Romain Powell Wilson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 2001-CP-00124-SCT

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court; January 8, 2001; Mississippi; State Supreme Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Romain Powell Wilson appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court after the Jackson County Circuit Court confirmed an arbitration award and compelled settlement with Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc. Wilson, feeling aggrieved by the circuit court's judgment, represented herself in the appeal. Greyhound cross-appealed, seeking attorneys' fees and costs due to Wilson's actions. The Supreme Court found no errors in either the direct appeal or the cross-appeal, affirming the circuit court's judgment and refusal to award attorneys' fees to Greyhound. Additionally, the Court enforced a mandatory 15% statutory penalty, granting Greyhound a judgment of $6,975 against Wilson.

The case arose from a 1995 lane-changing collision involving Wilson and a Greyhound bus. Initially, Wilson consulted multiple attorneys, ultimately retaining Walter L. Nixon, Jr. Following an arbitration hearing in June 2000, an arbitrator awarded Wilson $46,500 in damages. However, she refused to accept the award and did not sign the necessary release documents. Greyhound subsequently interpled the awarded amount into the circuit court and sought confirmation of the arbitration award. Evidence presented included a letter from Wilson authorizing binding arbitration and another from Greyhound's attorney outlining a "high/low" settlement agreement related to the arbitration outcomes. Despite Wilson's claims of misunderstanding, Nixon testified that she approved the terms of the arbitration and settlement agreement.

At the evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator confirmed that he informed Wilson and others present about the implications of binding arbitration, particularly that it meant waiving the right to a jury trial and that his decision might not satisfy everyone. A sworn affidavit from Jenny Myers, a former paralegal who worked with Attorney Walter L. Nixon, was presented. Myers recalled assisting Nixon with Wilson's case and confirmed that Nixon explained the binding arbitration process and its finality to Wilson, who expressed concerns about her health and agreed to arbitration, signing a statement in Myers' presence.

The trial court later issued a Judgment Confirming Arbitration Award and Compelling Settlement on January 9, 2001. The arbitration award noted Wilson's pre-existing injuries and surgical history, which influenced the arbitrator's decision. Greyhound, while initially denying liability, accepted it for the arbitration. The court confirmed the arbitration award, enforced the settlement agreement, and required Wilson to execute release documents, ensuring settlement proceeds were distributed to her after deductions for attorney fees, medical liens, and court costs, leaving her with approximately $23,000.

Wilson appealed the trial court's decision, expressing dissatisfaction with both the arbitration process and the awarded amount, claiming a lack of understanding of arbitration. Greyhound cross-appealed regarding the denial of attorneys' fees and costs.

Wilson's pro se brief presents several claims: 1) a request to reverse the circuit court's decision, 2) dissatisfaction with her attorney's four-year delay in legal action, 3) concerns about the circuit court's indifference to the arbitration duration, which she opposed, 4) denial of her proposed record corrections for appeal, 5) the initiation of binding arbitration without her consent, and 6) a claim that Greyhound was not proven responsible for the accident. Despite these claims, the court finds them unmeritorious, focusing on whether there was any abuse of discretion in the trial court and whether the arbitration was binding. The court emphasizes the deference given to trial court findings supported by credible evidence, stating that such findings will not be overturned unless they are manifestly wrong or based on an erroneous legal standard. The scope of judicial review in arbitration cases is narrowly defined, requiring every reasonable presumption to favor the validity of arbitration proceedings. The applicable Mississippi Code outlines the criteria for vacating an arbitration award, including corruption, evident partiality, misconduct, or exceeding powers. Historical case law reinforces the limited review scope, indicating that challenges to awards cannot delve into the merits or suggest that a different outcome was warranted.

In Hutto v. Jordan, the Mississippi Supreme Court established that arbitration awards can only be set aside for specific statutory grounds, namely fraud, misconduct, or valid objections; errors of law or fact do not invalidate an award if it was made fairly. In Craig v. Barber, the Court reinforced the limited scope of judicial review of arbitration awards, highlighting that only statutory bases for refusal to enforce an award are applicable. The rules encourage liberal construction of arbitration agreements to promote dispute resolution and uphold arbitration validity. 

The trial court's review revealed no abuse of discretion, as it had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Despite Wilson's testimony, the court found sufficient evidence that she authorized her attorney to engage in binding arbitration. The arbitration award, documented in detail by arbitrator Wynn Clark, met statutory requirements. Wilson's requests for record corrections were denied due to non-compliance with procedural rules, focusing on factual disputes rather than record issues. Ultimately, there was no evidence of corruption or undue influence, affirming the arbitration award's validity under the applicable statute, leading to the conclusion that the trial court acted within its discretion.

