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Kenneth Moody v. State of Mississippi
Citation: Not availableDocket: 2001-KA-00779-SCT
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; April 12, 2001; Mississippi; State Supreme Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Kenneth Moody was indicted in 1995 on two counts of capital murder and one count of simple murder in Perry County, Mississippi. He entered a written "Memorandum of Understanding" on June 22, 1995, agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for the State not seeking the death penalty. The trial court rejected this agreement, leading to an interlocutory appeal in which the Supreme Court of Mississippi found the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to accept the plea. The case was reversed and remanded for the trial court to enforce the plea agreement. Upon remand, the trial court scheduled a hearing to accept Moody's guilty pleas, but Moody later chose not to fulfill the agreement's terms, despite initially expressing concern over the trial court's refusal to accept his pleas. Both the State and defense acknowledged that Moody did not offer his guilty pleas as required. Consequently, the State sought to revoke the Memorandum of Understanding, and on September 22, 1998, the trial judge declared it null and void due to Moody's failure to comply. In cause number 4856, Kenneth Moody was indicted on December 21, 2000, by the Perry County Grand Jury for two counts of capital murder: Count One for the murder of Robbie Bond during the commission of sexual battery, and Count Two for the murder of William Hatcher while similarly engaged. Following a change of venue, the trial occurred in the Second Judicial District of Harrison County from March 27 to April 7, 2001, presided over by Judge Richard W. McKenzie. The jury convicted Moody on both counts but could not reach a unanimous decision on sentencing, resulting in a life sentence without parole eligibility as mandated by law. Judge McKenzie ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Moody's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) or a new trial was denied, prompting his appeal for reversal of convictions and remand for a new trial. However, the court found no reversible error and affirmed the decision. The factual background includes concerns raised by friends of Hatcher and Bond about their absence from work on May 15, 1995. After searching, they discovered personal items belonging to Bond near Mahned Bridge. Subsequent investigations led to the arrival of law enforcement, who found evidence including a knife blade, hair, and bloodstains. Moody was questioned on May 18, 1995, following which he confessed to the murders after waiving his Miranda rights. His confession was partially admitted as evidence during the trial. Deborah Haller, a forensic scientist from the Mississippi Crime Lab, was requested to examine a blue pick-up truck and excavate graves on the Moody property. On May 18, 1995, she and her team discovered the body of an unclothed female, bound by jumper cables, and a clothed male beneath her. Testing of vaginal swabs from the female revealed seminal fluid, which was sent to Reliagene for DNA analysis. Forensic scientist Joe E. Andrews matched hairs from the truck to those of Bond. David Moody, also known as William David Moody, was indicted for his role in the crimes. After a change of venue, he was convicted of capital murder and accessory after the fact, receiving two consecutive life sentences, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 2002. A petition for writ of certiorari was denied in 2003. Dr. Steven Hayne performed autopsies on Bond and Hatcher, noting significant decomposition. Hatcher suffered multiple stab wounds, blunt force trauma to the head, and a skull fracture. Bond also had blunt force trauma, skull fractures, defensive injuries, and was missing her right thumb. Although no vaginal trauma was found, Dr. Hayne indicated that such trauma may not always be present in sexual assault cases. He observed bruises on Bond's thighs and larynx, suggesting forceful obstruction. The document raises a legal question regarding the trial judge's instruction to the jury about the presumption of innocence for the defendant. During jury voir dire, the trial judge mistakenly conflated the presumption of innocence with the directed verdict standard, stating that the defendant, Kenneth Moody, is presumed innocent until the state proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the state and that the defendant is not obligated to testify or present evidence. The presumption of innocence remains with Moody throughout the trial unless the state successfully overcomes it. The state later contended that Moody did not lodge a timely objection to the judge's comments, which prevented any opportunity for correction. When Moody finally objected, he claimed the judge’s statements misrepresented the law regarding the presumption of innocence and directed verdicts. The judge clarified that if the state fails to meet its burden, he would direct a verdict, rendering the presumption of innocence moot as the jury would not need to deliberate. In capital cases, the procedural bar may be relaxed due to the significant rights involved, as established in West v. State. The court has also allowed for relaxation of the procedural