Shelby Michael Townsend v. Cathy Rose Woods Townsend Kinningham

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2002-CA-02087-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; November 7, 2002; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Supreme Court of Mississippi case no. 2002-CA-02087-SCT involves Shelby Michael Townsend and Cathy Rose Woods Townsend (Kinningham). The court affirmed the Chancery Court's denial of Michael's motion to modify their final divorce judgment, which had been issued on April 4, 1997, after Cathy filed for divorce citing uncondoned adultery. The divorce decree, which included a memorandum of understanding regarding retirement benefits, presented conflicting terms: the memorandum referred to the benefits as a property interest, while the decree classified them as alimony. Following Cathy's remarriage in May 2002, Michael sought to modify the judgment to eliminate alimony payments and other obligations. Chancellor James H.C. Thomas, who presided over both the divorce and the modification motion, ruled that the memorandum accurately represented the equitable distribution of marital assets, and the decree's wording was erroneous. The court also noted that issues regarding life insurance coverage were not appropriately presented for appellate review. The key issues on appeal were whether the chancery court erred in denying the modification and whether it improperly amended the final judgment. The court concluded that the chancellor's ruling stood correct.

The Court's standard of review for a chancellor's opinion is limited, only overturning it when there is substantial evidence to support the opinion, unless the chancellor abused discretion, was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard. The Court reviews chancellor decisions under an abuse of discretion standard and legal questions de novo. The Memorandum Opinion addresses two main issues: grounds for divorce and equitable distribution of property, noting an agreed personal property settlement and identifying USAF retirement benefits. Clear evidence presented in court showed that the plaintiff contributed significantly to the marriage, facilitating the defendant's educational and career advancements, and thus she is entitled to $1,000 monthly from the retirement benefits. The memorandum affirms the plaintiff's entitlement to health benefits under CHAMPUS and requires the defendant to maintain a $500,000 life insurance policy, designating the plaintiff and their children as beneficiaries. The defendant's counsel is instructed to prepare a judgment consistent with this opinion. The final judgment of divorce states that both real and personal property, including USAF retirement benefits, were accumulated during the marriage, and confirms the plaintiff's entitlement to $1,000 monthly alimony from the military retirement benefits, with the Memorandum Opinion incorporated as part of the judgment.

The chancellor denied the motion for modification of the final judgment of divorce, affirming that the memorandum accurately represented the equitable distribution of marital assets, while the final decree mischaracterized the court's intent with "improper wording." Chancellor Thomas, who oversaw the divorce proceedings, stated that the final judgment awarded Plaintiff $1,000 per month from Defendant's military retirement as alimony. Plaintiff remarried on May 27, 2002, prompting the dispute regarding the nature of the monthly payment. Plaintiff argued that the term "alimony" was incorrectly used and contested that the payment should be viewed as property distribution. Defendant contended that alimony ceases upon remarriage and highlighted that the time limit for correcting the judgment error under Rule 60(b)(6) had expired. The chancellor noted that the final judgment, dated April 4, 1997, incorporated the March 13, 1997 Memorandum Opinion, which accurately reflected the court's intent and equitable distribution. The court accepted responsibility for the incorrect labeling of the payment but asserted that the memorandum's findings should prevail when interpreting the two documents together. The motion for modification was ultimately denied, with Defendant arguing that Plaintiff's failure to appeal the final judgment constituted acceptance of its language. Additionally, he claimed that the chancellor should have directed a re-drafting of the judgment if it was deemed inconsistent with the memorandum, but since he did not, the judgment as written was upheld.

Michael's argument is primarily focused on Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which outlines the conditions under which a court may correct clerical mistakes or relieve a party from a final judgment. Rule 60(a) allows for corrections of clerical errors at any time before the record is sent to the appellate court. Rule 60(b) provides specific grounds for relief from a judgment, including fraud, newly discovered evidence, and other justifiable reasons, but limits motions based on the first three grounds to within six months of the judgment. Michael contends that Cathy failed to request modification within the six-month timeframe, waiting over five years post-judgment. He argues that her only recourse would be under Rule 60(b)(6), which requires exceptional circumstances, a standard Cathy cannot meet, as supported by the case Mitchell v. Nelson. In that case, the court denied relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for failure to demonstrate due diligence regarding newly discovered evidence. Cathy argues that the chancellor corrected a clerical mistake made by Michael's attorney in the divorce decree and claims entitlement to property acquired during their marriage. She references the chancellor's memorandum indicating that her property interest was measurable and contingent upon Michael's death, with life insurance benefits as a substitute. Cathy asserts that the correction of the clerical mistake is permissible under M.R.C.P. 60(a) and Miss. Code Ann. 93-5-23 (Supp. 2003).

