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Taylor v. Benham
Citations: 46 U.S. 233; 12 L. Ed. 130; 5 How. 233; 1847 U.S. LEXIS 314
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; February 18, 1847; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
William T. Taylor, George Taylor, William Primrose, Andeliza (his wife), George Porter (and Elspet, his wife), William Rainey, Alexander Rainey, and Elizabeth Rainey filed a legal complaint against Vincent M. Benham, the administrator of Samuel Savage's estate. The case, originating from the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, involved cross appeals concerning allegations of financial mismanagement and neglect of property by Samuel Savage, who had served as executor of William F. Taylor’s estate. The complaint asserted that Savage failed to account for funds received during his tenure as executor and neglected lands in Kentucky, resulting in their loss. The case was complex, involving extensive documentation and evidence. It was divided into two main claims: one related to transactions in South Carolina, where William F. Taylor resided and died, and another related to the management of property in Kentucky. William F. Taylor had been naturalized in South Carolina in 1796 and died in 1811, leaving a will that was probated shortly after his death. His surviving siblings, Samuel and Mary Taylor, had children who became parties to the lawsuit. The will required the sale of Taylor's property under specific terms, including credit arrangements for both personal and real property, and included provisions for legacies to individuals, including a legacy to his enslaved woman, Sylvia. Further details of the will were outlined in subsequent sections. The remainder of the testator's estate, after fulfilling prior legacies, is bequeathed to his brother Samuel Taylor and sister Mary Taylor, to be divided equally, contingent upon both being alive at the time of death and having descendants. Should either sibling die without issue, the survivor or their descendants will inherit the entire estate equally. The testator appoints four executors: Samuel Savage, Patrick McDowell, Duncan Matheson, and William Ross, revoking any previous wills. None are required to post a bond as per state law. The estate's settlement includes an initial inventory on September 30, 1811, followed by a second inventory totaling $808.12 on January 18, 1812. The executors sold property worth $24,011.46 in January 1812, and while McDowell ceased participation, Savage, Matheson, and Ross submitted separate accounts. Matheson reported a balance of $281.76 due to the estate on March 30, 1813. Ross submitted three accounts from 1813 to 1815, indicating balances due totaling $16,427.20, but it is unclear what happened to these funds, and the complainants disavowed claims against Ross. Savage filed ten accounts from 1813 to 1818, with the final account detailing various expenses and a significant cash disbursement of $10,037.36 to parties interested in the estate. On March 14, 1818, the estate's balance is calculated at $9,966.97 1/2, with additional cash received from administrators L. Hammond ($180.00) and Wm. Hall ($246.45 following a compromise), totaling $10,393.42 1/2. After deducting $349.87 1/2, the final balance is $10,043.55. This account was filed on April 22, 1818, with all items verified by executor Samuel Savage, signed by Jon Simkins, O. E. D. Alongside, a receipt confirms that Samuel Taylor, William Rainey, and Mary Rainey received $10,037.36 in full settlement of the estate's administration. Earlier, on February 14, 1815, Savage petitioned a South Carolina Court of Equity to loan estate funds. The court permitted him to lend the money for twelve months on approved security. Samuel Taylor arrived in the U.S. in 1815 and, on February 9, 1816, agreed with Savage to pay out available funds and settle the estate's affairs. Taylor consented to allow Savage two years to finalize the estate, relinquishing any interest on funds previously deposited in the Augusta bank and on future collections, provided they were paid in a timely manner. Taylor also authorized Savage to compromise any claims related to the estate. On February 9, 1816, Savage paid Taylor a total of $5,300, followed by an additional $4,700 on March 26, 1816, which were recorded in an account settled on February 3, 1817, with the Court of Ordinary. On April 2, 1816, Samuel Taylor granted a power of attorney to Adam Hutchinson and Peter Bennock, empowering them to collect debts owed to his sister Mary Rainey and her husband, William Rainey, from the estate of the late William F. Taylor, and to pursue legal actions for recovering real estate in Kentucky. On September 26, 1817, Savage communicated difficulties in collecting estate funds, expressing intent to settle by paying $3,000 to $4,000, contingent on proceeds from selling his land. On April 22, 1818, Savage paid Hutchison $10,037.36. The document then shifts focus to the Kentucky land transactions, beginning with a land grant on May 25, 1786, by Virginia Governor Patrick Henry to Daniel Broadhead, who later conveyed it to William Forbes, who subsequently sold it to John Phillips in 1794. The land passed through various owners, eventually reaching Mary Forbes, who conveyed it to William Forbes Taylor in 1805. In 1808, Taylor initiated legal action against land occupants. Upon Taylor's death in 1811, Mary Taylor and her husband authorized others to pursue claims on the land, claiming heirs' rights through pedigree. In 1818, Savage, as Taylor's executor, executed two deeds for parts of the land, receiving $800 and $1,318 respectively. After relocating to Tennessee and Alabama, Savage discussed the Kentucky lands with William Primrose in 1836, admitting to executing the deeds but denying receipt of funds. In December 1837, Samuel Savage died, and George M. Savage was appointed as his executor. On September 1, 1838, a bill was filed by Samuel Taylor, William Rainey, Alexander Rainey, and Elizabeth Rainey, all aliens residing in Scotland, against George M. Savage regarding the estate of the deceased. The bill indicates that William F. Taylor, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Scotland, passed away around 1811 in South Carolina, having executed a will that was recorded on August 11, 1811. This will appointed executors Patrick McDowell, Duncan Matheson, William Ross, and Samuel Savage, who duly accepted their roles. The will specified that, after paying legacies, the remaining estate was to be divided between Taylor's