Hutchinson v. Hamlet

Citation: 243 F. App'x 238Docket: No. 06-16452

Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; July 3, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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Respondent Warden Jim Hamlet appeals the district court’s decision to grant Michael Hutchinson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, which found ineffective assistance of counsel during Hutchinson’s state court robbery trial. The district court determined that the state court’s ruling to the contrary was an unreasonable application of established federal law (Strickland v. Washington). While the State acknowledges trial counsel's deficient performance, it argues that Hutchinson's claim is unexhausted due to the introduction of new expert testimony in federal court not presented in state court, asserting that this did not prejudice Hutchinson. Conversely, Hutchinson contends that the expert testimony did not fundamentally change his claim, thus maintaining exhaustion, and the district court agreed that he was indeed prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to present the testimony.

The expert testimony from Gregg Stutchman, a photogrammetry expert, was introduced during the federal proceedings, analyzing crime-scene photographs. Stutchman concluded the suspect was too short to be Hutchinson, a claim unsupported by any expert evidence presented by the State. The district court found Stutchman credible and persuasive, while also criticizing Hutchinson's trial counsel as lacking credibility and being biased. Consequently, the failure to investigate and present the expert testimony was deemed to undermine confidence in the verdict, warranting habeas relief.

Given the filing date of Hutchinson’s petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the exhaustion of state remedies was necessary, defined as presenting the claim fairly to state courts. Although new evidence is typically not considered if it significantly alters a claim, the court acknowledged that additional evidence could be reviewed if it does not change the claim's fundamental nature.

Hutchinson is eligible for habeas relief if the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of established federal law, as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, according to 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The Strickland standard is recognized as established law for these purposes. A federal habeas court can grant relief if the state court identifies the correct legal principle but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the case. Federal court reviews of district court decisions on habeas petitions are generally conducted de novo, with factual findings reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. If state courts deny a habeas petition without explanation, an independent review is necessary to assess their application of federal law. 

Regarding Hutchinson’s case, the district court correctly found that he exhausted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in state court, as the expert testimony presented did not fundamentally alter his claim but rather reinforced it. Hutchinson had actively sought funds for expert testimony throughout state proceedings and had consistently argued that his height precluded him from being the robbery perpetrator. This distinguishes his case from Aiken v. Spalding and Nevius v. Sumner, where new evidence was introduced much later without prior state court mention or relevance to the original trial context. In contrast, Hutchinson’s expert testimony was based on evidence available during his original trial and supported by his previous requests and actions in state court.

In Nevius, the court dismissed an argument that relied on unmentioned evidence, which had not been pursued in state courts. Conversely, Hutchinson made efforts to present expert testimony in state court, enhancing his petition with detailed insights regarding his counsel's investigation and the potential contributions of an expert. The court noted that including expert evidence does not make a claim unexhausted if the petitioner sought to introduce it in state court, confirming that Hutchinson met the exhaustion requirement.

Furthermore, the district court found that the California appellate courts misapplied Strickland by not recognizing ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice in Hutchinson’s case. The evidence against Hutchinson lacked corroboration from physical or forensic sources, leading the court to view his case as weak. The credibility of the defense expert's testimony was affirmed, especially since the State did not present evidence to counter these expert conclusions. The court criticized the State's speculation regarding the expert's accuracy as insufficient.

Had Hutchinson's trial counsel introduced expert testimony supporting a height defense, it could have corroborated Hutchinson's testimony and undermined the credibility of the sole eyewitness, whose account contained inconsistencies and who had been dismissed for cash register shortages, as well as contradicting the testimonies of non-eyewitnesses. The court recognized that failing to present evidence that effectively challenges the prosecution's case is prejudicial, regardless of eyewitness identifications or confessions against the defendant.

Consequently, the district court's finding of prejudice due to counsel's inadequate performance in not presenting expert testimony was upheld, entitling Hutchinson to habeas relief. The judgment of the district court was affirmed, and the State did not contest the credibility finding on appeal. This ruling is not precedential except as specified by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.