United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 7 v. King Soopers, Inc.

Citations: 52 F. Supp. 2d 1215; 161 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3093; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10329; 1999 WL 451099Docket: No. Civ.A. 99-B-515

Court: District Court, D. Colorado; July 2, 1999; Federal District Court

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Summary judgment is granted in favor of the plaintiff, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local No. 7, in a case involving King Soopers, Inc. Jurisdiction is established under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The parties are bound by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) effective from June 30, 1996, to July 10, 1999, which stipulates that employees cannot be discharged without good cause and grants the employer management rights as long as they do not conflict with the CBA. A Tardiness and Absence Policy instituted by King Soopers allows for immediate discharge after three consecutive unexcused absences.

Ms. Lilly Parbhu was discharged on September 5, 1997, for failing to report to work for three consecutive days. The Union filed a grievance on her behalf, which led to arbitration. The arbitrator found that while Parbhu violated the policy, her long-standing good employment record and lack of prior serious disciplinary action warranted a lesser penalty. The arbitrator ordered her reinstatement and converted her discharge into an unpaid suspension. King Soopers did not comply with the reinstatement order. Subsequently, both the Union and King Soopers filed separate lawsuits concerning the enforcement of the arbitrator's award, which were consolidated for resolution.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine disputes over material facts, as outlined in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The review of an arbitrator's award is highly limited, requiring enforcement if the decision derives from the parties' agreements rather than the arbitrator's personal judgment. The finality of arbitration means awards can only be overturned under exceptional circumstances, and courts cannot reassess the merits based on alleged factual errors or misinterpretations of agreements. In the present case, both parties agree on the existence of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that Ms. Parbhu violated the Tardiness and Absence Policy, which was in effect before the CBA. The stipulated issues for arbitration were whether her discharge was justified and what remedy should apply. King Soopers argues that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by reducing Ms. Parbhu's punishment from discharge to suspension, asserting that the Tardiness and Absence Policy, deemed unambiguous, mandates discharge for violations. The court will determine whether this policy is integral to the CBA and whether it is ambiguous, concluding that the Tardiness and Absence Policy is not part of the CBA.

King Soopers argues that the Tardiness and Absence Policy was integrated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under its Management Rights Clause. However, this policy was established before the CBA took effect on June 30, 1996, and the CBA includes an integration clause stating it encompasses all agreements between King Soopers and the Union, excluding pre-existing rules. Therefore, the Tardiness and Absence Policy is not part of the CBA. 

The case of Mountaineer Gas Co. v. Oil, Chemical, Atomic Workers Int’l Union is distinguished because, in that instance, the drug policy was enacted after the CBA was effective and was subject to arbitration. Similarly, the management rights clause in Sysco Food Services explicitly allowed the employer to create enforceable rules, which is not the case here, as the Management Rights Clause does not limit an arbitrator’s authority or imply that violations of prior rules warrant automatic discharge.

King Soopers’ references to Mistletoe Express and Kerr-McGee are also misplaced, as those cases involved explicit just cause provisions within their CBAs for employee discharge. In contrast, Ms. Parbhu’s termination is not based on a specific rule in the CBA that automatically justifies discharge. The primary issue for the arbitrator was whether her termination was for good and sufficient cause, as agreed upon by both parties.

The arbitrator's task was not to determine if Ms. Parbhu violated the Tardiness and Absence policy, which King Soopers implicitly acknowledged was not part of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Instead, the focus was on interpreting the ambiguous term "good and sufficient cause" in the CBA's Discharge and Discrimination Clause. The CBA allows the arbitrator to resolve disputes regarding its terms, notably that employees may be discharged for "good and sufficient cause." 

The arbitrator assessed external evidence to interpret this phrase, as permitted by Tenth Circuit law only in the context of ambiguous provisions. "Good and sufficient cause" lacks a definition or enumerated offenses in the CBA, making it ambiguous. The arbitrator's reliance on extrinsic evidence was justified, given the broader discretion afforded in this case compared to previous rulings, such as Mistletoe, which involved a more clearly defined "just cause" provision. 

King Soopers contended that the arbitrator overstepped by finding a violation of the Tardiness and Absence Policy but imposing a lesser sanction than prescribed. However, the primary question was whether "good and sufficient cause" existed for Ms. Parbhu's discharge. King Soopers' argument that a violation of the policy necessitated discharge is undermined by the absence of a clear definition or list of offenses in the CBA, indicating they intentionally left room for ambiguity.

King Soopers contracted for arbitration rather than federal court to resolve ambiguities in its collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The decision of the arbitrator is upheld based on Tenth Circuit precedent, particularly the case of Mistletoe, which allows an arbitrator to interpret a 'just cause' provision to include progressive discipline based on industry custom. The arbitrator determined that Ms. Parbhu’s conduct warranted only progressive discipline, not discharge, after reviewing both industry practices and King Soopers' policy implementation. This interpretation aligns with rulings from multiple other circuits affirming that if a CBA does not clearly define 'good and sufficient cause,' courts must defer to the arbitrator’s interpretation. The stipulated questions to the arbitrator indicated both parties recognized the authority to include a progressive discipline remedy. King Soopers failed to negotiate explicit rights for discharging employees for specific conduct within the CBA, and any conflict between its management rights and the 'good and sufficient cause' standard is appropriately within the arbitrator's purview. Given the deferential review standard, the arbitrator's decision is deemed reasonable. Consequently, the Union’s motion for summary judgment is granted, King Soopers’ motion is denied, and the Union is awarded judgment confirming the arbitrator’s ruling, while King Soopers' complaint to vacate the award is dismissed, and costs are awarded to the Union.