brother, Samuel, and sister, Mary, provided both were alive at the time of his death and had issue. If either sibling died without issue, the survivor or their descendants would inherit the entire remainder. The bill confirms that both residuary legatees were alive at the time of the testator's death, married, and had issue; however, Mary has since died, and her descendants (the complainants) are claiming their share. The executors managed the estate separately, with McDowell overseeing Georgia affairs and Savage handling those in South Carolina. Matheson and Ross settled their accounts before their deaths (in 1812 and 1816, respectively), and the complainants received the balances due. It is noted that the bulk of the estate, valued at $100,000, was managed by Savage, who failed to account for $50,000 of this sum. Additionally, at the time of the testator's death, Savage was indebted to him for $789.70, a debt not included in Savage's inventory, and had received $681.75 in cash, which he also did not report. The bill alleges that Savage fraudulently concealed both the debt and cash received. An inventory and appraisement of the testator's effects in South Carolina reveals no returns were made for certain liabilities or debts due to the estate, despite a significant amount being received by Savage. The complainants assert that Savage failed to account for sales of valuable land, which generated several thousand dollars that remain unreported. They state that only partial accounts were submitted by Savage, and they file these as exhibits. One specific item of $10,037.55 alleged to have been paid to the complainants' attorney is disputed, with a request for proof of payment and authority. Savage is accused of retaining $3,232.31 for commissions and travel expenses without accounting for interest on received funds, which the complainants claim as their right. They allege that Savage fraudulently represented himself as the sole surviving executor while McDowell was still alive, and sold land in Kentucky for cash instead of following the will's terms, which mandated credit sales. The lands, worth eight dollars per acre at the time, were sold for significantly less than their potential value. After these sales, Savage moved to Alabama and failed to disclose the sales to the complainants, misleading them about the status of the Kentucky lands. Furthermore, it is claimed that Savage neglected other valuable lands in Kentucky worth $500,000, resulting in their loss due to legal neglect. The complainants indicate that Savage’s actions involved fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation regarding the estate's assets and their management. George M. Savage is named as a defendant in a legal bill concerning the estate of Samuel Savage, for whom he is the personal representative. The plaintiffs request an accounting and seek a decree for payments owed from Samuel Savage, including the actual or present value of Kentucky lands sold, with interest, and compensation for lands lost due to negligence. In his response filed on March 25, 1839, George M. Savage denies that Samuel Savage executed the will or any related trusts beyond South Carolina, asserting that the will was never recorded or proven outside South Carolina, including in Kentucky. He contends that the executors had no authority to manage property outside South Carolina, where the testator was domiciled at death. He disputes any claim that Samuel or Mary Taylor inherited any estate under the will, arguing that the bequests are void and that the complainants lack standing to pursue the suit unless represented by a legally appointed personal representative. George M. Savage challenges the assertion that Samuel Savage solely managed the estate in South Carolina, stating that all executors jointly handled estate matters and properly filed an inventory and account of sales in the Edgefield district court. He asserts that all property in South Carolina was accounted for, denying the existence of unaccounted estate assets or any claim that $100,000 of the estate was under Samuel Savage's control, emphasizing that all transactions were accurately documented in court records. Additionally, he refutes claims of indebtedness amounting to $789.70 and denies that Samuel Savage had $681.75 in cash at the testator's death. George M. Savage also denies allegations of concealing debts and affirms that proper returns of debts due to the estate were made to the court by the executors, supported by referenced exhibits. The defendant denies the allegations that Samuel Savage failed to return an account of sales to the ordinary, asserting that records confirm a complete return of sales of both real and personal estate by Savage and the other executors. The defendant refutes claims regarding the sale of valuable land in South Carolina by the executors, stating that all transactions were fully accounted for. It is claimed that Samuel Savage made a final settlement of the estate’s transactions on April 22, 1818, in the presence of attorney Adam Hutchinson, where all accounts were balanced and a sum of $10,037.36 1/4 was paid over to Hutchinson. The defendant contends that Savage did not misappropriate estate funds and believes Savage's assertion of no personal profit from the estate is true. The defendant argues that the complainants cannot claim interest due to an agreement made on February 9, 1818, between Samuel Taylor, Mary Rainey, and William Rainey, which stipulated that Savage could retain and manage funds without accruing interest, as long as payments were made in a reasonable time. The defendant notes that Savage paid $5,300 and $4,700 to Taylor in 1818, indicating prompt action in settling the estate. The defendant maintains that this agreement serves as a complete bar to any interest claims. Additionally, the defendant clarifies that Savage did not improperly retain $3,232.31 for commission and travel expenses, asserting that the sum retained was reasonable and subject to examination by the ordinary. Evidence is presented that suggests Samuel Taylor was satisfied with Savage's management of the estate as of March 26, 1816, before leaving the country and appointing Hutchinson to oversee the estate's final settlement. A copy of the power of attorney to Hutchinson is presented, with the original having been destroyed. After this, no claims were made for over twenty years until an attempt was initiated to review the accounts and settlements before the ordinary. The defendant asserts the following points: 1. The settlements are conclusive and cannot be reopened by any court for review. 