Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit; July 12, 2007; Federal Appellate Court
Dawn Dillon, a former paraprofessional at Twin Peaks Charter Academy, appeals the district court's summary judgment favoring the Academy and St. Vrain Valley School District No. RE-1J. Dillon's lawsuit, filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges violations of her First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights related to her non-renewal of employment. She claims retaliation for exercising her rights to free speech and association, illegal prior restraint on these rights, and deprivation of procedural due process concerning her non-renewal and an adverse performance evaluation that harmed her future employment prospects. Additionally, she raises state law claims for breach of contract and estoppel. The Academy, a K-8 charter school in Longmont, Colorado, operated under the District's charter, with Dr. Dorothy Marlatt as principal during the relevant period.
Dillon's employment began in 1997 without a written contract, and her early performance evaluations were satisfactory. However, tensions arose in fall 1998 when six teachers, including Dillon, began meeting off-campus to discuss operational concerns about the Academy, despite Dr. Marlatt's orders against such discussions. During a December 1998 meeting, Dillon voiced concerns regarding inadequate support for middle school teachers. Following continued off-campus meetings, the teachers received unfavorable performance reviews, ultimately resigning in March 1999, just after Dr. Marlatt's resignation. The court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the case.
Ms. Dillon was offered a vacated teaching position by the Board, which she declined. On April 15, 1999, six teachers announced their intent to sue the Academy on various federal and state claims. In May 1999, interim administrator Ivan Adams recommended to the Board that Ms. Dillon and another paraprofessional, David Hardy, not be renewed for the following school year, citing mediocre performance ratings and concerns about Ms. Dillon's vocal opposition to Board policies, which he claimed fostered divisiveness among staff. The Board accepted this recommendation in an executive session, influenced by testimonies that Ms. Dillon had associated with the suing teachers and attended off-campus meetings.
On June 4, 1999, Adams informed Ms. Dillon of his non-renewal recommendation, attributing it to her associations and a disruptive relationship with Mr. Hardy. Following this, Ms. Dillon expressed her belief that the non-renewal was unjust and indicated her intent to sue. She formally filed her lawsuit on December 27, 1999. The Academy and the District filed for summary judgment on August 31, 2000. In a ruling on March 28, 2006, the district court granted summary judgment for the Academy, dismissing the District's motion as moot. The court found that the topics discussed by Ms. Dillon and the other teachers were not of public concern and that Ms. Dillon did not demonstrate an adverse employment action linked to her speech or associations. Furthermore, it determined she had no protected property interest in her employment, undermining her procedural due process claims, and rejected her liberty interest and contract claims, citing her status as an at-will employee.
On appeal, Ms. Dillon contends that the district court erred in its conclusions regarding public concern and adverse employment actions, asserting that the Academy's actions amounted to illegal prior restraint and that promises made by the Academy should have established a protected property interest.
Ms. Dillon contends that statements in her performance evaluation by the Academy were disseminated to the District, adversely affecting her job prospects. She argues the district court improperly dismissed her state law claims, overlooking evidence of the Academy’s conduct and prior commitments. The court reviews summary judgment de novo, affirming it only if no genuine material facts exist, and it must ensure that First Amendment rights are not infringed upon.
Dillon presents three First Amendment claims: retaliation for free speech, retaliation for free association, and an illegal prior restraint on speech and association due to Dr. Marlatt’s directives. The court previously dismissed her free speech claim, citing that the discussions were not of public concern and that she had not experienced an adverse employment action. However, some topics discussed meet the Garcetti/Pickering standards for protected speech. Nonrenewal of her contract, if linked to her protected speech, qualifies as an adverse action under First Amendment retaliation claims, which do not rely solely on property interest in employment.
Additionally, Dillon's freedom of association claim is treated as part of her free speech claim. The court found this claim failed as she was not associating over public concerns and did not experience an adverse employment action.
Ms. Dillon's association to discuss public concerns supports her First Amendment retaliation claims, including both freedom of association and freedom of speech. Her non-renewal constitutes an adverse employment action sufficient for these claims to proceed past summary judgment. Additionally, she presents a distinct prior restraint claim, arguing that it chills potential speech before it occurs, a point not addressed by the district court. The matter is remanded for the court to evaluate this claim under relevant precedents.
Regarding her procedural due process claim, Ms. Dillon contends that her employment was terminated without just cause and without notice of the reasons for this termination. Courts must determine if she had a protected interest that warranted due process protections and, if so, whether she received adequate process. Due process typically requires a meaningful hearing before depriving an individual of a protected interest. In Colorado, absent a specific enactment, at-will employees lack a property right in continued employment. Ms. Dillon, having no written contract, is presumed to be an at-will employee, as indicated by the Academy's charter, which specifically states that all service providers are at-will and cannot alter this employment nature. Colorado law restricts government entities in their contractual obligations, and those dealing with such entities are deemed to have constructive knowledge of these limitations, negating any claims of justifiable reliance on contrary statements.
The excerpt addresses several claims made by Ms. Dillon against the Academy related to her employment and non-renewal. It references a case (Kirkland) where the court held that a school district could not be bound by an administrator’s promise regarding an employee’s salary due to the at-will nature of employment, which applies to Ms. Dillon. Her procedural due process claim regarding non-renewal is dismissed because she was an at-will employee and could not justifiably rely on contrary assurances.
Ms. Dillon also alleges violations of her procedural due process rights concerning unprocessed grievances, but this claim fails as the Academy’s grievance policy does not create a property interest, aligning with precedent (Wells v. Hico Independent School District). Furthermore, she claims her performance evaluation by Mr. Adams contained stigmatizing remarks that harmed her future employment prospects, amounting to a deprivation of a protected liberty interest. However, the court found that these statements were not publicly disclosed, which is necessary for such a claim to hold, as established in Watson v. University of Utah Medical Center. Ms. Dillon failed to provide evidence that the statements were communicated outside the Academy.
In her breach of contract claim, Ms. Dillon argues that the Academy did not follow its grievance policy after her oral complaint regarding her non-renewal. However, since she was an at-will employee, the Academy was legally entitled to terminate her employment at any time, which undermines her contract claim.
The Board was not required to provide a rationale for its decision not to renew Ms. Dillon's employment due to the at-will nature of her position. Ms. Dillon's estoppel claim, based on an alleged promise of non-retaliation for raising concerns at a Board meeting, was deemed waived as she offered minimal argument and no legal authority in her appellate brief. The Academy contended it should not be liable under Section 1983, asserting there was no official policy or custom that violated Ms. Dillon's rights, referencing established legal precedents that require a direct link between an entity's actions and alleged constitutional violations. The district court did not address the Academy's policy argument, leaving it open for consideration on remand. The district court found the District's motion for summary judgment moot, but since the appellate court disagreed with the dismissal of certain claims, the District may reassert its motion on remand. The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment on procedural due process, contract, and estoppel claims while reversing it concerning retaliation claims related to freedom of speech and association, remanding the prior restraint claim for further proceedings. The ruling is not binding precedent apart from certain legal doctrines but can be cited for persuasive value. Additionally, Ms. Dillon's discussions, although supportive of teachers, did not rise to matters of public concern as defined by precedent, and her role as a teacher's aide made the Garcetti analysis from a related case applicable here.