bar in instances of serious cumulative errors, as seen in Williams v. State. The application of a procedural bar is determined on a case-by-case basis, influenced by various factors, according to Pinkney v. State. In Hull v. State, the court declined to review jury comments made by the judge during voir dire because no objection was raised until after the jury was not present. The principle established in King v. State emphasizes that contemporaneous objections are necessary for preserving errors for appellate review, referencing Smith v. State. Numerous cases illustrate that failure to provide a contemporaneous objection results in the waiver of the issue on appeal. In Doss v. State, a lack of objection regarding the striking of jurors barred the issue from appeal. Similarly, in Irving v. State, a death penalty defendant's failure to object to jury racial composition waived that claim. Ballenger v. State reinforced this by ruling that not objecting to the repositioning of a juror forfeited the due process rights claim. In Simmons v. State, the court found no error when the trial judge disallowed the defense from labeling the defendant as "innocent," instead requiring the term "presumed innocent." The record indicates that the objection to the trial judge's comments made during voir dire was not contemporaneous. After these comments, the judge continued with the voir dire, assuring prospective jurors they would receive comprehensive legal instructions for their deliberations on Moody's guilt or innocence concerning two counts of capital murder. The judge also explored jurors' views on the death penalty, individually questioning some. Following a recess, defense counsel raised objections to the judge's earlier comments for the first time, which did not constitute a contemporaneous objection. The court found no error in the judge's comments. The judge acknowledged that if Moody's interpretation of his remarks was correct, it would signify a long-standing error on his part. Though one comment suggested that if the State did not meet its burden of proof, the judge would take the case from the jury, the overall context clarified that the burden remained with the State and the jury's responsibilities were clearly outlined. Moody was well-represented by experienced defense attorneys, who likely would have objected if they had perceived a significant error at the time. Jury Instructions C-3 and C-4, which emphasized the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, were provided without objection, reinforcing the notion that jurors are presumed to follow the judge's instructions. The objectionable comments occurred on the fourth day of voir dire, and given the extensive trial proceedings that followed, it is unlikely that these comments influenced the jury's verdicts. Thus, the assignment of error regarding the judge's comments is deemed without merit. The document also raises a separate issue regarding potential jury taint from pretrial publicity. Moody argues that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury venire against discussing the case or consuming media coverage during a recess. The judge acknowledged forgetting to provide this admonition at the end of the first day of jury voir dire. After extensive media coverage of the case, Moody's counsel moved to strike the entire jury venire, which was not sequestered. In response, the judge conducted a detailed voir dire to assess jurors' exposure to media coverage, categorizing them into those with knowledge of the case and those without. After seven days of voir dire, a jury was empaneled with only two jurors having any knowledge of the case. Both jurors assured the court of their ability to remain fair and impartial. Moody expressed concerns about a tainted jury pool and insisted that the entire panel should have been dismissed due to the initial oversight. However, after thorough individual questioning, juror Johnny Jefferson was found not to possess any prejudicial knowledge, only recognizing one of Moody’s attorneys from a television report. Juror Shellie O'Keefe acknowledged hearing vague details about the case but indicated she had no specific knowledge of the individuals involved and did not harbor any ill-will towards Moody, claiming she could remain impartial. The court noted that the assurances from jurors regarding their impartiality should be given significant weight, referencing previous case law that upheld the seating of jurors who experienced media exposure but maintained they could decide based solely on the evidence presented in court. In Earley v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed juror exposure to media about a case, affirming the trial judge's discretion not to grant a mistrial after discovering that one of several jurors had read a detrimental newspaper article post-jury selection. The trial judge's actions included polling jurors and dismissing the offending juror, leading to the upholding of Earley’s conviction. In contrast, Moody's case is not directly comparable because the questionable actions occurred during voir dire, before jurors were officially selected. The juror in Moody's case, O'Keefe, reported having heard extraneous facts but had not formed an opinion or known the names involved, differing from the context in Earley where a juror read specific prejudicial information after the trial