2. If not conclusive, they serve as prima facie evidence of correctness. 3. The statute of limitations and the passage of time indicate that the estate has been settled and all funds disbursed. Regarding the Kentucky lands, the defendant claims the testator did not own land in that state at his death and that a lawsuit concerning 4,000 to 5,000 acres was ongoing until January 8, 1818, when judgments were issued. It is alleged that Primrose, an agent for the complainants, compromised claims in 1836 for a minimal sum. If the testator had title to the lands, the defendant argues that upon his death, the title escheated to Kentucky, and any trusts under the will were extinguished. The defendant contends that the power to sell was a naked power, requiring all four executors to act collectively, thus actions by one alone were ineffective. The defendant acknowledges Samuel Savage's trip to Kentucky in 1818, where he executed certain documents but denies any fraudulent representation as the sole surviving executor. Additionally, the defendant claims the conveyance was void due to McDowell, another executor, not joining the conveyance at the time. He disputes that the Kentucky lands were sold for cash, asserting instead it was for an insignificant amount in property, and invokes the statute of limitations regarding the sale. The defendant confirms Samuel Savage’s death in November 1837 in Alabama, where he served as executor and is a resident. He also challenges the court's jurisdiction. The complainants' amended bill, filed on May 31, 1839, acknowledges the testator's domicile in South Carolina, his deceased parents, and identifies his only siblings, Samuel and Mary Taylor, who had children that are also complainants. It is stated that the testator had no other relatives in the United States at the time of his death, making Samuel and Mary his only heirs at law. Samuel Taylor visited South Carolina in 1815 to settle with the executors of an estate and received $10,000 from Samuel Savage in early 1816, but no interest was paid. Savage communicated with Taylor in September 1817, and the legatees received no further funds, as Savage did not finalize his accounts. After moving from South Carolina, Savage reportedly received at least $10,000 of the estate's funds. A newly obtained cash-book revealed that Savage was indebted at the testator's death, and the executors failed to secure a bond for their trust responsibilities. The defendants’ answer, filed on September 19, 1839, contested most allegations, establishing the issues at hand. The District Court determined that the complainants were entitled to $5,212.92 from Samuel Savage, comprised of $2,118 from a sale of Kentucky lands and accrued interest. George M. Savage was removed as executor, and Vincent M. Benham was appointed as the administrator de bonis non. The complainants appealed, arguing the court erred by not granting the full amount claimed. Execution was to be levied on numerous slaves owned by the estate, but an appeal for George M. Savage was complicated by his removal, preventing bond execution. In January 1843, the execution was deemed null, suggesting the decree was not against the correct party. Subsequently, on October 4, 1844, the complainants filed a bill of revivor against Benham, who responded with a demurrer, citing deficiencies in the revivor bill, including lack of detail on original proceedings and whether Benham had assets from the estate. The defendant, as administrator, lacked privity with George M. Savage, the individual against whom a decree was issued, making a bill of revivor improper. The court noted that the bill did not clarify whether the decree was issued prior to George M. Savage's removal as executor. The court overruled a demurrer and recognized that the defendant had no personal knowledge of the original suit or its proceedings. It confirmed that George M. Savage was removed as executor on November 28, 1842, and that the defendant was appointed administrator de bonis non of Samuel Savage on the same day. The defendant, Benham, was noted to be the administrator at the time the original decree was rendered. Benham's motion to dismiss the suit for lack of prosecution was denied. The District Court ordered the decree against George M. Savage to be revived against Benham, prompting Benham to appeal. On appeal, it was argued that the demurrer should have been upheld since reviving a decree against the administrator de bonis non was erroneous. Additionally, it was contended that the bill aimed to hold the executor liable for the fiduciary misconduct of Samuel Savage, which was improper. It was also established that the letters testamentary issued in South Carolina did not grant the executors authority to act outside that jurisdiction. Consequently, the sale of Kentucky lands by Samuel Savage did not affect the title or interest of the residuary legatees of Taylor, as the authority to sell had to be strictly followed and could not be executed unilaterally. The testator's will implicitly conferred the authority to sell the real estate to the executors. In Anderson v. Turner, the court found that the estate of William F. Taylor was never probated in Kentucky, meaning he died intestate regarding his real estate there, leading to the lands descending to his heirs. These heirs, being aliens at the time of his death, were unable to inherit the Kentucky lands, which consequently escheated to the state. The complainants, who claimed to be both heirs and residuary legatees, disaffirmed a sale of the Kentucky lands made by Samuel Savage, the executor, by selling the same lands themselves. This act contradicted their claim for Savage's liability regarding the sale. Furthermore, a final settlement of Savage's dealings as executor was made in South Carolina, which could only be challenged through specific allegations of error. The court also concluded that Taylor held no title to the lands he intended to sell, acting merely as a trustee. The District Court of Alabama lacked jurisdiction over the matter, as it was fundamentally a dispute about the fiduciary actions of Savage, which should have been addressed by South Carolina courts. Additional legal arguments presented by Mr. Crittenden argued that Taylor's directive to sell his lands functioned similarly to a devise, which would prevent escheatment. Samuel Savage, as executor of a will, was required to obtain letters testamentary in Kentucky before selling lands there. However, his failure to do so does not absolve him of responsibility to