Billy Wayne Frith v. BIC Corporation

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2000-CT-01124-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; June 20, 2000; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The appeal involves Billy Wayne Frith and Wanda Frith, parents of minor Joshua Brent Frith, contesting a summary judgment granted to BIC Corporation by the Scott County Circuit Court. The court ruled that the Friths' claims were preempted by safety regulations under the Federal Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). The incident occurred on December 19, 1994, when ten-year-old Joshua suffered severe burns after igniting a disposable lighter he found in his backyard near a gasoline container. Although Joshua believed the lighter was a BIC model, the actual lighter was not recovered.

Initially, the Friths filed a lawsuit against BIC and other parties for negligence and product liability, which BIC removed to federal court, claiming fraudulent joinder of a Mississippi resident. The federal court remanded the case back to state court, ruling that the claims against BIC were federally preempted but lacked jurisdiction for removal due to incomplete party participation.

Subsequently, BIC successfully moved for summary judgment, asserting that the Friths' claims were preempted by the CPSA. The Friths appealed, arguing that the CPSA does not expressly or implicitly preempt their state-based claims. They contended that the federal regulations were intended for children under five years old and cited a savings clause in the CPSA that they believe protects their claims from preemption.

BIC argues that the trial court properly applied the principles of implied conflict preemption established in Cooper v. General Motors Corp. and Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. The court agreed with BIC's stance against dual regulation, determining that applying state law to the design of cigarette lighters would subject BIC to conflicting regulations from both the CPSC and a higher common law standard proposed by the Plaintiff, which Congress did not intend with the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA). The court concluded that the Plaintiff's design defect claim arises under federal law, presenting a federal question. 

The excerpt highlights the Supremacy Clause, which invalidates state laws conflicting with federal law, and outlines three scenarios for federal preemption: explicit preemption by Congress, implied preemption due to comprehensive federal regulation, and implied preemption from actual conflicts between federal and state law. The CPSA includes a preemption clause prohibiting states from establishing safety standards that differ from federal standards unless identical, aimed at the same injury risk.

The Friths argue that the CPSA's savings clause limits the preemption provision's scope to exclude common law claims, citing Colon ex. rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc. However, the court finds Colon unpersuasive and notes the Friths have abandoned a common law negligence claim in favor of pursuing strict liability under product liability theory. Additionally, the Consumer Product Safety Commission sets child-resistance standards for disposable and novelty lighters, applicable to products manufactured or imported after July 12, 1994.

Federal laws can serve as minimum standards, allowing states to establish stricter regulations as long as there is no conflict with federal law. In cases of conflict, courts assess whether implied preemption applies, which occurs either when state law regulates an area intended for exclusive federal occupation (implied field preemption) or when state law directly conflicts with federal law (implied conflict preemption). Implied conflict preemption applies when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible or when state law obstructs federal objectives. The court upheld the trial court's finding that the Friths' state claims are preempted by federal law.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Scott County was affirmed, with all appeal costs assigned to the appellants. A dissenting opinion highlighted the Consumer Protection Act's savings clause, which maintains that adherence to federal safety regulations does not absolve liability under state law. The dissent argued that disregarding this clause misinterprets both federal regulations and the intent behind the Consumer Protection Act. The dissent also referenced Geier, which upheld that a similarly worded savings clause permits state actions that exceed minimum federal safety standards, but ultimately preempted a suit that would restrict manufacturers to a single safety measure, contrary to the intent of allowing diverse safety options.

Implied preemption cannot be applied in this case without a judicial determination that Frith's claim obstructs the objectives of federal regulations, as established in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). The circuit court did not consider Geier, issued shortly before its opinion, and erroneously relied on cases discussing express preemption rather than implied preemption. The court misinterpreted Cooper v. General Motors Corp., 702 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1997), claiming that a savings clause preserves state actions; however, Cooper does not support this interpretation and, like Geier, involved the federal option of safety measures.

The circuit court's assertion that Frith’s claim would impose a child resistance standard conflicting with federal standards is flawed. It incorrectly assumed Frith's claim depended on preventing ten-year-olds from operating the lighter entirely. The court also mistakenly concluded that implied preemption arises solely from state actions that impose additional burdens, when it should have assessed whether state actions could coexist with federal regulations.

The circuit court's application of an incorrect legal standard led to a failure to evaluate the impact of Frith's state claim on federal regulatory schemes. Both Frith and BIC frame the issue correctly under a Geier analysis. BIC argues that implied preemption is warranted as the Consumer Products Safety Commission supports a safety rate that balances child protection with usability of lighters. BIC contends that imposing liability would require safer lighters, conflicting with public policy by making them harder for adults to use, potentially leading to the use of non-regulated products. However, this perspective overlooks that the pressure for safer products would apply universally to all manufacturers, irrespective of regulation.

Allowing plaintiffs' claims to proceed aligns with the objectives of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), which aims to protect the public from unreasonable injury risks, assist in evaluating product safety, create uniform safety standards, and promote research into product-related incidents. A minimum national standard for disposable lighters, along with state common law liability, enhances public safety, especially for children, by incentivizing manufacturers like BIC to develop safer products.

The majority opinion challenges this reasoning, referencing Geier, which underscores that occasional nonuniformity is acceptable if juries can create and enforce safety standards while compensating victims. Implied preemption should not be based solely on a state law potentially imposing higher safety standards than federal ones; it requires that the state action undermines the federal law's objectives.

In this case, the regulations do not address much of the plaintiff Frith's claim, as he was injured after finding and cleaning a lighter, which may relate to its design aesthetics rather than its mechanical operations. Despite regulations indicating that lighters are difficult for five-year-olds to operate, ten-year-olds may not face the same challenge. If a jury finds that a lighter can be designed to be functional for adults while being less appealing to children, Frith could validly assert his claim.

BIC's assertion that allowing this case would undermine consumer protection regulations is unfounded; the worst-case scenario would compel manufacturers to enhance safety based on current technology, consistent with the CPSA. The case should be reversed and remanded for trial. Additionally, compliance with consumer safety regulations does not exempt a party from liability under common or state law, as stated in 15 U.S.C.A. § 2074(a), and available remedies under this section are supplementary to other legal remedies (15 U.S.C.A. § 2072(c)).