commenced. The State referenced Mu'Min v. Virginia, highlighting that voir dire aims to ensure an impartial jury, with the critical consideration being whether jurors possess fixed opinions that could bias their judgment. The U.S. Supreme Court in Mu'Min ruled that mere exposure to media does not automatically violate due process, as seen when eight jurors had heard about the case but the court found no due process infringement. In Moody's case, only two jurors had heard vague details, and Moody failed to prove that this exposure caused serious or irreparable harm. Therefore, the issue regarding juror exposure to media was deemed without merit. The document also hints at a subsequent issue regarding the denial of additional peremptory challenges for the defendant. Moody contends that he was prejudiced by the necessity to use all his peremptory challenges to exclude jurors with knowledge of the case. The State counters that losing a peremptory challenge does not violate the right to an impartial jury, emphasizing that mere usage of such challenges does not equate to a constitutional rights violation. Both parties acknowledge that the trial judge granted each side an additional peremptory challenge, resulting in 19 strikes each instead of the standard 14 allowed in death penalty cases. The applicable rules stipulate that each side should receive 12 challenges for regular jurors and 2 for alternate jurors, but both Moody and the State received 21 challenges each. The excerpt references Mu'Min, which highlights the dual role of voir dire in ensuring an impartial jury and aiding in the exercise of peremptory challenges, affirming that jurors need not be entirely ignorant of the case. The document cites Mettetal v. State, asserting that the loss of a peremptory challenge does not equate to a denial of the constitutional right to an impartial jury, as long as the seated jury is impartial. A prerequisite for claiming a denial of constitutional rights due to a denied challenge for cause is that the defendant must have exhausted all peremptory challenges and been forced to accept an incompetent juror. Moody’s claims are weakened by the fact that through voir dire and the trial court's removal of jurors for cause, he ended up with a jury that included only two members who had heard anything about his case. Additionally, Moody likens his jury's composition to a prior case, Mhoon v. State, where the jury was deemed a statistical aberration due to the disproportionate number of law enforcement-related jurors. However, it is noted that Moody's jury did not exhibit such an imbalance. Moody contends that the State relies on the juror's oath to be fair and impartial, asserting that mere juror assurances do not guarantee unbiased decision-making. However, the record lacks any evidence suggesting jurors failed in their commitments. Moody also claims juror misconduct tainted the jury panel, citing incidents during voir dire where excused jurors allegedly advised others on how to evade jury duty. Although the judge had a plan to prevent jurors from mingling, misconduct occurred, prompting the judge to sequester excused jurors until voir dire concluded, while denying a defense motion to quash the jury venire. The State references Myers v. State to illustrate that the juror conduct in this case was not as egregious as in Myers, where a juror misrepresented critical information. In Myers, a juror failed to disclose her husband's criminal history, which warranted her dismissal. In contrast, there are no identified jurors in this case who lied or withheld information, distinguishing it from Myers. Moody's reference to Pulliam v. State, which allows for quashing a venire due to fraud or substantial prejudice, is unsupported by evidence of any such misconduct in the record. Judge McKenzie addressed concerns regarding juror conduct raised by Moody, implementing measures to contain excused jurors until voir dire was completed, and found no evidence of fraud or prejudice in the juror's behavior. Moody also claimed he was prejudiced by remarks made by a bailiff during voir dire, which were overheard by juror Anita Bland, who was later selected to serve on the jury. During an individual examination, Bland stated she heard the bailiff inquire about security measures, which led her to assume extra security was necessary due to the capital nature of the case, not because she perceived Moody as dangerous. She confirmed that this assumption did not affect her judgment regarding his presumption of innocence. Overall, her testimony indicated that she interpreted the bailiff's comments within the context of a serious case rather than as an implication of Moody's character. Bland affirmed her ability to remain impartial as a juror, stating she would not be swayed by the bailiff's comments, understood Moody's presumption of innocence, recognized the State's burden of proof, and would base her decision solely on the courtroom evidence and applicable law. Moody's attorney, Kirksey, referenced Rush v. State to argue that "overzealous security" affected the trial, citing that seeing a defendant in handcuffs warranted a new trial. However, the court found no prejudice in Rush, noting that handcuffs were not present in Moody's case. Judge McKenzie had ordered that Moody not be shackled in the jury's presence and limited law enforcement visibility, rendering