the legatees for the money he received from those sales. As executor, he is accountable for the proceeds of the sales, which must be reported like any other estate funds, and he cannot evade this responsibility by challenging the sales he conducted. Savage's liability extends to the fair market value of the Kentucky lands at the time of sale, significantly higher than what he actually received. His removal from South Carolina, the legatees' distant residence, their minority and marital status, and his fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment of transactions exclude him from benefiting from the statute of limitations or lapse of time defenses. The objections raised against his accountability include claims that he was not obligated to manage the Kentucky lands, that the complainants were aliens and the lands escheated upon the testator's death, that the complainants waived their rights due to the statute of limitations, and that they forfeited their right of recovery by compromising with their agent. However, as Savage undertook responsibility for the Kentucky lands and received compensation for it, he is liable for the proper execution of his trust. His role as executor also positioned him as a trustee for the lands, obliging him to fulfill all responsibilities associated with that role, as indicated in the will. The will grants the executor powers that differ from typical executorial duties, effectively making him a trustee with responsibilities defined by the contract rather than by law. The objection that the lands escheated is dismissed, as the executor's act of selling the lands and accepting payment negates this defense. It is established that lands intended for sale with proceeds going to aliens do not escheat, supported by case law. The directive to sell the lands is treated as a trust enforceable by equity, ensuring that even if the powers are not executed, the trust remains valid since a trust does not fail for lack of a trustee. Additionally, neither the statute of limitations nor the passage of time applies due to fraud and concealment; the suit was initiated promptly upon discovering the cause of action. The argument that the decree cannot be revived against the administrator de bonis non due to lack of privity with the original executor is countered by emphasizing the necessary privity with the testator's estate. A decree against an executor for a testator's debt can be revived against the representative of the estate, even if the original executor's representative has changed. Concerns regarding jurisdiction of the District Court of Alabama acting as a Circuit Court are addressed, with the author expressing skepticism towards legal conclusions that defy common professional reasoning. Samuel Savage relocated from South Carolina to Tennessee and subsequently to Alabama in 1818, where he permanently settled and died. After leaving South Carolina, he was not subject to lawsuits in its courts. The complainants, who are foreign residents, were not obligated to monitor his potential presence in South Carolina. Any legal process issued by South Carolina courts that was not personally served would not subject an Alabama citizen to their jurisdiction. Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, a civil suit could only be brought against a defendant in their district of residence or where they could be found. The argument concludes that Samuel Savage could only be sued in South Carolina if he voluntarily returned, raising concerns about the implications for justice—suggesting that complainants would be left without remedy based on the defendant's choices. The speaker questions whether this situation aligns with the principles of U.S. jurisprudence and criticizes the notion of progress if it implies a regression in justice. The complainants seek from the defendant, acting as administrator of Savage's estate, the balance of assets from the estate of W. F. Taylor, alleging fraudulent concealment of these assets. They argue for individual liability from Savage's estate due to misconduct, emphasizing that their claim is not against the estate of Taylor but against Savage's personal estate. It is argued that South Carolina does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, as the executor can be held accountable in Alabama. While South Carolina courts have authority over estate administration, an executor who has left the state can still be pursued in their domicile. Lastly, it states that the testator's instructions regarding the sale of lands implicitly grant the executors the authority to execute the sale, equivalent to explicit language. The appointment of executors and the allocation of sales proceeds create a trust obligation for the executors, who are tasked with managing the residue of the estate after certain legacies. These executors serve as agents for the testator and are also trustees for the devisees concerning the funds they acquire through sales. While they hold no personal interest in the funds, their authority is intertwined with a trust, which courts of equity are responsible for enforcing. There are two main objections regarding holding one trustee, Samuel Savage, solely liable for the execution of this trust. First, the joint nature of the authority and trust implies that it cannot be executed by a single trustee alone. However, case law supports that a power coupled with a trust can survive and be executed by a surviving trustee, and that powers granted to executors may be executed by one if they act in their capacity as executors. Second, it is argued that since the power was not clearly defined in the will and was not probated in Kentucky, the property must have descended to the heirs, leading to escheat due to their alien status. The counterargument is that equity will enforce the testator's intent, implying the necessary powers for executors to fulfill the trust, even without express provisions in the will. The court would interpret the authority to "raise money" from the land as implicitly granting a power to sell. Notably, where explicit devises or powers are absent, equity will still ensure that a sufficient interest is conveyed to execute the trust effectively, emphasizing the testator's intent. The legal issues at hand involve the rights of heirs, distributees, devisees, and creditors concerning land that has descended to an heir. The land is subject to the exercise of a power granted by the testator, whose intention is to be fulfilled through the will. The respondent’s counsel argues that an interest must be conveyed for