Craig A. Southerland v. Susan Diane Shoemaker Southerland

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2000-CT-00421-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; February 9, 2000; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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In the case of Craig A. Southerland v. Susan Diane Shoemaker Southerland, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the award of child support, lump sum alimony, and attorney's fees stemming from the couple's divorce. The appeal arose from a Chancery Court decision where the ex-husband contested the awards as excessive. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decisions on all counts, leading Craig Southerland to seek certiorari from the Supreme Court, which primarily focused on the child support award. 

The marriage lasted from 1976 until the divorce proceedings initiated in June 1999, during which the couple had two children. At the time of divorce, Craig earned a monthly income of $5,111, while Susan earned $903.66. The chancellor awarded Susan $50,000 in lump sum alimony, payable in monthly installments of $1,500, along with $1,000 per month in child support and $3,750 in attorney's fees. 

The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the lump sum alimony and attorney's fees but reversed the child support award, citing non-compliance with statutory guidelines outlined in Miss. Code Ann. 43-19-101(2000). The guidelines establish a rebuttable presumption for child support awards based on a percentage of adjusted gross income, which the Court found was not adequately considered in determining the appropriateness of the $1,000 monthly support. The case has been remanded for further proceedings regarding the child support adjustment.

Craig's monthly adjusted gross income is $5,111, translating to an annual income of $61,332. Based on this, child support calculated at 14% results in $715.54 monthly. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial court justified exceeding statutory guidelines by referencing a mutual agreement between both parents to enroll their child in private school, which incurs an extraordinary cost of approximately $368 per month. Even disregarding the adjusted gross income exceeding the $50,000 threshold, statutory guidelines suggest a support amount of $583, which, when combined with the private school tuition, totals $951 monthly. The chancellor's analysis indicated that Mr. Southerland could afford this additional expense without hardship, while Mrs. Southerland would struggle to cover ordinary expenses on a lower support amount.

Since the child support award exceeded the presumptive amount, the chancellor was required to document findings justifying this deviation, particularly regarding the adjusted gross income surpassing $50,000. However, the Court determined that the chancellor did not adequately fulfill this requirement. The trial court maintained that the child should not lose the opportunity for private schooling due to Mr. Southerland's actions leading to the divorce. The Court of Appeals concurred, recognizing private school tuition as an extraordinary expense separate from standard support, although lacking authoritative backing. Previous rulings suggest that school tuition is inherently a part of child support obligations and must be reasonable relative to both parents' financial capacities. In the case of Collins v. Collins, the Court upheld an arrangement where private school tuition was included in the overall child support, affirming that if parents agree on private schooling, the support awarded must meet the child's basic needs adequately.

The chancellor's finding regarding child support was deemed inadequate under Mississippi Code Ann. § 43-19-101. While a father's prior agreement to send a child to private school is a valid consideration, it alone does not justify support exceeding statutory guidelines. The Court of Appeals' affirmation of lump sum alimony and attorney's fees is upheld, but the child support issue is reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Dissenting opinions contend that the chancellor's decision was appropriate, emphasizing that significant discretion is afforded to chancellors in such matters and that their findings should not be overturned without evidence of manifest error or abuse of discretion. The dissent argues that the chancellor properly recognized the child support guidelines, articulated the reasons for deviating from them, and provided specific findings that aligned with statutory requirements. It further critiques the majority's broad conclusion that a father's agreement for private schooling is insufficient for exceeding support guidelines, advocating for a nuanced, case-specific approach to child support determinations.