this issue meritless. Regarding the admission of Moody's confession from May 18, 1995, he claimed it was coerced to protect his cousin from arrest. During the interview conducted by law enforcement, including Lt. Pickens and M/Sgt. Fortinberry, Moody was fully advised of his Miranda rights, which were read aloud to him with confirmation of his understanding at each step. After reviewing and signing the rights form, Moody provided incriminating statements, demonstrating his comprehension of the rights and the waiver process. Moody acknowledged understanding his rights through a standard waiver form and expressed a willingness to provide a statement without the presence of a lawyer, stating that no coercion or threats influenced his decision. During questioning, he expressed concern for his cousin Richie, asserting Richie’s innocence and indicating his willingness to speak only if Richie was released. Despite initial reluctance, Moody confessed to the murders, stating he felt guilty for implicating his cousin. He later referenced legal precedents emphasizing that a confession must be voluntary and not obtained through promises or threats, citing Layne v. State and Abram v. State regarding the necessity of voluntariness. He also mentioned Barnes v. State, which highlighted that confessions made to benefit a third party are inadmissible, reinforcing the principle that a confession under duress or in exchange for leniency is not considered free and voluntary. Moody's claims regarding law enforcement conduct during his confession are found to be unsubstantiated. The court noted that the actions of the officers did not reach the level of egregiousness seen in prior case law, specifically Barnes. During the confession interview, there were no threats or promises made to Moody, and no evidence suggested that his cousin Richard was being held to coerce a confession. The officers only indicated that if Richard was innocent, he would be released after Moody provided information. Moody initially denied involvement in the murders but later engaged in a discussion about Richard's innocence, prompting a response from law enforcement that emphasized the need for Moody to share details about the events in question. The officers maintained that they could not release any individual until their investigation confirmed that person’s lack of involvement in the crimes. The criteria for determining the voluntariness of confessions were referenced, explaining that the State must prove voluntariness without coercion or reward. The State made a prima facie case on this matter, supported by testimonies from law enforcement officials present during the confession, thus warranting further judicial review of the confession’s admissibility. The trial court's evidentiary hearing followed standard protocol, ensuring that any claims of coercion by the defense were properly addressed. Fortinberry informed Moody that if his cousin was uninvolved, he would not face charges, clarifying this was not an inducement to speak. Lt. Pickens advised Moody of his rights, and Sheriff Herring noted Moody showed no signs of impairment. Both Deputy Sheriff Smith and Lt. Pickens confirmed that no promises were made to Moody regarding his confession. M/Sgt. Fortinberry supported their accounts. After a suppression hearing, Judge McKenzie ruled that the State proved the confession's voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the circumstances. The decision followed legal standards, and the appellate court would not reverse it unless manifestly erroneous. Moody's claim that the trial judge erred by allowing the State to rehabilitate Lt. Pickens' testimony was also addressed; during cross-examination, Pickens initially stated uncertainty about the number of arrests made on May 18, 1995, indicating two or three individuals were taken into custody. Three individuals were taken into custody, with two confirmed arrests related to the crime in question. The witness, a law enforcement official, indicated that Richard Moody was a suspect both at the time of the crime and presently. However, confusion arose when the witness mistakenly mixed up Richard Moody with another individual, David Moody, which led to a clarification session outside the jury's presence. The court acknowledged the witness's confusion and expressed concern about how to address it before the jury. The witness clarified that while Richard Moody was taken into custody, he was never charged, and the investigation did not yield further evidence implicating him. The prosecution's questioning of the witness was scrutinized by the defense, which objected to potential coaching of the witness after the confusion was identified. The court noted the unusual nature of the situation and the witness's reluctance to provide information due to the prior admonition against mentioning David Moody. The exchange highlighted the challenges in ensuring the witness provided accurate testimony without inadvertently introducing prejudice against Richard Moody. MR. PRICE requested to clarify a misunderstanding regarding which Moody was charged in the case, stating that it was David and not Richard. He argued that the jury's exposure to this confusion was unfair. The issue was resolved without the jury present, after which Deputy Pickens confirmed his confusion about Richard Moody's involvement. Defense