the will's execution, but an alternative exists whereby land directed for sale is treated as personal estate, losing its real estate characteristics. Conversely, money intended to be invested in land is regarded as real estate under the will. The will does not require probate in Kentucky for the power to be executed, as probate concerns jurisdiction over personal property, not the power itself. The testator, a naturalized citizen with alien relatives unable to hold real estate, intended for both real and personal property to be converted into money for distribution. His will is effective upon death, independent of probate, and the court can imply a power to sell and a trust to distribute the estate. The heir holds the land subject to this power, raising questions about state claims versus inherited rights. The defendant is held accountable for equitable claims from the complainants, regardless of whether the power could be executed by Samuel Savage or not. The defendant cannot evade responsibility by claiming that his actions as trustee—concealing transactions and misappropriating funds—are beyond the court's equitable jurisdiction. Complainants are entitled to a decree for the amount received by Samuel Savage, plus compound interest, as the funds in question were rightfully theirs. Although complainants lacked enforceable title to the land, the money Savage received, while acting as a trustee for the land's tenants, was misappropriated for his personal use and fraudulently withheld. Courts of equity do not tolerate such abuses of trust. Executors are held liable for unauthorized sales of estate property and may incur liability for compound interest in cases of fraud or willful neglect. The statute of limitations does not protect the defendant from a decree due to the fraudulent concealment of the transaction, as the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. The bill includes an express allegation regarding the discovery of the fraud. Jurisdiction issues are irrelevant since Savage acted without authority from any Kentucky court. A minimum recovery of $2,118.00, with interest from July 21, 1818, is requested. Regarding the South Carolina estate, the defendant claims several defenses, including lack of liability to suit in Alabama, final settlement claims, and the statute of limitations. However, the so-called final settlement was not recognized as such by the ordinary and lacked proper accounting for assets and interest. Consequently, it was merely an annual account current, and the ordinary could not finalize the settlement without a complete exhibit of assets. Additionally, the statute of limitations is not applicable due to the nature of fraud and trust, which only commence upon discovery of the fraud. The court must find compelling circumstances to allow the statute of limitations to bar the claims of heirs and legatees regarding estate accounts and settlements. Infancy and coverture prevent the statute from running. In this case, the children of Samuel Taylor were minors, and Mary Taylor (Rainey) was a married woman. The respondents argue that the complainants are barred by Alabama's six-year statute of limitations and claim a lack of standing to sue in Alabama. Specific allegations of fraud, including their discovery timeline, are sufficient to support a general claim of discovery within six years. Regarding interest, an executor is liable for interest on any balance held unless retained for estate purposes. The administrator’s attorney contended that for the complainants to recover on Kentucky lands, they must prove: (1) ownership of the land by Taylor, (2) that he devised it, and (3) that the executors had the authority to sell and did sell it. The respondent disputes all three claims, asserting that the deed to Taylor executed a use that vested title in another party, implying the land escheated. He also contends that Taylor did not specifically devise the land and that the executor lacked the power to sell. The case involves a bill in equity initiated by the heirs and devisees of William F. Taylor, who was a naturalized citizen of South Carolina but resided in Scotland. The respondent, George M. Savage, is the executor of Samuel Savage from Alabama. The claim alleges that Taylor's will directed the sale of his estate's residue to benefit the complainants, with Savage as one executor. It is alleged that Savage failed to fully account for property received in South Carolina and neglected to manage certain lands in Kentucky. The respondents deny that they took letters testamentary outside South Carolina or that Taylor’s property in South Carolina was unaccounted for, asserting that Taylor owned no valid land in Kentucky and that a claim made in 1836 was compromised and released by the complainants' agent. The title to certain property had escheated to the State due to the executors being aliens, which limited their power to sell, particularly as some had died before 1818. Although Samuel Savage executed deeds for about one-fourth of the land in that year, the opposing party argued that no valid title was transferred and that no court outside South Carolina had jurisdiction over the issue. The statute of limitations was invoked against all claims. A procedural issue arose following a judgment favoring the complainants, during which George M. Savage was removed as executor and Vincent M. Benham was appointed as administrator de bonis non. The case was remitted to the Circuit Court to include Benham as a party. An objection was raised regarding the liability of an administrator de bonis non for assets managed by a deceased executor, citing various legal precedents. However, under Alabama law, particularly a statute from September 4, 1821, this objection was deemed unsustainable, allowing the suit to proceed against successors in administration. The claims for relief in the case are twofold: one concerns Samuel Savage's alleged failure to settle debts owed to William F. Taylor and others while acting as executor in South Carolina, and the second pertains to his alleged negligence and mishandling of funds related to Kentucky land. The property in question was owned by the testator, and its proceeds were collected by the executor under his testamentary authority. The primary objections raised against the claim include the assertion that no outstanding amounts were due or collected by the executor that he did not account for and settle by April 22, 1818. It is argued that any potential claims should be addressed in South Carolina, where the executor's letters were issued, and