United States v. Blaine County

Citations: 157 F. Supp. 2d 1145; 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14985; 2001 WL 1028348Docket: No. CV99-122GFPMP

Court: District Court, D. Montana; July 23, 2001; Federal District Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

A Motion for Summary Judgment has been filed by Defendants Blaine County, Montana, and associated individuals in response to a lawsuit initiated by the United States. The United States claims that Blaine County’s at-large voting system discriminates against Native Americans, as evidenced by the absence of Native American County Commissioners in the county's history. The U.S. asserts that a shift to single-member districts could enable Native Americans to achieve a voting majority. The complaint cites a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, alleging that Native Americans have less opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.

Blaine County's motion argues that the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act are unconstitutional. The legal standard for granting a motion for summary judgment requires that there be no genuine issue as to any material fact, allowing for judgment as a matter of law. The moving party may rely on various forms of evidence including pleadings and affidavits. The Supreme Court has established that if the non-moving party cannot present specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial, summary judgment should be granted.

To prevent summary judgment, the non-moving party must provide specific facts that demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, beyond merely indicating a "metaphysical doubt" regarding material facts. The substantive law determines which facts are considered material, and all facts are viewed favorably towards the non-moving party. The moving party initially bears the burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, typically by indicating a lack of evidence supporting the non-moving party's claims. Once this burden is met, the onus shifts to the non-moving party to present specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. General allegations or denials are insufficient; specific facts must be supported by affidavits demonstrating personal knowledge.

Blaine County asserts that summary judgment is warranted on the grounds that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional, claiming it violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments by interfering with states’ rights to conduct elections. The Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965 to address barriers that disenfranchised black voters, with subsequent amendments in 1970 and 1975 aimed at new restrictive tactics. Prior to amendments in 1982, plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory intent, which was challenging. The 1982 amendments shifted the burden, allowing plaintiffs to demonstrate discriminatory results instead. The Act's constitutionality has faced multiple challenges, with the Supreme Court upholding it as an appropriate exercise of congressional power in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. The Eleventh Circuit also confirmed the constitutionality of the 1982 amendments in U.S. v. Marengo County Commission, validating the results standard over intent.

In Major v. Treen, the court affirmed the constitutionality of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, emphasizing Congress's authority under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to address state actions that perpetuate past discrimination, even if those actions do not directly violate Section 1. The Voting Rights Act's purpose is to combat minority vote dilution and ensure effective participation, not limited to formal barriers like literacy tests. The case of Jordan v. Winter highlighted racial bloc voting in Mississippi, demonstrating that racial considerations influence electoral outcomes.

Blaine County argues that the 1982 amendments are unconstitutional due to a lack of specific historical evidence of voting discrimination relevant to its jurisdiction. However, precedent confirms the validity of nationwide laws enacted by Congress, such as the ban on qualification tests established in Oregon v. Mitchell. Blaine County cites recent Supreme Court decisions that have constrained Congressional enforcement powers under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, notably City of Boerne v. Flores and Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett. These cases introduce a two-prong test of congruence and proportionality for evaluating Congressional actions, requiring a clear relationship between the legislative response and the discrimination addressed. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be assessed in relation to the specific harms they intend to remedy, with an understanding that strong measures for one issue may not be justified for another.

Congress can enact remedial laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, but these laws must closely relate to the specific harms they aim to address. The Supreme Court employs a two-prong test to evaluate such legislation, emphasizing proportionality as a critical component. Recent cases illustrate this principle. In *Boerne*, the Court ruled the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) unconstitutional because it lacked a factual basis for assessing discrimination and imposed limits beyond those guilty of discriminatory conduct. Similarly, the *Patent Remedy Act* was found unconstitutional in *Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank* due to its broad application against states without sufficient grounding in identified wrongs. The Court invalidated further Congressional acts, including the *Trademark Infringement Act* and the *Age Discrimination in Employment Act*, for similar reasons. In *U.S. v. Morrison*, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) because it targeted private conduct rather than state actions, highlighting that Section 5 enforcement focuses on state accountability. Lastly, in *Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett*, the Court ruled the Americans with Disabilities Act an excessive application of Section 5, noting that states are not mandated to provide special accommodations for disabled individuals if their actions are rationally based.

Legislation for special accommodations for the disabled must originate from positive law rather than Section 5 enforcement power. Congress did not establish a historical pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination against the disabled, which is necessary for Fourteenth Amendment legislation. Even if such discrimination existed, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) remedies are not congruent or proportional to the violations due to the ADA’s extensive requirements.

In contrast, the Voting Rights Act differs fundamentally as Congress had a substantial factual basis, including extensive records of voting discrimination against minorities, when enacting it and its amendments. Congress is not required to provide specific findings on the severity of voting discrimination each time it seeks to address an issue. The Act, originally aimed at African American discrimination in the 1960s, remains applicable for addressing discrimination against Native Americans, supported by historical evidence of voting discrimination against them.

The Voting Rights Act’s remedies are proportional to the harm, as affirmed by the Supreme Court's recognition of Congress's authority to enact national voting discrimination laws. The Act ensures equal opportunity for minority representation without guaranteeing it, contingent upon showing discriminatory results from suspect voting practices. The Voting Rights Act meets the congruence and proportionality requirements for Section 5 power.

Recent Supreme Court cases cited by Blaine County do not pertain to voting issues, which are central to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Court concludes that Congress did not exceed its authority in creating the Voting Rights Act, which aims to remedy voting discrimination. Consequently, Blaine County's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied, and no specific case has been cited that deems the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.