counsel, MR. KIRKSEY, objected when questions about Richard's involvement in the crime were posed, but the court permitted the questioning despite acknowledging the procedural irregularity. Moody's counsel then sought a mistrial, accusing the judge of disregarding the law and improperly assisting the prosecution. The judge admonished the counsel for their conduct and recess was called before tensions escalated. Counsel cited West v. State, asserting that the judge's involvement warranted a mistrial, referencing a case where a murder conviction was reversed due to the judge's excessive intervention on behalf of the prosecution. However, it was concluded that the trial judge's conduct in this case did not parallel that in West. Throughout the trial, the judge maintained caution and did not demonstrate an intention to try the prosecution's case. The judge had a duty to ensure compliance with prior admonishments regarding witness testimony. Instances of confusion were addressed by dismissing the jury to prevent violations of the court's directives. The prosecutor, however, indicated that he could resolve the confusion without a recess. The trial judge had previously instructed that no witness could testify about matters related to Angela Freeman, David Moody, or Kenneth Moody. During a recess initiated by Judge McKenzie, the prosecutor requested to ask a witness a clarifying question, asserting that it would resolve confusion regarding the identification of one of the Moodys. Despite this, the judge aimed to uphold his earlier admonishment, which ultimately favored Moody, despite criticism from him. The dynamics of the trial indicated that the judge sought to prevent any potential "coaching" of witnesses during recesses, a concern rooted in procedural and evidentiary rules. The judge's decision to recess was met with disapproval from both defense and prosecution, with the prosecutor deeming it "unfair." Upon the resumption of testimony, the judge offered defense counsel the opportunity for surrebuttal, which was declined. The passage references similar cases, such as Jasper v. State, where a judge's actions outside the jury's presence, though viewed negatively, did not result in reversible error. Another case cited, Williams v. State, involved prosecution misconduct through witness coaching, leading to a reversal and remand for a new trial. In Williams, the District Attorney improperly signaled a witness during cross-examination, which created an appearance of bias and led to a reversal of the decision. In contrast, the current case does not present similar impropriety, as no actions occurred that would warrant a reversal. Moody challenges the validity of his indictment for capital murder, arguing that linking the murder of William Hatcher to the sexual battery of Robbie Bond is flawed since they are distinct victims. The indictment specifies that Moody allegedly killed Hatcher while committing sexual battery against Bond. Mississippi law (Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-19(2)(e)) defines capital murder as including killings committed during certain felonies, including sexual battery. Moody's argument that he could not have committed sexual battery while simultaneously murdering Hatcher is rejected. Legal precedent supports that actions leading to the underlying felony are included in the capital murder charge, and the timing of the death relative to the underlying felony does not invalidate the charge. The "one continuous transaction" rationale in Mississippi law further supports the indictment's validity. Moody's argument that his actions did not elevate the murder of Hatcher to capital murder due to the timing of the sexual battery on Bond is rejected. The legal principle established in related cases is that the res gestae of a crime includes events leading up to, during, and immediately after the felony, without a necessary completion of the underlying crime for the felony-murder doctrine to apply. A break in the chain of events, such as abandonment of the original crime, would exclude subsequent homicides from the felony-murder statute, but in this case, Moody's actions were continuous—he killed Hatcher and immediately thereafter sexually assaulted and killed Bond, fulfilling the criteria for capital murder. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence for Hatcher's murder, Moody contends that the State did not prove Hatcher was killed during the commission of a sexual battery on Bond. However, the legal standard requires reviewing all evidence in favor of the verdict. The court emphasizes its limited authority to overturn the jury's decision unless substantial evidence shows that reasonable jurors could not have found Moody guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The cases cited establish that if evidence supports the jury's verdict, it should not be disturbed by the appellate court. Moody contends that Hatcher was deceased at the time the sexual battery against Bond occurred, asserting that this precludes capital murder charges since his intent to sexually batter Bond could not have existed prior to Hatcher's murder. He cites Dr. Steven Hayne's testimony indicating that Hatcher was likely rendered unconscious immediately and died shortly thereafter. The State counters that Moody's intent can be inferred from his actions, as incapacitating Hatcher was necessary for