that a proper examination of the account must occur there before any proceedings can be initiated in Alabama against Samuel Savage or his executor, George M. Savage. Relevant case law is cited to support this position, including Vaughan et al. v. Northup et al. and Aspeden et al. v. Nixon. Additionally, the statute of limitations is invoked against the claim, suggesting that if the elapsed time since 1818 renders recovery illegal or inequitable, further analysis of the other objections may be unnecessary. The settlement in 1818 is characterized as final, with the balance paid to the plaintiff’s agent. Given Samuel Savage’s subsequent departure from the state, the statute of limitations would generally start in 1818, and any special circumstances warranting an extension should have been raised in the original legal pleadings. Despite the absence of such special defenses, the court also considers the principles of laches and neglect by the complainants, which weigh heavily against revisiting a formally settled account after two decades. A significant burden of proof regarding fraud, accident, or mistake must be met to justify reopening the settlement. The presence of the plaintiff's agent at the final settlement, who had the opportunity to raise objections, further strengthens the conclusion that the case is one where the passage of time should bring repose. Relevant legal precedents are referenced to support this conclusion. The claim concerning the funds received by Samuel Savage relates to a portion of land in Kentucky, which William F. Taylor purportedly had an interest in. However, Taylor's title to the land is derived from a trust deed from Mary Forbes, the administratrix of William Forbes, rather than outright ownership. William Forbes received the land in fee in 1786 and later conveyed it to John Philips in 1794. Philips then transferred it to Mary Forbes in 1802, with a deed stipulating that it was held in trust for the rightful heirs of William Forbes. In 1805, Mary conveyed the land to William F. Taylor, the only U.S. relative of William Forbes, under similar trust terms. The land risked escheating to the state unless conveyed to ensure it could be held for the heirs residing abroad. Following this conveyance, Taylor initiated thirty-three ejectment suits in Kentucky in 1808 against settlers on the land, which remained pending after his death in 1811. These suits continued under nominal lessees and were resolved favorably in January 1818. After Taylor's death, there is no evidence that his executors or heirs took any action regarding the lands, aside from Samuel Savage's administrative account from December 1812, which included a trip to Kentucky. Additionally, on September 14, 1815, Mary Taylor and her husband authorized Patrick McDowell and Samuel Taylor to collect her share of both William F. Taylor's estate and the Kentucky lands, where she claimed heirship along with Samuel Taylor, from Nathaniel Forbes and their mother Elizabeth. In 1816, Samuel Taylor appointed Adam Hutchinson and Peter Bennock as attorneys to manage claims related to the estate of William F. Taylor and to recover real estate in Kentucky owed to him and his sister. However, in September 1817, Samuel Savage, not the appointed attorneys, communicated with Samuel Taylor regarding the Kentucky lands and the unsettled estate in South Carolina. Despite recoveries in 1818, the heirs or their agents did not take possession of the lands until 1837. In July 1818, Savage, having moved to Tennessee, sold approximately one-fourth of the lands for $2,118, presenting himself as the surviving executor of William Taylor's will. Other occupants who did not purchase from him obtained injunctions against the judgments and continued to occupy the land peacefully until 1837, when attorney William Primrose intervened. The original attorneys had not acted, with Hutchinson deceased and Bennock declining to participate. In letters from 1824 and 1825, Samuel Taylor did not reference the Kentucky lands. Primrose discovered Savage had sold about 1,100 acres and negotiated with the remaining occupants for a release or quitclaim that did not reflect the lands' full value. Crucially, Primrose, despite initially disputing the validity of Savage’s actions, ultimately agreed to ratify Savage's deed while reserving claims against Savage for the proceeds from the sale. Primrose later sought accountability from Savage in Alabama. Additionally, it is noted that upon William F. Taylor's death in 1811, both Nathaniel Forbes and Elizabeth Forbes were aliens, raising questions about the complainants' interests in the Kentucky lands at the time of Savage's sale and whether he could be held liable for his actions. William F. Taylor, at the time of his death, held a trustee's interest in certain lands, lacking personal ownership. His will granted executors the authority to sell these lands and stipulated that proceeds be allocated for the benefit of the true beneficiaries. The will included a directive for the sale to occur shortly after his death and encompassed all property "belonging to me," indicating intent to empower executors to sell both trust-held and fee-simple properties. Key legal questions arise regarding whether the executors held merely a power to sell, a power coupled with a trust, or a power coupled with an interest, especially in light of claims that the lands have escheated to the State of Kentucky. Taylor's will outlined that after settling small legacies, the remaining estate would be divided between his brother Samuel Taylor and sister, provided both were alive at his death and had heirs. The construction of this clause, in conjunction with previous provisions, suggests Taylor held the property in express trust for the heirs of William Forbes until his death, effectively devising the trust and land proceeds to his residuary legatees, who would act as trustees for Forbes' heirs. Identifying these heirs is crucial, with indications that they included Nathaniel Forbes, who died without issue, leading to his grandmother, Elizabeth Forbes, inheriting before passing the inheritance to her surviving children, the complainants. Given the health issues faced by Nathaniel and the foreign status of the other heirs, Taylor likely aimed to prevent escheat of both his and Forbes' property to the state. Two interpretations of the will could fulfill this intention: one where executors are seen as having a power coupled with a trust, selling the land for the benefit of his siblings, or another that views their power as coupled with an