall from a different truck. The causal link was interrupted by two key intervening factors: Langer's directive for Jackson and Flint to perform the transfer in a specific manner and Flint's own decision to climb the ladder and subsequently fall. Langer was pivotal in the decision-making process, having assigned the wrong tanker and provided instructions at critical points, including directing the transfer at a truck stop under unsafe conditions.

The plaintiff also attributed fault to Jackson, arguing that his experience made him responsible for the accident. However, evidence showed Flint voluntarily decided to climb the ladder, with no substantial debate on the matter. Flint acknowledged that concerns about ladder safety were inherent to the job, indicating that he was familiar with the risks involved. The court concluded that while the transfer of Versene was foreseeable, the specific circumstances of the transfer were not, thus breaking the chain of liability.

In Vega ex rel. Muniz v. Piedilato, an adolescent boy sued the owners of an apartment building for injuries incurred from falling down an air shaft between two rooftops. The plaintiff cited several negligence theories, such as the failure to lock the roof access door and the absence of fencing around the air shaft. However, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a reasonable jury could not find that the lack of security measures caused the fall; rather, the fall resulted from the plaintiff's attempt to jump across the space. Consequently, the court ruled that the injuries were not proximately caused by the property conditions.

Similarly, in the case involving Flint, the injuries were attributed to Langer's decision to order a transfer and Flint's own attempt to climb a ladder. IMTT's actions were also found not to be the proximate cause of Flint’s fall. 

The plaintiff tried to use the rescue doctrine to maintain a connection to the causation chain, arguing he acted as a rescuer for Jackson. However, the court found Jackson was not in imminent peril, and the situation did not require immediate action typical of rescue doctrine cases. Flint and Jackson delayed their actions, indicating that Jackson was not in a critical situation. The court dismissed the applicability of the rescue doctrine, stating that Flint did not rescue Jackson and distinguishing this case from McKay v. Mayronne, where imminent danger was present.

Furthermore, the plaintiff contended that IMTT was engaged in an "inherently dangerous activity," warranting a higher standard of care. The court clarified that this should not be conflated with "abnormally dangerous activity," which imposes strict liability and was not pled by the plaintiff, thus not considered in this case. The undisputed facts did not support an exception to the general rule.

The Court finds the 'inherently dangerous activity' theory inapplicable in this case, as it was not pled by the plaintiff. Under New Jersey law, a principal is generally not liable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor, with limited exceptions, one being if the contracted activity is inherently dangerous or poses a peculiar risk without special precautions. The plaintiff did not present any relevant cases applying this doctrine outside its specific context, and there is no principal/contractor relationship between the plaintiff and IMTT.

Regarding Jackson’s motion for summary judgment, both plaintiff Flint and defendant Jackson were truck drivers for Langer, classified as independent contractors under an Owner/Operator Mutual Lease Agreement. This Agreement made drivers responsible for their own expenses and did not involve payroll tax deductions. Jackson worked for Langer since June 2002, while Flint was employed from April or May 2004 until his accident in July 2004. Although Flint received workers’ compensation benefits, he argues that the nature of his agreement and his application for benefits are not issues before the court. Jackson contends that Flint’s dismissal of his claim against Langer was due to the workers’ compensation exclusivity bar, which Flint does not dispute but claims the reasoning is irrelevant. 

The Court emphasizes that Flint's receipt of benefits is pertinent to Jackson's argument regarding the fellow servant bar under N.J. Stat. Ann. 34:15-8, which applies to tort claims against him. Flint's classification as an independent contractor is contested because he has received workers' compensation, categorizing him as an employee for those purposes. New Jersey law stipulates that workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for employees injured during employment, limiting their options for recourse against employers.

The exclusivity rule prevents an employee from maintaining a common law tort action against a fellow employee for a compensable accident, as per N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, which exempts fellow employees from liability unless an intentional wrong is alleged. Flint, having accepted workers' compensation benefits and acknowledged as an employee under the Act, cannot argue otherwise or claim that Jackson intentionally harmed him. Even if Flint's claim against Jackson had merit, both would be categorized as employees based on established criteria.

To determine employee status, two tests are employed: the 'control test' and the 'relative nature of the work test.' The control test assesses the employer's right to control the work, while the relative nature of the work test evaluates whether the work is integral to the employer's business. However, these tests are not relevant here since Flint has already received benefits. Flint's assertion that he and Jackson were independent contractors is countered by the court's precedent in Rutherford v. Modern Transp. Co., which highlights that formal classifications do not negate the realities of the employer-employee relationship. 

In this case, Langer exercised control over Flint and Jackson’s work, directing their schedules and routes, which satisfies the control test. Additionally, both relied exclusively on Langer for income, wore company-branded clothing, and their work was essential to Langer’s operations. The fact that they paid for their own workers' compensation insurance does not alter their employee status, as the insurance was secured through Langer, and such arrangements do not negate employee classification.

Consequently, Flint's claim against Jackson is barred under New Jersey's workers' compensation law. Regarding Langer's motion for summary judgment filed on September 23, 2010, it is rendered moot since the motions for summary judgment from IMTT and Jackson have been granted, making Langer's motion unnecessary. The conclusion is that IMTT and Jackson's motions for summary judgment are granted, IMTT’s motion to strike is moot, and Langer’s motion for summary judgment is also moot.