Greyhound's cross-appeal seeks an award of attorneys' fees and costs from Wilson, claiming her refusal to honor a binding arbitration and settlement agreement was unreasonable. Greyhound's motion for confirmation included a request for fees to be deducted from the settlement proceeds, but this was minimally discussed during the trial. The trial judge expressed skepticism about Greyhound's entitlement to fees, questioning their status as a party of interest. In their brief, Greyhound argued they were a "disinterested stakeholder," referencing case law that distinguishes between stakeholders motivated by self-interest and those not involved in conflicting claims. They contended that, unlike the case cited (Cogan v. United States), where the defendant was not a disinterested stakeholder due to conflicting claims, they were not shielding themselves from claims. Greyhound also noted the precedent set in Amerihost Development, which remanded the issue of attorneys' fees back to the trial court to determine stakeholder status. Ultimately, based on the record and relevant case law, the trial court's denial of Greyhound's request for attorneys' fees and costs was found not to be an abuse of discretion, as Greyhound was not deemed a disinterested stakeholder.

Greyhound seeks to recover attorneys' fees and costs from Wilson based on the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988 and Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Miss. Code Ann. 11-55-5(1), courts may award attorneys' fees to any party if it finds that a claim or defense was brought without substantial justification, for delay or harassment, or involved improper conduct. For pro se litigants, fees can only be assessed if the court determines the individual knew or should have known their action was unjustified. "Without substantial justification" is defined as being frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. The case Scruggs v. Saterfiel outlines that a claim is frivolous if the pleader has no hope of success. A weak case is insufficient to be deemed frivolous. Recent precedent in Wheeler v. Stewart upheld an award of attorneys' fees against a pro se litigant who was warned that fees would be sought, reinforcing that ignorance of legal advice does not exempt one from liability for costs.

The trial court's decision to deny Greyhound's request for attorneys' fees on appeal is upheld, as Greyhound did not allege any abuse of discretion by the trial court. The interpled funds have already been disbursed, leaving no available funds for Greyhound's fee payment. Additionally, there is no documentation supporting Greyhound's claimed attorneys' fees or their reasonableness. The court declines to consider Greyhound's entitlement to sanctions under the Litigation Accountability Act for the first time on appeal. 

Greyhound's citation of M.R.A.P. 38 for an award of attorneys' fees is also rejected because the cited rule applies only if Mississippi Code Section 11-3-23 does not apply, which Greyhound failed to demonstrate. Consequently, Greyhound is not entitled to fees or expenses under this rule. 

The court must address the statutory penalty under Mississippi Code Section 11-3-23, which imposes a 15% penalty on the appellant if the judgment is affirmed. This applies to both cases where the judgment is monetary and where an appellant seeks a greater judgment after being awarded one at the trial level. The case law illustrates that a previous judgment may be reduced by 15% if the appeal is unsuccessful. Furthermore, cross-appellees who are unsuccessful in their appeals can still collect the penalty if the original judgment is affirmed. Although Wilson did not formally challenge the arbitrator's award, her dissatisfaction with the amount is evident from her brief and trial court transcript.

Wilson contends that inaccuracies and omissions in the arbitration process were not permitted to be corrected, asserting that their inclusion would have altered the arbitration's outcome. Following the circuit court's validation of the arbitrator's award, Wilson submitted a letter on October 20, 2000, requesting factual findings, which the court ignored. Her requests for an extension to gather medical records to counter claims about her heart condition and to introduce new evidence of additional injuries were also denied, with the court stating it was not obligated to issue findings post-arbitration. During a pre-hearing colloquy, Wilson confirmed she had declined the monetary award from Greyhound, citing dissatisfaction with the amount, particularly regarding her medical expenses. Despite her attempts to supplement the appeal record with unsubmitted medical reports, these efforts were unsuccessful. Ultimately, Wilson's appeal sought to increase the awarded amount, leading the Court to impose a mandatory 15% penalty on the $46,500 judgment due to her unsuccessful appeal, highlighting her prior litigation experience as a significant factor in this determination.

Neither party appealed with supersedeas, resulting in the satisfaction of the judgment. Greyhound interpled disputed funds into the circuit court registry, and following the final judgment, the trial judge correctly ordered the disbursement of these funds. Consequently, there is no judgment to reduce by 15% due to Wilson's unsuccessful appeal. A judgment must be entered in favor of Greyhound against Wilson for $6,975, which is 15% of the final judgment of $46,500. The court found no reversible error in either the direct appeal or cross-appeal, thus affirming the judgment and the trial court's decision not to award Greyhound attorneys' fees and costs. However, the court enforced the statutory 15% penalty under Miss. Code Ann. 11-3-23, allowing Greyhound Bus Lines, Inc. to recover $6,975 from Romain Powell Wilson, with execution permitted. The judgment was affirmed, and the statutory penalty was entered. The decision included notes clarifying the roles of parties involved, stating that Greyhound is not relying on certain procedural rules, and referencing the court's authority to assess penalties based on precedent.