interest, allowing immediate title vesting for selling purposes while holding proceeds in trust for his siblings and Forbes' heirs. Samuel Savage's interpretation of the will indicates that he believed he held a power beyond mere authority as an executor, demonstrated by his actions of visiting Kentucky to fulfill his duties and selling approximately a fourth of the lands. This suggests he viewed his power as coupled with a trust or interest. Case law supports the notion that executors can possess a power coupled with a trust, particularly when they are directed to sell property and manage proceeds in a specified manner. The distinction between a naked power and one coupled with a trust lies in whether the executors have a discretionary power or an imperative duty. While conflicting cases exist, prior rulings establish that even if executors are not explicitly named as sellers, such a power may be implied. The court clarifies that if executors have other obligations under the will, such as paying debts or distributing legacies, their power to sell is coupled with a trust or interest, which survives their tenure. Furthermore, if the testator intended for the proceeds to be distributed to parties other than the heirs, this intention still implies a power coupled with a trust for the executors. Courts generally favor interpretations that enable executors to fulfill the testator’s intent, granting them necessary powers or interests to achieve the will's objectives, particularly in equity. When a trust or a power coupled with an interest is established, its duration and extent should align with the intended purpose. Courts may infer a power coupled with an interest from the overall context of a will, particularly when the fee has not been vested elsewhere and is necessary for the executors to fulfill the will's general intent. The interest does not need to be substantial; minimal interests suffice if they allow for the distribution of proceeds or the use of estate assets for others' benefit. Both equitable and legal interests are recognized, and an interest does not need to generate profit, as any title in the estate suffices. When a will grants a power coupled with an interest, the conveyance is intended for the designated beneficiary, akin to a direct devise. Courts of equity may allow titles to vest in executors to facilitate the sale and conversion of estate assets, particularly to prevent escheat. They prioritize substance over form, treating the directed actions as completed, even if the title is formally held by executors until a sale occurs. Until a sale is finalized, the title typically remains with heirs unless stated otherwise in the will. In cases where the devisees are not the heirs at the testator's death, the title should be seen as passing through the will, affirming the complainants' rights by devise rather than descent. In Jackson v. Schauber, the issue revolves around the transfer of trust estates and the implications of escheat. The case of Jackson v. De Lancy concludes that, in situations where heirs might escheat, the title to a trust estate typically passes to residuary legatees, who hold it for the beneficiaries. The prevailing opinion is that such estates are included in a general devise to residuary legatees unless indicated otherwise. Specific circumstances suggest the trust estate was intended to pass to these legatees, who were seen as the beneficiaries before the devise took effect. The argument against the sale of certain lands by Savage, based on the claim that they had escheated to the State of Kentucky, is countered by the assertion that escheat applies only to land descending to an alien, not to land acquired by devise or purchase. Therefore, aliens can retain property until an office is found. The claim that lands descended to aliens upon the death of William F. Taylor or Nathaniel Forbes is rejected, as they received the property through devise, not descent. Courts of chancery are also noted to avoid creating implied uses in aliens that would jeopardize property, preferring to convey title to executors in trust instead. The case further explores whether Samuel Savage or his representatives are liable for accounting for property in Alabama, emphasizing that if they are not liable there, the case fails due to lack of jurisdiction. Notably, while the heirs of Nathaniel Forbes and Elizabeth are also the residuary legatees of William F. Taylor, their interests in the Kentucky lands differ from their interests in Taylor's personal property. The interest of the complainants arises from a deed executed by Mary Forbes to William F. Taylor, rather than from Taylor's will, which only directed the sale of the trust property by his executors. It is emphasized that the property in question is not part of Taylor's estate as recognized in South Carolina since the sales were conducted in another state, with proceeds that were never transferred to South Carolina. Consequently, Samuel Savage, who sold part of the property after relocating and concluding his administration, is not required to account for the sale in South Carolina. Without letters testamentary or a proven will in Kentucky, and since he lived elsewhere, he cannot be sued in that state. If there is any liability concerning the sale proceeds, it would be in Alabama, where Savage had his domicile and where the demand was made. When approached in 1838 by the complainants' attorney for the proceeds of his sale, Savage acknowledged executing releases for a portion of the lands but disputed the amount received, claiming it was less than stated in the deeds. He also raised objections against accountability, including questioning the complainants' interest in recovering as legatees or cestui que trusts, the legality of the sale, the minimal amount received, and the statute of limitations. However, it was established that the complainants, as residuary legatees, were entitled to the trust estate upon conversion to money and were responsible for managing and accounting for it to the true beneficiaries. Cestui que trusts and devisees have an indisputable interest in the proceeds from the sale of property, as there has been no prior escheat of the lands. Challenges to the sale's legality arise from the presumed deaths of certain executors, the non-recording of the will in Kentucky, and initial verbal denials of the sale's validity. However, the executors possessed the authority to sell the property under the will, which is a power coupled with a trust. This type of power does not require the same level of strictness as a title