the assault on Bond, supporting the jury's conclusion that this was Moody's intent. Moody argues that there was a temporal gap where he could not have formed the intent to batter Bond until after Hatcher's death. However, the State maintains that the acts against Hatcher and Bond were interconnected, constituting a continuous crime, with ample evidence for the jury to determine that Moody had the requisite intent prior to Hatcher’s murder. Moody references Walker v. State, arguing that his case relies solely on circumstantial evidence of intent, which he claims does not meet the standards set in Walker. The court disagrees, referencing its own precedents that establish intent can be inferred from a defendant’s actions and surrounding circumstances, even without explicit declarations of intent. Consequently, the court concludes that Moody's intent to assault Bond was sufficiently demonstrated through his actions and contextual evidence. Additionally, Moody challenges the admissibility of Jody Newell's testimony regarding vaginal swabs and slides taken from Bond, arguing she lacked direct involvement and specific recollection of the samples. Newell, however, confirmed her presence during the autopsy and her knowledge of the standard procedures followed, despite not recalling the specific case. The court finds this testimony permissible. M.R.E. 602 restricts witness testimony to matters where the witness has personal knowledge, which may be supported by their own testimony. This rule is complemented by M.R.E. 703 regarding expert opinion testimony. The admissibility of evidence is largely at the trial court's discretion, with reversals occurring only in cases of abuse that prejudices the accused. The trial judge must operate within the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting Newell's testimony, as she possessed the necessary personal knowledge, despite her lack of recall regarding a specific autopsy. Regarding the admissibility of DNA identification testimony from Gina Pineda, Moody objected on the grounds that Reliagene lacked a reliable scientific test for low-level contaminated and degraded samples and that its methods were not widely accepted. However, Pineda testified that the typing kit used would not produce false results, only no results for degraded DNA, aligning with FBI standards. She also noted Reliagene's accreditation from recognized organizations that set guidelines for DNA testing. Moody's argument for the necessity of in-house validation studies was countered by Pineda’s confirmation of such studies being conducted by Reliagene, including degradation studies. Counsel for Moody contended that Pineda's testimony indicated Reliagene lacked accredited protocols for testing mixed, degraded low-level DNA samples. In response, the State's attorney asserted that Pineda had confirmed the lab's accreditation and the completion of validation studies for mixed samples. The trial judge acknowledged this testimony. Dr. Craig Cohen, a genetics expert called by the defense, affirmed that Reliagene performed excellently overall, acknowledging only one problematic sample out of 30 to 40 tested. Regarding the admission of evidence, it was noted that a trial judge's decision would not be reversed unless there was prejudice to the accused, and the trial judge did not abuse discretion in allowing Pineda's testimony. Moody also claimed he should have received a circumstantial evidence instruction concerning sexual battery, arguing his confession lacked admissions to that charge and that there was no direct evidence. Although Dr. Hayne testified there was no vaginal trauma, he also indicated that such trauma could be absent in premenopausal women following a sexual assault. Contrarily, forensic serologist Franovich found intact sperm on vaginal slides, contradicting Moody’s assertion of only seminal fluid. Furthermore, Moody's confession to capital murders was considered direct evidence. The totality of the evidence, including testimonies from Dr. Hayne and Franovich, supported the conclusion that sufficient evidence for sexual battery existed, making a circumstantial evidence instruction unnecessary. The court reiterated that any evidentiary weight issues were within the jury's purview. The case is characterized as one of direct evidence, negating the need for a circumstantial evidence instruction. Moody's appeal concerning the denial of a manslaughter instruction for the second count of the indictment is procedurally barred due to his failure to object at trial. Moody claims he deserved an instruction on heat of passion manslaughter, citing Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-35, but his confession does not support this claim. The distinction between murder and manslaughter lies in the presence of deliberation and malice, which Moody's actions do not demonstrate. The relevant case law establishes that lesser-included offense instructions should only be granted when there is evidentiary support, and the court finds no such basis in this case. The refusal to grant the manslaughter instruction is deemed proper, as the record does not indicate provocation for Moody's violent behavior. After reviewing the record and applicable law, the court finds no reversible error and affirms Moody's convictions and sentences for two counts of capital murder, with life sentences running consecutively.