Rule 60(a) provides a mechanism for correcting clerical errors in judgments and trial records, while errors of a more substantive nature must adhere to MRCP 59(e) or 60(b). The rule is designed solely to ensure that documents reflect the original intent and cannot be used to alter the intended meaning. Historical Mississippi practice, supported by statutes such as Miss.Code Ann. 11-1-19 and cases like Ralph v. Prester, confirms that this rule is limited to corrections of judgments and cannot create judgments that were never issued. There are no time constraints for making these corrections, as all courts possess the inherent authority to rectify clerical mistakes at any time.

The Court has reinforced that the power under Rule 60(a) cannot be employed to change a judgment’s effect unless such a change is evident from the record, as illustrated in Whitney Nat. Bank of New Orleans v. Smith. Additionally, in Dilling v. Dilling, a property agreement conflict highlighted that clarity in legal documents is essential. The case involved a dispute regarding mortgage payments and equity distribution, where testimony indicated confusion over the terms. The chancellor recognized a mistake in the agreement, ordering the husband to pay the mortgage. The Mississippi Supreme Court has historically recognized that property settlements in divorce decrees, while resembling contracts, are not modifiable unless reformed for clarity. Section 93-5-2 of the Mississippi Code mandates the settlement of property rights, which can be incorporated into divorce decrees.

In Johnson v. Consolidated American Life Ins. Co., the Mississippi Supreme Court established that contract reformation is permissible only under two conditions: (1) if a mutual mistake occurs, or (2) if one party makes a mistake accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct from the other party. A mistake justifying reformation must relate to the drafting of the contract, not simply its formation. For instance, in Sunnybrook Children's Home, a scrivener's error justified reformation of a land deed to reflect the grantor’s true intent. 

In the case of the Dillings' property settlement agreement, the Court of Appeals confirmed that substantial evidence supported the chancellor’s decision to reform the contract due to a drafting mistake. Ms. Dilling's financial testimony indicated her inability to cover the marital home’s expenses, leading to the conclusion that the agreement needed modification. Even if the error was solely Ms. Dilling's due to her attorney's omission, Mr. Dilling's conduct was deemed inequitable, particularly his acceptance of a disproportionate share of the marital home’s equity without justification.

Additionally, the Court addressed whether Rule 60 provided the authority for the chancellor to amend the property agreement. It clarified that Rule 60 is not the only source of authority for adjusting divorce judgments. Section 93-5-2(2) allows for the modification of judgments incorporating property settlement agreements, and Section 93-5-23 grants the court discretion to make equitable orders regarding maintenance and alimony, permitting future modifications as necessary.

Rule 81 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure states that these rules have limited application in actions governed by statutory procedures, particularly in divorce cases under Title 93 of the Mississippi Code. The Mississippi Supreme Court has established that the procedural provisions of Title 93 limit the applicability of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which only apply where the divorce statute is silent. In the case of Dillings, the Court affirmed the chancellor's authority to modify the divorce judgment based on sections 93-5-2(2) and 93-5-23, following the reformation of the property settlement agreement, which was supported by substantial evidence. The Court referenced *Palmere v. Curtis*, where it was determined that a court cannot alter the terms of an existing contract without the consent of both parties. Cathy argued that the chancellor correctly ruled against modifying the earlier ruling by adding the term "alimony." She distinguished between Rule 60(a), which clarifies original intentions, and Rule 60(b), which allows changes to clear but incorrect judgments. Cathy claimed that adding "alimony" was not a clerical error and, if deemed so, Rule 60(b)(6) applies, as it allows changes without a time limit under exceptional circumstances. Additionally, she argued that the inclusion of "alimony" altered the meaning from the original memorandum and was inconsistent with due process, suggesting the final judgment should be void under Rule 60(b)(4).

The Court determined that a memorandum granted Cathy a property interest in retirement benefits, specifically $1,000 monthly, following her contributions to the marriage, including support during Michael's college and raising their children. The chancellor clarified that the USAF benefits were categorized as "other items of property" distinct from the personal property settlement. He mandated that Michael maintain a life insurance policy with proceeds divided between Cathy and their children, given the retirement benefits would end upon his death. 

Upon reviewing Michael's motion for modification, the chancellor noted that the final divorce decree mischaracterized the $1,000 payment as alimony instead of property distribution. He reaffirmed the memorandum as the accurate reflection of the court's intent regarding equitable distribution. The Court found Michael's argument that the alimony ceased upon Cathy's remarriage to be unfounded. 

It emphasized that Rule 60(a) does not allow substantive changes to judgments but permits corrections of clerical errors without time limits. The Court supported the chancellor's decision, confirming that the original intent was to award Cathy a property interest in retirement benefits, and upheld the denial of Michael's motion for modification. The ruling was affirmed with concurrence from multiple justices.