under special statutes. Savage claimed to be the surviving executor of the will, and although two executors are confirmed deceased, the status of a third is implied to be deceased based on other references. Therefore, Savage’s right to conduct the sale is valid since a power to sell, when coupled with an interest or trust, survives with the surviving executor. If all but one trustee decline the trust, the remaining trustee is authorized to act independently. Additionally, recording a sale under a will is not inherently necessary to validate it unless mandated by local law. If local laws require recording, such statutes must be followed; otherwise, failure to record should not invalidate the sale. It would be inequitable for an executor to benefit from his own failure to record, and equity principles suggest he should not be allowed to deny his financial responsibility to the beneficiaries who have been disadvantaged by his actions. The court finds it just that the complainants are entitled to the money from Savage's estate, at least the amount determined by the lower court. Simple interest is deemed appropriate in such cases. Savage is estopped from denying the terms of his own deed, as established in prior case law. In equity, an agent cannot act for personal gain when representing another, and anyone who receives funds meant for another party is considered a trustee and can be sued for breach of trust. The complainants confirmed Savage's sale as valid, despite initial disavowal, and their later ratification did not negate their claim to the money. This confirmation did not harm Savage, as it was in line with what he had promised. If the sale is deemed invalid, it nonetheless harmed the complainants by undermining their title and forcing them into a lower settlement. A trustee is liable for any misconduct or breach of trust, regardless of personal gain. However, determining whether Savage owes a larger sum presents challenges, as estimates are speculative due to the time elapsed and the death of involved parties, alongside the complainants' long delay in pursuing the matter. Savage may have refrained from further selling the remaining lands or managing the judgments due to the heirs, Samuel and Mary Taylor, appointing Hutchinson and Bennock as special agents instead of him. The standard for establishing liability beyond the amounts received involves demonstrating severe negligence or willful misconduct. Given the passage of time and the obscuring effects of death, proving such negligence is unlikely. Claims of damages due to mere neglect are subject to a different statute of limitations than those related to trust funds. If a breach of trust occurred when the neglect first happened, the claim could be barred by the statute of limitations due to the nineteen or twenty years that have elapsed. Additionally, an executor's assertion that receipts did not exceed Savage's expenses is weak, as it lacks thorough evidence and was not sworn by Savage himself. There is no documented account of expenses presented in court. The evidence against this assertion includes an admission of receipts amounting to several hundred dollars, acknowledgment of payments received, a recorded confession of a payment of $2,118, and witness testimonies regarding payments and the solvency of purchasers. If there were any uncertainties regarding the amount received, they were resolved in the District Court, where the account was reviewed and no exceptions were raised. The final objection regarding the statute of limitations for recovering the amount received with interest differentiates between express trust funds and claims for mere neglect. Although Savage received the funds in 1818, he was not asked to account for them until 1837, which was when he became liable for accounting. His retention of the funds until that demand does not constitute evidence of neglect or intention to avoid accountability prior to the request made by the complainants or their agent in 1837. The statute of limitations for the case did not commence until a specified point, meaning it did not bar the equity bill filed in September 1838. Several legal precedents are cited to support this view. The issue of fraud and concealment was raised, which could affect the application of the statute of limitations, but the court chose not to rule on these matters due to the complexities arising from the death of key parties and the passage of time. The plaintiffs claim against Samuel Savage as both legatees and cestui que trusts, but the court found that they could recover as residuary legatees. The bill’s description of the plaintiffs and their rights was deemed acceptable, although the liability of Samuel Savage was criticized for lack of clarity. Savage acted under the will of William F. Taylor in fiduciary roles that were not distinctly differentiated in the bill; however, this lack of precision was not considered enough to necessitate an amendment at this stage. The claims were directed solely against Savage and his executor, and sufficient facts were alleged to indicate the dispute's subject matter, thus curing any procedural objections. The court concluded that it had resolved enough issues to affirm the lower court's judgment without addressing additional questions raised by counsel on both sides, and it dismissed a related appeal. The case was heard in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The court has affirmed the decree of the District Court regarding the case involving William Taylor and others as appellants against Vincent M. Benham, the administrator of Samuel Savage's estate. The appeal from the complainants has been dismissed with costs. The excerpt also discusses the implications of a voluntary assignment where if one of two trustees declines to act, the trust continues with the remaining trustee. It notes that upon the death of the last trustee, the estate descends to the heirs, who inherit the estate subject to the trust, unless all disclaim the trust, in which case it also vests in the heirs. The excerpt references various cases to support these principles, highlighting differences in handling such situations across jurisdictions. Furthermore, it touches on the legal validity of a sale conducted by Savage as a surviving executor, despite potential informality, noting that the transaction has been recognized over time through occupation and confirmation by the heirs. The court implies that it is equitable for Samuel Savage and his representatives to repay the money received from this sale to the beneficiaries of the trust.